

NARRATIVES AND BILATERAL RELATIONS:
RETHINKING THE “HISTORY ISSUE” IN SINO-
JAPANESE RELATIONS

Karl Gustafsson

Stockholm Studies in Politics 139



Narratives and Bilateral Relations

Rethinking the “History Issue” in Sino-Japanese Relations

Karl Gustafsson

©Karl Gustafsson, Stockholm 2011

ISSN 0346-6620

ISBN 978-91-7447-305-6

Printed in Sweden by Universitetservice US-AB, Stockholm
2011

Distributor: Stockholm University: Department of Political
Science

Contents

Preface.....	12
Part I	14
Chapter 1: Defining the research problem	15
1.1 Understanding bilateral relations	16
1.2 Understanding Sino-Japanese relations: The academic discourse.....	22
1.3 Understanding Sino-Japanese relations: The discourse in the press	30
1.4 The problems with and consequences of the discourse.....	35
1.5 An alternative approach: Analysing narratives	36
1.6 The structure of the dissertation	38
Chapter 2: Theoretical concepts and material	39
2.1 Discourse.....	39
2.2 Identity	40
2.3 Collective memory	41
2.4 Narrative	42
2.5 Three narrative emplotments.....	46
2.6 Communities.....	47
2.7 The politics of museums	48
2.8 Senders and receivers.....	49
2.9 The role of the analyst	51
2.10 Critical scholarship	52
2.11 Contributions to social science	53
2.11.1 Identity and memory studies	53
2.11.2 Area studies: China studies and Japan studies	53
2.11.3 Museum studies	54
2.11.4 Political science.....	54
2.11.5 Critical discourse studies	54
2.12 Material	55
2.13 Conclusions	59
Chapter 3: Method	61
3.1 Context	62
3.1.1 Text and co-text	64

3.1.2 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity	66
3.1.3 The broader socio-political and historical contexts	67
3.1.4 The institutional context	68
3.2 Analysis of topics	68
3.3 Analysing narratives about war	70
3.3.1 CDA and issues concerning language	71
3.3.2 The discursive construction of groups	72
3.3.3 Analysing narratives	76
3.3.4 The interpretations of narratives in the form of historical lessons	84
3.4 The politics of exhibitions on war history in the USA, Germany and Austria	85
3.4.1 The <i>Enola Gay</i> controversy at the National Air and Space Museum	86
3.4.2 The Price of Freedom Exhibition	87
3.4.3 The <i>Wehrmacht</i> Exhibition in Germany	89
3.4.4 The <i>Wehrmacht</i> Exhibition in Austria	91
3.4.5 A few remarks	93
3.5 Conclusions	94
Part II	96
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Chinese context	97
4.1 The broader socio-political and historical contexts	97
4.1.1 The historical context	97
4.1.2 Meaning-making and societal struggles	101
4.1.3 Education	111
4.1.4 Narratives as threats	114
4.2 The institutional context	115
4.3 Conclusions	120
Chapter 5: Analysis of the Japanese context	122
5.1 The broader socio-political and historical context	122
5.1.1 The historical context	122
5.1.2 Meaning-making and societal struggles	126
5.1.3 Education	130
5.1.4 Narratives as threats	136
5.2 The institutional context	138
5.3 Conclusions	145
Part III	147
Chapter 6: Analysis of topics	148
6.1 The Sino-Japanese War	151
6.2 The 18 September Incident	152
6.3 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident	153
6.4 The Nanjing Atrocity	153

6.5 The “comfort women”	156
6.6 The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.....	159
6.7 War crimes trials.....	160
6.8 The post-war era	160
6.9 Conclusions	162
Chapter 7: Analysis of Chinese narratives.....	164
7.1 The discursive construction of groups at Chinese museums	166
7.1.1 The 9.18 History Museum	166
7.1.2 The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Museum	168
7.1.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders	169
7.1.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster	171
7.2 The narratives at Chinese museums.....	172
7.2.1 The 9.18 History Museum	172
7.2.2 The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Museum	178
7.2.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders	187
7.2.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster	198
7.3 The interpretation of narratives at Chinese museums	214
7.3.1 The 9.18 History Museum	214
7.3.2 The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Museum	215
7.3.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders	217
7.3.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster	219
7.4 Conclusions	220
Chapter 8: Analysis of Japanese narratives	222
8.1 The discursive construction of groups at Japanese museums.....	222
8.1.1 The Yūshūkan	222
8.1.2 The Yamato Museum.....	225
8.1.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots	225
8.1.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.....	226
8.1.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum	226
8.1.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum.....	227
8.1.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum.....	228
8.2 The narratives at Japanese museums	229
8.2.1 The Yūshūkan	230
8.2.2 The Yamato Museum.....	236
8.2.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots	240
8.2.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.....	242
8.2.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum	246
8.2.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum.....	254

8.2.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum.....	259
8.3 The interpretation of narratives at Japanese museums	263
8.3.1 The Yūshūkan	263
8.3.2 The Yamato Museum.....	264
8.3.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots	266
8.3.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.....	268
8.3.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum	268
8.3.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum.....	270
8.3.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum.....	272
8.4 Conclusions	273
Chapter 9. Comparison and conclusions	276
9.1 Similarities and differences among the Chinese exhibitions	277
9.2 Similarities and differences among the Japanese exhibitions	281
9.3 Similarities and differences between the Chinese and the Japanese exhibitions	285
9.4 Conclusions	288
References.....	302

Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CPC	Communist Party of China
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
ERNC	Educational Reform National Council
FLE	Fundamental Law on Education
GMD	Guomindang (Nationalist Party)
IR	International Relations
JTU	Japan Teachers' Union
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SDF	Self Defence Forces

Preface

It is often said that writing a doctoral dissertation is a journey. It is understood metaphorically as an intellectual journey. In my case, however, the dissertation project has taken me not only on such a metaphorical journey but also on a large number of physical journeys, most importantly to places all over China and Japan. During these journeys I have had the great pleasure of getting to know people, who have, in different ways, assisted, helped me and made possible the completion of this book. These people have made possible the completion of this project, for example, by commenting on earlier drafts and related texts. Needless to say, I am responsible for any faults and shortcomings. The people I have met throughout my journeys are too numerous to mention and I am quite sure I will forget many of them. Nevertheless, I shall make an attempt to thank those to whom I am most indebted.

First of all, I need to thank those who provided the funding that made it possible for me to embark on my journeys. The Johan & Jakob Söderberg Foundation and the Japan Foundation have been particularly generous. I also need to express my gratitude to the Foundation for the study of Japanese society, Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswårds minne, the HS & Emmy Josephson Foundation, the Lydia & Emil Kinnander Foundation, the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, and the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.

The Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, has been a stimulating place to work at even though I have spent almost half of my time as a Ph.D. Candidate abroad. At the department, I have received valuable comments on previous drafts from people who have taken the task seriously. These people include: Kristina Boréus, Ulf Mörkenstam, Dan Öberg, Göran Bergström, Åsa Hansson and Jussi Kurunmäki. I have also had many stimulating conversations about research-related and other issues with Niklas Bremberg, Pär Daléus, Maria Franzén, Anneli Gustafsson, Cajsa Niemann and Per-Anders Svård. As a visiting researcher, I had the opportunity to spend time at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen and Keiô University in Tokyo. My stay at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, Tokyo University, was especially fruitful. I learned a lot from participating in the Kawashima Seminar and wish to thank all those who took part in the seminar, Shimizu Ken, Ienaga Masaki and of course, Kawashima Shin, in particular. I am also greatly indebted to Takamizawa Osamu, Ôkuma Hiroshi, Kokubun Ryôsei, Tanaka Akihiko and Katsumata Hiro. John Campbell and all the participants in the Social Science Dissertation Workshop at Shaken, in particular Christian Wirth, Kai Schultze and Lluç Lopez i Vidal, have contributed greatly with comments and advice. Pekka Korhonen, Juha Saunavaara, Elina Sinkkonen, Juha Vuori, Paul Midford, Mike Lan Shi-Chi, Scott Wilbur, Caroline Rose, Shogo Suzuki, Philip Seaton, Rana Mitter, Kirk Denton, Helena Meyer-Knapp and Ban Wang have all given useful comments and advice. My supervisors, Jan Hallenberg, Marie Söderberg and Linus Hagström have shown great patience and encouragement. It is no overstatement to say that without their criticism and suggestions I would never have been able to systematize my ideas into anything even resembling a dissertation. My parents, brother and sister have always been supportive in many ways. Finally, I need to thank my wife, Naoka, for always being supportive and encouraging. In early 2008, my journeys took me to Beijing where I met Naoka. She has accompanied me on many of my journeys to peace and war museums all over China and Japan without complaining. The perseverance that must have taken, I believe, is a strong expression of love.

Part I

Chapter 1: Defining the research problem

In the worst-case scenario, a deterioration in bilateral relations may lead to war, destruction and death. Not only is it extremely important to understand bilateral relations, but the way in which bilateral relations are commonly understood also has certain consequences for both research and how politics is conducted. How, then, should bilateral relations be understood? The overarching aim of this dissertation is to present a framework that makes possible an understanding of such relations in a way that challenges and highlights the consequences of mainstream approaches. To achieve this overarching aim a case study of the “history problem” in Sino-Japanese relations was carried out. A secondary aim of the project is to provide an alternative understanding of the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations, thereby supplementing the existing body of literature that deals with the issue and offering a novel perspective on Sino-Japanese relations. Although attention is paid to the specific context and circumstances surrounding this particular case, the analysis nevertheless has implications for the overarching aim – and the framework developed and employed can, I believe, be used to understand bilateral relations in other settings.

This dissertation is concerned with issues of identity in International Relations (IR), especially that part of identity, which deals with the past. Through an analysis of historical narratives, seen in museum exhibitions, about war in Sino-Japanese relations, a contribution is made to the existing IR literature that deals with similar or related issues (He 2009, Suzuki 2007, Callahan 2010, Campbell 1998, Neumann 1999, Weldes 1999). Although some of these works have addressed similar issues, one question that is seldom touched on is how narratives about the past are discursively constructed. Since these issues are arguably what could be labelled non-traditional security issues, the study also contributes to the discussion of such issues (Buzan et al. 1998:2-5). The analysis is divided into three parts: a contextual analysis, an analysis of topics and an analysis of narratives. The contextual analysis answers the following questions: Under *what conditions* are narratives about the war between China

and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s¹ produced in China and Japan? What *characterizes* the social and historical contexts in which the museum exhibitions have been produced? The analysis of topics deals with contextualization and the portrayal of major events and phenomena. It answers the following questions: *Which* topics, among those identified, are mentioned in the exhibitions? *How* are the topics mentioned depicted? The analysis of narratives answers the following questions: *What* kinds of narrative can be found and which dominate in peace and war museums dealing with the war between China and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s? In order to answer the latter question satisfactorily it is also necessary to answer the following question: *How* are these narratives constructed, that is, through what linguistic and other means are they created? This last question needs to be addressed because it is assumed that *content* cannot be adequately studied without paying attention to *form* (e.g. Richardson 2007:46). The results of the contextual analysis are used to interpret the results of the analysis of narratives. Without a contextual analysis it is not possible to reach an understanding of the broader significance of these narratives within the societies in which they exist.

Section 1.1 below, discusses the ways in which bilateral relations are understood in some of the most influential approaches within IR. Section 1.2 briefly examines how the history issue, a specific issue in the bilateral relations between China and Japan, is dealt with in the academic discourse and section 1.3 does the same for newspapers. Section 1.4 summarizes the problems and consequences of the way in which the problem is usually understood, and in section 1.5 the alternative approach developed and applied in this study is introduced. Finally, a brief overview is provided of the content of the chapters of this dissertation in section 1.6.

1.1 Understanding bilateral relations

How should bilateral relations be understood? Are bilateral relations more or less determined by the distribution of power in the form of material capabilities between unitary state actors in

¹ The war period is defined and contextualized differently in different narratives. This is an important aspect of the politics involved in creating such narratives. For example, some narratives regard the war as having started on 7 July 1937 whereas others consider 18 September 1931 to be the starting point. Regardless of when the war is seen to have started, the events leading up to it may or may not be traced back to the 19th century. The narrative may end with the end of the war in 1945. Alternatively, post-war events may be part of it. The framing and selection of the main events of a narrative are therefore of great significance for the meaning conveyed. Unlike treatments of World War II in Europe, in representations of the war in East Asia it is often the case that war and colonialism are entangled. Even though full-scale war between Japan and China did not break out until 7 July 1937, Japan had enjoyed extra-territorial rights in parts of the north-east since the Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905. Such rights were subsequently extended to elsewhere in China through treaties signed by the Japanese and

an anarchic world? Is international life to a large extent characterized by cooperation, integration and interdependence in a world in which states are not the only relevant actors? Or, has the international system been constructed by states, thereby allowing for the possibility that the anarchic system could be overcome, or at least reconstructed in another way, by states? Alternatively, is it more fruitful not to regard states as unitary actors but to start by analysing domestic discourses and identity narratives that may involve representations of “self” and “other”? In this section, the first two approaches mentioned above, which are often regarded as the mainstream theoretical schools in IR, are discussed and some of their assumptions are criticized. The third approach, which is probably the most influential constructivist approach in IR, is also discussed and criticized from the vantage point of the fourth, within which the approach developed in this dissertation can be positioned.

Mearsheimer mentions the “three core beliefs” shared by most realists. These are the assumption that states are “the principal actors in world politics”, the belief that the external environment in which states find themselves, rather than their internal characteristics, influence their behaviour and, finally, that states are primarily concerned with power, for which they compete (Mearsheimer 2001:17-18). Neo-realism, especially Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism (or structural realism), has been influential in IR since *Theory of International Politics* was published in 1979 (Waltz 1979). Defensive realism is similar to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism in that it supposes that the anarchic structure of the international system forces states to compete for power. However, it differs from offensive realism in that states are believed not to strive for the maximization of their power to become hegemonic but only to seek security by gaining the power necessary to survive (Mearsheimer 2001:18-22). Waltz criticizes what he labels reductionist theories – those that “explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or sub-national levels” (Waltz 1979:69). For Waltz, what happens in the international realm cannot be explained by the character of states but has to be explained by systemic factors. Hence,

even if every state were stable, the world of states might not be. If each state, being stable, strove only for security and had no designs on its neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened. One cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of international politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behaviors of states (Waltz 1979:64).

Chinese governments. In China, these treaties were widely regarded as unequal and as having been imposed by

Waltz is, in other words, concerned with state behaviour – structure constrains state behaviour but the more powerful the state is, that is, the greater its material capabilities, the greater its opportunities for action. Furthermore, since Waltz is explicitly state-centred (Waltz 1979:93-95), and regards internal factors as insignificant in international politics, different actors within a state are not distinguished – only states act. Despite its structural constraints it is still easy to find this theory too agent-centred as it reifies the state-as-actor and denies the importance of its constitution. Hence, “[a] balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view” (Waltz 1979:118).

Neo-realism has been criticized on several counts. For example, it “has depicted states ... as abstract unitary actors whose actions are explained through laws universalized across time and place: states appear to act according to some higher rationality that is presented as independent of human agency” (Tickner 1998:457). According to the kind of structural theory advocated by Waltz, actors are constrained by structural systemic factors when acting but are still regarded as more or less given – these unitary actors are mainly nation states, the inner workings of which are largely ignored. Furthermore:

although Waltz has repeatedly claimed that neorealism is a theory of international politics and hence not of foreign policy, strong counter-arguments have been made that this is essentially an untenable position, and hence that nothing prevents neorealists from formulating a theory of foreign policy of their own. It has also been noted that despite such denials, neorealists in actual fact frequently engage in the analyses of foreign policy (Carlsnaes 2006:336).

Hopf even argues that the main proponent of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, cites foreign policy outcomes as evidence for the systemic theory he argues is not a theory of foreign policy (Hopf 2002:271-72). Gourevitch argues that reality is too complex to be characterized in Waltz’s terms as levels – international or system level (anarchic), state (characterized by institutionalization) and individual (individual psychology). He contends that the international arena is not exclusively anarchic but highly institutionalized in some areas, whereas anarchy can be found within countries (Gourevitch 2002:309). Ashley identifies several problems linked to neo-realism’s commitment to positivism. Central to this commitment is the “methodological principle” that “predisposes the positivist to identify the irreducible actors whose

force.

rational decisions will mediate the entry of meaning into social action” (Ashley 1984:252). Within this actor model, “science itself is incapable of questioning the historical *constitution* of social actors” (Ashley 1984:253). The irreducible actor within Waltz’s neo-realist framework, the historical constitution of which cannot be questioned, is, of course, the state as actor.

According to Keohane and Nye, international relations have increasingly come to be characterized by complex interdependence. This consists of connections between societies through multiple channels, which are informal as well as formal. Interstate relations are the ones usually dealt with by realists, but transgovernmental relations exist if the realist assumption that the state is a unitary actor is discarded and transnational ties can be detected if the realist belief that the states is the only (significant) unit is abandoned. The second characteristic of complex interdependence is that there is no hierarchy among issues. In other words, military security does not necessarily dominate the agenda. This is because the sharp division between the domestic and the international is discarded because these domains have become increasingly interrelated. Finally, military force is not used in relations characterized by complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye 1977:24.25). Keohane and Nye argued that realism will sometimes be able to provide better explanations for international events or situations, but in other cases complex interdependence will be a more useful model (Keohane & Nye 1977:23-24).

Neo-realism and neoliberalism are often seen as sharing several features. For example, both have been influenced, to a large extent, by behaviouralism (Jackson & Sorensen 2007:42). Neo-realists and neoliberals also share the assumption that states are the main actors in IR (even though neoliberals assign greater significance to non-state actors) and that these actors see security through a lens that prioritizes self-interest (again, neoliberals often stress this to a lesser extent than neo-realists) (Wendt 1992:391-92, Sanders 1998:437, Keohane 1998:468-71). The common ground shared by both approaches is exemplified in the volume *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Oye (ed.) 1986), which presents a framework based on game theory with the intention of bridging the divide between security and economic issues. It “brings the contending ‘interdependence’ and ‘Realist’ positions together in a common framework” (Snidal 1986:56). This bringing together of the two schools strengthens the common ground between the approaches by emphasizing the presupposition that international politics is about “the goal-seeking behavior of states” (Snidal 1986:27). The strong position of rationalism in both neo-realism and neoliberalism can explain why scholars in these traditions

have been described as treating "the identities and interests of agents as exogenously given and focusing on how the behavior of agents generates outcomes" (Wendt 1992:391-92).

So far the "two main strands of the 'orthodoxy': neo-realism and neo-liberalism" have been treated (Sanders 1998:428). One of the fundamental starting points of constructivism in IR is that: "constructivists are interested in how the objects and practices of social life are 'constructed', and especially those that societies or researchers take for granted as given or natural. Naturalization is problematic because it obscures the ways in which social objects and practices depend for their existence on ongoing choices, and as such it can be oppressive and a barrier to social change" (Fearon & Wendt 2002:57). Although there are different branches of IR constructivism, most agree that "the material world does not come classified, and that, therefore, the objects of our knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language" (Adler 2006:95). Whereas realists assume that analysts and practitioners alike are able to directly access a reality exogenous to their own existence, constructivism emphasizes the importance of meaning-making and interpretation. Constructivists therefore contend that, "objects and events do not present themselves unproblematically to the observer, however realistic he or she may be" (Weldes 1999:7). Furthermore, in contrast with rationalist approaches, "constructivism is concerned with showing the socially constructed nature of agents or subjects. Rather than taking agents as givens or primitives in social explanation, as rationalists tend to do ... constructivists are interested in problematizing them, in making them a 'dependent variable'" (Fearon & Wendt 2002:57). Rationalists usually regard interests as given or as resulting from material factors. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the formation of an identity and a discursive framework precedes interests (Gourevitch 2002:312-13). Hence, it "is only *as some-one* that we can want *some-thing*, and it is only once we know who we *are* that we can know what we *want*" (Ringmar 1996:13).

Wendt's (1992, 1994, 1999) constructivist systemic approach is similar to Waltz's theory in that it is concerned with the international system. However, whereas Waltz sees the anarchic make-up of the system as determining state behaviour, Wendt argues that "anarchy is what states make of it", that is, that an anarchic international system does not necessarily cause states to adopt strategies of self-help (Wendt 1992:423-24). Wendt discusses collective identity formation quite extensively but is concerned mainly with collective identity formation *among* rather than *within* states. Wendt has received a great deal of criticism, for either disregarding or bracketing domestic factors and domestic identity construction (see e.g. Hall 1999:27, Gourevitch 2002:319, Neumann 1996:165, Smith 2000:161-62). Wendt

“speaks of states constructing understandings of the world, how they are socialized into accepting rules. This sort of reasoning implies a unitary way of thinking which downplays the arena of domestic politics. It draws us away from examining the processes within a country that lead to the absorption (or opposition) of these international norms” (Gourevitch 2002:319). He hence “continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests” (Weldes 1999:9).

Proponents of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) assert that “Neo-realists either downplay or ignore all levels except the system one” (Buzan & Waever 2003:28). By contrast, they argue that the regional level is the most important. Buzan and Waever contend that Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are defined by power relations (in the realist balance of power sense of the term) and “patterns of amity and enmity”, which make up a constructivist dimension of the theory (Buzan & Waever 2003:49-50). “These patterns of amity and enmity are influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, and geography, but to a large extent they are path-dependent and thus become their own best explanation” (Buzan & Waever 2003:50). A pattern, “is best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions” (Buzan & Waever 2003:47).

Even though domestic factors are mentioned here, in the RSCT framework this refers to “domestically generated vulnerabilities”, that is, whether a state is internally stable (Buzan & Waever 2003:51). The patterns of amity and enmity are seen as constructed first and foremost through state interaction in a regional system along the model of Wendt’s system theory (Buzan & Waever 2003:50). The approach therefore, like Wendt, risks ignoring the role of domestic identity, and of discourse-related factors in the creation of such patterns of amity and enmity by focusing too much on the system level (the regional system level in the case of RSCT and the global system level in the case of Wendt). This certainly appears to be the case in the empirical section of the book, where it is stated that the East Asian region has a difficult historical legacy (Buzan & Waever 2003:175), but the domestic dimension of identity construction is given scant attention, presenting the governments of China and Japan more or less as unitary actors. It asserts that in the 1990s, “Japan continued to fail to come to terms with its neighbours over pre-1945 history, and its mixture of limited apology, intransigence, and unwillingness to confront the questions of history in its domestic life did not foster

much sense of progress” (Buzan & Waever 2003:152). China, on the other hand, is described as having continued to cultivate a “historical hatred of Japan” (Buzan & Waever 2003:157).

This relatively comprehensive discussion of RSCT is warranted because it exemplifies some of the problems that have been identified in the academic literature dealing with Sino-Japanese relations and hence connects the discussion of IR theory with more empirically oriented studies. Significantly, the problems that occur to a large extent in empirical works can be traced back to more theoretically explicit discussions. It should be noted that few works deal explicitly with bilateral relations in the sense that they pay equal attention to both parties in a bilateral relationship. Systemic theories and analyses of the international relations or foreign policy of a particular state are common whereas explicitly bilateral approaches, especially ones that take into account domestic factors in both states, are much less common. The present study is explicitly concerned with bilateral relations and deals with such relations by analysing the identity narratives within two states, China and Japan, in order to provide a novel understanding of a specific bilateral issue – the so-called history issue. In other words, a case study of this bilateral issue is conducted with the overarching aim of illustrating how bilateral relations may be understood.

In the sections above, critique of mainstream approaches in IR from various alternative approaches has been briefly accounted for. For example, it appears that even structuralist approaches that set limits for what state actors are able to do internationally award these same state actors considerable leverage domestically. It may be that the state-centrism that characterizes these approaches, together with their disregard for domestic factors, cause this domestic agent-centrism. Nonetheless, the mainstream appears to exercise considerable influence over how empirical research is conducted. The underlying theoretical assumptions of such empirical studies are not always explicit, but the influence of these mainstream approaches can often be discerned. Section 1.2 discusses such empirical studies.

1.2 Understanding Sino-Japanese relations: The academic discourse

As is mentioned above, the aim of this dissertation is to provide an answer to the general question of how to understand bilateral relations. A brief account is given above of how different theoretical approaches understand international and bilateral relations. This section presents a brief analysis of how the specific issue in the particular relations with which this study is concerned is commonly understood. The academic literature is discussed below in

this section and the results are summarized of an analysis of the treatment of the issue in newspapers in section 1.3. Before accounting for the results of this analysis, however, something needs to be said about how the analysis was conducted and the assumptions on which it was based.

Any issue or problem can be defined, framed or presented in several different ways, making certain means of dealing with it seem obvious while other measures appear irrelevant. The analysis therefore departs from the notion that: “Any description of an issue or a ‘problem’ is an interpretation, and interpretations involve judgements and choices” (Bacchi 1999:1). Political problems and issues are hence not just there for us to discover. Problems or issues are not simply found – they are created. In other words, problem representations already have within them some kind of diagnosis of the problem, and this has consequences. Such consequences include measures for dealing with the issue (Bacchi 1999:1-2). Scholars, journalists and policymakers alike diagnose events and problems explicitly and implicitly, knowingly and unknowingly.² The discourse on the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations was surveyed in order to find out how the issue is generally defined, framed and presented in the scholarly literature as well as in the press.³ The analysis was carried out by asking the following questions of the material: Is the history issue mentioned? If mentioned, then *how* is it mentioned? Is it defined? If defined then *how* is it defined? Is the issue presented as consisting of any sub-issues? Is responsibility for the existence of the problem explicitly or implicitly ascribed?⁴

The analysis demonstrates that the discourse suffers from a lack of reflection concerning how the problem is represented. The ways in which these problems are presented

² Weldes, in her analysis of how US policymakers interpreted and reacted to the Soviet Union’s placing of nuclear missiles in Cuba, is a good example of how such diagnosis is carried out. As Weldes puts it: “The Soviet missiles, in short, had to be *made* to mean something before it was possible for US state officials to know what to do about them, or, for that matter, before it was possible to know whether anything needed to be done about them at all” (Weldes 1999:2).

³ The analysis has been carried out in a way similar to how the analysis of topics (see chapter 3 for a description of the method and chapter 6 for the results of the analysis) was conducted. I have examined how the history issue is defined and depicted. When conducting the analysis of academic texts, the passages in which the history issue is discussed have been gathered together in a table in a separate document in order to get an overview. I have gone through this document several times in order to see how the issue is depicted. All the newspaper articles analysed have been gathered in four documents. In these texts, the passages describing the history issue have been highlighted in order to facilitate analysis. Compared to the analysis of topics, however, this analysis involves a considerably greater number of cases and the discussions and definitions are not easy to classify into a small number of categories. This has made it difficult to provide an overview of the results by gathering them in a table that can be provided in the dissertation. Instead, I have described and provided examples of how the issue is depicted. This way of presenting the results may not be entirely satisfactory to the reader but I still believe that the material analysed has provided ample support for the conclusions drawn.

⁴ This analysis is quite similar to the analysis of topics briefly outlined in chapter 3 and conducted in chapter 6.

often give the impression that the description is an objective account of the problems described and that no other conceptualization of the issue is possible. Furthermore, it is shown that the way in which these issues are defined has consequences for what is deemed problematic about it. This also has consequences for how the issues are approached and studied. In addition, although many of the texts treated are not explicit regarding their theoretical assumptions, the influence of some of the explicitly theoretical approaches within IR discussed above is also illustrated. What is most significant in this examination is that there are ways of studying the problem that have hitherto been largely ignored as a consequence of the way in which these issues have been understood and presented. The discussion is therefore followed by an alternative approach to the problem – an approach that has the potential to shed light on aspects that are usually ignored or downplayed. I am not trying to suggest that this approach is *the* correct or “objective” way of understanding the problem. As has been mentioned above, there are several ways of presenting any issue and one way of presenting it is not necessarily more correct than another. The issue dealt with here is no different from any other in this respect. What is important, as is mentioned above, is that the way in which an issue is presented elucidates different aspects of it and that if one way of presenting an issue comes to dominate the discourse it risks becoming naturalized, that is, it risks becoming *the* way of understanding it. Other ways of defining it risk not being reflected on. The way the issue is defined here, then, will also exclude certain aspects of it, aspects that have been treated in detail elsewhere. In this way, it serves to elucidate those features of the problem that are typically not touched on. This blind spot is hence illuminated.⁵

In order to survey how the history issue, or issues, in Sino-Japanese relations is discussed in the English-language academic literature on the topic, searches were conducted for articles dealing with Sino-Japanese relations published between 1995 and 2010 using several databases of academic journals, such as the Social Sciences Citations Index, Sage Journals Online, EBSCO Multiple Database Search and JSTOR. The reason for using all these databases is that each one failed to provide a satisfyingly comprehensive search result because each lists some journals but not others. To anyone familiar with the field of research it should be obvious that a large number of articles will be missed if one relies solely on such databases. Consequently, articles and books dealing with Sino-Japanese relations were identified

⁵ It should be noted that some of the issues placed at the centre of attention in this study have been discussed before. I am not trying to suggest that they have not. They are sometimes considered problematic. However, they are rarely discussed as part of the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations and they are not dealt with in the way they are treated here.

by other means, for example, by going through reference lists in articles and books dealing with the topic. It could, of course, be argued that this “snowballing” strategy also fails to provide a complete list of works on the topic. Although it is conceded that the survey conducted may not have been exhaustive, and was certainly not satisfyingly systematic, it is still believed that, in the absence of a more systematic method, it was sufficiently complete to facilitate a general statement concerning how the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations is discussed and defined in the English-language academic discourse. Texts that focus on issues pertaining mainly to one of these two countries, for example, the foreign policy of either state, rather than bilateral relations per se, have been excluded. The rule of thumb has been that if the words “Sino-Japanese relations” or similar phrases are mentioned in the title of an article, it has been included.

In all, 57 English-language texts – articles, books and book chapters – on Sino-Japanese relations were examined.⁶ A brief overview of how the history issue is treated in research on Sino-Japanese relations is provided below, giving some examples of how the issue is sometimes defined. Some of the works that come closest to the approach developed here – those which also focus to a large extent on history-related issues – are discussed in greater detail in order to differentiate this study from the works of these other scholars. History-related issues are mentioned in a large majority of the scholarly texts examined, even though most studies have a broader scope and do not concentrate specifically on such issues. Sometimes, history-related issues are discussed without being labelled as the “history issue”. In some texts the term history issue is used without it being clear what exactly is meant by it, while in other cases it is explicitly defined. It is sometimes the case that the problems are explicitly defined in terms of “Japan’s” attitude to its wartime past: “China and Japan have long had differences over an array of issues, including the “history issue” (Japan’s remorse, or lack thereof, regarding its activities in China during World War II and earlier), the status of Taiwan, and territorial disputes in the East China Sea, among others” (Smith 2009:232). Sometimes, the history problem is regarded as consisting of several sub-issues:

⁶ The following texts have been examined: Buszynski 2009, Callahan 2007, Cheng 2003, Cheung 2010, Deans 2000, Deng 1997, Dreyer 2001, Drifte 2000, 2009, Fan 2008, Hagström 2008/09, Hagström & Jerdén 2010, He 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009, Heazle 2007, Heazle & Knight 2007, Hughes 2002, Jian 2007, Jin, 2006, Jin, 2002, Koo 2009, Liao 2007, Manicom 2008, Manicom & O’Neil 2009, Men 2010, Moore 2010, Pan 2007, Reilly 2006, Rose 1998, 2000, 2005, 2008, Roy 2004, Rozman 2007, Sakuwa 2009, Sekhar 2008, Shen & Cheung 2007, Smith 2009, Sutter 2002, Suzuki 2007, Söderberg 2002, Takamine 2005, Wan 2003, 2006, Wang 2000, Wesley 2007, Wishnick 2009, Wu 2000, Yang, B. 2006, Yang, D. 2002, 2003, Yang, J. 2003, Yao 2009, You 2006, Zhao 2002.

Most of the conflicts and problems in Sino – Japanese relations have their roots in two main issues: the history of World War II and the status of Taiwan. The former has to do with Japan’s interpretation of its aggression against China during the war, including such issues as the Japanese history textbook revisions and official visits to the graves [sic] of war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine (Fan 2008:376).

The quotes above illustrate the state- and agent-centric depiction of “Japan” and “China” as more or less unitary actors that act and react to each other’s actions. Apart from the issues of Japanese ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,⁷ and the content and revision of Japanese history textbooks,⁸ which are most commonly mentioned, the apology issue,⁹ insensitive remarks¹⁰ made by Japanese politicians and the issue of war reparations¹¹ are also referred to with some frequency. “Japan’s” handling of remarks by Japanese politicians concerning issues such as the Nanjing Massacre,¹² the so-called Comfort Women,¹³ forced labour,¹⁴ weapons left behind in China by the Japanese military after the war as well as biological and

⁷ The Yasukuni Shrine issue is quite complex and involves several problems related to the enshrinement of Japanese war dead, including convicted Class A war criminals, at the Shrine and worship by Japanese politicians at the shrine. For more on Yasukuni see chapter 5.

⁸ The textbook issue is often described as being about the content of history textbooks for use in Japanese junior high schools, which are thought to make light of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the war in Asia. For more information on the issue see chapter 5.

⁹ The apology issue is often understood as either with the Japanese government’s inability to apologize or the quality of apologies delivered to victims of Japanese aggression during Japan’s colonial rule and military expansion in the first half of the 20th century.

¹⁰ This issue is sometimes referred to in the Chinese media discourse in terms of the importance of “squarely facing history”, which can of course be seen as encompassing several issues (eg. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1996). However, in this context “gaffes” by Japanese politicians are often referred to. Such “slips of the tongue” have involved denial of Japanese wartime aggression and statements that in other ways mitigate the Japanese government’s responsibility for the war (eg. *The Daily Yomiuri* 1994). Statements denying or playing down the Japanese government’s responsibility for the Nanjing Atrocity, the “comfort women” and other issues have led to diplomatic problems from time to time. In 1994, for example, Environment Agency Director General Sakurai Shin claimed that “Japan did not intend to start the Pacific War as an act of aggression” (*Daily Yomiuri* 1994). Another example is Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s ambiguous comment in a Diet session in April 1999 that: “Whether Japan carried out that war of aggression should be judged by people in the process of history”. The comment gave rise to strong official Chinese protests which were followed by a statement by an official from the Japanese Foreign Ministry which declared that the 1995 Murayama statement embodies the Japanese government’s official stand (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2000). It has been argued that apologies made by Japanese Prime Ministers to the victims of Japanese aggression, such as the ones made by Prime Ministers Murayama in 1995 and Koizumi in 2001 and 2005, represent the “mainstream” Japanese standpoint on the war, which is in line with the judgment of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. The other historical view is one “affirming the Greater East Asian War” (as opposed to the Pacific or Asia-Pacific War). This second view is expressed by politicians who made insensitive remarks according to which, for example, the war is claimed to have been fought to liberate the peoples of Asia from Western colonialism, the Nanjing Atrocity is described as a fabrication and Japanese colonial rule in Korea is described in positive terms (Feldman 2005:69-72). Denials following apologies are sometimes described as anti-apologies or a backlash (Yamazaki 2005, Lind 2008).

¹¹ Some Chinese victims of Japanese militarism have tried to obtain reparations from the Japanese government and Japanese companies in the Japanese courts. They have been successful in some cases. In other cases the claimants were even though the courts have sometimes acknowledged wrongdoing, arguing that compensation claims were settled when bilateral relations were restored in 1972 (Rose 2005:69-98).

¹² In December 1937, when the Japanese army captured Nanjing, it massacred a large number of civilians and Prisoners of War (POWs), and many women were raped. The issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

¹³ During the war, the women euphemistically referred to as “military comfort women” were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers in field brothels, called “comfort stations” (see chapter 6).

¹⁴ During the war, a large number of mainly Koreans and Chinese but also European, Australian and US POWs from allied countries were forced to undertake hard labour in Japan, often in mines. Some of these victims were forcibly taken from China and Korea to Japan to do hard labour in terrible conditions.

chemical warfare are also referred to. Many of the issues of which the history problem is regarded as consisting have in common that they are, to a very large extent, concerned with Japan, and especially with the behaviour of Japanese leaders. This becomes clear in the following quote: “Japan’s handling of the history issue, in particular Prime Minister Koizumi’s highly controversial annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, is having repercussions beyond China” (Heazle 2007:182).

Even though the behaviour of Japanese leaders is often central to the depiction of the issue, Chinese behaviour is also given quite a lot of space. The so-called history card is mentioned in about one-third of the texts analysed. Even though it does not seem to be part of the definition of the history issue it is still closely related. If the history problem is commonly regarded as involving Japan’s attitude to its history of aggression, the history card seems to be linked to the Chinese government strategically using this issue for political purposes in its dealings with its Japanese counterpart, or the Chinese government managing public opinion for similar purposes:

The government in Beijing has a proven record of “leveraging public indignation to extract concessions from Tokyo”, and some in China’s ruling elite see history as a blunt instrument to be used on occasions where Japan seeks international and regional recognition commensurate with its economic and military capabilities (Manicom & O’Neil 2009:218).

Whereas the agent-centric focus on behaviour is quite evident in discussions of “the behaviour of Japan” or of Japanese leaders, the quote above illustrates that the behaviour of the “government in Beijing” is understood not just through an agent-centric lens but also in terms of rationalism – the Chinese government is understood as a rational actor pursuing strategic interests. While some criticize the history card argument as simplistic, others echo the views cited above. Significantly, much of the treatment of the history card shares a strong focus on behaviour, especially the behaviour of leaders, with discussions of the history problem.

Not all the studies explicitly define the issues in the way discussed above,¹⁵ but alternative definitions and ways of discussing the issue are extremely rare. That alternative definitions hardly appear is significant. The discussion by Yang is characterized by a considerably larger degree of reflection on the issue than is usually the case. For example, he discusses the Chinese government’s definition of the problem as well as how the issue is discussed by Japanese government officials (Yang, D. 2002:11-12). He concludes that the “his-

¹⁵ Sometimes the issues are not mentioned, while in other cases, even if they are mentioned, it is unclear what is being referred to.

tory problem has not been invented out of thin air, but has real historical roots; at the same time, it is not just about history” (Yang, D. 2002:27). In other words, it is not just about China playing the history card but the history problem has been tangled up in politics: “The China-plays-history-card interpretation is not so much wrong as it sees only half of the picture” (Yang, D. 2002:16). Yang’s reflection could perhaps be labelled objectivist, as his aim appears to be to determine the true nature of the history problem. The approach therefore differs from the one adopted here. The aim of the present discussion is not to reach a conclusion concerning what the history problem really is, but to analyse how it is commonly understood and defined – because, as is noted above, this has consequences.

Whereas some studies on Sino-Japanese relations disregard history-related factors, instead prioritizing other aspects, and some discuss history-related factors as one among several important aspects, other studies deal with such issues in detail. The most theoretically sophisticated studies dealing with history-related narratives (or myths) in Sino-Japanese relations are probably He (2009) and Jin (2006). These studies deal with historical myths in a way that distinguishes such myths from “historical facts” and from history as written by historians (He 2009:25-41, Jin 2006:32-36). In addition, the analyses conducted are not concerned with specific narratives in the form of first-hand sources but are conducted in a more generalized way, drawing on secondary sources to a large extent as expressions of a certain “myth” are detected (see e.g. He 2009:123-40, Jin 2006:36-48). These approaches are discussed in more detail in chapter 9. For now, it is sufficient to state that they deal with historical narratives in a way that differs in two main ways from the one adopted here: they do not analyse the form of specific narratives and they are influenced by positivism and hence adopt an objectivist approach to historical narratives. In contrast to their approaches, I believe that it is not so easy to distinguish between myths and history written by historians. It is difficult to determine what really happened in the past and what did not. Establishing what happened in the past is outside the scope of this study.¹⁶ Instead, the focus is on how the past is represented and made sense of in narratives about war in China and Japan. In other words, the concern is not with what is true and what is not – but with how meaning is created and identities, as instantiated in narratives, are constructed.

¹⁶ When I mention that something happened in a certain way in the past, this means that historians largely agree on it. Such agreement, however, does not exclude the possibility of *representing* it differently and of ascribing different *meanings* to events.

In addition to the research on Sino-Japanese relations mentioned above, the history issue is frequently mentioned in other academic literature.¹⁷ Studies that deal with Japanese war memory and nationalism, and similar studies that deal with the Chinese context tend to take account of the domestic contexts to an extent that studies in IR seldom do. While not

¹⁷ Even though it is not possible to cover this whole field in a systematic fashion, a few notable examples are mentioned below. In a textbook on comparative politics, it is claimed in the chapter dealing with Japan that: “Japan never openly apologized to Asia for the offenses of World War II” (Schreurs 2009:204). This claim is presented despite the Murayama statement and other Japanese apologies. In Murayama’s statement he used the word “aggression” and expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” (Murayama 1995). Subsequent Prime Ministers have used the statement as a model for their own apologies. In 2005, at the Asian-African Summit, then Prime Minister Koizumi said: “In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force” (Koizumi 2005).

In another discussion of apologies it was said: “While no one can erase the bad history between China and Japan, Japan can do something about the history issue, and so can China. While former Prime Minister Koizumi’s remarks at ceremonies in Tokyo marking the 60th anniversary of the end of WW2 on August 15, 2005, were commendable, why couldn’t a Japanese prime minister say the same thing in Beijing and perhaps visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial? For its part, China could accept such apologies and lay the matter of apologies to rest once and for all” (Moore 2010:303-04). This statement is made in spite of Koizumi’s 2001 statement after visiting the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing in which he expressed his “heartfelt apology and condolences” (心からお詫びと哀悼) (Koizumi 2001). This does not mean, of course, that Japanese apologies have not been lacking or unproblematic. Most problematic is perhaps that Koizumi’s apologies did not stop him from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. However, it does highlight the widespread confusion concerning whether the Japanese government has apologized at all. Elsewhere, it is claimed that: “Japanese museums dwell on the suffering of the US nuclear attacks with hardly a mention of the Japanese aggression that provoked it. No historical museum in Japan gives anything close to an accurate rendering of the atrocities that the Japanese army inflicted on China and Korea, including forced sexual slavery of “comfort women” and experiments with chemical and biological weapons” (Shirk 2007:155). Obviously, the meaning of the phrase “an accurate rendering” can be debated but this statement is made despite the existence of Japanese museums that focus specifically on Japanese atrocities, including one dedicated exclusively to the so-called ‘Comfort Women’.

A reading of Iris Chang’s account of contemporary Japanese views on the war could easily give the impression that Japanese aggression in general and the Nanjing Atrocity in particular are seldom discussed in Japan and that, if they are, they are usually denied. For example, Chang claims “the Japanese have for decades systematically purged references to the Nanking massacre from their textbooks. They have removed photographs of the Nanking massacre from museums, tampered with original source material, and excised from popular culture any mention of the massacre” (Chang 1997:12-13). While it is unclear who “the Japanese” are, the impression is that a collective effort to “purge references” to the Atrocity has been made by the Japanese people. It is unclear who put references to the Atrocity in textbooks and photographs of it in museums in the first place. Similarly generalized accounts of how “the Japanese” have dealt with the past can be found, for example, in the following text: “The Japanese have tried to present themselves as victims of the West. They point out that the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and its promise to ‘throw off the yolk of Imperialism’ appealed to the peoples of Asia who had suffered under European colonial rule” (Feiler 1991:142). Like Chang, Feiler presents the attitude of “the Japanese” in a way that gives the impression that all Japanese share the same opinions about the war.

From the approach adopted here, these claims are not seen as the problems per se but rather as symptoms of a widespread discourse that focuses on “Japanese” behaviour to the extent that it gives the impression that if only “Japan” could change its (erroneous) behaviour then the problems would, to a large extent, disappear. Indeed, the problem is sometimes labelled a Japanese problem rather than a bilateral problem – hence the phrase “Japan’s history problem” is not uncommon (Szechenyi 2006, Ikenberry 2006, Lind 2009). Although it could be argued that there is indeed a Japanese domestic history problem linked to the domestic dimensions of the issue, for example, the “forced” enshrinement of for example Christians at Yasukuni Shrine, an aspect of the Yasukuni

denying the international dimension of the history issue, studies dealing with the Japanese context often focus on it primarily as a domestic issue (see e.g. Nozaki 2008, Orr 2001, Saaler 2005, Seaton 2007, Seraphim 2006). Similarly, studies that concentrate on Chinese memory and nationalism do so mainly by examining the Chinese circumstances without dealing in much detail with the Japanese context (see e.g. Callahan 2010, Hughes 2006, Gries 2004, Zhao 2004). However, while such analyses provide useful and thoroughgoing insights into the domestic context, a comparative focus that takes both domestic contexts into account would better contribute to an understanding of the bilateral dynamics of these domestic issues. Some important studies in this vein have been conducted in recent years (see e.g. He 2009, Yoshida 2006, Rose 1998, 2005). Nonetheless, more research and alternative approaches are needed.

1.3 Understanding Sino-Japanese relations: The discourse in the press

A search was conducted in the Lexis Nexis Academic database¹⁸ for newspaper articles published in the 10-year period to 31 July 2010. The search term used was “China AND Japan AND history problem OR history issue”. The search yielded 445 results. Among these, some were deemed irrelevant since they did not mention the history problem/s or history issue/s in Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, some articles appeared several times. After having excluded these results, 346 articles remained. The remaining articles made up the corpus for the analysis of the newspaper discourse on the history issue. In the analysis, special attention was paid to how the issue/problem was defined and discussed. The analysis was conducted by interrogating the material using the questions listed in section 1.2.

Among the 346 articles, 94 were published by Mainland Chinese newspapers and news agencies, 91 by Japanese and 65 by South Korean. The remaining articles were published by newspapers from: Australia (16), Canada (1), Hong Kong (18), India (2), New Zealand (1), North Korea (1), Taiwan (4), Singapore (28), the United States (23) and the

problem that is seldom given much attention in China, it is the international history problem that is being defined as “Japan’s history problem”.

¹⁸ Lexis Nexis Academic is a database for conducting searches among articles published in major English-language newspapers and by news agencies. It also includes translated articles from sources such as the BBC Monitoring: World Reports service. For more information on Lexis Nexis Academic and the 6,000 sources included in the database, see <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>. This database was used to facilitate a systematic search. Another option would have been to use several different databases, including databases containing articles written in Chinese and Japanese. Such an approach, however, would not have made possible a sufficiently systematic search. It would have been necessary to use a number of different databases some of which are not very user-friendly. Moreover, the possibilities for conducting searches vary across databases. Using a single database made it possible to perform a systematic search that still includes Chinese and Japanese

United Kingdom (2). This shows how much attention is given to these issues by newspapers and news agencies in the countries directly involved. Needless to say, there are also a large number of publications in these countries that are not included in the database used. Most Chinese search results came from the *China Daily* and the *Xinhua* news agency. Japanese search results were mainly from *Yomiuri*, *Nikkei Weekly*, *Japan Times* and the *Kyodo* news agency. Despite the limitations of the database used, using a single database rather than several different ones arguably made the search more systematic and transparent. Furthermore, since the search generated what could be described as a fairly large number of search results, it should be possible to reach conclusions concerning what characterizes the discourse in the press on the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations.

Explicit definitions are rare in the corpus analysed. Instead, implicit definitions and sub-issues associated with the overarching problem occur frequently. These references to sub-issues allude to certain understandings of the issue. The most frequently mentioned sub-issue is the Yasukuni Shrine. Japanese textbooks and Japanese apologies are also mentioned often, but less frequently. It should be stressed that whereas specific sub-issues, especially the Yasukuni Shrine issue, are mentioned more often in Japanese articles, Chinese articles more commonly stress “Japan’s” and the Japanese government’s attitude to the history issue. It is often emphasized that the Japanese government needs to “properly handle the history issue”. Such discussions of Japanese attitudes to the past appear in Japanese and other newspapers as well but are more common in Chinese articles.

What is perhaps most striking about how the history problem is treated in Japanese articles is the vagueness that characterizes the use of the term. The terms history problem or history issue are almost always used in an unclear way without defining what is involved. This lack of clarity could perhaps be interpreted as a euphemistic way of obfuscating what the issue is. Nor is vagueness uncommon outside Japan, although the degree of elusiveness is greater in the Japanese discourse. The most commonly mentioned sub-issue, just as in the overall discourse, is the Yasukuni issue. Other common sub-issues are textbooks and the apology issue. In some Japanese articles, most commonly in the conservative *Yomiuri*, the Chinese government is criticized for using the history issue as a diplomatic tool by playing the history card. In a few articles, patriotic education in China is mentioned as a reason for a perceived increase in anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese. In some instances, different

articles (many of which were originally published in Chinese or Japanese but have been translated) as well as articles published in newspapers in a number of other countries.

perceptions of history in Japan and its neighbouring countries are described as problematic. It is, however, difficult to find one specific direction in the Japanese discourse. Different views are often referred to without the author taking a clear stand for either one or the other. In some cases, the Japanese government's responsibility is referred to. Prime Minister Koizumi's personal responsibility is mentioned, for example, in connection to actions such as Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The need to conduct joint history research is sometimes mentioned in Japanese newspapers.

The issue is dealt with differently in the Chinese press. An explicit definition of the history issue can be found in an editorial in the government mouthpiece, *China Daily*, published just after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) triumphed in the election to the Japanese lower house in August 2009, assuming power in a coalition government. In the editorial, the DPJ's attitude to historical issues was praised. It pointed out that even though Japanese leaders have apologized for the "immense misery Japan had inflicted on the Chinese people", no written apology had been offered. The editorial explicitly defined the history issue as "Japan's attitude toward its wartime past of aggression" (*China Daily* 2009a). This way of defining the issue effectively rebuts any possible claims that Chinese views of the past may be problematic. In fact, readers who have little knowledge of the issues are likely to accept this definition as simply a description of the state of affairs. This explicit definition also sheds light on statements about the history issue in other Chinese articles. While such explicit definitions of the issue are uncommon in Chinese articles, statements such as the following frequently occur: "China hopes Japan will appropriately handle the history issue". Such comments make perfect sense if the history issue is understood as "Japan's attitude toward its wartime past of aggression". The same logic is used when specific sub-issues are discussed. Then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji was quoted in 2001 as saying: "this year, problems related to the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine visit came straight after each other, which aroused strong responses from the peoples in Asian countries". He also stated that: "China hopes the Japanese side will adopt a correct attitude towards these problems". The need for Japan to "adopt a correct attitude" is occasionally expressed in terms of acting in accordance with Japanese apologies and statements on the history issue.¹⁹ The most important conclusion to be drawn regarding the Chinese newspaper discourse is that the issue concerns how "Japan" and especially the Japanese government handles the issue and has nothing to do with

Chinese behaviour – or Chinese narratives about the war. The Chinese discourse is more consistent than the Japanese (and that of other countries), reflecting the fact that both the *China Daily* and *Xinhua* are mouthpieces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and hence deliver the official standpoint, a standpoint that has been consistent throughout the 2000s. This consistency manifests itself in the stock phrases and themes that recur in many articles. It is likely that other newspapers follow the same line since recommendations on sensitive topics are often handed down from propaganda organs (Shambaugh 2007:52-53). Moreover, similar phrases can be found in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's official pronouncements on the issues (MOFAPRC 2002).²⁰ If views opposed to the Chinese government's official standpoint are referred to, they are always refuted. This is in stark contrast to most Japanese articles in which different opinions are printed without being rebutted.

As is noted above, the history issue is also mentioned in articles in South Korea.²¹ Japanese revisionism, for example, in history textbooks and regarding the so-called comfort women, as well as the Yasukuni issue, Japanese apologies and “Japan's” general attitude to its colonial and wartime past are often mentioned. Just as in the Chinese discourse, there is no question of who is to blame for the problems – all the issues mentioned are linked to Japanese attitudes, and “Japan's” actions and attitudes are sometimes explicitly described as “impudent” and “provocative” (e.g. *Korea Herald* 2006). Articles are also published outside of the three countries most obviously and actively involved in the “history issue”, articles are also being published on the issue. The same issues are referred to in these other countries. The Yasukuni issue is mentioned most frequently, followed by discussions of Japanese apologies and attitudes as well as the content of Japanese textbooks. In some of these articles, the Chinese government is described as playing the history card to gain advantage in its diplomatic dealings with Japan. The Japanese behaviour and views given space or drawn attention to are usually those of the right wing and conservatives. The focus on conservative views is understandable to some extent because conservative politicians expressing controversial views have occupied high government positions. The media has a tendency to preoccupy it-

¹⁹ This is sometimes made more explicit in relation to the most commonly mentioned sub-issue – that of prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Shrine visits are described as acts that go against Japanese official statements and a correct Japanese attitude on the history issue.

²⁰ In other words, a high degree of intertextuality can be detected.

²¹ This is perhaps not so surprising as South Korea was also a party involved in the conflict. While in some cases the issue is only described as a bilateral one between South Korea and Japan, it is often mentioned that what is described as Japan's history problem concerns Japanese descriptions and behaviour in relation to not only its colonization of Korea but also its war in China. Interestingly, South Korea's differences with China concerning the kingdom of Goguryeo, described as an ancient Korean kingdom claimed by China as part of Chinese history,

self with controversial topics. Nonetheless, such activities and views are overrepresented whereas those of more moderate or left-wing Japanese are given scant attention, if mentioned at all.²²

are also mentioned as a history problem. Nonetheless, the history issue involving Japan gets far more coverage than the one with China.

²² In one article discussing Sino-Japanese relations, for instance, it is claimed that “Japan” refuses to apologize for wartime atrocities (*South China Morning Post* 2005): “Among all the problems clouding bilateral ties, the most problematic are the so-called ‘history issue’ - including Japan’s refusal to apologise for wartime atrocities – and, more importantly, Mr Koizumi’s annual shrine visits”.

Sometimes, extreme views are described as “Japan’s view”. An article in the *Christian Science Monitor*, for example, describes the historical views presented by the Yûshûkan war museum, run by the Yasukuni Shrine, a non-governmental religious organization, as being an expression of “Japan’s revisionism” (*Christian Science Monitor* 2006): “Then there are new US concerns about Japan’s revisionism regarding its history with the US. The Yushukan museum, on the grounds of Yasukuni shrine, suggests that the US, not Japan, was responsible for World War II”. The extreme views at the Yûshûkan are presented as being representative of Japanese views while exhibits at other facilities are being ignored. Measures that need to be taken by “Japan” or the Japanese government are sometimes mentioned, such as apologizing, admitting its war crimes and compensating victims. It is sometimes said with regard to Yasukuni that Japanese leaders should refrain from visiting. Other actions proposed are the removal of “the remains” (*The Statesman* 2006) or “the coffins” (*South China Morning Post* 2005) of the Class A war criminals. The point to be made here is not that there are no “remains” or “coffins” at the Yasukuni Shrine but rather that most of the measures suggested in regards to the history issue are to be taken by “Japan” or the Japanese government, hinting at an understanding of the problem according to which it originates more or less solely in the Japanese context. At the same time, in some articles, the Chinese government “playing the history card” is described as a problem even though it does not seem to be understood as a part of the “history issue” but rather as the Chinese government *using* the “history issue” as a diplomatic tool.

Comparisons between how the wartime past has been dealt with in Japan and Germany are quite common in several countries. In a 2005 *Xinhua* commentary it was said that: “Japan and Germany ... receive quite different responses from the international community”. A newspaper article in the *People’s Daily* was quoted as saying that: “One of the major reasons is the two countries’ completely different attitudes towards the history of invasion” (*Xinhua* 2005). In another article it is said that: “Japan has, unlike Germany, proved unable to settle the issues of World War II” (*Japan Times* 2006). In these comparisons, the German approach to dealing with the past is often presented as having been perfect and is seldom questioned. Contrasting German contrition with Japan’s failure further emphasizes Japanese shortcomings and contributes to the portrayal of the Japanese as especially unwilling to repent.

Newspaper articles from Japan and some other countries (Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and the USA) claim that the Chinese government is playing the history card. It is not always clear what this means but it seems to entail bringing up history-related issues, usually to gain diplomatic advantage from Japan. The “history card” also appears, as is mentioned above, to be understood not as a part of the history issue but rather as the Chinese government *using* the “history issue” as a diplomatic tool. The history card is seldom mentioned in Chinese articles, but one article denies that the Chinese leaders are playing the history card and instead claims that it is Japan that is playing the history card by rewriting history (*China Daily* 2005). An editorial in the Japanese *Mainichi Shimbun* argues that as long as Japan keeps running away from the history issue, its neighbours will continue to play the “history card” (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2005b). In an article in the *Daily Yomiuri*, the history card is described as something the Chinese leadership uses “to drum up nationalist support” (*Daily Yomiuri* 2003, see also *National Post* 2005). This view of the Chinese leadership playing the history card when it is convenient simplifies China’s domestic politics. The focus is very much on the government leaders and their behaviour. An alternative description of Chinese society is provided in chapter 4.

1.4 The problems with and consequences of the discourse

In sum, it is mentioned, it is referred to, sometimes a definition is given, but regardless of whether you read newspaper articles or academic texts, you seldom get reflection concerning what the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations is and especially not concerning *how it is portrayed*. Instead, the issue is often treated in an objectivist fashion. It is often represented in a way that is problematic and has several consequences. Some of the problems, I argue, are connected with some of the obsessions of mainstream IR theory. The objectivist treatment of the issue mentioned above is reminiscent of positivism. In the points listed below, it becomes quite clear that state-centrism, agent-centrism and rationalism are also central to an understanding of the issue in the academic and newspaper discourses. The main problems and consequences are that:

1. The focus is, to a very large extent, on Japan (within the context of the history issue).
2. The focus is chiefly on the *behaviour* of leaders, especially Japanese leaders but also on Chinese leaders in relation to playing the history card.
3. Chinese representations are rarely dealt with in the context of the history issue.
4. The actions and views of different Japanese – politicians, right-wingers and the people – are often bundled together resulting in a generalized portrayal of the views and behaviour of “the Japanese”. In some cases, the assumption or claim is made that Japanese depictions are more or less the same and that any references to atrocities carried out by the Japanese military are excluded from Japanese representations.
5. There is a lack of research that deals with both contexts.

In discussions of the history issue, the apology issue and “Japan’s” attitude to history, the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the issue of the content of Japanese textbooks are the most commonly mentioned. This way of defining the problem leads to a specific understanding of how to deal with and how to study it. Since the problems are traced to the Japanese context it is assumed that the problem can be resolved through a change in behaviour by the Japanese (leaders). Many texts therefore assume, imply or give the impression that a change in Japanese (government) behaviour would lead to improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. Discussions of what is called the Chinese government’s use of the history card are also preoccupied with behaviour. This gives an impression of Chinese society according to which the CCP is all-powerful and has the ability to use the history issue and public opinion strategically as diplomatic tools whenever it pleases. This agent-centric, rationalist focus on behaviour, even though it may provide many useful insights, I argue, needs to be complemented with an analysis that is not preoccupied with behaviour and does not treat the identities of actors as un-

problematic but instead digs deeper into the constitution of identities and pays attention to the social contexts within which these actors exist and operate. The approach developed in this dissertation, focusing on narratives, does just this.

Narratives about war, it will be shown, are closely entangled with the identity politics of both countries and contribute to the construction of the identities (or interpretive frameworks) through which people interpret the world around them. Focusing on narratives does not mean that behaviour is ignored. Indeed, through an analysis of behaviour, the argument that narratives matter is supported by illustrating that the behaviour of actors confirms that these actors believe narratives to be important. Actors, it will be shown, believe that people's minds are significantly affected by the stories about the war to which they are exposed. This is why they construct or try to affect the content of narratives. That actors attempt to alter the content of narratives does not necessarily mean that they are very successful in changing them, but it does confirm that they believe them to be important. Moreover, when actors try to influence the content of, or construct, a particular narrative they are regarded as acting in accordance with a particular narrative to which they happen to subscribe (or with which they identify). In other words, it is not only constructivist scholars that make such assumptions. These assumptions provide the basis for propaganda, as well as cultural and educational policies. If these narratives really possess the power to mould minds then an in-depth analysis of their content will surely provide us with critical insights.

1.5 An alternative approach: Analysing narratives

One way to address the consequences of the discourse and provide an alternative understanding of bilateral relations, I argue, is to examine narratives about the war in both China and Japan. Such narratives make up the stories that identities are based on, contribute towards socializing people into becoming citizens of imagined communities and contribute to the construction of frameworks through which people interpret the world around them. They tell people how to behave as citizens of a particular community. Questions need to be addressed about what kinds of narrative can be found and which dominate. Narratives about the war are seldom given much treatment, although they can be found in many different media in both societies. A large number of museums, for example, deal with the war in both countries. These museum exhibitions provide some of the most elaborate narratives about the war to be

encountered in either China or Japan. This dissertation therefore analyses narratives about the war in Chinese and Japanese peace and war museums.

As is mentioned above, narratives can be found in several different media. History textbooks have been systematically studied to a considerably greater extent than museums. The narratives presented in history textbooks are usually not as elaborate as those in history museums dealing with the war. They have this in common with general history museums because, like general history museums, they deal with a considerably longer time period than narratives that deal specifically with the history of the war. In addition, there are not as many history textbooks as there are museums, and history textbooks have to be approved by the government. Textbooks, then, possess a kind of official authority that makes studies of them important (Hein & Selden 2000:4). However, if we wish to study not only official, but also unofficial narratives, museums offer an alternative to textbooks. Indeed, it could perhaps even be argued that there is a downside to the emphasis that has been put on textbooks in that it has stressed the role of the government at the expense of other actors, thereby enforcing rather than addressing the problem of state-centrism. A preoccupation with textbooks therefore risks obfuscating the possible plurality of narratives.

Museums have the potential to contain a broader range of narratives or views on the war. Furthermore, by studying museums it is possible to circumvent the state-centrism of studies of textbooks while also capturing regional and other differences. In short, museums are potentially more diverse and by studying them it is possible to gain an insight into not only what is officially approved but also what is not. This in turn makes it easier to see what is omitted from the dominant narratives. It has been argued that an additional reason for examining textbooks is that the controversies around them can be understood as challenging hegemony (Hein & Selden 2000:4). While this is certainly true, as is demonstrated below, museum exhibitions have also been the subject of controversies. Moreover, a study of the Japanese context has suggested that museums have high relative importance for historical consciousness.²³ Finally, while a relatively large number of studies have been carried out on textbooks, studies of museums, especially systematic and comparative studies, are rare des-

²³ The study (Seaton 2007:108-109) was a survey of 436 Japanese university students (mostly first- and second-year undergraduates) in which the students were asked how much their views concerning the Asia-Pacific War had been affected by different media. The students were asked to rank these media on a scale from one (no influence) to five (high influence). While textbooks/school education came sixth, museums were ranked second, only narrowly surpassed by documentaries. The results were as follows: 1. Documentaries, 2. Museums, 3. Television news, 4. Films, 5. Non-fiction books, 6. Textbooks/school education, 7. Testimony (Japanese), 8. Manga, 9. Television dramas, 10. Literature, 11. National press, 12. Relatives' testimony, 13. Foreign governments, 14.

pite the huge number of museums that deal with the war in both China and Japan.²⁴ The results of studies of museums can be compared and contrasted with those dealing with textbooks in order to see whether they point in the same or a different direction and whether the narratives are similar, that is, whether the degree of interdiscursivity and intertextuality is high.

1.6 The structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical concepts employed in the dissertation, such as narrative, identity and collective memory, as well as the material to be analysed. This discussion clarifies how the central concepts are related. Chapter 3 addresses methodological concerns and outlines the framework used when conducting the analysis. Moreover, it is briefly outlines that museum exhibitions focusing on war are highly political not only in the cases dealt with in this dissertation (i.e. Japan and China), but also elsewhere in the world. Chapters 4 and 5 contain contextual analyses of the Chinese (chapter 4) and Japanese (chapter 5) contexts. Such analyses are crucial in order to make sense of the results of the analysis of topics, presented in chapter 6, and the analysis of narratives in chapters 7 and 8. The contextual analysis provides background information about the social and historical contexts in which the narratives are produced and helps to explain some of the content of specific narratives as well as the occurrence or omission of certain topics. In chapter 9, the analyses of narratives presented in chapters 7 and 8 are compared and the conclusions are presented.

Hometown history, 15. Regional press, 16. Foreign media, 17. Internet, 18. Magazines, 19. Radio, 20. University, 21. Cram school, 22. Activists.

²⁴ According to a 2006 article in the *People's Daily*, more than 150 museums dealing with the War of Resistance existed or were under construction in China at the time the article was published. A Japanese guidebook to peace and war museums lists more than 100 Japanese museums (Rekishi Kyôikusha Kyôgikai 2004).

Chapter 2: Theoretical concepts and material

It was argued in chapter 1 that an approach to the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations that focuses on the types of narrative about the war found in both Japan and China can provide a fuller and alternative understanding of the issue. Before discussing how to analyse such narratives, a discussion is needed about how the notion of narrative relates to other concepts, such as collective identity and collective memory. While the analysis deals with Japan and China, it is argued that the framework presented is also applicable to other settings. The framework developed combines theoretical concepts dealing with discourse, narrative, identity, collective memory and museum studies. The methods used are inspired by approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), mainly by the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).²⁵ The chapter ends by introducing the material that is to be analysed.

2.1 Discourse

Discourse is the kind of word that is used so frequently and in so many ways that it sometimes comes to mean everything and nothing. It is used in casual conversation, in newspapers and in academic writing and speech. It can be and has been defined in many different ways, and the practitioners of discourse analysis also define it differently. However, it *is* at least defined in the field of discourse analysis. In the definition adopted here a distinction is made between “discourse” and “a discourse”. “Discourse”, without either a definite or an indefinite article, is used to refer to written, oral or visual communication or action in general. A discourse, on the other hand, is topic-oriented – it is “a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action”, are “socially constituted and socially constitutive”, “related to macro-topics” and “linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:89, cf. Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:66-67).²⁶

²⁵ For an introduction to CDA, see Wodak & Maier 2009. For an introduction to DHA, see Reisigl & Wodak 2009.

²⁶ For other definitions of discourse see, for example, Jäger & Maier 2009:45, van Leeuwen 2009:144, Fairclough 2009:164).

These discourses are made up of texts. Such texts may be written, oral or visual (e.g. Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:67).²⁷ Texts “objectify linguistic action” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:90). The researcher studies specific texts in order to say something about a discourse. Discourses are concerned with patterns across texts while texts are more specific (Heer & Wodak 2008:11). Texts are genre-specific – they may come in the form of political speeches, newspaper articles, films, textbooks, or, as is the case here, museum exhibitions. Texts connect the two speech situations of *producing* and *receiving* (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:89-90). A text is produced by certain social actors and received by others. Texts exist and need to be understood in the context in which they are created.²⁸

2.2 Identity

The concept of collective identity has been much discussed and several definitions are available. Here, the following definition of identity is employed:

By a collective or we-identity, we mean the image that a group builds up of itself and with which its members identify. Collective identity is a matter of identification on the part of the participating individuals. It does not exist “in itself”, but only ever to the extent that specific individuals subscribe to it. It is as strong – or as weak – as it is alive in the thoughts and actions of the group members, and able to motivate their thoughts and actions (Assmann, cited in Heer & Wodak 2008:7).

Moreover, identity is based on inclusion through the delineation of the in-group, the “we”, and exclusion by defining out-groups that differ from the “we” (Giesen 1998:13, Heer & Wodak 2008:7). This inclusion or exclusion is based on “two possible relations of comparison: similarity, on the one hand and difference, on the other” (Triandafyllidou & Wodak 2003:205-06). Difference is central to identities because the characteristics and culture of a specific group change. It is hence only in relation to difference that the in-group can be defined (Gilbert 2000:22-23). Furthermore, “human identities are social in character. It cannot

²⁷ This understanding of discourse differs from the one proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, according to which all social practice is discourse (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:67).

²⁸ The concept of context is discussed in more detail below. Discourses are regarded as social practices that are dependent on the context in which they are produced – the narrower textual and situational context and the broader institutional, historical, political and social contexts constitute discourses. The relation between the societal context and discourses is not one in which ‘objective’ social structures affect discourses. “Context is subjectively perceived, filtered through schemata and interpreted on the basis of experience” (Heer & Wodak 2008:12). These contexts are at the same time constituted by discourse. Social actors constitute certain social conditions, knowledge, identities and relations between social actors through discourses. Social conditions can be produced, legitimized, reproduced, challenged or transformed by discourses. The emphasis on context means that texts can only be understood within these contexts (Wodak et al. 2009:8-10, Pollack 2008:133). A contextual framework therefore has to be put together by the analyst in order to enable an understanding of texts and the narratives that

be otherwise because identity is about attributing meaning, and a precise meaning is not an essential property of words or things” (Triandafyllidou & Wodak 2003:206). Identity is closely connected to narrative and the past:

History enters individual identity because to have a sense of who one is requires being able to tell a story about oneself, and, furthermore, a story which relates one to others by connecting with the stories they tell about themselves. It requires, in short, making oneself part of a shared narrative (Gilbert 2000:48).

The concepts of collective memory and narrative are hence central to the instantiation of the abstract images that identities are. There is a cognitive aspect of identities in that they function as frameworks through which the world and those who populate it are understood and events and actions are interpreted. When confronted with large amounts of information, identities have a simplifying and economizing function, making the complex intelligible (Hopf 2002:4-7): “Identities categorize people according to common features, making the other’s actions intelligible to himself” (Hopf 2002:5).

2.3 Collective memory

The dimension of identity that deals with the past, realized in the form of narratives, can be labelled collective memory. In Halbwachs’ work on collective memory, the central argument is succinctly summarized in the following way: “our conceptions of the past are affected by the mental images we employ to solve present problems, so that collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present” (Coser 1992:34). According to this kind of thinking, collective memory is always selective and may make different interpretations of the same events. It follows from this line of argument that differences between the memories of different groups may cause conflicts. However, Halbwachs, and many who have followed in his footsteps, seem to forget to emphasize the role of the future in memory creation – “the interpretation of the past serves as a means for understanding the present and expecting the future” (Rüsen 2008:3). Collective memory, then, “shapes the story that groups of people tell about themselves, linking past, present and future in a simplified narrative. It is what keeps the past – or at least a highly selective image of it – alive in the present” (Bell 2006:4). Museums are one of the depositories for such stories (Kavanagh 1996:xiii).

texts make up. Texts refer to other texts, that is, they are intertextual. Discourses on certain topics overlap and intersect with discourses on other topics – they are interdiscursive (Wodak & Reisigl 2000:36-37).

2.4 Narrative

India's minister of state for external affairs, Shashi Tharoor, was quoted in *China Daily* speaking about soft power: "It's not the size of the army that wins, it's the country that tells a better story" (*China Daily* 2010a). This quote is interesting as it draws attention to narratives – to stories told about groups of people. However, it seems to accept an idea common among discussions about soft power – that stories will be accepted how they are intended to be. Furthermore, it seems to assume that those who tell stories are "countries", which tell them to foreign audiences who will probably accept "our" story because it is obviously a good one. When Tharoor gave his speech, however, he did so in front of a domestic audience. What is often disregarded in domestic debates is how these stories are received elsewhere (Leheny 2010:131). In other words, such debates seldom consider the possibility that the stories, when exported, are first de-contextualized and then re-contextualized. They therefore become infused with the values of the new context. These domestic debates are important, however, as domestic debates tell the domestic audience what they are and what they can do. Another problem with such debates is that in them it is often assumed, as the above quote suggests, that nations more or less naturally have stories ready to tell. Such an understanding obfuscates the way these stories construct the imagined communities that make up nations and hide the domestic struggles between advocates of different national stories or narratives.

Identities, as is mentioned above, as images with which members of a collective may identify, are quite abstract notions. Narratives, however, provide anecdotes and instantiate or exemplify identity, thereby providing stories about the self with which "we" can identify. Through this instantiation, these abstract images become more concrete. They hence function as mirrors (Cf. Triandafyllidou & Wodak 2003). Narratives about a group "legitimize the community and guarantee its continued existence" (Hinchman & Hinchman 2001:xvii). They are "told and retold, furnish the stock from which individual life narratives can be constructed" (Hinchman & Hinchman 2001:xviii). This, then, is how individual narratives are connected with those of the collective. They may therefore provide models for how members of the community are supposed to behave. Although narratives, being stories, always connect past, present and future, the concept of collective memory helps to emphasize that the narratives analysed here deal mainly with the past even though these stories about the past are shaped by the present as well as by the future (Hinchman & Hinchman 2001:xiv, xviii). Narratives are texts "with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful

way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people's experiences of it" (Hinchman & Hinchman 2001:xvi). They do not just list events – they tie them together and order them into a story.²⁹ They “do not simply mirror reality”, although they may purport to; “storytelling inevitably involves selectivity, rearranging of elements, redescription, and simplification” (Hinchman & Hinchman 2001:xvi). In narratives, events are endowed with meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole (White 1990:9, 42-44). Put another way, events are interpreted through a particular lens since meaning does not reside in the events themselves. What we are concerned with, then, is “to explore relationships between facts, that is to say, the interpretation of events and of collective, as well as individual, experiences of reality. Historical interpretations thus consist of narratives about events from different perspectives. These perspectives, consciously or otherwise, are always influenced by vested interests” (Heer & Wodak 2008:1).

Narratives have a potential for change in that they are used in “emphasizing certain traits and skewing their meanings and logics” (Martin 1995:13). Different narratives are put forward by actors such as politicians, activists and institutions in a range of different forms such as speeches, school textbooks and history museums. “Power comes into play when one narrative is chosen out of the many competing and possible ones” (Wodak

²⁹ Narratives tie selected events together and ascribe meaning to those events. This becomes obvious when Hayden White contrasts the modern narrative form of history with medieval annals. The annals chosen simply list events that took place in Gaul during the time period from 709 to 734 AD (White 1990:6-7). In some years no events are listed – it is as though nothing occurred in those years. At least, nothing occurred that the author of the annals regarded as important enough to record. In this way, then, it is clear that by virtue of having been written down certain events are established as significant. However, this is where the process of meaning-making stops. The events are not interpreted; nothing is said about why they transpired or about any possible consequences. These occurrences are not connected – there is no plot, no story and no subject. Under the year 712, it says, “Flood everywhere” and in 732 “Charles fought against the Saracens at Poitiers on Saturday”. This is all the information we are given. None of the events recorded are described as more significant than the other. We are not provided with any explanations concerning why the floods took place or if and how they affected people living in the region. It is similarly unclear why Charles fought the Saracens and what the outcome of the battle was (White 1990:7). We are given few clues concerning the interpretive frameworks by means of which events were ascribed meaning. It is conceivable that if the community is a deeply religious one, the flood could have been interpreted as “the wrath of god”, whereas if a scientific worldview dominates it is seen as a natural phenomenon (Cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985:108, Howarth 2000:101-02, Torfing 1999:94, Jäger & Maier 2009:39-44, 59-60). In the same way, the reason that Charles fought the Saracens may have been because the Saracens were understood as being inherently evil and threatened Charles' (and his subjects') way of life, or maybe it was the case that Charles sought glory in the battle against a worthy and well-mannered enemy in a battle between chivalrous gentlemen. Charles may have lost the battle and the Saracens perhaps brutally massacred a large number of people living in the domain over which Charles ruled. The author of the annals, however, does not provide any clues concerning how the events were interpreted. This is an important difference between annals and narratives. In narratives events are endowed with meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole (White 1990:9, 42-44). Put another way, events are interpreted through a particular lens since meaning does not reside in the events themselves. Meaning is ascribed to events through discourse, thereby turning these events into narratives. How meaning is ascribed to events in discourse, that is, through what linguistic means this is accomplished is discussed in detail in chapter 3.

2002:145, cf. Martin 1995:5). The target audience of such narratives may or may not identify with such stories and may even attempt to redefine narratives or produce stories of their own. Since such narratives may affect the behaviour of members of a group (because they contain models for how members are supposed to act) they are of great importance. Those who control such stories, to the extent that they are identified with, can exercise power through them. Narratives do not just tell “us” who “we” are – they also tell us who we are not. For this reason, “others”, who exemplify behaviour different from “ours” often play a defining role in narratives.

It is quite common in research discussing the self/other nexus for the stereotypical depiction of out-groups to be stressed but the stereotypical portrayal of the in-group not to be emphasized to the same extent. However, van Dijk’s (1998:33) “ideological square”, which entails positive in-group description and negative out-group description, involves both. It can be summarized in the following way:

1. Emphasize our good properties/actions.
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions.
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions.
4. Mitigate their good properties/actions.

This ideological square does not exclude the stereotypical description of the self even though, as is mentioned above, most studies seem to be more interested in the stereotypical depiction of others. I wish, however, to stress that it is not just the stereotypical portrayal of the out-group that is important. I argue that the stereotypical depiction of the in-group, while often not given the emphasis that it deserves, may also be of great significance for inter-group relations. The extent of its significance is an empirical issue. The possibility that stereotypical portrayals of the in-group exist should be kept open. It seems intuitively reasonable to assume that the sharper the contrast between negative representations of the other and the positive portrayal of the self, the greater the risk that feelings of animosity arise. Such contrasting images risk strengthening arguments such as: “We have always treated them well but they always behave badly towards us”, simply because this is the essence of the logic on which such representations are based.

It has been claimed that through history “a society defines itself by marking itself off from its past” (de Certeau, cited in Heer & Wodak 2008:5). Difference, in other words, does not have to be external. It is possible for the “we-group” to define itself not just in relation to an external other. This may also be done in relation to an internal other – its

prior self. A political party, for example, may wish to disassociate itself from what is perceived, at least in part, as an obsolete political ideology. The party in question may have suffered a setback in the most recent election, and its strategists may believe that there are reasons to present itself as radically different from what it was before. It will therefore stress that it is a new incarnation of the same party by emphasizing both continuity and discontinuity. In an attempt to be more attractive to the electorate it will present itself as different from how it used to be. At the same time, it will certainly stress that it is different from other parties.

Just as political parties may define themselves in relation to what they used to be, identities of other groups can be defined partly in relation to what the group used to be. This, of course, is because historical narratives are not just accounts of what happened in the past but accounts informed by the present and the future. In the case of national identities, there are several ways in which the collective can be defined in relation to a “historical other”. This depends on what aspects are emphasized as being different. It is likely that not all aspects of what the collective used to be will be presented as being different from the present self. There will be continuity in some areas and discontinuity in others. It is likely that what are perceived as the negative aspects of the past self will be presented as “other”. For example, a society that has gone from being industrially undeveloped to becoming developed may emphasize what is understood as its previous backwardness as aspects to be associated with the historical other. Similarly, an aggressor in a past war may present this aggression as a characteristic of the “historical self”, while the “current self”, in contrast, is understood and presented as peaceful and responsible. Different groups within a society may of course disagree about which aspects, if any, of the past self should be regarded as “other”. Whereas one group advocates a clean break concerning certain aspects, another might perhaps stress continuity. As is mentioned above, that a community defines itself in relation to its past self does not mean that it does not at the same time define itself in relation to external “others”. Furthermore, while members of community X may regard certain qualities as belonging to its “historical other”, members of community Y may consider those characteristics to be an important ingredient in their perception of the current community X. Attention is paid not only to how external others are portrayed but also to how internal others are treated. The relation between the past and the present is salient here – questions over whether narratives tie qualities seen as characterizing the past self and past other to the present self and the present other are important since these contribute to shaping the identities (or frameworks) through which both the current self and the current other as well as their actions are interpreted.

2.5 Three narrative emplotments

In this section, an account of previous research dealing with narratives about war in China and Japan is given in order to make explicit why a typology and method for the study of such narratives is necessary. Chapter 3 outlines the typology and method, including an account of the indicators, developed using methodological tools from CDA, that a certain emplotment is present in the narrative being analysed. A narrative, then, is the story being analysed. Such stories may contain several different emplotments. The term emplotment refers to the way in which a narrative is plotted, that is, the *kind of story* told (cf. White 1975:7-11). In narratives about war, it is contended that there are three types of emplotment, each of which focuses chiefly on one type of participant or protagonist. These are hero, victim and aggressor emplotments.

Previous research on Chinese narratives about the war has claimed that narratives stressing Chinese heroism, resistance and class struggle dominated during the Mao era, while Japanese aggression was largely suppressed. Since the changes in Chinese society brought about by Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, however, class struggle has been downplayed more and more and its place has been taken by national struggle. It is argued that this has led to a situation in which narratives that emphasize Chinese victimhood and Japanese aggression have come to dominate, while Chinese heroism has been de-emphasized. Several scholars have discussed the issue of the extent to which heroism has been replaced by victimhood in Chinese narratives about the war (See for example: Waldron 1996:945-978; Mitter 2000a:279-293; Denton 2007; Gries 2004:52-53, Coble 2010:435-56). Wang, for example, has noted that: "most national history textbooks usually adopt a mix of both 'victor narrative' and 'victim narrative'" (Wang 2008:109). Similarly, in an analysis of narratives about World War II and the role of the Atomic Bomb in the war, Dower describes the dominant US narrative as heroic or triumphal, while in Japan a traditional narrative describing Japan as victim has been challenged by a victimizer narrative according to which the Japanese were not only victims but also perpetrators (Dower 1997:37-48). What these discussions have in common is that none goes very far in theorizing about narratives dealing with war. In previous research, a particular way of interpreting the past is usually described as a victor, victim or other kinds of narrative but there is little discussion about how such narratives can be identified, what they consist of and how to analyse them. Put differently, a methodology that provides indicators for characterizing different emplotments is missing. Moreover, these discussions are largely specific to the contexts with which they deal. In other words, no attempts are

made to construct general typologies that can be used when analysing narratives about war across different contexts. In this dissertation, a typology of different types of narrative emplotments is presented and applied. The categories used make possible an interpretation of narratives that differs from the existing research dealing with such issues (cf. Ekengren & Hinnfors 2006:66-67). It is suggested here that the framework developed is generally applicable and could be utilized to understand other cases. A brief discussion of other cases is provided in chapter 3. Whereas all sorts of narrative are mentioned in previous research, in the typology developed here, there are only three types of narrative emplotment – the hero, victim and aggressor emplotments. These emplotments and the indicators that the analyst looks for when examining narratives are described in chapter 3.

2.6 Communities

It is mentioned above that narratives involve stories about collectives or communities. Communities can exist on several levels, one of which is the nation. Nations are imagined communities that consist of members, most of whom have never met and will never meet. Nonetheless, the nation is imagined as inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 2006:6-7). Furthermore, the nation “is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 2006:7). The events in which so many millions of people died, mentioned by Anderson as evidence for the strong imagined bonds between the members of these communities, are not just connected to imagined communities in this way. The stories about these events, I would argue, often make up an important part of the shared goods that sustain these imagined communities. Stories about how earlier generations of the imagined communities died, in one way or another, for the community are important adhesives that bond the imagined communities of today. A common past is part of what makes up imagined communities and some events are central in narratives about such common pasts.

2.7 The politics of museums

Politics is a struggle for power (Marsh & Stoker 2002:10). One of the tasks of the political scientist is to expose the use of power. One institution in which power is at play is the museum. Nonetheless, the museum as a place in which power is exercised has been largely ignored by political scientists (Luke 2002:xiii). Elucidating the political role of museums is therefore one aim of this study.

Museum exhibitions are places in which the statements of position that identity narratives make up (MacDonald 1996:14) are presented by actors, be they civil society groups or governmental bodies (Karp 1992:2-6). As statements of position, museums both illuminate and omit (MacDonald 1996:14). As part of civil society, museums make up an arena in which “values are asserted and attempts at legitimation are made and contested” (Karp 1992:6). If the narratives presented in exhibitions involve, for example, negative other representations or denial of or omissions concerning past wrongdoings, they may give rise to or fuel feelings of animosity. Exhibitions are therefore implicated in the construction of patterns of amity and enmity. Even if the leaders of two countries make efforts to improve political relations, such initiatives will rest on fragile foundations as long as such elements are common in dominant narratives. Museums, along with many other media, contribute to the constitutive construction of collective identities. They have both a formative and a reflective role (MacDonald 1996:4). It has been claimed that in museums, a nation’s qualities are “written” or “shown” and that they hold the stories “we” tell about “ourselves” (Zolberg 1996:69, Kavanagh 1996:xiii). It has also been contended, however, that through different museums different groups express what they believe the nation’s qualities *should* be (Gustafsson 2009:22). According to Bohman (1997:20), the staff at museums decide, more or less consciously, what a national identity consists of – or rather what they want it to consist of. What is being expressed may not necessarily be accepted, as is suggested by the statement about the civil society role of museums mentioned above. Museums are important as educational institutions (Luke 2002:xiii). This, along with their function in preserving priceless artefacts, gives them authority (Seaton 2007:171). The authority of museums is often also evident in the imposing architecture of these institutions.

Museums, with their physical structures and authority, offer opportunities for groups to have their narratives institutionalized that other media cannot provide. Citizens’ movements around Japan have lobbied to have their memories and narratives institutionalized

in museums. Such institutionalization ensures that these narratives will be spread through education. The very physical institutionalization that museums entail can also function as a base from which the activities of these groups can be organized. In Japan, several private museums have been set up by civil society groups, such as those responsible for the Women's Active Museum in Tokyo, the Oka Masaharu Museum in Nagasaki and the Grassroots House in Kochi, the activities of which are not restricted to their exhibitions but also include the production of written material, special exhibitions held at other venues and efforts for reconciliation with, for example, China and South Korea. In China, private museums have also been set up to institutionalize certain memories. In China also, museums not only deal with exhibitions but also play a central role in commemorative activities such as sounding sirens and hosting ceremonies on anniversaries, such as 18 September, when military conflict broke out in north-east China in 1931, and 13 December, the date of the start of the Nanjing Atrocity. The institutionalization of narratives in museums is hence a way of strengthening the position of a certain narrative.

2.8 Senders and receivers

It is mentioned above that the staff at museums decide, more or less consciously, what they want a national identity to consist of (Bohman 1997:20). Narratives are constructed by one or more senders or producers, in the case of museum exhibitions usually a team of curators. These curators always work under certain conditions and may therefore receive input and comments from government departments, civil society groups or concerned citizens. For example, the curators responsible for the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall have written that: "Leaders from all levels came to the construction site in person and showed concern for and gave guidance and assistance to the exhibition work" (Zhu & Zhang 2008:296). The senders therefore work within a context: "Producers, if they want to see their work disseminated, must work within more or less rigidly defined values and beliefs of the social institutions within which their work is produced and circulated" (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:120). The constraints of the context of production can vary a lot depending on the institutional setting – where the money comes from, the breadth of the constituency, and so on. It needs to be stressed, however, that the producers often have some room to subjectively interpret the context of production.

Similarly, the receivers may not necessarily accept what is being expressed. A receiver, in this case the museum visitor, interprets the narrative constructed by the sender. Just like the sender, the receiver also has certain values and beliefs. The receiver of a representation or a narrative will not necessarily interpret it in the way intended by the sender. The receiver might, for instance, “recognize the substance of what is meant while refusing the speaker’s interpretations and assessments” (Scannell, quoted in Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:120). Nonetheless, as is argued by Barker and Galasinski (2001:65), “texts seek to impose a ‘preferred reading’ or ‘structure of faith’ upon the addressee”. Such preferred readings are dominant but not determined. The receiver may not necessarily understand a product in accordance with the reading preferred by the sender. The receiver may interpret a text in a slightly different way or in an oppositional way, rather than according to the way intended (Hall 2006:134-38). It is this “preferred reading” that is of concern here. It is the task of the analyst to uncover the preferred reading and expose the objectives of the narratives studied. It is assumed that the narratives studied are ideological in the sense that they are connected with power and knowledge that justify and legitimize certain actions. Ideology can hence be seen here as “the attempt to fix meaning [meaning being fluid] for certain purposes” (Barker & Galasinski 2001:66). Ideology is hence employed to make one version of reality the accepted one, thereby excluding other ways of understanding the world. Struggle between different ideologies may hence be seen in opposing narratives (Barker & Galasinski 2001:66-67).

Politicians and bureaucrats in both Japan and China seem to agree that school-children are more receptive to these kinds of narratives – they are seen as more “malleable” (Gustafsson 2010b).³⁰ Power, then, is an essential aspect of the production process. The producer, although working under contextual constraints, has the power to *construct* narratives. Other actors may be able to influence the content of narratives – they therefore have some power to *affect* the content of narratives. Receivers have the more limited (and less active) power – to *resist* or *not to accept* a narrative or parts of it.³¹ If narratives about who “we” are

³⁰ Nonetheless, it follows from the discussion about identity above that receivers accept narratives only to the extent that they identify with the propositions put forward in them.

³¹ Those who control the institutions that produce and disseminate discourse in general, including narratives, have more power than those who do not have access to such institutions (van Dijk 2008:84). Institutions often seen as possessing and exerting such power include the media and the education system (van Dijk 2008:40, Richardson 2007:220). Of course, history museums may be seen as part of the education system since they are often entrusted with educating children as well as adults. Furthermore, they are usually regarded as authoritative institutions that “do not act or preach but simply harbour and display things of knowledge and value” (Brown 2006:126). Those who control the content of exhibitions also exert power in this way. The power of discourses also resides in that they contribute to the construction of the interpretative frameworks through which individuals interpret the world and the actions of others. This goes for actions conducted by those belonging to a person’s in-

can influence “our” behaviour (if we need to know who we are in order to know what we want), then it makes sense for actors to try to have their narratives dominate, or to try to influence the narratives created by other actors. As is demonstrated in chapter 5, there is evidence to suggest that several actors believe this to be the case (See also Gustafsson 2010b).

2.9 The role of the analyst

No analyst is a *tabula rasa*. We all come from one background or another and have baggage consisting of certain experiences. It is impossible to leave this baggage behind when launching a research project. In this case, the analyst is a Swedish citizen studying Chinese and Japanese discourses. Regardless of whether the analyst is examining conditions as an insider or an outsider of a culture, different choices can always be made. Some may argue that as an outsider it is possible to be more detached or neutral. At the same time, it might be argued that the outsider may lack the relevant contextual knowledge necessary to make informed interpretations. It may also be argued that the outsider can provide a “fresh” perspective because s/he is not as entangled in the discourses as the insider perhaps is regarded as being. As researchers, it is necessary for us to be aware of the choices we make when conducting our analyses. We also need to make an effort to present our assumptions to our readers in order to make our analyses and interpretations transparent. The attitudes and beliefs of the analyst are likely to have some impact on the interpretations made. The possibility of making different kinds of interpretation is always there. There is therefore no way of interpreting entirely objectively. This is the case regardless of the epistemological and theoretical beliefs of the analyst, even though those adhering to some schools of thought may refuse to admit this. Obviously, most analysts will attempt to be as objective as possible. However, even though some may believe it possible to be objective, there is no way of knowing whether this aim has been achieved or not. While it is possible to determine whether a text is linguistically biased through the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (see chapter 3), a text that is free from such bias may simply have been written by an author skilled at hiding her or his opinions. As analysts we provide interpretations that are commented on and assessed by other analysts. This process of commenting by experienced and knowledgeable scholars has the potential to contribute to reducing the arbitrariness of interpretations. The use of certain analytical tools ap-

group as well as by those people belonging to out-groups. In this way, discriminatory discourses contribute to the construction of interpretative frameworks based on prejudice (van Dijk 2008:103, 164-69).

plied in this research project, I would argue, further contributes to this aim. As Barker and Galasinski (2001:64) argue: “linguistic analysis of discourse, anchored within systemic-functional linguistics, can help reduce the arbitrariness of interpretation by anchoring it on the discourse itself”. The linguistic tools employed in the analysis outlined in chapter 3 facilitate a systematic analysis that provides the analyst with a firmer foundation on the basis of which interpretations can be made and conclusions drawn.

2.10 Critical scholarship

The term critical should not be misunderstood as meaning negative. It means that an attempt has been made to consider phenomena from different perspectives. Furthermore, it involves “not taking traditional interpretations for granted: thereby providing new answers – and posing new questions” (Wodak 2008a:xvi). In discussions of the meaning of the term critical scholarship, it is sometimes argued that the analyst should make explicit her/his loyalties when conducting critical scholarship. Much critical scholarship entails showing how power is abused. The analyst therefore aims to show how one group abuses power in order to dominate another. The analyst will then make explicit that her/his loyalties lie with the dominated group. Those adhering to an objectivist view of science will often criticize such a stance as being biased, subjective or unscientific. Such claims to objectivity are usually countered by critical scholars as being simply a way for such analysts to conceal their stance or ideology. Scholars who in this way claim to be objective are seen as lacking reflexivity as they deny that they too make choices and present interpretations rather than absolute truths. The present study deals with representations of history produced by different groups within two nation states. To the extent that I, as a critical analyst, intend to take sides, I do not mean to take the side of either of the producers of these narratives. Instead, as mentioned above, I believe it to be the task of the analyst to reveal the ideological aims of the preferred readings of these narratives. To the extent that a side is taken, then, the side taken is that of the receivers as it is assumed that the preferred readings of the narratives involve both subtle and sometimes explicit attempts to affect the identity and hence also the actions of the receivers or addressees.

2.11 Contributions to social science

The interdisciplinary nature of the research project means that it combines theories and methods used in different disciplines and areas. This cross-fertilization has the potential to contribute to all the fields that inform the framework developed. While the main aim of the dissertation, as is mentioned in chapter 1, is to contribute to the literature on identity in the field of International Relations, a few words should perhaps be said about possible contributions to other areas of social science.

2.11.1 Identity and memory studies

Different kinds of narratives about war are frequently referred to in identity studies, which explores the role of stories about the past, as well as in memory studies. Terms such as victim narrative, victor narrative, heroic narrative, perpetrator narrative, feel good narrative, and so on, are often mentioned. Despite the frequent employment of such expressions, little effort has been made to devise a general typology of and methods to study narratives about war. Whereas the general concept of narrative has been given much treatment, these specific types of narrative are often not defined clearly and, more importantly, little is mentioned concerning how such narratives can be identified. How do we recognize, for example, a victim narrative or a victor narrative when we see one? The existing literature provides us with few answers to this important question. How can such narratives be studied and compared systematically without a typology that can be employed in different empirical settings? By employing tools often used in critical discourse studies, the depiction of participants in narratives about war is placed at the centre of attention and indicators that make it possible to identify specific narrative emplotments are provided. This provides us with a clear method for analysing such narratives, a method that facilitates systematic examination of discourses about war, thereby making it possible to detect different kinds of narrative about war.

2.11.2 Area studies: China studies and Japan studies

There is quite a large body of literature on Chinese nationalism and discourses concerning the past in China. Quite a few studies have also been conducted on Japanese war memory, the history problem as a largely domestic issue in Japan and on Japanese nationalism. However, despite their obvious links, the two contexts have only rarely been studied together. Furthermore, in both these fields of area studies, the role of history museums has received little

treatment. In addition, methods such as the ones employed here have been utilized only to a small extent within these fields. Much of the research that has been conducted on Japanese and Chinese peace and war museums, and on war memories in general, has been carried out within a research area that deals mainly with these respective contexts.

2.11.3 Museum studies

The project makes use of theoretical assumptions developed within the discipline of museum studies. However, these are combined with theories and methods from other domains. The result is an analytical framework for the study of history exhibitions, especially exhibitions dealing with war history, that could, I believe, influence other studies dealing with such exhibitions. For example, the tools commonly applied within the area of critical discourse studies when analysing, for example, newspaper texts and speeches by politicians have only been used to an extremely limited extent in studies of museum exhibitions. This study illustrates how this toolbox can be put to use when analysing the stories told in museum exhibitions.

2.11.4 Political science

The dissertation makes a contribution to political science by stressing the political nature of museums. While it might seem obvious to some that museums and perhaps especially museums dealing with the collective past of a community are highly political institutions, little attention has been paid to museums in mainstream political science. I believe that the examples from other empirical settings provided in chapter 3 underscore this point. In addition, as a dissertation in political science, the study will hopefully make political scientists more aware of the issues of the politics of the past and the politics of memory in general, issues that are often left to historians and memory studies specialists to explore.

2.11.5 Critical discourse studies

The dissertation makes contributions to critical discourse studies in several ways. To start with, the field of critical discourse studies has to a large extent focused on discourses as expressed in speeches by politicians, official documents, newspapers and the media more broadly. Museum exhibitions have so far not been given much attention. Furthermore, critical discourse studies have chiefly analysed texts written in Western European languages. The need for studies dealing with other empirical contexts and analyses of texts written in other

languages has been emphasized (Wodak & Meyer 2009:16). Finally, the importance of conducting comparative critical discourse studies that compare different empirical settings and texts written in different languages has also been stressed. The dissertation provides insights for critical discourse studies in all the three areas mentioned here.

2.12 Material

Material has been collected at a large number of museums dealing with the war. The number of Japanese museums visited is somewhat larger than the number of Chinese ones. There are several reasons for this, some of which are of a practical nature. China is a considerably larger country with a (so far) less developed infrastructure than Japan and the time needed to visit a large number of museums is hence significantly greater. Whereas most Japanese museums can be reached by high-speed train connections, in China it was in several cases necessary to first travel by air and then by train or car for several hours. Information about most Chinese museums is also significantly more difficult to come by. For example, fewer museums have websites. Moreover, a number of the Chinese museums that I intended to visit were closed for renovation at the time of my planned visit.³² While this points to the fact that money is being put into rebuilding and enlarging such sites in China, it is nonetheless an indicator of the problems involved in the collection of material for this research project. It should also be noted that many Japanese museums are relatively small in comparison with their Chinese counterparts and receive fewer visitors (as indicated in Table 3.1). All Chinese museums are housed in buildings used for the specific purpose of hosting the exhibition, whereas a large number of Japanese exhibitions occupy rooms in buildings used for other purposes.

Table 2.1 Visitor figures for Chinese museums (Source: Personal correspondence unless otherwise stated)

Museum	Number of visitors
1. Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders (opened 1985)	About 5 million visitors a year since it reopened in 2007. 5,430,000 (in 2010 (until 10 December). About 22.1 % students. 28,000,000 visitors since the museum opened in 1985.
2. Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (Beijing) (opened 1987)	Over 2,000,000 visitors (80 % schoolchildren) in two years after re-opening in 2005. 14 million visitors in the first 20 years after it opened (Xinhua 2007).
3. The "9.18" Historical Museum (Shenyang) (opened 1999)	About 700,000 (60,000-70,000 students). About 7,000,000 visitors in the first seven years after reopen-

³² This was the case for the Panshan Martyrs Memorial in Tianjin, the War Criminals Correctional Facility in Fushun, the Xi'an Incident Memorial and the Site of the Reorganizing of the Chinese Workers and Farmers Red Army Qiongya Column in Hainan.

	ing in 1999 (Xinhua wang 2006).
4. Eighth Route Army Memorial (Wuxiang, Shanxi) (opened 1988)	About 800,000 (250,000 students). 1,800,000 visitors since opening in 1990 (Shanxi government net 2008).
5. The New Fourth Army Memorial (Yancheng, Jiangsu) (opened 1986)	658,000 (2008).
6. Pingdingshan Massacre Memorial Hall (Fushun, Liaoning) (opened 1972)	500,000-600,000 a year (last five years). 5,000,000 visitors since opening in 1972 (CCTV 2009).
7. Crime Evidence Exhibition Hall of Japanese Imperial Army Unit 731 in China (Haerbin, Heilongjiang) (opened 1985)	573,228 (2009), (About 30 % students). 1,578,559 (About 30 % students) between 2007 and 2009.
8. Ranzhuang Site of Tunnel Warfare (Hebei) (opened 1959)	More than 500,000 (Minors 30 %, soldiers 35 %) (2007) (Zhonghongwang 2007a).
9. The North-eastern Martyrs Memorial Hall (Haerbin, Heilongjiang) (opened 1948)	460,000 (About 22 % schoolchildren visiting in groups (2005) (Zhonghongwang 2007b). (30,000,000 visitors since opening in 1948 until 2005 according to museum brochure (Dongbei Lieshi Jinianguan 2005:3)
10. Historical Museum for Japan's Occupation in North-east of China (Changchun) (opened 1991)	More than 5,000,000 visitors since opening in 1991 (Puppet Manchurian Palace website).
11. Site of the Eighth Route Army Xi'an Office (opened 1959)	Almost 10,000,000 visitors in the first 44 years since opening (Eighth Route Army Xi'an Office Website). ³³
12. Dongjiang Column Museum (Luofushan, Guangdong) (opened 2003)	About 230,000. ³⁴
13. Shanghai Songhu Campaign Memorial Hall (opened 2000)	220,000 (70 % students).
14. Jianchuan Museum Cluster (opened 2005)	More than 1,000,000 in five years since opening (Wenhua Zhongguo 2010, Zhongguo Xinwenwang).
15. Guangdong Memorial Hall of East River Column (Dongguan, Guangdong) (opened 2005)	About 160,000. (About 18.8 % Students).
16. Zhenhai Coast Defense History Museum (Ningbo, Zhejiang) (opened 1997)	About 120,000 (40 % students).
17. Site of the Eighth Route Army Wuhan Office (opened 1979)	More than 1,900,000 visitors during a time period of more than 20 years (Wuhan government net 2011).

Table 2.2 Visitor figures for Japanese museums (Source: Personal correspondence unless otherwise indicated)

Museum	Number of visitors
1. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (opened 1949, refurbished 1955, enlarged 1994)	1,357,233 (2008) (Schoolchildren 32 %, 22,6 % in group visits) (Hiroshima City Web 2010)
2. Yamato Museum (Kure) (opened 2005)	863,812 (2009) (Schoolchildren: about 8.2 % (high school and below. Total: 6,403,720 (28 February 2011) (School children: about 7.7 %).
3. Himeyuri Peace Museum (Okinawa) (Opened 1989)	816,745 (2008) (Schoolchildren 42 % (2007))
4. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (opened 1949, changes made in 1955, 1975 and 1996)	670,523 (2008) (Schoolchildren: 32 % (2007))
5. Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots (Chiran) (opened 1975, enlarged 1991)	677,617 (2008) Average: 560 000 (School children: 14 %) (Personal correspondence)
6. Yûshûkan (Tokyo) (opened 1882, enlarged 1932, closed 1945, Treasure relic hall opened 1961, Yûshûkan reopened 1986 and enlarged 2002.)	480,000 (2008) (Schoolchildren: 4-8 % (1990s) (Seaton 2007:176).
7. Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum (opened 1975, exhibits changed in 1978, rebuilt in 2000)	433,163 (2008) (Schoolchildren: 68 %, 63 % in group visits) 4,143,243 visitors 2000-2009.
8. Shôkeikan (Tokyo) (opened 2006)	114,514 (April 2009-March 2010). ³⁵

³³ The number of schoolchildren is not given but the role of the museum in educating young people is emphasized.

³⁴ There are no statistics on the number of students but since it is a patriotic education base, schoolchildren certainly visit.

9. Peace Osaka (opened 1991)	71,317 (2008) (Minami 2009:37). (School children 67.6 % (2001)) (Seaton 2007:176).
10. Kawasaki Peace Museum (opened 1992)	54,620 (Children: about 18 %) (2009).
11. Kyoto Museum for World Peace (opened 1992, enlarged in 2002)	52,500 (2009) (Schoolchildren: about 50.9 %). 742,000 visitors since opening (until February 2011).
12. Kanagawa Plaza for Global Citizenship Peace Exhibition Room (opened 1998)	54,830 (2009) (Schoolchildren and students: about 35.5 %). Total since opening: 790,491. ³⁶
13. Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation (Tokyo) (opened 2000)	49,268 (2010) (School children: 20 % according to survey done by the museum (response rate 6 %)).
14. Saitama Prefecture Peace Museum and Reference Library (opened 1993)	32,824 (2008) (University students and below: about 40.4 %) 166,922 2006-2010.
15. Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room (opened 1995)	25,703 (2009) (Children under 18: 52.2 %). (Total since opening: 464 123 (54.4 % children under 18)).
16. Hokuchin Museum (Asahikawa, Hokkaido) (Opened 1964, reopened 2007)	25,243 (2008) (Minami 2009:36). 100,000 visitors since reopening (Hokuchin Museum website).
17. Sakai Peace and Human Rights Museum (Osaka-fu) (opened 1994, refurbished 2006)	18,666 (2010) (School children: about 49.4 % (Junior high school and below)).
18. Himeji Historical Peace Center (opened 1996)	16,065 (2010) (School children (junior high school and below) 19,8 %).
19. Sendai War Damage and Recovery Memorial (opened)	About 10,000 (Children: about 45 %)
20. Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum (Nagasaki) (opened 1995)	About 5,000 (School children: 65-75 %).
21. Suita War Material Room for Peace (Osaka-fu) (opened 1992)	3,454 (2009) (Children: About 3 %)
22. Women's active museum on war and peace (WAM) (Tokyo) (opened 2005)	3,136 (2007) (School children: 8.4 %).
23. Grassroots House (Kôchi) (opened 1989)	About 3,000 (participants in activities).

The material collected consists of photographs, video recordings and printed material. Most museums gave permission to take photographs and make video recordings of the exhibits. In some cases, however, such permission was not forthcoming. Several of the larger museums produced catalogues that were available for visitors to purchase. These catalogues contain images of, if not all the material, then nearly all that is on display. The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, the 9.18 History Museum, the Yûshûkan, the Himeyuri Peace Museum and the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum all forbid visitors to take photographs of exhibits even for research purposes. However, at all these institutions I was able to purchase a catalogue containing images of the exhibits and the textual material on display.

Data were collected on, for example, visitor numbers and press articles on the museums. When selecting museums to be analysed, the aim was to include a large number of

³⁵ Uses a machine at the entrance to count visitors and hence has no statistics concerning how many are school-children or students.

³⁶ The figure refers to visitors to three exhibition rooms – the Children Fantasy Exhibition Room, the International Understanding Exhibition Room and the Peace Exhibition Room. Visitors purchase one ticket and can enter all three exhibition rooms. There are no figures showing how many enter each exhibition, although many parents are said to bring their children to visit the Children Fantasy Exhibition Room.

museums to make it possible to detect patterns in how the war is portrayed. The selection criteria used are set out below. The museums should deal with the Asia-Pacific war.³⁷ This disqualifies, for example, general history museums that may include a small section dealing with the war period. Furthermore, the exhibitions should have a historical narrative. Institutions that simply display war memorabilia without putting it into a historical narrative were excluded because they, generally, do not mention any events. Moreover, an effort was made to include museums from all over Japan and China in order to be sensitive to regional and other possible variations. Accessibility also matters – museums that are easily accessible were given priority along with those that are well-known and receive a large number of visitors. Lists of and literature concerning relevant museums were consulted to help identify the most relevant museums.³⁸

All the museums are analysed in the analysis of topics. However, for practical reasons, the analysis of narratives focuses on a selected number of especially prominent exhibitions. Detailed analysis was carried out on only a few museums in each country – the ones that receive the largest number of visitors and the most attention. In the case of China, all the museums visited apart from the Jianchuan Museum Cluster are state institutions. In order to see whether there is a difference between private and public institutions, a detailed analysis was carried out on the Jianchuan Museum Cluster. The analysis of Chinese museums centred on those that receive the largest number of visitors, that is, the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum and the 9.18 History Museum in Shenyang. These three institutions do not just receive large numbers of visitors their profiles are high in other ways as well. All three have hosted Japanese politicians – they have, in this sense, been

³⁷ Some museums at which material was collected were still excluded because they do not fit the selection criteria applied to select museums to be analysed in the analysis of topics. This is the case with the Military Museum in Beijing and the Shōwakan in Tokyo. The latter was excluded because it deals very little with the war. Indeed, its name, the Shōwakan, refers to the Shōwa period, which did not end until 1989. The former was excluded because the exhibition dealing with the War of Resistance at the museum is only one among a large number of exhibitions dealing with a large number of Chinese wars. The exhibition on the war period at the Japanese National Museum of History was excluded on the same grounds. It might be argued that the Yūshūkan is similar to these two museums in that it does not deal only with the Asia-Pacific War. However, in the case of the Yūshūkan, the wars that precede the Asia-Pacific War only date back to the 19th century and could be regarded as contextualization of the events of the Asia-Pacific War. Furthermore, the Yūshūkan has been the object of controversy not only in Japan but also internationally, and the fact that it is run by the Yasukuni Shrine also makes it an important case. This does not mean that the National Museum of History and the Military Museum are not worthy of attention. However, a selection needs to be made and even though these museums are excluded a large number of museums are still included. The material analysed should be sufficient to obtain a satisfactory understanding of how history is depicted in Chinese and Japanese narratives about the war, and of which narratives dominate.

³⁸ In the case of Japan, the *Peace and War Museum Guidebook*, was used, which lists a large number of Japanese museums (Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai 2004). Chinese museums were located using lists of museums published on the Internet, such as the *List of Model Patriotic Bases* (News of the Communist Party of China 2009a) and the list of *Red Tourism* (News of the Communist Party of China 2009b) sites, both of which can be found as links on the CCP Propaganda Department's website (News of the Communist Party of China 2009c).

the objects of “museum diplomacy”.³⁹ Furthermore, they have all been discussed in debates in the Japanese parliament, the Diet; they are all closely connected with some of the main days of commemoration of the war in China;⁴⁰ and they all conduct commemorative activities that receive media attention on these dates. Finally, they are on the list of 100 model patriotic education bases, along with sites such as the Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square and the Great Wall.

Taken together, seven Japanese museums, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, the Himeyuri Peace Museum, the Yamato Museum, the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots in Chiran and the Yūshūkan received 5,336,123 visitors in 2008 (Minami 2009:36-37). The analysis of Japanese narratives focuses on these museums since they receive the largest number of visitors and can therefore be assumed to have the greatest impact on views about the war. It does, of course, matter *who* visits. If we suppose that schoolchildren are in a phase of their lives in which they are more malleable than adults, it follows that museums that receive schoolchildren in large numbers are more influential.

2.13 Conclusions

This chapter has presented the theoretical concepts central to the study as well as the material that is to be analysed. Simply put, identities are seen as images constructed by groups, the members of which identify to different degrees with these images. Narratives about groups are elaborate anecdotes that instantiate or exemplify such images. Narratives that deal with the past could be said to make up or exemplify the collective memory of a community. Such communities are thus imagined entities. The narratives about the past that are the objects of

³⁹ For example, Murayama became the first Japanese prime minister to visit the War of Resistance Museum. While visiting, Murayama stated that: “I have come to the Marco Polo Bridge, which is one of the symbols of the war that caused a great loss for the Chinese people. It has reminded me of the past and strengthened my determination to work for peace.” In the museum’s guestbook, he wrote: “Face history and wish for Japan-China friendship and everlasting peace” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1995). Hashimoto, who was the first Japanese prime minister to visit north-east China after the war, commented after visiting the museum that: “However easily we forget things, we cannot cast history aside; we must always bear its weight.” However, he also stressed the importance of looking ahead: “By looking squarely at history, we hope the friendship between Japan and China will further develop in the future” (Sasajima 1997). Koizumi visited the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing in 2001 and expressed his “heartfelt apology and condolences” (心からお詫びと哀悼) (Koizumi 2001). The current prime minister, Kan Naoto, laid a wreath for the victims at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial in 2002, when he offered apologies and expressed remorse to some survivors of the Atrocity with whom he met (*Xinhua News Agency* 2002).

⁴⁰ On 18 September 1931, the Japanese army in north-east China exploded a bomb in Mukden (now Shenyang) and blamed the Chinese in order to occupy Manchuria. On 7 July 1937, full-scale war broke out after shots were fired at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge), close to where the War of Resistance Museum is now located. On 13 December 1937, what came to be called the Nanjing Massacre (and the Rape of Nanjing) started as the GMD’s capital, Nanjing, fell.

study are constructed through discourse. They order and connect events into a meaningful story for and about these communities and their members. Three narrative emplotments have been presented – heroic, victim and aggressor emplotments. Chapter 3 discusses methodological concerns, including a method for studying emplotments, which explicates indicators that make it possible to anchor the analysis of narrative emplotments firmly in the material analysed.

Chapter 3: Method

Quite a lot of research has been carried out on narratives dealing with war. In this body of literature, a range of different kinds of narrative are said to exist – victim narratives, victor narratives, aggressor narratives, and so on. However, it is often unclear in the existing scholarship how the analyst recognizes a certain type of narrative when s/he sees one. Moreover, these studies are often preoccupied with one particular case and context. One consequence of this is that these studies do not provide a general framework that can be used in systematic and comparative studies of narratives across contexts. The framework presented here aims to fill this gap by building on and developing existing scholarship. A typology is presented and a method for the systematic study of narratives about war is proposed based on an approach that centres on the depiction of participants in the narratives studied. A general typology and framework for analysis are needed because they make possible systematic and comparative analyses of narratives about war by firmly “anchoring” the interpretations made in the material analysed. Barker and Galasinski (2001:64) argue that, “linguistic analysis of discourse, anchored within systemic-functional linguistics, can help reduce the arbitrariness of interpretation by anchoring it on the discourse itself”. It is sometimes argued that it is the systematization of scholarly inquiry that makes it scientific. Furthermore, a framework is useful for studies in International Relations (IR) since it clarifies how “self” and “other” are depicted in narratives that instantiate the abstract images that are collective identities. Only through systematic and comparative study can we know the similarities and differences between narratives in different contexts. It might be argued that a lack of a systematic comparative focus risks leading to superficial comparisons that shed light on some differences and/or similarities while ignoring others. Such comparisons do only run the risk of creating and/or reinforcing stereotypes and mistaken beliefs, but also fail to contribute to the production of knowledge and useful insights about the phenomena studied.

The analysis is guided by the research questions presented in chapter 1.⁴¹ A central issue concerns *how* events and participants are discursively depicted. This issue is crucial because *content* cannot be adequately studied without paying attention to *form* (e.g. Richardson 2007:46). The study is comparative as it seeks to uncover differences and similarities in the narratives presented at peace and war museums dealing with the war between 1931 and 1945 – both within and between the two countries studied. The research strategy is retroductive, meaning that the researcher moves between the phenomenon studied and the framework employed. The framework, then, is not set in stone from the beginning – adjustments may very well be made along the way (Blaikie 2006:108-14). Furthermore, the approach is interdisciplinary as it combines methods and theoretical assumptions from several fields.⁴²

In this chapter, the material to be analysed is discussed and the methods used are outlined, starting with the method for the contextual analysis. The method employed for the analysis of topics is introduced, and the method for analysing narratives, including the typology for narratives about war, is discussed.

3.1 Context

Disciplines and approaches in the social sciences often analyse texts (in the broader sense of the term) in one form or another, be they speeches, documents, interviews or other representations, including images. Such texts, however, are hardly intelligible without knowledge con-

⁴¹ The contextual analysis answers the following questions: Under *what conditions* are narratives produced in China and Japan about the war in the 1930s and 1940s? What *characterizes* the social and historical contexts in which these museum exhibitions have been produced? The analysis of topics answers the following questions: *Which* topics, among the ones identified, are mentioned in the exhibitions? *How* are the topics mentioned depicted? The analysis of narrative answers the following questions: *What* kinds of narratives can be found and which ones dominate in peace and war museums dealing with the war in the 1930s and 1940s between China and Japan? To satisfactorily answer this question it is also necessary to answer the following question: *How* are these narratives constructed, that is, through what linguistic and other means are they created?

⁴² Theo van Leeuwen has identified three models of interdisciplinarity. The centralist model “sees itself as the centre of the universe of knowledge” (van Leeuwen 2005:3). Such models place the theoretical frameworks, methods and subjects usually studied in the discipline at the centre. The pluralist model, on the other hand, is more interested in issues and problems and its approach to interdisciplinarity is one in which different disciplines cooperate as equal partners and remain autonomous. Edited volumes containing works by scholars from different fields working on the same problem make up a common result of such endeavours. In the integrationist model, finally, researchers bring their special skills to the table and cooperate in a spirit of teamwork based on the idea that the disciplines involved are interdependent. Like the pluralist model it is problem-oriented (van Leeuwen 2005:3-10). Even though I find the attitude to research advocated by those belonging to the integrationist model appealing, a dissertation is written by one person. Nonetheless, since my dissertation project is problem-driven, I believe that an approach which integrates methods and theories from different disciplines is the most promising and fruitful. Obviously, one person cannot do everything well (van Leeuwen 2005:8). My strategy has therefore been to not only immerse myself in the relevant literature in each field but also to try to receive comments on my ideas and work from researchers active in each discipline on which the research project touches.

cerning the circumstances under which they were produced, the history of the ideas articulated and the other texts and ideas that are referred to in the texts analysed. For this reason, approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) stress the importance of context (Wodak & Meyer 2009:20-21, Richardson 2007:20, 24-25, van Dijk 2010, van Dijk 2008:237-47, Wodak & Reisigl 2000:41). Social science has a lot to learn from CDA concerning the treatment and theorization of context. The concept of context employed, like the theoretical framework as a whole, has to be defined by the object of study and depart from the problem central to the study. As is mentioned above, the analysis conducted in this study is divided into two main sections: the contextual analysis and the analysis of narratives. The material analysed in the narrative analysis section does not exist and cannot be understood in a vacuum. The contextual analysis is hence necessary in order to understand the broader implications of the results of the narrative analysis.

On a fundamental level, emphasizing the salience of context entails arguing for events, actions, written or spoken texts, and so on, to be understood within the environments in which they occur. “We thus not only *describe* but especially also *explain* the occurrence or properties of some focal phenomenon in terms of some aspects of its context” (van Dijk 2010:4). The issue of what is *relevant* – and by extension also *irrelevant* – context is one that is seldom given much treatment within the social sciences. Indeed, it is not uncommon to come across texts claiming to present *the* “context” or *the* “relevant context” of a specific phenomenon without referring to a theory of context and without arguing why the context presented is relevant. One argument that could be made is that the context is *indexed* in the text – it is somehow referred to. However, this approach is somewhat unsatisfactory, as some of the factors influencing a text surely are not explicitly referred to. It might instead be argued that the context has to do with the broader *conditions of production* of a text. Put simply, this would include all the factors that influence the production of a text. The question is how the analyst determines what these relevant factors are. An easy solution to this problem does not seem to exist. Two analysts with a broad knowledge of the general and the specific conditions of production may well stress different aspects of the context. If this is the case, the contextual account becomes a theory among others and the plausibility of it will be the object of discussion among scholars. One way of making firmer claims about context might be to demonstrate empirically that a certain kind of phenomenon has occurred and has affected the text, or a text belonging to the same category (or universe or class of events) as that studied, and to argue that it is therefore possible that this has affected or may in the future affect other cases –

or that because this has happened before, those involved in the production of similar texts are likely to be aware of and affected, in one way or another, by it.

The approach to context used here has been adapted from the four-level approach to context developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009:93) (See also Wodak 2008b:12-13). Context is hence divided into four levels:

1. The immediate co-text in which the textual elements analysed appear.
2. Intertextuality – the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, including the origins and history of the discourses.
3. The general and specific extra-linguistic institutional frames in which the narratives analysed are produced.
4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts that the discursive practices are embedded in and related to.

The assumptions regarding co-text posited in the theory of context employed need to be taken into account when the analysis of narratives is conducted. It is therefore not a part of the analysis carried out in the contextual analysis chapters. These chapters instead deal with the three other contextual levels. When the contextual analysis is carried out, it is divided into two main parts: the broader socio-political and historical context, including the history of the relevant discourses; and the analysis of the institutional context in which these particular museums function. As these contexts are discussed, intertextuality and interdiscursivity are taken into account. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are not treated separately but discussed within the other analyses because intertextuality and interdiscursivity often characterize these contexts. Furthermore, they need to be taken into account when the analysis of narratives is conducted.

3.1.1 Text and co-text

To start with, a word needs to be understood in the context of the sentence in which it appears. The sentence is part of a paragraph and an exhibit is part of a larger display. Displays make up parts of sections of exhibitions housed in museums. While the co-text is part of the theory about the context employed, these assumptions matter when conducting an analysis of narratives, rather than when conducting the contextual analysis. Since the objects of study in the analysis of narratives are museum exhibitions, this level of context has to take account of theoretical assumptions central to the study of museum exhibitions.

The exhibitions dealt with here, in contrast to some exhibitions, are governed by historical themes rather than by available objects. When objects and images are put on display in a historical exhibition they have already been taken out of their original context and are re-contextualized. As they are re-contextualized they become infused with the values of the new context. In such exhibitions, artefacts and images lose their primacy and become subordinate to the themes. Their function is mainly corroborative. They “give added force to the argument” (Crew & Sims 1991:171, cf. Barthes 1977:32-51). An image may have several possible meanings and the text is used to tie one of these down – it is used to *fix* the meaning (Barthes 1977:39). Even though images make strong impressions and the images may be what the visitors remember, the text tells visitors *how* they are to be remembered. Different images can, of course, accompany similar texts. For example, the text “in December 1937 the Japanese military captured Nanjing and committed the Nanjing massacre” may be accompanied by either an image showing the Japanese troops marching into Nanjing or Chinese soldiers defending Nanjing or by one of the Chinese victims of the massacre. Moreover, images and headings, can draw the visitor’s attention to a section of an exhibition.

Of course, there may be contradictions between texts and images just as there are contradictions in society. It has been argued that “societies are not homogeneous, but composed of groups with varying, and often contradictory, interests, the messages produced by individuals will reflect the differences, incongruities and clashes which characterize social life” (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:18).⁴³ The possibility of contradictions between texts and images cannot be ignored. However, even when such contradictions do exist, they may be difficult to detect.⁴⁴ The narrative, it could perhaps be said, has an overwhelming function and has been designed in order to hide such contradictions. In addition, the narrative may also possess an emotional force that further serves to obscure contradictions. It is therefore unlikely that the casual visitor will notice such ambiguities. Nonetheless, the analyst needs to be aware of the possibility of their existence. The argument that objects and images are subordinate to narratives is further indicated by the fact that some objects are created to illustrate the narrative. Whereas some objects on display are historical artefacts, others have been created to be displayed. Statues and paintings that illustrate historical events belong to this category of objects that differ from artefacts used in the past.

⁴³ For example, an image used in an advertisement, which is clearly sexist, may be accompanied by a text that goes out of its way not to be (Kress & van Leeuwen:18).

3.1.2 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity

Intertextuality concerns how texts are related to other texts, that is, how they are referred to and discussed in other texts (Fairclough 1992:102). Different settings are interrelated through intertextuality: “Ostensibly unrelated institutions and genres, such as cabinet, parliament, school, pub, TV, press, exhibition and film are connected via the process of discursive recontextualization” (Heer & Wodak 2008:12). We hence have a theoretical argument, according to which the narratives on which the analysis is centred are related to other texts in other arenas. Empirical evidence to illustrate this argument is presented in chapters 4 and 5.

Texts are never constructed in a vacuum. They exist in relation to other texts, past and present. Intertextuality “signals the accumulation and generation of meaning across texts where all meanings depend on other meanings” (Barker & Galasinski 2001:69). These texts include excerpts from and are based on other texts. Texts are interrelated in that they refer to the same events and the same participants. It could be said that a “text responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in so doing helps to make history and contributes to the wider process of change, as well as anticipating and trying to shape subsequent texts” (Fairclough 1992:102). This means that “written texts can be part of an ongoing communicative interaction – for example, a dispute or a supplication or a political agenda – that in subtle and profound ways shapes the narrative text” (Ochs 1998:188). It can therefore be said that texts can be seen as answers to other texts and to situations. Situations, such as societal circumstances, may give rise to questions. Specific texts and narratives may be produced as responses to such circumstances (Ochs 1998:188). Narratives in museum exhibitions are thus answers to or comments on other texts or situations. A narrative presented at a museum could be described as the end of a textual chain (Wodak 2008b:18). This means that in the course of planning an exhibition, curators may have received comments from citizens, the government or other groups concerned about the content of the planned exhibition. Newspaper articles may have criticized certain parts of the plans. The end result or outcome of such discussions and comments would be the end of the textual chain. However, in the case of museum exhibitions, such end results will not necessarily exist for eternity – they can be changed. An exhibition may be revised because it is criticized after it has opened. The curators may be alerted to factual errors in the exhibition. It is also possible that if an exhibition becomes a huge suc-

⁴⁴ They are arguably easier to notice in advertisements that may contain a single image and a short text. However, in a museum exhibition, consisting of a large number of images, objects and texts telling the story of a specific historical period, it will be considerably more difficult to identify such inconsistencies.

cess, money is allocated to enlarge it. Exhibitions are not just responses to other texts; they also provoke reactions and responses. They are discussed and touched on in other texts.⁴⁵ The museums studied here are based on and sometimes make references to other texts. Similarly, other texts may refer to these museums or to what is stated in a particular display in a museum. Newspaper articles, for example, may report on museums. When someone makes an argument in a text, s/he may refer to an exhibit in an exhibition because the museum is considered a reliable source. Museums and their exhibits may also be referred to in parliamentary debates, as is shown below.

As is noted above, arguments may be transferred from one text to another. When a textual element is taken out of one context and inserted into another it is first de-contextualized (from the original context) and then re-contextualized into another. Such re-contextualization causes a partial change in meaning in the textual element. How meaning changes is linked to the context into which it is re-contextualized – to the values and interests of the new context (Heer & Wodak 2008:12, van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999:93-98). Re-contextualization is always part of representation. In the words of van Leeuwen and Wodak, “(i)n the case of a discursive practice, we represent (report, explain, analyse, teach, interpret, dramatize, critique, etc.) some other social practice(s), whether discursive or not, and this therefore always takes place outside the context of the represented practice” (1999:96). All this, of course, has consequences for all representations of historical events, no matter whether it is a history textbook, a museum exhibition or a study conducted by a history professor.

3.1.3 The broader socio-political and historical contexts

Outlining the societal and historical contexts within which the museums operate is crucial to understanding the meaning of the exhibitions on display. Without such contextual knowledge it is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding their functions in relation to domestic identity politics. For example, it is noted above that different groups within a society make their

⁴⁵ A quote made by a politician may, for example, be taken out of the context in which it was originally uttered and re-contextualized to fit an argument made by a journalist or political opponent of the politician. In this process, then, something that was uttered in one context may be repeated in another context. When this is done, the speaker may wish to draw on the connotations of the original context or simply ridicule the original speaker. A person who starts a speech with the words “I have a dream” is most probably aware of the speech made by the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and may wish the image of the Reverend to pop up into the heads of the audience. Invoking other texts and the connotations of those texts thus has to do with meaning-making. The meaning of the words uttered, however, will differ from the words as they were uttered in the original context. This is also the case when historical events or objects are referred to or represented. They are taken out of their original context and represented.

own readings of the past, stressing certain national “traits” and values as being distinctive of the members of the group. If the members of the group adopt such narratives it may have an impact on their behaviour. However, without knowledge of the societal context it is difficult to understand how such narratives may fit into the domestic context. Information on the societal and historical contexts is indispensable for an understanding of how a particular historical narrative presented in a museum is connected to other societal domains and larger political debates. Paying attention to the historical context involves providing an account of how views of the past have developed historically in the context studied. An important aspect of this contextualization has to do with groups that have created certain discourses and their domestic political objectives. These discourses may have developed and been used to achieve certain aims in the past and may be used again, for similar or different purposes, in a new context.

3.1.4 The institutional context

The museums studied operate under certain contextual conditions and constraints that may vary between and within societies. A distinction is made between the institutional context, which includes the more specific conditions under which texts are produced and the broader socio-political conditions. The broader political context is considered in the analysis of the socio-political and historical context and does not deal specifically and narrowly with the context in which museums operate. The institutional context can be divided into general and specific contextual information. The former refers to general information concerning museum exhibitions in China and Japan respectively, whereas the latter has to do with contextual information regarding specific exhibitions, for example, episodes that can help to explain the presence or absence of a certain exhibit in a particular exhibition. Of course, such specific contextual information may be regarded as part of the general context, especially if similar episodes involving other museum exhibitions have occurred. Specific contextual information may thus be provided in the analysis of a particular narrative in order to explain or contextualize a particular exhibit. General contextual information, on the other hand, is provided in chapters 4 and 5.

3.2 Analysis of topics

Topical analysis is used in several approaches to CDA, often as the first step in a project that after this initial investigation moves on to conduct a closer examination of linguistic realiza-

tions (Wodak & Reisigl 2000:36-40, Jäger & Maier 2009:53-54, Huckin 2002:347-72). The present study draws on all these approaches to the analysis of discourse topics, but develops a way of conducting such analysis that takes account of the specific object of study.

An analysis of topics makes it possible to provide an overview of the themes or topics dealt with in particular exhibitions. Such an analysis is useful when dealing with large amounts of material, as is the case here. Obviously, the analysis has its merits as well as its disadvantages. For example, it provides insights concerning which events, phenomena or themes are mentioned in a large number of exhibitions, thereby providing an overview of the content and facilitating a comparison within and between the countries dealt with. It therefore makes it possible to see whether certain themes dominate in one country whereas other themes are more common in the other. That a topic is mentioned does not necessarily mean much. Attention is therefore also paid to *how* these events are depicted. Since this analysis is far from exhaustive, however, it is followed by an in-depth analysis of the narratives of some of the more prominent museums. The analysis of topics is similar to the one performed in chapter 1, on how the “history issue” in Sino-Japanese relations has been defined in scholarly works and newspaper articles.

The topical content of the exhibitions is analysed in order to provide an overview of how a number of events and phenomena are depicted. This overview is a first basis for comparison and provides insights concerning how the war is contextualized. While the interest is chiefly in how the war period between 1931 and 1945 is depicted, some narratives may start in 1937, ignoring the events that preceded the outbreak of full-scale war on 7 July 1937. Other narratives may begin with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. In contrast to what is the case in Europe, in East Asia, colonialism and war are often conflated in historical narratives. Other stories may continue into the post-war period, emphasizing for example decolonization around the world or the Cold War and the nuclear age. All these different ways of contextualizing the events that took place during the war affect the overall meaning of the presentation.

By checking which topics can be found in particular cases it is possible to see which topics are frequently dealt with and which ones are often left out. Nonetheless, since the focus is on Sino-Japanese relations, disparities between Chinese and Japanese representations are of course a central concern. How are topics to be chosen? There are several ways of drawing up a long list of topics. For example, the researcher may come up with topics through a process of “soaking and poking”, that is, immersing oneself in the material. Familiarity with

the historical period dealt with makes it possible to produce a large number of topics. However, since the material is extensive and especially since the aim of this initial analysis is to provide an overview of how the war is treated in Chinese and Japanese narratives, the number of topics should be kept small. A small selection of topics makes it possible to analyse not just *if* but also *how* these topics are depicted. Since it is an overview we are after, major events and phenomena should be chosen.

The following topics were selected for this study: the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the September 18 Incident (1931), the Lugouqiao (卢沟桥), or Marco Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937), the Nanjing Atrocity, the “comfort women”, the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and/or Nagasaki, and the War Crimes trials and the post-war era. This analysis provides an overview that makes it possible to get a rough idea of how the events treated are contextualized but does not go as deep into the specifics as the analysis of narratives does. Attention is paid to vocabulary, that is, how events are labelled, as this is, in some cases, crucial to the meaning conveyed. In Japanese debates about history, different ideological positions are reflected in different wordings. For example, leftists usually refer to the war as a whole as an “aggressive war” (侵略戦争) while conservatives may admit that “aggressive acts” (侵略行為 *shinryaku kôï*) were committed. Right-wingers may deny that aggressive acts were committed and instead claim the war was just. The word ‘*shinryaku*’ (侵略) also means “invasion”. When used to refer to an invasion, however, it is implied that the invasion was an aggressive one. In less critical narratives words such as ‘*shinshutsu*’ (進出), meaning “advance”, may be used (Seaton 2006:20-21, Yamazaki 2006:157-58).⁴⁶ That these different referential choices ascribe different meanings to events should be obvious.

In sum, the analysis of topics answers the following questions: Which topics, among those identified, are mentioned in the exhibitions? *How* are the topics mentioned? This analysis is similar to the one performed in chapter 1, which examined how the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations has been defined in scholarly works and newspaper articles.

3.3 Analysing narratives about war

The analysis of narratives is divided into three main parts – the discursive construction of groups, the narratives per se and the interpretations of the narratives or stories told in the form

of historical lessons for the present and future. Before moving on to discussing these three parts in more detail, it is necessary to briefly discuss issues concerning CDA and language.

3.3.1 CDA and issues concerning language

Most studies based on CDA deal with texts in European languages. This does not, however, mean that CDA analyses cannot be performed on texts in non-European languages. Indeed, it has been stated that one of the most important issues for CDA to deal with is comparative studies across linguistic and cultural boundaries, in order to overcome the Euro-centrism that has characterized it (Wodak & Meyer 2009:14). Analyses of texts have been conducted in Chinese and Japanese. However, even though the basic assumptions governing CDA are the same in all languages, attention needs to be paid to differences in the functional grammar between languages since such differences may involve differences in lexical choice. Put differently – while it is possible to choose between different lexical choices in one language, it is not always possible to choose in another language. The range of choices may differ somewhat. This has been pointed out with regard to the study of Chinese discourses by Fang (1994:468-69), and concerning Japanese ones by Barnard (2003:257-58). Hence, studies of the metafunctional grammar of the Chinese and Japanese languages have been consulted (Halliday & McDonald 2004:305-393, Teruya 2004:185-249). In the present study, however, the material is so extensive that only very basic grammatical constructions are analysed.

It is sometimes argued that the history-related problems in Sino-Japanese relations are linked to cultural and linguistic differences: “many Japanese argue that *shinshitsu* [sic] (advance into) and *jiken* (incident) are not such benign terms as they may sound in Chinese, and hence their use in describing Japanese action in China does not amount to white-washing. With apparent sincerity, some Japanese and even Chinese say that cultural misunderstanding has exacerbated the history problem between the two countries. While the Japanese prefer to be ambiguous, they argue the Chinese style is more direct” (Yang, D. 2002:18-19). Some argue that the Japanese language makes use of passive forms to a larger extent than other languages and that such usage does not imply that the author of a text is trying to obfuscate agency. While this argument certainly has some currency, for example, in that vagueness and passive verb forms are more common in Japanese and explicitness often characterizes Chinese, this kind of reasoning borders on a linguistic determinism that is

⁴⁶ The question of wording is even subtler when it comes to how the war itself is labelled. Defenders of the war

highly questionable. Nor can it explain the empirical fact that the same event is labelled differently within a certain language (e.g. massacre or incident), or that some events are labelled massacre and other events incident. This goes not only for the labelling of events but also for the use of verb forms and nominalizations – comparison can reveal such differences. To understand such variance it is necessary to look beyond language to political and ideological factors. Language, in other words, is determined by ideological persuasion, not the other way around. The ideological point of view of a speaker or writer determines linguistic realization (unless the speaker/writer manages to hide her convictions). For example, it seems reasonable to assume that, even though both countries use the Korean language, constraints on linguistic realization differ in the Koreas. Grammatical limitations may of course exist but apart from these there are almost certainly societal constraints that have little to do with inherent features of language and much to do with ideological biases. Hence, those belonging to a group with a certain political conviction within a country may label an event a massacre while their political opponents prefer the term incident. It may also be that an event during which members of an out-group victimized members of an in-group is labelled a massacre whereas if the opposite is the case it is labelled an incident. The empirical existence of variance in reference to events and actions refutes the linguistic determinist argument. As long as there is linguistic choice the determinist argument lacks currency.

It also needs to be emphasized that far-reaching conclusions are not drawn on the basis of one or a few instances of passive verb forms. Other factors and representational choices are taken into account. Conclusions are therefore drawn on the basis of patterns that go far beyond verb forms. Other linguistic elements and the overall choice of content are taken into consideration.

3.3.2 The discursive construction of groups

This section addresses the issue of how to analyse which types of identity category are constructed and stressed as well as whether and how in-groups and out-groups are constructed and emphasized. When analysing specific narratives one of the most fundamental concerns is how key protagonists are referred to. In research on narratives about war (as in IR) it is often assumed before the analysis that the relevant identity category is the national. Such an assumption makes it less likely that the analyst will discover any other possible identity cate-

often label it “the Greater East Asian War” while progressives prefer the term “15-year war”.

gories. Indeed, a narrative may be interpreted as a national one even though it does not stress the national category. By treating the discursive construction of groups as an empirical issue it is possible to avoid the potential pitfall of presuming all narratives to be national ones that stress the national category to an equal extent. What kinds of communities are discursively constructed and stressed? Are the terms employed when referring to participants used in a consistent manner? Are national, local or other identity categories emphasized and what consequences does this have? What kinds of identity categories are visitors encouraged to identify with? Michael Billig has argued that the constant reproduction of nationhood through the use of what are often understood as “banal” national symbols is not innocent: “Nationhood is still being reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are flagged” (Billig 1995:8). It can also be reproduced through the telling of certain stories and through the use of a certain kind of language when telling such stories.

The discursive construction of groups might be regarded as a strategy employed in the construction of narratives. Strategy, as the word is conventionally used, has connotations of cold calculation. Here, however, it is understood as being more complex. Agents have been socialized into behaving in a certain way (partly through their exposure to narratives about the group with which they are encouraged to identify) and their freedom of action is hence not absolute. As Wodak et al. puts it: “Strategic action is oriented towards a goal but not necessarily planned to the last detail or strictly instrumentalist: strategies can also be applied automatically” (Wodak et al. 2009:32). Linguistically, group belonging can be expressed, for example, by using the pronoun “we” (Wodak 2002:152-53). This pronoun often plays a central role in texts since it is open to manipulation (Barker & Galasinski 2001:74-75). It can be used to linguistically realize communities (Íñigo-Mora 2004:27-52). The use of the pronoun we, often in connection with the name of a national group, for example “we Swedes”, is not necessarily done in a calculating way but may be used more or less automatically because the agent using it has been socialized into identifying with the imagined community made up by Swedes. Nonetheless, in texts that have been prepared in advance for a certain purpose, for example, speeches by politicians and museum exhibitions, a higher level of calculation can be expected. When delivering a public speech domestically, a prime minister or president of a country is more likely to use the pronoun we in this way as the result of calculation in an attempt to appeal to or construct a national identity.

While the pronoun we is perhaps more common, for example, in speeches than in narratives presented at history museums, there are other ways of linguistically expressing

group belonging. Such expressions include compound words such as the Japanese “*wagakuni*” (我が国) and the Chinese “*woguo*” (我国), both meaning “our country”. There are also similar words such as the Chinese “*zuguo*” (祖国) and the Japanese equivalent “*sokoku*” (祖国), often translated as “motherland” although “ancestor land” would be closer to its literal meaning. Other expressions of such strategies include phrases such as “to take on something together” and “to cooperate and stick together” (Wodak 2002:152). These elements “invite identification and solidarity with the ‘we-group’, which, however, at the same time implies distancing from and marginalization of ‘others’” (Wodak 2002:153, cf. Dierkes 2005:262).⁴⁷

Metaphors can also be used to stress group belonging. Metaphors involve the representation of something as something else. Metaphors involve similar qualities being transferred from one area to another. To take just one common example, anthropomorphizing a state or a country personifies it, making identification and solidarity with the entity easier (Wodak & Reisigl 2000:58). Such anthropomorphization can take the form of the state-as-person metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 2003). This involves the conceptualization of a state “as a person, engaging in social relations within a world community. Its land-mass is its home. It lives in a neighborhood, and has neighbors, friends and enemies. States are seen as having inherent dispositions: they can be peaceful or aggressive, responsible or irresponsible, industrious or lazy” (Lakoff 1991). Such a conceptualization obscures the internal make-up of a state, for example, differences concerning religion, ethnicity and class. Such “metaphors imply intra-national sameness” (Wodak et al. 2009:44). It therefore presents the state in a way that encourages identification with it at the same time as it stresses unity and obfuscates domestic differences of opinion. This discussion points to the fact that participants in narratives do not necessarily need to be individuals or groups of people – they may be states or other entities.

In any given sentence, there are always several choices concerning how to refer to a participant. Participants may be labelled as collectives or members of collectives or as individuals. The labels used may also have positive or negative connotations. One classic ex-

⁴⁷ Put another way, choices of vocabulary do not just “project meaning and social values onto the referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that *other* social actors are referred to and represented” (Richardson 2007:50). Hence, some participants in a story may be referred to in a way that turns them into “bad guys” while others are referred to in a way that construes them as “good guys”. The values associated with the labelling of one participant are, in other words, added further meaning in relation to the values that the reference of another social actor connotes. Such descriptions are often related to the in-group/out-group nexus. The device that van Dijk calls the ideological square, mentioned above, neatly sums up how this functions. According to van Dijk, when this device is employed, the good actions/qualities of the in-group and the bad actions/qualities of the out-group will be foregrounded while the bad actions/qualities of the in-group and the good qualities/actions of the out-group will be backgrounded (van Dijk 1998:33).

ample is that one person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist. However, there are many other examples. The terrorist/freedom fighter could be described in many other ways, for example, as a "family man", "golf player", "city-dweller", "accountant", "33-year old", "heterosexual", "activist", "amateur singer" or "wannabe rock star". Any person could be described in a number of ways. None of these labels is necessarily incorrect. When a choice is made between these different labels, however, this will have consequences for how the person is understood. Some group memberships are highlighted. In Richardson's (2007:49) words: "We all simultaneously possess a range of identities, roles and characteristics that could be used to describe us equally *accurately* but not with the same meaning". In this sentence, Richardson hints at what could perhaps be regarded as a general principle in critical analyses of texts – that an account can be factually correct but still highly ideological. When a text is analysed, it is not so much scrutinized for inaccuracies (even though occasionally what most historians consider to be factual errors may be discovered) as for expressions of an ideological nature. Choosing to label a participant in one way rather than another may be the result of a strategy of seeking to portray the participant in either a positive or a negative way. Part of such a strategy may be a willingness to depict the participant as someone to be identified with. The participant may, for example, be described as an exceptionally good example of how a member of the in-group should behave and identification is thus encouraged. One way of encouraging identification is to *humanize* the participant, to portray her/him as a person who leads or led a life similar to that led by most members of a particular community.

To this could perhaps be added that it might be useful to explore the extent to which actions are described in a way that presents them as qualities, that is, as durable traits that cause a person to act in a certain way. Categories for classification have differed between different historical periods as well as between cultures: "What in one period or culture is represented as 'doing', as a more or less impermanent role, may in another be represented as 'being', as a more or less fixed identity" (van Leeuwen 1996:54-55). Furthermore, it seems reasonable to believe that the good actions of the in-group, if we follow van Dijk's reasoning on which the ideological square is based, will be presented as the result of the in-group's inherent qualities, and so on. The logic is that: "We are good and therefore we do good". It then follows that: "No, a member of our group could never do that. We don't do such things".⁴⁸

⁴⁸ This relation between actions and qualities is interesting. A politician may admit to having taken some illegal substances while partying as a student but would probably not admit to having been (or still being) a junkie. In this case, there is no "objective" way of determining where the line is to be drawn between action and quality. When does drug use turn someone into a junkie? Of course, it can certainly be argued that when use turns into an

The point is that when conducting an analysis attention needs to be paid to whether a participant *does* something or whether s/he *is* something. The issue of appraisal in representations is therefore important – “social actors are appraised when they are referred to in terms which evaluate them, as good or bad, loved or hated, admired or pitied” (van Leeuwen 1996:58).

As is discussed below, in any given sentence, there are always several choices concerning how to refer to participants. When it comes to the construction of groups, it is salient whether participants are labelled as collectives, members of collectives or individuals. For example, are participants labelled as members of groups such as “Japanese”, “Japanese citizens” or “citizens of Tokyo” or are they individuals? In other words, to what extent is a group constructed and is this group the members of a nation, those who dwell in a particular city or those who belong to a certain organization?

3.3.3 Analysing narratives

Previous research on narratives about war in China and Japan were briefly discussed in chapter 2. It was noted that although a number of different narratives are referred to, there is no satisfying typology or method for studying such narratives. It was also stated that such a typology has been developed for this study, in which three main types of emplotment and participant are distinguished – victims, aggressors and heroes. This approach contributes to the study of narratives about war by presenting specific indicators that make it possible to anchor the analysis in the material analysed, thereby facilitating systematic analysis. This section explains this method in more detail.

Heroes and aggressors are usually portrayed linguistically and in images as actors – they carry out actions. Victims, on the other hand, are on the receiving end of actions – they are acted on and often referred to in the CDA literature as patients. As is mentioned in chapter 2, elements in the narratives studied that depict or draw attention to these participants are emplotments. This gives us a typology of narratives about war in which there are three main emplotments – the heroic, the perpetrator and the victim emplotment. The attribution of responsibility is central to the approach to the study of narratives developed here in that in a pure victim emplotment history happens rather than being made. This obfuscates responsi-

addiction this makes the person using a junkie. However, judgement is not always based on such criteria and some may still brand a person who has stopped using drugs a junkie. It is easier when the referent word has to do with a profession. I teach from Monday to Friday every week and hence I am a teacher. However, with other labels it is more difficult to decide when action turns into quality and when behaviour becomes identity. How many lies do you have to tell to be a liar? The answer to this question is less clear-cut.

bility. Heroes and perpetrators, on the other hand, are ascribed agency, although the former is evaluated in a positive and the other a negative light. Other types of participants, such as witnesses, bystanders and traitors, sometimes figure in narratives. However, in the narratives studied, victims, perpetrators and heroes dominate, and the others do not figure as the main protagonist. When analysing the depiction of participants, methods for analysing texts as well as images and objects are employed.

Different kinds of emplotment are realized partly through the use of certain kinds of linguistic construction as well as through the use of images and objects that direct attention to certain types of participant. Here, the qualifier “partly” is used to direct attention to an important feature of the way in which the analysis is performed and to avoid a misunderstanding that is sometimes directed towards linguistic analyses in social science, namely, that the analysis of the form, that is, *how* something is expressed, involves ignoring the contents, that is, *what* is being stated. While what is articulated is indeed analysed, the analysis also inquires into *how* it is being said since it is believed that paying attention to *how* something is expressed will provide a fuller understanding of *what is* and *what is not* being said. When something is expressed in a certain way, a choice is made not to express it in another way. These choices are a question not just of form but also of substance. It could even be said that substance, in part, is a matter of form: “*how* something is said is inseparably linked with *what* is said” (Pollack 2008a:133). Agency, then, is central to the conceptualization of narrative emplotment. It is by examining the issue of agency that the lead actor in a narrative can be identified and a decision can be made concerning whether we are dealing with a victim, an aggressor or a hero emplotment. A specific narrative, it should be remembered, may include elements stressing several different emplotments, although in a particular type of narrative a certain emplotment may dominate to a large extent.

Textual analysis that focuses on the *form* of texts is employed more or less by all approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g. Wodak & Meier 2009:28, van Dijk 2009:69-71, 114, van Leeuwen 2008:144-60, Fairclough 2009:162-83). In the analysis conducted here, the emphasis is on the depiction of the participants in the narratives studied. The way participants and their actions are labelled is of great importance for the meaning conveyed since “(t)he ‘same’ experience or object will be *worded* differently from perspectives which are differently discursively framed” (Locke 2004:50). As is mentioned in the section dealing with the discursive construction of groups there are several choices concerning how to label participants. Moreover, participants in events, as well as the events per se, are

assigned qualities through the use of predication. Such predication can be “used to criticise, undermine and vilify certain social actors” (Richardson 2007:53). Predicates, like other linguistic elements, serve the function of foregrounding and backgrounding. They are hence “linguistically more or less evaluative (deprecatory or appreciative), explicit or implicit and – like reference and argumentation – specific or vague/evasive” (Wodak & Reisigl 2000:54). In the following two examples (in which the predicates are italicized) predication results in very different meanings: “the police beat the demonstrators *in self defence*.”; “the police *brutally* beat the demonstrators.” Predication, then, is closely related to the attribution of responsibility and the circumstances surrounding an action. It can be used to tone down responsibility or to provide an excuse or extenuating circumstances. It can also serve to highlight responsibility or point to aggravating circumstances. Choices regarding predication will have consequences for the impression receivers get of a participant.⁴⁹

Action is at the heart of the analysis of how participants are depicted in narratives about war. The analysis of who does what to whom is central to arriving at a conclusion concerning what kind of emplotment we are dealing with. The depiction of action involves several choices that all affect how an action is perceived. To start with, if an action is described using a verb there is a choice among what kind of verb to use. Consider the following sentence: “The soldiers dealt with/got rid of/killed/massacred/butchered the villagers.” These verbs may all describe the same event. Furthermore, the choices between active and passive verb forms (transitivity) as well as nominalizations are central to the analysis (Barker & Galasinski 2001:70-71, Richardson 2007:54-59, Fairclough 1992:235-36). Transitivity “enables the representation in multiple ways of an implied extra-linguistic reality” (Barker & Galasinski 2001:70). It is a matter of how different kinds of process type relate to the depiction of participants in a text. Taken together, linguistic choices present drastically different realities. The meanings of the following two examples are quite different because of the differences in predication: “the police *brutally* beat the peaceful demonstrators”; “the police were *forced to* beat the *rioting* demonstrators”. Responsibility for this incident is linguistically assigned to the police in the first example while in the second “the rioting demonstrators” are

⁴⁹ Consider, for example, that a newspaper writes, “disgraced bribe taker John Smith claims to be innocent.” Here the referent “John Smith” is predicated by “bribe taker”, which could have been the referent of the sentence had “John Smith” been omitted. In that case, “bribe taker” would have been predicated by disgraced. As the sentence now stands, it is likely that more than a few newspaper readers will believe John Smith to be guilty. After all, he is described as both a bribe taker and disgraced. This kind of predication clearly undermines John Smith’s credibility.

largely to blame. If the vocabulary and transitivity are changed, the meaning is further altered: “the *rioting* militants *were dealt with*”. In this sentence not only is the violence of the police is omitted and replaced by the imprecise “dealt with”, but the passive form also serves to exclude the agent behind the action. Similarly, in narratives dealing with war, actors and their actions may be positively or negatively labelled and predicated, thereby depicting the actors as heroes or perpetrators. By excluding perpetrators the emphasis is put, to a greater extent, on the victim.

Attention is also paid to whether and how agents are presented in images, statues and objects. These may draw attention to certain participants or types of participant. It is entirely possible that there are no images of actors in an exhibition. It is also possible that the centre of attention of an exhibition is one or several participants. In depictions of participants in images several aspects should be taken into account. For example, different kinds of imaginary relations can be established between the viewer of and the participant depicted in the image. They can, for example, be shown in close-ups that make them appear as friends of the viewer: “pictures can give us close-ups of people who, in reality, are and will remain strangers to us” (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:135). The portrayal of participants in images can, then, contribute to the creation of imagined relations between strangers and the creation of imagined communities. Furthermore, a frontal angle increases the viewer’s involvement with the represented participant. In comparison, by placing participants far away from the viewer, making them small, they appear as strangers. Moreover, an oblique angle, as opposed to a frontal one, creates an impression of detachment and “otherness” (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:130-46, van Leeuwen 2008:137-41). If participants look back at the viewer this is often interpreted as a symbolic demand, the participant is depicted as wanting something from the viewer – if not the viewer becomes a voyeur, s/he can watch the participants without engaging with them (van Leeuwen 2008:140-41).

Images and displays can show objects and participants in static or dynamic ways. Classificatory displays or images of objects involve the objects being depicted statically. Such static depictions may, of course, be accompanied by vivid textual descriptions even though the images or objects in themselves lack such vividness and dynamism. Images may, on the other hand, contain agents that use objects in a way that is similar to textual depictions. Actors may, as in written sentences, perform different acts. These acts may or may not be directed towards other participants, that is, goals or patients (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:43-44). In such action processes, actors are often “the most salient participants, through

size, place in the composition, contrast against background, colour saturation or conspicuousness, sharpness of focus, and through the ‘psychological salience’, which certain participants (e.g. the human figure, and even more so, the human face) have for viewers” (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:61). Such action clauses always contain a vector, “formed by depicted elements that form an oblique line, often a quite strong, diagonal line” (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:57). Imagine, for example, an image in which hunters holding their raised rifles can be seen in the foreground, moving in the direction of their prey – animals that can be seen drinking water from a river in the background. In such an image, the hunters are portrayed as salient in that they are foregrounded, they are larger than the backgrounded animals and they move in the direction of the animals. In such an image, a vector can be said to emanate from the raised rifles carried by the hunters in the direction of the animals who make up the goal of the action. However, actions in images do not always have goals. For example, in an image showing soldiers marching in a certain direction it may be unclear whether they are marching towards a goal. In an image showing soldiers (in the foreground) attacking, for example, a post held by the enemy (in the background) the latter will function as goal or patient (Cf. Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:43-78). Agency can be depicted in this way not just in images but also in three-dimensional visual representation, for example, in statues and sculptures. Statues and sculptures are often among the largest and most eye-catching exhibits in museums. They are often placed outside museums and are therefore among the first exhibits encountered by the visitor. Participants depicted in sculptures can have the same vectorial structure as participants in images. Arms, for example, often form vectors that imply either transitive action to a goal or a goalless, non-transitive action (Kress & van Leeuwen 2003:242-43).

Agency and hence participants, then, can be depicted, obfuscated and excluded not just in texts but also in images. As is pointed out by van Leeuwen, there is a “difference between, on the one hand, ‘personalised’ pictures of bombardments, say in feature film sequences showing, in close up, the faces of the crew as they drop the bombs, as well as the faces of the villagers down below as they are about to be bombed, and, on the other hand, diagrams of the same event, for instance maps with large arrows pointing at the targets and schematic drawings representing the explosions” (van Leeuwen 1996:34). The same goes for the use of images in museum exhibitions, although these are often accompanied by textual elements or put in a context that may or may not explain who is being bombed and who is doing the bombing. In other words, perpetrators, heroes and victims, may or may not be part of an image. Hence, even though texts often tell us how to interpret images, images can speak

for themselves, although they may not always do so as explicitly and eloquently. Moreover, images in these exhibitions are seldom allowed to speak for themselves since texts tell visitors how to interpret them.

Objects may be displayed in order to illustrate the effects of an action or event. These objects usually do not, in themselves, point to a particular agent or patient. The context of the display may, however, make it obvious to the visitor that the object on display has been affected (and perhaps deformed) through a certain event. This, as is shown below, is the case, for example, with many objects on display at the museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The effects of the atomic bombs are illustrated by these objects. These displays are accompanied by texts, which highlight some of the circumstances and stories related to the objects rather than others. In other words and more generally, objects as well as images can be used, often together with text, to draw attention either to actors – usually perpetrators or heroes – or to those acted on – often victims. Just like textual elements, images and objects may, in other words, draw attention to heroes, perpetrators or victims and thereby make up elements of heroic, aggressor or victim emplotments.

In research on Chinese portrayals of the war, two main narratives are usually detected – victim and victor narratives. The victor narratives stress the heroic acts of the Chinese, while in victim narratives the experiences of Chinese victims of Japanese aggression and the acts of the Japanese aggressors are focused on. These victim narratives, then, deal both with Japanese aggression and Chinese victimhood. However, I argue that these two emplotments should not be conflated but instead separated into two. It is clear that this is possible since in some Japanese depictions of victims of, for example, the nuclear bombings, as becomes evident in the analysis of narratives below, the perpetrator, that is, the agent who dropped the bomb, is often omitted through the use of linguistic strategies. In addition, a participant in a narrative about war does not have to be a victor to be portrayed as heroic. For example, in the Japanese case actors may be described as heroic even though they are not depicted as victors. The term “victor narrative” is narrower than “heroic narrative” and it is useful to employ terms that can be applied to experiences characterized by defeat as well as victory. In this study, then, the term “heroic emplotment” is used whereas “victor emplotment” is not. It is also possible to stress sacrifice, with its more volitional and heroic connotations, rather than victimhood, which lacks such implications and to a greater extent suggests the existence of an assailant. One common characteristic of victim narratives (in its ideal type form) is that, as Neumann contends, “history isn’t made but happens” (2009). In other words, history is ex-

perienced, endured or suffered. When history simply happens there is no agency, those who experience it do not shape it, they do not act and they are hence not responsible (Neumann 2009:188).

When we come across stories about the deaths of members of the in-group we cannot assume right away that we are dealing with a victim narrative. Those who die are not necessarily victims. Members of the in-group who die can also be portrayed as heroes. In such cases, in contrast to the portrayal of victims, the hero is often depicted as an active subject performing an action rather than as the object of an action. Consider the following phrase: “The compatriots laid down their lives for their motherland”. In this sentence, those who die *act* – they are not simply acted on. Linguistically, they perform the action of “laying down their lives”, an action that has heroic, voluntary and patriotic connotations. There is a significant difference, in other words, between martyrdom and victimhood. Of course, the verb “sacrifice” can be used with an object – to sacrifice someone or something. When someone is sacrificed, she or he is often a victim, as, for example, in the phrase “a sacrificial lamb”. In Japanese and Chinese there are similar distinctions between the active act of sacrificing oneself and the passive act of being sacrificed. Importantly, heroes cannot be aggressors or otherwise negatively depicted, as this nullifies their heroic status.

The example mentioned above illustrates how the creation of meaning through the use of heroic tales is often connected to an imagined community – the heroes in a heroic narrative are often the heroes of a particular community and if they “lay down their lives” they are usually portrayed as having done so in the name of the community. Other actions performed by the heroes are similarly portrayed as acts carried out for the greater good of the group rather than for narrow purposes such as personal fame, selfishness or self-preservation. Such heroic acts can therefore be taken as exemplifying how an ideal member of the community should behave. The heroes are sometimes portrayed as embodying the values of the community, that is, the values that a model member of the community should possess. Even in peacetime, there is ample space for unselfish acts for the greater common good. While such acts may not go as far as “laying down one’s life” they may include other sacrifices for the sake of the community.

In a perpetrator narrative, the actor committing the act plays the leading role. The perpetrator is the one performing the action. As an example, a sentence such as the following could be regarded as typical: “The aggressors brutally murdered the villagers.” While the victim is also present in this sentence, as is often the case when atrocities are recounted,

the perpetrator may be omitted, thereby emphasizing the victim experience. In this example, however, the main actors are the perpetrators, the aggressors, and the action performed, the murdering of the villagers, is carried out by this actor. The emphasis is therefore on the aggressor even though the victim is also present. This illustrates how, in actual narratives, several emplotments are present. It is possible for the same event to be depicted in all three ways, stressing different aspects of an event and evoking different emotions. The leading roles of perpetrator, hero and victim can all be played by either the self or the other. Nevertheless, while this is certainly possible, in general it seems to be the case that some roles are more commonly played by the self than by the other. If we follow the logic of the ideological square and assume that “our” positive and “their” negative actions are usually stressed while “our” bad and “their” good actions are mitigated, it appears more reasonable to assume that the self will be playing the role of hero and/or victim, while the other will play the role aggressor. This, however, is a generalization that is not necessarily correct – it is an empirical question that is more complex than the ideological square assumes. Nonetheless, this logic does provide a useful frame of reference when carrying out the analysis. It can be regarded as an ideal type model against which specific cases can be compared.

In sum, the typology of narrative emplotments presented includes three ideal types of emplotment, based on the depiction of participants in narratives about war. These are heroes, aggressors and victims. So what characterizes these emplotments or the depiction of these participants? In short, heroes are usually agents. They often perform positive and heroic actions and they may be further emphasized as heroic through the use of predication of both their persons and actions. Aggressors are also usually actors (even though they may be acted upon by heroes). They often perform negative and aggressive actions, which may be emphasized through the use of predication that further stresses the negative and aggressive nature of their persons and/or actions. Victims are typically patients, that are acted on, and seldom actors (even though they may figure as agents, for example, when they flee from aggressors). The victimhood and tragic fate of victims may be emphasized further through the use of predication stressing the dreadful nature of the misfortune with which they meet. This typology supplies categories and indicators according to which specific exhibits may be classified and thereby facilitates a systematic analysis of narratives about war that firmly anchors interpretations made in the material analysed. By paying attention to which types of participant are classified as belonging to which group, that is, whether those stressed as belonging, for example, to a certain nationality are depicted mainly as heroes, aggressors or victims, it is possible

to determine how self and other are depicted. Even though it has been argued that not just textual material but also images, statues and objects can be analysed using this method, textual material is given priority. This choice has to be made since the material cannot be analysed in its entirety. The arguments for prioritizing textual material are presented above. Nevertheless, prominent exhibits of other types are also analysed.

3.3.4 The interpretations of narratives in the form of historical lessons

The question of how the stories told are interpreted in terms of explicit “lessons” for the present and future is explored in this section.⁵⁰ These lessons illustrate how comprehension of the past by people living today is affected by their understanding of present concerns and how collective memory entails construing the past in the light of the present, as is discussed in chapter 2. These narratives contain lessons not just for the present but also for the future. Such “lessons” involve, for example, wishes for peace and the desire not to go to war again. They may also entail appeals about not to forget the sacrifices made by those who gave their lives in the war. The possibilities are numerous. What is important is that they are explicitly to do with the present and the future rather than the past. A distinction is thus made between the analysis of the historical narrative and the analysis of the *interpretation* of the historical narrative – the historical lesson to be drawn from the story told. The creation of such lessons involves imposing meaning on events that occurred in the past. The narratives per se, of course, also involve the imposition of meaning on events through the way the story is told. However, the historical narratives per se do not contain explicit lessons – these are present in the interpretations of the narratives.

In explicit interpretations of narratives in the form of lesson to be learned, modal verbs expressing obligation such as “should”, “must”, “should not” and “must not” sometimes appear. The message may, for instance, be that: “We *must* learn from the past and never go to war again”. It is a question of to what degree the sender (usually a speaker or writer) thinks that an action or a decision should be taken. Here, as well, different choices can be made

⁵⁰ The understanding of “historical lessons” adopted here differs significantly from the one developed by Robert Jervis. Jervis argues that lessons are drawn from past experiences and that these affect how decision makers understand situations deemed to be similar. Even though he acknowledges that many variables interfere and that it is therefore difficult to come up with any general laws concerning how events lead to lessons being learned, that, in turn, lead to a certain kind of future behaviour, he still argues that it is possible to determine probabilistic behaviour on the basis of how lessons are learned from history. He thus rejects the idea that decision makers simply invoke particular “lessons” in order to support the policies they wish to pursue and instead contends that some events, especially if they have been experienced directly, leave deeper traces that predispose policymakers to act and react in certain ways (Jervis 1976:217-87).

(Richardson 2007:60). The following sentence illustrates categorical choice: “In order to ensure peace, we *must* protect the pacifist constitution”. Obligation modality is important in the messages that are found in the analysis of museum exhibitions. The reason for this is that in such sections of exhibitions the events that occurred in the past are explicitly connected with the present and the future. Exhortations to take a certain action in order to prevent the past from repeating itself are not uncommon.

3.4 The politics of exhibitions on war history in the USA, Germany and Austria

This section aims to show, by discussing several empirical cases, that exhibitions on war history are highly political, and that this is not a phenomenon that exists only in Japan and China. When presenting research in English on the geographical region usually referred to as East Asia to a readership belonging to a large extent to the so-called Western part of the world, there is a risk that such accounts, perhaps unintentionally, contribute to an orientaling discourse (Said 2006). Even though this probably is probably not the intention of authors of critical scholarship dealing with East Asia, such critical scholarship may be (mis-) understood by some readers as highlighting problems that exist only in the particular areas of the world examined. In order to avoid making such a negative contribution I believe it is crucial to demonstrate that the phenomenon studied is a more general one. An additional reason for providing this overview is to demonstrate that the need for a framework that allows comparison of narratives about war goes beyond the cases focused on in this study. By providing a typology of narratives about war that can be used in different empirical settings, this study becomes comparative in the broader sense of allowing comparison through the utilization of the framework outlined (George & Bennet 2004). Without conducting an in-depth analysis of these cases, it is shown that there are elements in these exhibitions that point to the three main emplotments used in the framework employed in this study.

Examples are discussed from the USA, Germany and Austria. The controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, is one of the museum controversies that has attracted the most attention, from the public as well as from academia. Less well known is the more limited debate concerning the Smithsonian’s *Price of Freedom* exhibition. In Germany and Austria, the *Wehrmacht* exhibitions sparked controversy and brought to light events that had previously

not been given much prominence in national narratives concerning the war. The German and Austrian cases are also of interest because of the similarities with the Japanese context and the many comparisons between how “Japan” and “Germany” have dealt with their pasts. The list of cases should in no way be understood as exhaustive. Rather, the discussion provides a brief overview of some notable cases illustrating the significance of exhibitions on war history. These discussions should be kept in mind when dealing with the contexts in which Chinese and Japanese museums operate.

3.4.1 The *Enola Gay* controversy at the National Air and Space Museum

Since the events of 11 September 2001, there has been an increase in memorializing activities in the USA, such as Memorial Day and Veterans Day parades. Moreover, a large number of memorials and museums dealing with World War II have recently been established. This has prompted some to claim that the USA is in an obsessive state of “memorial mania” (Doss 2008:227, 230).⁵¹

In 1995, there was great controversy in connection with the cancellation of the heavily criticized exhibition *The Crossroads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb, and the Origins of the Cold War* at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC. The original aim of the exhibition was “to ask why the bombs were dropped, who had been harmed when they exploded, and what has been the influence of nuclear weaponry in the post-1945 world” (Luke 2002:24). Put another way, those who put the exhibition together intended to contextualize the *Enola Gay* and the end of World War II. This contextualization involved displays of images of the burned bodies of Japanese A-bomb victims, discussions over whether the US government should have dropped the bombs and the dropping of the bombs in connection with the Cold War (Luke 2002:31). That the exhibition was to be held in 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, further added to the controversy. The debate, it appears, centred very much on which emplotment should dominate the narrative – a victim emplotment, focusing on Japanese victims, or a heroic emplotment, dealing mainly with US heroic sacrifice.⁵²

⁵¹ The same might easily be said of China and Japan considering the large number of museums constructed in both countries in recent years.

⁵² In a move to allay public criticism, the curators of the exhibition circulated the script among a range of different interest groups. The script met with massive criticism from, among others, the Air Force Association (which consists of retired as well as active personnel in the US Air Force) and the national veterans’ association – the American Legion. These groups lobbied fiercely in the media and Congress to get allegedly “revisionist” and “anti-American” representations of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki removed from the exhibition. Veterans’ groups regarded the displays to be exhibited as “both ‘too soft’ on Japanese aggression in World

After the script of the exhibition had been rewritten nine times, and having been threatened with reduced funding, the Smithsonian Institution gave up and simply displayed the Enola Gay itself along with news coverage about Hiroshima and a triumphant short film about the plane and its crew. Even though when the original script was first presented, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, Michael Heyman, had said that this was exactly what the exhibition would not be about, that is how it finally turned out (Luke 2002:23pp).⁵³

3.4.2 The Price of Freedom Exhibition

A few years after the controversy over the Enola Gay exhibition, another exhibition at the Smithsonian became the object of criticism. However, this time it did not lead to as large a controversy and the criticism did not cause any drastic changes in the content of the exhibition. The Smithsonian is a public institution that was originally created using private funds from abroad.⁵⁴ One part of the controversy involving the exhibition, *The Price of Freedom: Americans at War*, revolved around what critics labelled an act of “privatizing public memory” (Boehm 2006:1147, Thompson 2002, Burke 2006:239-42).⁵⁵

War II and “too hard” on American servicemen who sacrificed their lives to defeat Imperial Japan” (Luke 2002:24, Dorf 2007:207-08, Yoneyama 2001:324). In the other camp, it was argued that politicians should not interfere with the work of museum experts and historians, and that the exhibition was correct in its claims. It was also contended that there is a difference between commemorative and public history. It has been demonstrated how both sides accused the other of basing its view of history on ideology and of not being objective. However, one side wished to commemorate the victims of the war, especially those who died in or suffered from the atomic bombing, and raise questions concerning the connection between the Enola Gay’s mission and the beginning of the Cold War, while the other wanted to honour the US heroes who had victoriously fought a just war. The first storyline appeared offensive to those who supported the second one (Yoneyama 2001:325-30). In a way, it was a struggle over how history should be used for educational purposes – whether it should, as the curators had intended, stimulate “critical thinking” or, as the opponents of the proposed exhibition suggested, be an inspiring national history that one could take pride in, and that paid tribute to the sacrifice of the veterans who had fought in the nation’s wars was told.

⁵³ After the Enola Gay debacle, Heyman, the first Secretary of the Smithsonian, focused on avoiding controversy and instead using the skills that had landed him the position in the first place, that of raising funds. In 2000, Lawrence Small, a businessman who had worked for the housing finance company Fanny Mae and Citicorp/Citibank, succeeded him and fundraising from the private sector was stepped up (Dorf 2007:211). The emphasis on securing funding for exhibitions has led curators to design exhibitions that are likely to sell (Thompson 2002). These developments prompted Dorf to say that the Smithsonian is aiming to become “a business friendly collection of family museums, inoffensive to the majority of the House and the Senate” (2007:201).

⁵⁴ In 1829, the English scientist James Smithson (who had never been to the United States) left his fortune to the USA with the expressed purpose of creating an institution for “the increase and diffusion of knowledge”. After some controversy concerning whether to accept the gift, Congress passed legislation enabling President Jackson to do so in 1836 and the Smithsonian institution was finally established in 1846. Today it is the world’s largest museum complex, comprising, among other institutions, 16 museums (Smithsonian Institution Website, Dorf 2007:201-02).

⁵⁵ Critics have asked whether it will be possible to rent exhibition space to express personal views for personal interests. The Smithsonian used to be funded chiefly by the federal government but has always received private support (Thompson 2002). That the National Museum of American History (NMAH) is regarded as playing an important role in defining US identity is made explicit on its website by its director, Brent Glass, where he writes that: “For people of all ages, a visit to the National Museum of American History can be a defining event providing a deep and fundamental understanding of what it has meant to be an American” (NMAH website). This sug-

In November 2004, the exhibition *The Price of Freedom* finally opened at the Behring Center.⁵⁶ Much of the controversy surrounding the exhibition had to do with the fact that private funds, mainly from the millionaire, Kenneth Behring, were used to finance exhibitions and that those providing the funding wished the exhibitions to tell a heroic tale, that is, to be dominated by the heroic emplotment.⁵⁷ This focus on heroism can be seen in that the exhibition concludes with “an experience that focuses on the sacrifices veterans make when they fight in America’s armed forces” (Smithsonian Institution 2004:4). Moreover, framing war in terms of a price paid by the people of a nation, especially by those serving in its military, for freedom suggests that war is reluctantly turned to as a last resort. The conceptualization of a “price paid” also suggests sacrifice, in this case sacrifice in the name of the nation for freedom. Burke neatly summarizes this logic: “Because the nobility of sacrifice is considered to be a universal constant, the principles undergirding all wars are the same, and, in practice, no war is different from any other” (2006:244). By lumping together all wars fought by the USA, including the Indian Wars of “Westward expansion”, World War II, the Vietnam War and the Iraq Wars, under the common heading of “*The Price of Freedom*” a narrative is created, according to which American wars, despite the different contexts in which they took

gests that the identity constructed is a national one. The museum has received about 4 million visitors annually since it opened in 1964 (NMAH Website: Mission and History).

⁵⁶ The phrase the “Price of Freedom” is employed not only at the NMAH, where it occupies a central position, but elsewhere as well. At the National World War II Memorial, opened in 2004 in Washington, DC, there is an inscription in front of what is called the Freedom Wall, a large cenotaph adorned with 4048 gold stars, each star representing every 100 US soldiers who died during the war, that reads, “Here we mark the Price of Freedom” (Doss 2008:237).

⁵⁷ The museum used to have federal funds that could be used to realize the critical projects envisaged by Roger Kennedy, its director between 1979 and 1992. Since the Reagan administration cut funding the museum has had to rely on non-federal funding for all larger projects. However, those financing exhibitions seldom shared the critical vision of the curatorial staff and were instead often more interested in projecting a positive US self-image. After the Enola Gay debacle it became even more difficult to create the kinds of critical exhibition that many among the curatorial staff envisaged. It seems that the quest for funding led the NMAH in the direction of the kinds of celebratory narrative wanted by philanthropists such as Kenneth Behring, donator of the USD 80 million grant in 2000 that was to pay for *The Price of Freedom* exhibition. The crux, as in several earlier cases of funding from private benefactors, was that Behring had a vision for the exhibition – he wanted to see the nation’s great heroes. While the curatorial staff disagreed with Behring’s idea, the then secretary and chief fundraiser of the Smithsonian, Lawrence Small did not. Behring not only wanted the museum to add the name “Behring Center” to the exhibition but also that a close working relationship should be maintained with him, that the exhibition should focus on the military’s role in defending freedom and democracy and that individuals who had made great contributions and embodied the “American spirit” be honoured. Shortly thereafter, in 2001, Catherine Reynolds, a friend of Behring’s, announced that she wished to donate USD 38 million through her charity foundation in order to set up an exhibition on American achievers and that she wanted a hands-on role in the planning of it. After this, the curatorial staff in the NMAH branch of the Smithsonian Congress of Scholars wrote a protest memo that was signed by 34 out of 36 curators. They claimed that: “Secretary Small has obligated the Museum to relationships with private individuals that breach established standards of museum practice and professional ethics”. One of the curators who did not sign the memo, Steven Lubar, argued that it is possible to “educate” donors (Thompson 2002). Bob Thompson’s critical article, “History for Sale”, dealing with the Behring and Reynolds donations, was published in the *Washington Post* in January 2002. Reynolds withdrew most of her donation shortly afterwards (Burke 2006:242).

place, have reluctantly been fought in the name of freedom as an integral and defining part of the nation's history. The last lines in Director Glass' foreword to the exhibition seem to confirm this understanding of the defining function of these narratives about war: "To understand American history, we must understand the American Dream, the values, ideals, and traditions that are woven through the story of America. Freedom, peace, and security are fundamental parts of the American Dream. In many respects, our military history reflects our commitment to these ideals as well as the beliefs of the men and women who have made enormous personal sacrifices – on the battlefields and on the home front – to achieve them" (Smithsonian Institution 2004:4). The Director's reference to the "story of America" hints at the exhibition's function as a narrative exemplifying US identity⁵⁸ that seeks to strike a chord with (and reproduce) the patriotic sentiments of its visitors, and it has indeed met with an extremely positive reception – according to the museum's own surveys, it is one of the most popular exhibitions so far held at the museum (Boehm 2006:1147).⁵⁹ This brief discussion of the debates surrounding the Crossroads and Price of Freedom exhibitions seem to indicate what is controversial in the American context as well as how and to whom it is controversial. Moreover, it raises the question of who holds the power over public memory and who is able to influence hearts and minds.

3.4.3 The *Wehrmacht* Exhibition in Germany

Recent temporary and touring exhibitions in Germany have focused on shedding light on a range of topics related to aspects of war history that are regarded as previously not having

⁵⁸ The connection with identity is explicitly made elsewhere as well, for example, in a text that outlined the intentions of the exhibition, prepared in 2002 for a special Blue Ribbon Commission, which included historians, with a mission to analyse the museum. The text, (quoted from Burke 2006:239), reads (emphasis added): "*The Price of Freedom* will explore the issues that Americans have deemed worth fighting for and the costs Americans have paid to defend those ideals. Most Americans use the wars the country has fought as a way to understand the nation's history, and appropriately so, for *our country* has only gone to war when it thought it had something that seemed worth fighting for. *Our* wars define *our* history and reflect and shape *our* identity as American. *The Price of Freedom* will build on that popular understanding of history, putting *our* wars into context while at the same time letting visitors experience the horror of battle and the bravery of America's war fighters. It will tell the story of America's soldier and sailor heroes – Congressional Medal of Honour winners as well as those who served their country behind the front lines. But it will not only serve to honour the American men and women who fought and died for *our* country; it will also explain why they fought. The story of America's wars reflects the story of America – *our* ideals, *our* concerns, *our* industrial might, *our* political travails."

⁵⁹ In a 2001 article in the *Washington Times* the writer laments American historical amnesia by claiming that: "If we're ignorant of the historical sacrifices that made our liberties possible, we will be less likely to make the sacrifices again so that those liberties are preserved for future generations" (Williams 2001). The *Price of Freedom* exhibition could be interpreted as an intervention with the intent of making Americans remember these "historical sacrifices" that made "liberties possible" and thereby willing to themselves make sacrifices for the nation.

been given the attention they deserve (Paver 2009:227-28).⁶⁰ The exhibition “War of Annihilation: Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*, 1941 to 1944”,⁶¹ was surrounded by great controversy and received a large number of visitors (Pollack & Wodak 2008:207-226). The exhibition, created by the independent Institute for Social Research in Hamburg, was at first highly praised for destroying the so-called myth of the untainted *Wehrmacht*, according to which the *Wehrmacht* had fought an ordinary war while the SS had conducted atrocious acts without the involvement of the *Wehrmacht* (Heer 2008:228).⁶² Without conducting a comprehensive analysis, there is a lot that to suggest that the exhibition stresses the aggressor emplotment (the *Wehrmacht* as the aggressor) as a response to narratives that at least to some extent emphasized the heroic emplotment. Much of the controversy surrounding the exhibition appears connected to

⁶⁰ These exhibits have dealt with Jewish experiences, victim groups so far overlooked, perpetrator groups not given much attention before, the bombing raids, flight from the eastern regions and benefits enjoyed by the non-persecuted majority of Germans, and traces of the Nazi past in the contemporary German landscape.

⁶¹ The exhibition was called “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der *Wehrmacht* 1941 bis 1944”. While Heer and others translates “Vernichtungskrieg” as “War of Annihilation”, Bartov, Reemtsma and Boll translate it as “War of Extermination”.

⁶² While the Holocaust became part of German collective memory in the 1960s after trials were held, crimes committed outside the concentration camps – especially crimes committed by the *Wehrmacht*, did not become the object of much debate until the mid-1990s (Heer 2008:232-34). These debates were partly sparked by the *Wehrmacht* exhibition. Jan Philipp Reemtsma, founder and director of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research and involved in creating the *Wehrmacht* exhibition, relates that the organizers of the exhibition were often subjected to criticism, the argument of which was that the *Wehrmacht* was declared not guilty in the Nuremberg trials. However, as Reemtsma points out, while the *Wehrmacht* as an organization, unlike the SS, was not deemed criminal, the tribunal did point out that there was much evidence of the *Wehrmacht*’s participation in aggressive warfare and crimes against humanity (Reemtsma 2002:8-16). Nonetheless, in a memorandum prepared for the trial by six high-ranking military characters the seed was sown for what has later been labelled the “myth of the untainted *Wehrmacht*”. According to this statement, the *Wehrmacht* had not participated in but actually rejected Hitler’s racial war of annihilation on the eastern front and instead fought nobly and upheld international law but was “honourably defeated” by “overwhelmingly superior forces” (Heer 2008:232-34, Pollack 2008a:136-37, Hamburg Institute for Social Research 2004:30). A few years after the end of the war, members of the military elite started to publish their memoirs, which sought to portray the *Wehrmacht* in a positive light as a reaction to the negative portrayals by the Allies and the media covering the war crimes trials. In the 1950s, these memoirs were accompanied by accounts by ordinary soldiers that stressed the heroic acts of soldiers in the *Wehrmacht* (Pollack 2008a:136). While counter narratives were produced, the “Myth of the Untainted *Wehrmacht*” was not really threatened until the mid-1990s (Heer 2008:232, 234, Wette 2006:268-74). Another argument that has been made against the claims about the *Wehrmacht*’s crimes is that although some *Wehrmacht* units may have committed crimes, this does not incriminate the whole organisation. Bartov, however, argues that the *Wehrmacht* was “the primary tool of a criminal, genocidal regime” and hence was a criminal organisation (Bartov 2002:55). He further argues that those unwilling to accept the claims put forward by the exhibition acted on “defense mechanisms” because of the difficulty of recognizing that an organisation consisting of between 17 and 19 million soldiers, a large part of the population and among whom many had played important roles in rebuilding Germany after the war had in fact played a pivotal role in Hitler’s policies (Bartov 2002:44-45, 48, 55, 57-58). Furthermore, German soldiers had often been portrayed as victims rather than as perpetrators, especially in stories about the battle of Stalingrad (Heer 2008:238-39, Wette 2006:ix-x). It has been claimed in Germany that until recently there has been little focus on civilian German victimhood, concerning for example allied air raids. However, Neumann shows that this commemoration of German victims is not a new phenomenon (Neumann 2009:174-77). In Germany, just as in Japan, coming to terms with the past means dealing with not just one but a number of interrelated issues. It seems that Germany has done well in dealing with the Holocaust both in the fields of restitution to victims and in making the Holocaust a part of the common memory of the war period. However, despite this progress mythical narratives concerning other aspects of the war have been long-lived.

the fact that some people believed that the aggressor emplotment was stressed to too large an extent.⁶³

In 2001, the exhibition was reborn as “Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-44”. This “new and improved” version of the exhibition did not cause as much controversy as the previous one and was described as an example of “consensus history” by some (Uhl 2008:255-59).⁶⁴ The exhibition still presented the claim that the war in the east was “a war that differed from all others”, a “war of racial ideology and annihilation” (Hamburg Institute for Social Research 2004:7). It stressed, however, that orders were responded to differently by the soldiers on the ground – that some would argue that “an order is an order” while others would refuse to obey the very same orders, thereby emphasizing individual responsibility (Hamburg Institute for Social Research 2004:28-29).

3.4.4 The *Wehrmacht* Exhibition in Austria

In Austria, as in Germany, exhibitions dealing with the war experience have been numerous in recent years.⁶⁵ However, the exhibition with which we are mainly concerned here, the *Wehrmacht* exhibition, toured not only Germany but also Austria and created controversy in the latter country as well. The first exhibition was shown in Austria in 1995 and the second in 2002. Although discussions about Austria’s wartime past had taken place in the late 1980s,⁶⁶

⁶³ A slightly altered English-language version of the exhibition was set to open in New York in December 1999. The English version of the exhibition was cancelled and its German counterpart was shut down in November 1999 because of allegations that some of the photographs on display did not show what the captions said they did, that is, crimes committed by the German army. In order to get to the bottom of the issue of the authenticity of the photographs, the exhibitions were closed down and a commission of independent historians was given the task of evaluating the photographs. The result of the commission’s evaluation was that less than 20 were considered to be inappropriate for an exhibition about the *Wehrmacht*. Before the results of this investigation were announced, however, it had already been decided that the exhibition would not continue as it had been previously designed. Instead, a completely new exhibition that had omitted some of the most controversial contents of the previous one was opened in November 2001 (Boll 2002:61-62, Bartov 2002:41-42, 48-53, Heer 2008:230-32). In one account of the controversy surrounding the exhibition, it is claimed that while this episode started with a debate about mistakes made by the curating staff concerning the photographs on display, these doubts about the authenticity of some parts of the displays were turned into doubts concerning the claims of the exhibition as a whole and about the culpability of the *Wehrmacht* as an organisation (Boll 2002:92-99, Reemtsma 2002:13-16).

⁶⁴ Some photographs had been removed and many had been backgrounded, thereby causing some to argue that the “shocking visual experience” of the previous exhibition had been lost (Uhl 2008:255-59). It has been claimed that one of the main differences between the exhibitions was that in the new one responsibility had come to be attributed to the leadership of the *Wehrmacht* while ordinary soldiers were no longer held responsible. Some critics have argued that this shift obfuscated the crimes themselves. Critics have also contended that it was no longer claimed that anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic racism played a central role in legitimizing genocide as part of the war effort in these areas (Heer 2008:234-66).

⁶⁵ In Austria, however, the scope of the issues addressed in these exhibitions appears to have been narrower than in Germany, focusing especially on the plundering of Jewish property and accounts about the victims of euthanasia while other issues raised in Germany were addressed more sketchily (Paver 2009:245n5).

⁶⁶ In 1986, the so-called Waldheim affair centred on the wartime activities of the former Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, who was elected president of Austria. It was alleged that he had been involved in, or at

the so-called myth of the untainted *Wehrmacht* remained dominant until it was forcefully questioned by the first *Wehrmacht* exhibition in 1995 (Pollack 2008a:138-39). The controversy surrounding the exhibition appears to have had much to do with it challenging mainstream narratives based on the victim emplotment (Austria and Austrians being depicted as victims of Nazi aggression) by portraying Austrian soldiers in the *Wehrmacht* as aggressors.⁶⁷

As in Germany, two versions of the exhibition toured the country. Many regarded the second as an example of consensus history while the 1995 exhibition, in contrast, was labelled a one-sided condemnation of the *Wehrmacht*. The second was deemed scientific and objective while its predecessor was considered emotional and accusatory (Uhl 2008:258-62). Despite the generally conciliatory tone characterized by talk of consensus history, the second exhibition was still criticized.⁶⁸ A not uncommon reaction was that it would have been more appropriate to call it “Crimes *in* the *Wehrmacht*” instead of Crimes *of* the *Wehrmacht* (Uhl 2008:265). The difference in wording here entails much more than just hair-splitting and highlights the centrality of linguistic constructions. Swapping just one two-letter word alters the meaning of the phrase substantially. Crimes *of* the *Wehrmacht* implies that the *Wehrmacht* as an organization conducted a criminal war based on aggressive policies. Crimes *in* the *Wehrmacht*, on the other hand, individualizes these crimes. It does not deny that crimes were

least aware of, war crimes during his military service and that he had been a member of a Nazi organization. Questions were raised concerning war responsibility (Wodak & Reisigl 2000:94-112).

⁶⁷ It has been noted that the myth of the clean *Wehrmacht* was one of three founding myths in post-war Austria. The other were that of the *Stunde Null* (zero hour) and of Austria as the first victim of Nazi Germany through the 1938 annexation into Germany. According to the former, Austria was reborn in the zero hour in 1945 as a new republic, as an innocent child. The latter had its roots in the 1943 Moscow declaration, in which the allied powers had sought to encourage resistance in Austria by declaring it the first victim of Nazi aggression (Pollack 2008a:136-139, Pollack 2003:179-80, Wodak & de Cillia 2007:340-41, 349-51, 357). While these two closely related myths were produced by the state for political purposes, the *Wehrmacht* myth “pervaded the whole society and was (and to some extent still is) a belief shared by large parts of the population” (Pollack 2003:180). This has been the case even though there was no Austrian resistance against the annexation – in fact it was supported by 99 per cent in a referendum (Wodak & de Cillia 2007:354). According to this tale, Austrian soldiers became victims as they were portrayed as having been forced to fight for a foreign army. Since the 1.2 million Austrians who served in the *Wehrmacht* had been enlisted by force, they were often portrayed as only having done their duty (Wodak 2006:128-29). It has been claimed that the myth of the clean *Wehrmacht* has permeated Austrian history textbooks as well. In an analysis of textbooks, it was found that despite evidence put forward in the 1990s, in 2000, few textbooks had made any revisions leading to the inclusion of accounts of the *Wehrmacht*’s complicity in the Nazi annihilation policies (Loitfellner 2008:155-174). In the Austrian victim narrative, the Battle of Stalingrad has been depicted as the main event of the war to the extent, it has been argued, that it has become a symbol of the war in its entirety, thereby eclipsing or obfuscating other events that might be more difficult to confront (Pollack 2008b:175-204). The *Wehrmacht* soldiers were portrayed as having been betrayed by the *Wehrmacht* leadership as they were ordered to attack Stalingrad, an operation that caused them to suffer terribly. This operation was described as part of a conventional war rather than as a war of aggression. Furthermore, responsibility was put primarily on the Nazi leadership and secondarily on the SS (Pollack 2008a:138-43).

⁶⁸ Critics included the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the populist *Neue Kronenzeitung* which argued that all armies commit war crimes but that those committed by the enemy were omitted along with references to the expulsions of Germans after the war. The use of taxpayers’ money was also criticized (Uhl 2008:262-64).

committed but attributes them to individuals and not to the organization. The difference in wording is hence a difference between an aggressive war and an ordinary war in which aggressive acts may have been committed.⁶⁹

3.4.5 A few remarks

This section illustrates that war exhibitions are political and controversial outside the specific context on which this research project focuses. Such exhibitions are political mainly in that they contain stories about events that are closely related to collective memories and narratives that instantiate collective identities. Controversies arise when diverging interpretations of a collective's past, containing different emplotments focusing on victimhood, heroism or aggression, are at odds. Exhibitions using public funding, it appears, are especially prone to controversy in many countries. The Chinese and Japanese settings are not unique. When conducting research on narratives about war in China and Japan, attention should be paid to the specificities of these contexts. However, acknowledging and being aware of similarities is useful because it can contribute to an increased understanding of the theoretical issues dealt with. Moreover, it can also serve to challenge simplifications that have attained a status of established truth.

In Japan, as in Germany, attacks on photographs that are claimed to have been fabricated have been used to shed doubt on larger issues concerning historical events (Morris-Suzuki 2005:72-78). When suspicions are raised concerning the authenticity of a photograph, the implication is often that the claims connected to the images are dubious. Comparisons between Japan and Germany concerning issues linked to coming to terms with the past have been common in Japan at least since the 1980s. Among the issues that are often mentioned in this context is the lack of economic compensation for wartime suffering paid by the Japanese government to non-Japanese victims and the lack of trials of wartime leaders conducted in Japan. A widespread victim consciousness was seen as a central reason for what was seen as a Japanese failure to deal with its wartime past (Seraphim 2006:263-70). That some German policies for dealing with the past have not been matched by the Japanese government, may explain why Germany has been more successful than Japan in overcoming the past, but the discourse on Japan's war legacy has more or less ignored or failed to look for similarities be-

⁶⁹ Even though the exhibitions were harshly criticized by some it has still been described as a "powerful intervention" that has made it impossible to deny the *Wehrmacht's* participation in war crimes (Wodak 2006:126, 149-50).

tween not just Japan and Germany but also between Japan and other countries. The discourse on Japan's "victim consciousness" has often presented this mentality as something uniquely Japanese, thereby failing to recognize that at least regarding some war-related issues such mentalities have indeed been present not just in Japan but also elsewhere, including Germany and Austria. This failure to draw attention to similarities between attitudes toward the war-time past in Japan and elsewhere contributes neither to understanding nor resolving disputes concerning the past. Nor does it contribute to the development of theoretical models for understanding narratives about war.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter provides a discussion of the analytical framework of this study. In conclusion, it is useful to explicate and summarize the methodological discussions that have taken place in this chapter into a few basic questions that will guide the analysis. The contextual analysis answers the following questions:

1. Under *what conditions* are narratives about the war produced in China and Japan?
2. What *characterizes* the social and historical contexts in which these museum exhibitions have been produced?

The analysis of topics answers the following two questions:

1. *Which* topics, among the ones identified, are mentioned in the exhibitions?
2. *How* are the mentioned topics depicted?

The analysis of narratives about war, it is been argued, benefits from focusing on the participants in these narratives. Such an approach is especially useful for studies concerned with international relations since it elucidates how "self" and "other" are portrayed in the stories told. The basic questions guiding the analysis of specific narratives are:

1. What kinds of identity categories are constructed?
2. Who are the main participants in the narrative told?
3. How are these participants and their actions portrayed?
4. Is the visitor encouraged to identify or not to identify with particular participants?
5. Does the portrayal of participants follow an in-group/out-group logic?
6. How is the story told interpreted?
7. What is the main "message" or "historical lesson" delivered through this interpretation?

Part II

Chapter 4: Analysis of the Chinese context

Chapter 4 analyses the Chinese context. The broader socio-political and historical contexts, including the history of discourses, are analysed in section 4.1. Section 4.2 analyses the institutional context in which museums function. The relevant context outlined in this chapter will help gain an understanding of and with interpreting the content of these exhibitions when the material collected at museums in China is analysed in the chapters below. It may also be the case that aspects of the societal context can facilitate understanding of particular exhibits on display. While it provides an in-depth account of the context within which narratives are created, this chapter and chapter 5 do not reveal much about the content of the narratives per se. An overview of this content is provided in chapter 6 and in-depth analyses of the narratives are conducted in chapters 7 and 8.

4.1 The broader socio-political and historical contexts

4.1.1 The historical context

The legacies of discourses that used to be widespread can be detected in the meaning put into linguistic terms, for example, in how “socialism” has been redefined in China as market economic principles have been introduced. Similar legacies can also be identified in interpretations and reinterpretations of historical events.

In 1915, the Chinese government accepted parts of the 21 Demands put forward by Japan, a move that impinged on Chinese sovereignty. This led to popular protests not just against Japan but also against the Chinese government. Indeed, a discussion took place concerning which day should be designated a national humiliation day – the day the Japanese government presented its demands or the day the Chinese government signed the treaty. In the same year, a curriculum for national humiliation education was created. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Chinese government, as well as other groups, portrayed the episode as a “national humiliation” that needed to be remembered and cleansed (Callahan 2010:68-69, 73). National

humiliation days were celebrated in order to raise national awareness. In some cases groups tried to use such events to criticize the government and to put forward their own agendas. The government countered these moves by trying to monopolize the celebrations (Cohen 2003:160-64, Callahan 2006:190-92, Luo 1993:209-12). It should be noted, as is indicated above, that humiliation discourse during and before the war was not just concerned with the infliction of humiliation by external enemies but also a matter of the Chinese government giving in to demands instead of resisting. In Chinese journalistic accounts of the war, on the other hand, heroic Chinese resistance was emphasized in order to boost morale even when the Chinese forces were defeated and forced to retreat. It has been argued that the wartime propaganda emphasizing heroic resistance left a legacy that has affected how the war period was treated in the post-war era (Coble 2010:435-56).

Unity and national struggle were emphasized for some years, during the war against the Japanese invaders, but this changed at the end of the war. Civil war broke out not long after Japan was defeated. This meant that both the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) were occupied by civil war, and dealing with the internal enemy was a more acute challenge than remembrance of the struggle against the external enemy. Japan was no longer a threat. For the GMD, the immediate task was to deal with the Communists and those who had collaborated with the Japanese invaders. For the CCP, on the other hand, the GMD and its ally, the USA, were regarded as the main threats, the former both militarily and to its legitimacy. Nonetheless, war crimes trials were held by the GMD shortly after the war and by the CCP in 1956. The GMD sought an alliance with Japan and was therefore relatively lenient towards Japanese war criminals, but it punished Chinese traitors more severely. Similarly, in its approach to Japanese war criminals, the CCP emphasized re-education and did not impose severe sentences (Yoshida 2006:62-70). In 1949, the civil war ended with communist victory and the GMD fled to Taiwan. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), class struggle, rather than national struggle, became the lens through which history and current events were understood. According to such an interpretation, China's modern history was one "of the ruling classes, consisting of landowners and capitalists and represented by the Nationalist government, exploiting the masses and collaborating with foreign imperialists" (Yang 2001:54). Museums dealing with Japanese war atrocities did exist at this time. However, among the museums created in the 1960s, exhibitions that focused on the cruelties of China's reactionary classes were more common (Yang 2001:54-55). Furthermore, after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the outbreak of the

Korean War, depictions of the War of Resistance were used as propaganda against the USA. For example, the USA was described as having been conspiring with the Japanese army when the Nanjing Atrocity took place (Yang 2001:54). In an article published in 1951, for example, it was claimed that Chinese women were deceived by an American who made them gather in one place where Japanese soldiers could abduct the attractive ones and use them sexually. It was not just Japanese soldiers but also Americans who were portrayed as evil (Yoshida 2006:68-69).

In post-war Japan, the government refrained from taking the lead in creating a common narrative about the past, leaving war memory to interest groups that tied it to their own agendas. In China, on the other hand, the CCP's authoritarian rule made it possible to suppress strands of memory that did not fit its political agenda. This, however, did not mean that Chinese people forgot about Japanese atrocities. Nonetheless, it is often claimed that during the Mao era the heroic struggle led by the CCP was privileged at the expense of accounts of Japanese atrocities. This was partly linked to a perceived need to foster a feeling that the new China was a strong country that the people could take pride in. Relations between the PRC and Japan were normalized in 1972. Japan recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China and an apology for the war was included in the Joint Communiqué that was issued. The PRC waived its claims to war reparations (Wan 2006:88). The Japanese side started its Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme to the PRC in 1978 and has provided the PRC with what can only be described as enormous amounts of aid (Söderberg 2002:120-22).

Chinese society was transformed during the 1980s as a result of the economic reforms, and class as the main interpretative lens became increasingly subversive as market reforms allowed some to get rich before others. Furthermore, China's opening up also meant that the Chinese were subjected to potentially disruptive foreign, especially Western, influences. As communism was diluted a new interpretative framework became necessary. This new framework downplayed class and stressed patriotism and the Chinese national community. The previous out-group, the "GMD villains", was hence included in the in-group as the Taiwanese increasingly came to be regarded as compatriots. In the 1990s, after a patriotic education campaign was initiated (see below), history textbooks in the PRC were revised. The previously dominant view of history, based on a Marxist interpretative framework, had stressed the civil war as a class struggle and portrayed Japanese and Chinese peasants and workers as victims belonging to the same class. In the new textbooks, however, the civil war was less

important and international conflicts were emphasized. In the portrayal of the war of resistance, which had formerly been depicted as a struggle fought by the CCP, the role of the GMD was reassessed and depicted as having made a contribution to the national struggle against the Japanese invaders. Patriotic struggle hence came to take the place of class struggle (Wang 2008:790-91). The Chinese leadership during the Mao period also applied class as an interpretative lens to Sino-Japanese relations. The wartime militarist Japanese leaders were regarded as having exploited the Japanese people (Callahan 2007).

As national struggle replaced class struggle, unity among all Chinese, including ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese, was increasingly stressed. It is often claimed that the heroic tales of resistance that had previously dominated gradually came to be accompanied to a greater extent by narratives emphasizing Chinese victimhood and Japanese aggression. Central to the victimhood narrative has been the theme of “not forgetting national humiliation”, a slogan that is often accompanied by the exhortation to “revitalize China”. This theme does not deal exclusively with Japanese aggression but with what is understood as a century of foreign aggression, which began with the Opium Wars and unequal treaties and culminated in the anti-Japanese war, a war that marked the Chinese people’s first decisive victory in its long struggle against foreign aggression (Wang 2008:791-92, Gries 2004:48-51). These themes are, I argue, not mutually exclusive.

Texts might be regarded as reactions or responses to other texts or to certain situations. It is sometimes argued that the 1982 textbook crisis (when the Chinese and South Korean governments protested the depiction of war in Japanese history textbooks) prompted the Chinese government to stress the need for education about Japanese atrocities. According to this line of argument, the construction of Chinese museums dealing with the War of Resistance, such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum, the Unit 731 Museum in 1985 and the War of Resistance Museum in 1987, was a response to the textbook controversy in 1982. For example, it has been claimed that Chinese war museums were “a direct product of the Chinese struggle against Japan’s historical amnesia” (Ma 2007:159). A perhaps more common argument stresses the role of patriotic education. According to this view, patriotic education, including the construction, renovation and enlargement of museums dealing with the war, is a response to a situation, in the form of changes in Chinese society, rather than to the behaviour of some Japanese. However, stressing the role of the patriotic education campaign runs the risk of presenting Chinese nationalism as an entirely top-down process in which the CCP strategically shapes the minds of the Chinese people in order to achieve its purposes.

Chinese society is more complex than that and, as is noted above, patriotic discourses are not entirely new. The CCP, I argue, appeals to discourses that have a history in China – a history that precedes the Communist Party. It has been argued that this is the reason the CCP has been so successful in mobilizing the masses through patriotic education – because the discourse resonates with the grassroots (Callahan 2010:25-26). The success of the campaign has also been attributed to the international environment in the early 1990s. The social disintegration experienced by the Soviet Union and former communist countries in Eastern Europe, along with sanctions against China that many felt were directed at the country and the people rather than against the CCP, caused many Chinese to value patriotism and national unity rather than democracy (Zhao 2004:241-43).

4.1.2 Meaning-making and societal struggles

Even though the end of the Cold War and the changes in the international system that came with it had an impact on Chinese society, the changes caused by the reform process initiated in 1978 probably had an even larger impact on Chinese society and the policies of the CCP. In the 1990s, as Chinese society became increasingly pluralistic, the autonomy of the CCP in regards to foreign policy decision-making decreased. Tensions were aroused between a state-led patriotism, emphasizing an inclusive love for the country (爱国), and a more popular and exclusive nationalism (民族主义), often based on belonging to the dominant Han ethnicity. These may in some cases overlap and the latter may then support the former. However, the former may, in other cases, be challenged by the latter, for example, for not being nationalistic enough in relation to external demands and perceived threats (Deans 2005:48-51). In the 2000s, such tensions became even more visible not just in several incidents concerning China's relations with other countries, mainly the USA and Japan, but also in domestic incidents linked to non-Han nationalism, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet. Large-scale riots in Tibet in March 2008 and even more violent incidents in Xinjiang in the summer of 2009 challenged the official rhetoric of an inclusive patriotism of brother nationalities.

Nationalistic discourses about China being bullied by imperialist powers, as is mentioned above, have a long history. According to these discourses, weakness caused China, a great nation that at several times in history had been a great power, to be victimized at the hands of foreign imperialists. China's current rise is, then, a matter of restoring greatness rather than something new. In this context, Chinese leaders have presented themselves as being

on a mission to restore the “natural order of things” – to restore China to its rightful place as a superpower. This has often been expressed in terms of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Hence, leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin have, through intertextual moves, drawn on the discourse of Sun Yat-sen when using the slogan “rejuvenate China” (振兴中华) (Yan 2000:33-34). In this way, current leaders connect what is presented as their historical mission to the great revolutionary understood as the father of the modern Chinese nation. The current rejuvenation process is hence presented as a matter of continuing what was started 100 years ago.

Furthermore, as the above discussion shows, national humiliation discourse was not invented recently but rather an old conceptualization related to national struggle that was revived when the narrative based on class proved potentially dangerous. It has been pointed out that this national struggle discourse was well received by a large segment of the Chinese people (Callahan 2006:187). The legacy from the Republican era of this way of interpreting history may have contributed to facilitating this shift. Put another way, when the shift in the definition of the people from one based on class differences took place, this expansion of the in-group meant that difference in the form of a constitutive outside needed to be stressed (Hughes 2006:146-53). At the same time, the more nationalism has come to be stressed and tied to the CCP’s legitimacy, the more it has become an area in which the CCP can be challenged by those who claim to be more nationalistic or patriotic (Hughes 2006:146-53). In other words, Chinese nationalistic feelings cannot be fully controlled by the CCP (cf. Callahan 2010:27). This is especially important as societal changes not only made class a potentially subversive category but also created greater opportunities for the assertion of other identities, perhaps most importantly ethnic minority ones.

The Internet in China has increasingly become a space in which social problems are discussed, making “netizens” more and more powerful. The Internet is used to criticize not only adulterers but also corrupt officials and “unpatriotic” citizens (Downey 2010). The Chinese *fenqing* (愤青), or “angry youth”, have in several incidents voiced nationalistic opinions online in response to everything from riots against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the late 1990s to biased reports in the Western press concerning the ethnic riots in Tibet (Osno 2008). In a number of incidents it was illustrated how nationalism in China has become an

increasingly strong force, and how many nationalists express their opinions on the Internet.⁷⁰ In this section these recent events are dealt with.

In May 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, riots involving the rape of ethnic Chinese took place in Indonesia. The Chinese media did not report these events to begin with. While protests were staged in South East Asia, Taiwan and Hong Kong, none occurred in Mainland China until news about the riots penetrated the Chinese government's firewall. The incident has been seen as marking the end of the CCP's monopoly on information. In emotional and nationalistic reactions posted on the Internet, the CCP's patriotic credentials were questioned (Hughes 2006:81-82, Wu 2007:39-44). There followed largely anti-US nationalist expressions in the 1990s that have been described as a first wave of Chinese nationalism. If this first wave was to a large extent the work of intellectuals writing books and articles in magazines, the second wave was more of a mass movement that used the Internet to a much larger extent and targeted Japan rather than the USA (Gries 2005:848). Nonetheless, the reaction on the Internet to the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the collision between the US spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea on 1 April 2001 represented the dawn of the Internet activism, which later grew extremely large as the number of Internet users in China increased (Wu 2007:47-57, Hughes 2006:82-85, Shirk 2007:212-18, 234-39).

The second wave of Chinese nationalism involved a number of interrelated events that occurred between 2001 and 2005. Some of these Japan-related incidents have targeted Chinese who have been labelled "traitors". In one textbook on modern Chinese history, traitors to the Han race, *hanjian* (汉奸), "a tiny minority" in the history of the Chinese nation, are described as the scum of the nation who sell themselves to foreigners for personal gain (Callahan 2010:42, see also Liu 2000 for an in-depth study of Chinese collaboration with Japan). It has been pointed out in relation to calls for boycotts of Japanese goods in order to "halt Japanese economic aggression" that the label *hanjian* "can be applied to those working for a Japanese company or simply buying a Japanese product" (Yang 2002:14). In 2002, Ma Licheng, a journalist at the newspaper the *People's Daily*, wrote an article entitled "New Thinking on Sino-Japanese Relations" for the journal *Strategy and Management* in which he expressed his thoughts about recent expressions of anti-Japanese feelings in China. The main arguments of the article were that anti-Japanese behaviour was creating a negative image of

⁷⁰ Furthermore, leaders such as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao chat with netizens online (People's Daily 2011). In government publications, Internet opinion is increasingly referred to in order to support government policies and

China abroad, especially in Japan, and that Japan had already apologized sufficiently for the war and was no longer a militaristic country. The Chinese should hence adopt a noble attitude and let bygones be bygones. Ma's "new thinking" was initially supported by the elite media but on the Internet he was labelled a "traitor" and received death threats. He retired early from his position at the *People's Daily* and moved to Hong Kong (Hughes 2006:148-49, Wu 2007:66-68, Gries 2005:836-39). It has been pointed out that because of the fierce criticism of the moderates who took part in the debate, and the labelling of them as traitors, "members of the Chinese elites are reluctant to express moderate views on Japan" (He 2008:62).

Ma's article had been prompted partly by the treatment by Chinese nationalists of the Chinese film star and fashion model Zhao Wei, in 2001, and film director Jiang Wen in 2002. Zhao Wei was dressed in an imperial Japanese flag for a photo-shoot for a fashion magazine in 2001, shortly after Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Zhao was denounced as a "traitor" and insulted on the Internet. Even though she issued an apology, in late December a young man attacked her on stage during a public event, smearing faeces on her (Hughes 2006:148, Wu 2007:62-63, Gries 2005:832-34). Chinese actor and film director Jiang Wen, famous for *Red Sorghum*, a patriotic film about Chinese villagers fighting Japanese invaders, said in an interview in the *Asahi Shinbun* that he had visited Yasukuni Shrine several times. He later explained that he had done so for research purposes to get inspiration for the film *Devils on the Doorstep* (鬼子来了), a film dealing with the war. The Chinese Censorship Bureau did not allow the film to be screened in China and criticized it because Chinese civilians looking after a Japanese POW did not "hate the Japanese" (cited in Gries 2005:835). After his visits were reported in China in June 2002, he was fiercely criticized on the Internet. In the debate that ensued, some argued that doing research in the way Jiang Wen had done was an integral part of an artist's work, but others claimed that such actions inevitably hurt the feelings of Chinese people. Some criticized those making the latter argument for being narrow-minded (Gries 2005:834-36). In his assessment of these debates, Peter Hays Gries argues that the good news was that it showed that in China there is now, thanks to the Internet, a "vibrant political discourse and a pluralism of views", while the bad news was that the anti-Japan faction was on the rise and that "'debate' is probably a misnomer: a winner-takes-all, show-no-mercy style reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution is prevalent" (Gries 2005:832).

it is also often mentioned that the government takes Internet opinion into account in policymaking.

On 16-18 September 2003, what has been described as an orgy involving Japanese businessmen and local prostitutes took place at a hotel in Zhuhai in southern China. After a local newspaper published the story, Chinese Internet nationalists interpreted the incident as an act of deliberate “national humiliation”, since it took place on the anniversary of the Mukhden incident, on 18 September 1931, when the Japanese Kantô Army blew up the railway outside Mukhden (now Shenyang) in Manchuria, blamed Chinese nationalists for the explosion and used it as a pretext to initiate hostilities. On the Internet, Chinese nationalists demanded that the hotel should be burned down, the Chinese organizers, who were described as traitors to the Chinese nation, killed and Japanese goods boycotted. The Chinese government’s reaction was to describe the incident as “an extremely odious criminal case” and to demand that the Japanese government better educate its citizens (Wu 2007:78-79). This was only one of several anti-Japanese protests in China in 2003 (Wu 2007:77-79, Gries 2005:843-46). There was violent anti-Japanese behaviour among Chinese football fans during the 2004 Asia cup (Jin 2006:26, Gries 2005:846). This episode was much commented on in the Japanese media (Ienaga 2004:35-39).

In March 2005, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, presented a proposal on the enlargement of the Security Council. He later suggested that Japan and Germany, because of their significant financial contributions to the UN budget, should be regarded as the prime candidates for Security Council membership. Chinese Internet nationalists teamed up with overseas groups to gather signatures for a petition against the proposal. By 10 May 2005, a total of 286 Chinese websites were involved in collecting signatures and a total of 41,785,544 signatures had been collected. During this period the Japanese revisionist group *Tsukurukai* had their history textbook, which is considered to make light of atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the war, approved for use in Japanese junior high schools. On 9 April 2005, large-scale demonstrations involving as many as 10,000 participants broke out in Beijing, calling for a boycott of Japanese goods and opposing Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These protests had been organized mainly by students using the Internet. The violent protests spread to other cities, such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai. The Chinese government urged its Japanese counterpart to respect history and, at the APEC summit meeting in late April, Prime Minister Koizumi publicly apologized for Japanese wartime aggression (Wu 2007:82-87, Hughes 2006:151-52). The Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, took a tough stance against Japan and refused to apologize for the violence and damage to Japanese property, but measures were taken to deal

with the demonstrators and Li told Chinese at a meeting to: “Turn your patriotic fervour toward concrete actions in your work and diligent studies, so as to contribute to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Hughes 2006:152). Some claimed that the large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2005 were orchestrated by the Chinese government (Kahn 2005). However, Chinese society had become more pluralistic and war memory and other issues had come to be debated on a much larger scale outside the CCP. In some ways, the CCP’s monopoly on information had come to be questioned and a civil society more independent from the CCP was emerging. The issue of *how* to be patriotic was at the centre of the discussion. The demonstrators were regarded as expressing love for their country but told to do so in other ways.

It seems that, when it takes a tough stand in international relations, the CCP can refer to the netizens’ opinions, but when it does not, it risks being criticized for being soft. Additional incidents supporting this interpretation occurred in 2008 and 2009. After the terrible Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, the Chinese government was quick to accept assistance from other countries, among them Japan. There was even talk of using the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) to send equipment to Sichuan. This would have marked the first Japanese military presence in China since 1945. This idea, however, was abandoned after it was criticized by Chinese Internet activists, who were not ready to accept a Japanese military presence in China even if its objective was disaster relief. This incident illustrates that Sino-Japanese relations are still extremely fragile because of history-related issues, and suggests that Internet activism has an impact on policy (Gustafsson 2009:7). On 22 April 2009, the movie *Nanjing! Nanjing!*, dealing with the Nanjing Atrocity, premiered at Chinese cinemas. The director Lu Chuan received death threats and was called a traitor because it depicts one of the Japanese protagonists in a nuanced way. According to the director, the film was close to being cancelled in its first week because of criticism on the Internet (Wong 2009). This affair demonstrates that the “traitor discourse” is still very much alive and that it sometimes does not take much to be labelled one. Moreover, it seems to suggest that the depiction of Japanese soldiers as people who can be identified with as fellow human beings challenges the established view of the war of people belonging to the anti-Japanese nationalist faction. One conclusion that can be drawn from the above-mentioned events is that the CCP cannot afford to give in to foreign pressure in such situations because if it does it will lose legitimacy and credibility. Having stressed patriotism for such a long time, the CCP needs to act patriotically.

The common use of the word traitor by the Japan-bashers to denounce their adversaries as unpatriotic is noteworthy as it connects with the wartime phenomenon of col-

laboration. The term *hanjian*, which has the meaning of traitor to the *Han* race rather than to the country (卖国贼, *maiguozei*), sits uneasily with the patriotic discourse, which emphasizes love for the country and unity between the brother nationalities. The traitor discourse is therefore potentially subversive. Chinese revolutionaries in the late Qing dynasty claimed that the *Han* race differed from the Manchu race in order to mobilize the *Han* people to overthrow the Manchu Qing Dynasty (Chow 2001:47-76, Murata 2001:363-64). Racial nationalism was hence a central component in Sun Yat-sen's theory of the "Three Principles of the People" (三民主义). Sun depicted the *Han* as a pure biological entity. He emphasized that most of the Chinese people belonged to the *Han* and that those belonging to the "alien races" were few in number (Dikötter 1992:123-24). It should be noted that the concepts employed in referring to the Chinese nation and the Chinese (*Zhonghua* 中华, *Han* 汉, *xia* 夏, *huaxia* 华夏, etc.) are fluid and can have different meanings depending on the political ideology drawn on. In the late Qing dynasty era, one of these ideologies was inclusive and stressed universalism whereas the other was exclusive and distinguished the *Han* from the barbarians. This latter *Han* supremacist strain of thought was seen as dangerous by both the GMD and the CCP. In the PRC of today, however, where ethnic minorities enjoy preferential treatment, for example, in access to education and family planning, there has been a resurgence in *Han* supremacism that excludes and singles out non-*Han* minorities as internal "others" (or barbarians) while labelling *Han* people who do not share their views traitors to the *Han*. It is the objective of this movement to revive not the Chinese nation in a broad sense but the *Han* race in its narrow sense (Liebold 2010:539-59).

In the debates discussed above, the centrality of the concept of "patriotism" is significant. Much of the discussion focused on how to express patriotic emotions. However, there was no debate about *whether* Chinese should behave patriotically but only of *how* to be patriotic. Everyone agreed that as a Chinese one should be a patriot, that is, love one's country. Indeed, it has been claimed that "(w)hen patriotism became a buzzword in Chinese public discourse, more people wanted to proclaim their uncritical love for China and their desire to defend it from aggressive foreigners" (He 2009:248). The question was how to define and express this love. The debates can hence be understood as a struggle over the meaning of the term patriotism. That this interpretation is correct became obvious in an article in the *People's Daily* published in October 2010. The article was written in response to anti-Japanese protests in several Chinese cities after the captain of a Chinese fishing boat had been detained in Japan

for ramming a Japanese coastguard vessel with his boat. It was argued in the article that “(w)hen national interests and dignity are threatened, every Chinese will stand up and express their patriotic enthusiasm in various ways, which is only natural”. However, it was explicitly stated that “(w)e must insist on expressing our patriotism legally and rationally” (*People’s Daily* 2010b).

Patriotism has been stressed in Chinese discourse since the early 1980s. Patriotism (爱国主义) could be said to be a high value word in China. However, the meaning of the word, like the meaning of other high value words such as freedom or democracy, is not fixed. Different actors will hence try to define such terms in a way that suits their particular interests. Attempts to redefine it are especially sensitive since the legitimacy of the government is closely connected with it. The patriotic education campaign, I argue, should be understood not merely as an attempt by the government to strengthen its legitimacy, but also as a way to fix the meaning of the term patriotism in a way that benefits the CCP. Furthermore, when protests against the government have been launched, demonstrators have made sure to do so in a way that presents them as patriots.

The anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in 2005 involved an attempt to redefine the meaning of the word patriotism. An attempt was made to appropriate the concept for purposes other than those of the government. Thus, when the police were sent to deal with the demonstrators, the demonstrators shouted an old slogan according to which one is innocent of political crimes if one is patriotic (爱国无罪). The slogan was used in 1936 after the Nationalist government had imprisoned seven young members of a patriotic association that had criticized the government for not dealing with the Japanese. A movement was organized to set the seven free. It argued that if the seven were to be imprisoned, then patriots all over the country, including those belonging to the movement, would also have to be imprisoned. After protests, in which the slogan mentioned above was central, the seven were released. The gist of the slogan in its 1936 meaning was that if you do something as a patriotic act it is not a political crime and should not be punished. In other words, if one acts out of love for the country one can act against the government (Funabashi 2005, Wang 2005:39-42). It seems reasonable to believe that the appropriation of and attempt to redefine a word that is now a central ideological pillar of the state worried people in the Chinese government. While the CCP’s way of using the term has involved trying to tie it to love for the party-state, these demonstrators drew on a discourse according to which a patriot who goes against the gov-

ernment is not guilty of a political crime. When the demonstrators used the term patriotism, the CCP could not afford to come across as weak or unpatriotic. The concept of intertextuality is useful in this discussion. When the demonstrators used the slogan they were referring back to an event that occurred in 1936. What happened was therefore a re-contextualization of the slogan. Such a re-contextualization, as is mentioned in chapter 3, always involves some kind of change in meaning since a text is taken out of its original context and used in another. The values of the new context hence affect the meaning of the term. At the same time, the connotations of the original setting are invoked. If the original use of the word has positive connotations, as in this case, it might be possible for the new user to infuse her/his actions with these associated meanings.

The incident in 2005 was not the first in which students behaved in this way. For example, in 1986, student demonstrations began at the Hefei University of Science and Technology and spread to Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing. In the autumn of 1985, students protested against corruption and poor campus living conditions. However, these issues had been combined with a demand for a boycott of Japanese goods in the aftermath of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The students hence made sure that they came across as being patriotic, as patriotic demands were more likely to be met. They too made references to the 1936 incident. Hu Yaobang, who had received Nakasone in Beijing in November 1985, criticized the students for being short-sighted and instead called for a "sober-minded patriotism". He was removed from his post not long after (Hughes 2006:37-39). The students protesting in the spring and early summer of 1989 similarly referred to the 4 May 1919 movement as they attempted to present their claims as patriotic. Such student movements need to avoid coming across as traitors that may disrupt China's nation building process and overall stability. It is necessary for them to voice any dissent in patriotic terms. This is evidence of the strength of the patriotic discourse. At the same time, the Chinese government, in dealing with such protests, also needs to come across as patriotic. The use of nationalist themes by the democracy movements of the late 1980s therefore made it imperative for the legitimacy of the Party that the leadership present itself as patriotic in the 1990s (Hughes 2006:52-53). It has been argued that the student demonstrations had a subversive appeal because they presented an alternative to the official celebration of the movement (Callahan 2010:34). Criticism of foreign imperialism can hence be directed at the Chinese leadership or other Chinese who are perceived as being traitors or not patriotic enough (Callahan 2010:26-27). It is not so much that the Chinese government *creates* legitimacy by being anti-

Japanese, but rather that the Chinese government risks *losing* legitimacy if it is perceived as not being patriotic enough.

For example, in the case of visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Chinese leadership does not have the option of not responding through strongly worded protests. The reason for this is the myth on which Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations were based when they were normalized in 1972. According to this logic, a military clique was responsible for the war while ordinary Japanese were victims. This reasoning was not invented in 1972 but was the official view of the CCP and the GMD during and after the war (Yoshida 2006:62-63). The Chinese leaders' decision to differentiate between the Japanese people and the militarists might not have been easy to accept for Chinese people, as illustrated by the anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in 2005 (Kawashima & Mōri 2009:123-27). This myth makes it impossible for the Chinese leadership not to react if a Japanese Prime Minister visits Yasukuni because the act, according to this logic, denies the foundation of the relationship since it is understood as absolving the Class A war criminals, that is, the military clique, who are enshrined at Yasukuni. The Chinese logic for opposing shrine visits becomes clear in the following excerpt from an article in the CCP's mouthpiece the *China Daily*: "Before diplomatic ties were normalized, Chinese leaders stated clearly and frequently to Japanese friends: The war should be blamed on a few Japanese militarists, not the Japanese people, who were also victims. The 1972 establishing of diplomatic relations and the 1978 signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship took place in this light" (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2005a). This line of reasoning is often repeated by Chinese leaders (e.g. *The Times* 2007). It is stated clearly on the Chinese Foreign Ministry's website that it has always been the policy of the PRC to differentiate between ordinary Japanese, who were also victims of the war, and the few militarists who were responsible (MOFAPRC 2002).

The 2007 *Genron NPO* survey highlighted this point. In response to the question "What do you think about Japanese prime ministers visiting the Yasukuni Shrine?" 50 per cent of the Chinese respondents chose the alternative "Should not visit the shrine at all" whereas 23.8 per cent chose "Can visit if Class A war criminals' names are removed" (*Genron NPO* 2007:25). The latter alternative corresponds with the Chinese government's official view. Half of all the respondents are thus not on the same page as the Chinese government and instead support a stance that seems to reject the position on which bilateral relations were restored. To the extent that the answers reflect the sentiments of the Chinese people it suggests that there is a large segment of Chinese public opinion that wants to see the Chinese

government take a stronger stance towards Japan on this issue. This suggests that the CCP does not have total control over Chinese society, an impression sometimes given by media in the West. As public opinion has grown increasingly important in China, Chinese policymakers have stressed the importance of “guiding” public opinion (e.g. SCIO 2010). Making sure that media outlets present the CCP and its policies favourably is certainly an important part of this guidance strategy. However, at a more fundamental level, educating people to have an essentially positive opinion of the CCP, thereby increasing the probability that they find information emanating from the CCP trustworthy, is arguably of even greater importance in an environment in which other sources of information are increasingly accessible and the “soft power” of other states is regarded as a threat.

4.1.3 Education

The CCP’s propaganda apparatus is extremely sophisticated and comprises a large number of organs “extending into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information” (Shambaugh 2007:27). The CCP Propaganda Department (中宣部) is the spider in the web of the propaganda system and oversees newspapers and other organs belonging to the apparatus. It is also responsible for launching nationwide propaganda campaigns such as the patriotic education campaign. It should be mentioned that propaganda does not have the negative connotations in the PRC that it has in many other countries, and is regarded as a way of teaching the masses (Shambaugh 2007:25-58). Before going deeper into a discussion of the CCP’s Patriotic Education Campaign, some brief comments should be made about the role of patriotism in moral education, or *deyu* (德育), in the PRC and its historic roots in Confucian thought. Chinese *deyu* differs from what is often seen as moral education in other countries. The concepts of micro-*deyu* and macro-*deyu* can be distinguished in the Chinese context. The former refers to what is often perceived as moral education, that is, education about moral principles or morality. Macro-*deyu*, on the other hand, is a broader concept, comprising moral, political and ideological education. This macro-*deyu* in the PRC has long included patriotic principles (Li et al. 2004:449-461). There has, however, been an increased emphasis on the patriotism component of *deyu* since the early 1990s – to the extent that policies dealing specifically with patriotic education have been adopted, while remaining a part of *deyu*. According to these policies, patriotic education should permeate all subjects taught in schools.

As far back as 1983, and again in 1988, the importance of patriotic education of the youth was stressed.⁷¹ After the crackdown in Tiananmen in 1989, patriotism came to be further stressed at the expense of socialism. The Education Commission therefore broadened the scope of patriotism to include it in the entire curriculum. Jiang Zemin mentioned the Nanjing Massacre as a good example that could be used in patriotic education. He also drew the conclusion, implicit in earlier logics, that socialism was essentially the same as patriotism. By the time the 1991 notice on the importance of patriotic education and the 1994 Guidelines for Patriotic Education were issued, the importance of patriotism in education had already been stressed for a few years, and the concept of patriotism had taken the place of socialism as the “great power pushing forward” China’s history (Hughes 2006:56-60). However, as was pointed out by Deng Xiaoping in reaction to the Tiananmen protests in 1989, ideological and political education and the need for hard struggle had not been stressed enough (Deng 1989). The 1995 Education Law further established the importance of patriotic education across the curriculum (Hughes 2006:73). The 1991 notice and the 1994 guidelines on education made emphasizing patriotism more comprehensive. This state-led campaign coincided with a nationalistic current among intellectuals. Populist nationalist works written in the 1990s also attest to the existence of nationalist undercurrents outside government circles. The rise of state-led nationalism as well as nationalism among intellectuals has been attributed to the changes in China’s international situation in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union coincided with criticism of China in the wake of the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen. With the Soviet Union gone, China was suddenly the last great bastion of communism and the CCP managed to depict the criticism by Western governments and media as criticism of China rather than of the CCP. This was enforced by the so-called China threat theory and related calls in the West to contain China. In this atmosphere, the patriotic

⁷¹ In 1983, it was argued in a document issued by the government that young people, because they have not received the education necessary, are unable to scientifically analyse problems and hence may arrive at erroneous conclusions. Emphasis was being put on the need to strengthen patriotic and ideological education as some comrades were said to be in a position where they ran the risk of losing faith in socialism and perhaps even in the country because of mistakes such as the Cultural Revolution (Propaganda Department et al. 1983). In 1988, in a notice issued concerning the strengthening of moral education in middle and primary schools, which in many respects echoed the 1983 document, it was argued that: “We must guide students to integrate their own ideals, hopes, dreams and ambitions with the future of the motherland and destiny of the nation, and inspire them to work hard at their studies for the sake of realizing the Four Modernizations and strengthening China.” Furthermore, it emphasized that patriotism must be “particularly prominent” in moral education. Here, understanding the Chinese people’s struggle against imperialism and feudalism is also stressed. Pride in the historic mission of revitalizing the motherland is said to be vital so that people will put the interests of the motherland above everything else. Finally, the importance of the Party in this revitalization was underlined (CCP Central Committee 1988).

education campaign was received much more enthusiastically in the PRC than previous campaigns had been (Zhao 2004:8-11).

The 1994 Guidelines for Patriotic Education form a comprehensive document that deals with the content and implementation of patriotic education in Chinese society. It stresses that the aims of the campaign are to inspire the national spirit, foster national pride, promote national unity and revitalize China. It states that: “patriotism and socialism are in essence identical”. The history of China, especially its modern and contemporary history, is said to occupy a central place in the campaign. People, it is said, should understand how the Chinese people remained indomitable in the face of foreign aggression and fought bloody wars for national independence and liberation. The role of the CCP in leading the whole people in the brave struggle to establish New China should especially be understood. Traditional culture, the country’s national conditions (国庆), national defence and security, unity among the nationalities and the importance of peaceful unification are all stressed. The Chinese are described as a multinational family. According to the plan, patriotic education is for all people, but with a focus on youth. Their patriotic consciousness should be developed and people should be guided into establishing correct ideals, beliefs and values. Schools, from kindergarten to university, play an important role in the education process and all education departments in all provinces should work out patriotic education plans for all subjects. Schools must also conduct education outside school that appeals to the senses of the students. Youngsters need to understand the relation between the nation, the collective and the individual. They should love the nation, the hometown, the collective and their position, and contribute to the nation. Teaching materials that appeal to young people should be used. Patriotic education bases such as museums are given considerable attention. All such sites are said to be important for patriotic education. It is stated that schools must make use of these bases in their moral education. Tourist departments should make sure that their guides have an awareness of patriotic education. Activities at these locations should be made attractive and inspiring. Commemorative activities can be used on important holidays and schools can use the sites for winter and summer camps. It is emphasized that a societal atmosphere should be created in which patriotic ideology is made into the leitmotif of society. Patriotic education should hence be disseminated via all levels of news, publishing and the visual media. Traditional holidays, it is said, should be used not only to entertain the people but also to provide them with patriotic education. Patriots such as heroes, martyrs and other outstanding models should be publicized and commemorated as good examples (Central Committee of the CPC 1994).

While various media are used in patriotic education, Wang identifies two main tools on which the campaign rests – the revision of history textbooks which began in 1991 and the construction and reconstruction of more than 10,000 patriotic education bases all over China. In addition to these two main pillars, films, songs, books and other media are employed in the campaign (Wang 2006:12-13). The campaign has been so comprehensive that it has been argued that: “history and memory have been institutionalized” (Wang 2005:14). For example, the CCP usually launches short-term political campaigns but, from its beginning in 1994, the patriotic education project was always intended to be an enduring endeavour. Hence, even though it was directed mainly at young people at the beginning, its scope has been broadened considerably to make it the most important component of ideological education for employees in government organizations, teachers, military personnel and party members (Wang 2008:793, 798-99).

4.1.4 Narratives as threats

In 2004, the CCP issued the policy document “Some Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving the Development of Ideology and Morality Among Minors”. It stresses the important role of minors in the future of the motherland and that because they are the future there is a need to further emphasize their education in patriotism, collectivism, socialism and the national spirit. This is especially salient, the document explains, since “hostile international forces” have intensified their ideological and cultural attempts to influence Chinese minors. In other words, minors need to be immunized from the soft power and the narratives of others. The document repeats much of the content of the patriotic education plan. However, it also mentions that there are untapped resources in various official holidays, among these the births and deaths of revolutionaries and national heroes as well as events such as 18 September, the Nanjing Massacre and other days of national shame. It is also mentioned that holidays and vacations should be used, for example, for school trips to revolutionary sites. The role of patriotic education bases is also stressed in this document. These should make group visits by schools free of charge while individual students should be charged half the entrance fee. Furthermore, the importance of “purifying” the environment for minors by making sure the Internet is free from harmful content is emphasized (Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council 2006:75-91). There is evidence to suggest that museums dealing with the war of resistance are supposed to fulfil a similar function. For example, in an interview, Yu Yanjun of the War of Resistance Museum’s educational staff said that: “(t)here are many young peo-

ple whose understanding of Japan is just from ... television and the brand names of household appliances, and they do not know the historical tendency of the 'Japanese imperialists' to invade, as well as the hegemonic nature of the Western world today" (Mitter 2000a:292). In an article published on 18 February 2011 by the English-language version of the *People's Daily*, the "father of China's great firewall" spoke out about his creation and discussed the need for censorship. He explicitly stated that: "Calls for a more open information flow represent a soft power threat to China from foreign forces".⁷² The soft power of others is seen as a threat against which Chinese people need to be kept safe through censorship, or, better yet, immunization through education.

4.2 The institutional context

When the PRC was founded in 1949, the CCP Ministry of Culture took control of 21 major museums. These, however, were deemed obsolete and "ill suited to the needs of a modern socialist society". Consequently, the CCP turned to the Soviet Union to learn how to create museums that could be used in the proletarian education project to enlighten the masses. The number of museums in China rose from around 20 in 1949 to 1357 in 1999 (Hung 2005:916-918). Until the 1980s, the number of museums dealing with the War of Resistance against the Japanese Invaders, which the war of 1931-1945 is usually called, was fairly modest. Since the second half of the 1980s, and especially since the 1990s, however, the number of such institutions in China has increased rapidly. When such museums were first established in China in the 1980s they were small (Ma 2007:159). One observer who visited the Nanjing museum in 1991 described it as "a sad, ill-maintained place in a poor suburb" (Buruma 2009:127). Since then, however, huge amounts of money have been put into rebuilding the museum and today it is huge. Chinese modern history museums are primarily state-funded (Denton 2005:566-68), although some war museums raise money from local companies that can thereby improve their patriotic credentials.

Museums dealing with the War of Resistance are spread out over large parts of China, with an emphasis on the regions that made up the war theatre. Hence, regions that ex-

⁷² The article was published on the People's Daily's website on 18 February 2011 but was soon removed (at <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7292052.html>). A search for the article, called "Father of China's Great Firewall speaks out" still yielded the original link on 6 March 2011. However, the contents had been removed and the page was entirely blank. The article had, however, been reproduced at several sites, including the following: <http://www.motherboard.tv/2011/3/1/father-of-great-firewall-speaks-out-is-promptly->

perienced little or no fighting during the war have few or no such museums, while a large number of museums can be found in the regions that were occupied and the places in which battles occurred. In north-east China, which was occupied by Japan from 1931, there are a large number of museums dedicated to the war. With very few exceptions, Chinese war museums are located where events took place during the war. While this arguably increases the authenticity of these museums, it means that some are located in less accessible places. Some museums counter this weakness by targeting schools and workplaces, thereby receiving visitors, most of them schoolchildren, in large groups (Mitter 2000a:291).

It is customary for the CCP to create model examples as part of their political campaigns. For this reason, a list of 100 model patriotic education bases, carefully selected from among such sites located all over China, was published in 1995. Many of the chosen sites received funding for renovation and enlargements. The aim of putting together such a list is to get local governments to heighten the patriotic profiles of existing sites and to join in creating new ones. While the central authorities chose the 100 sites for the list, the provincial and local governments also approve patriotic education bases. In 2001, the deputy minister at the Propaganda Department disclosed in an interview that a dozen provinces spent some CNY 10 million on patriotic education sites every year. According to Wang, 434 sites had been created at the provincial level and 1938 at the county level in just the provinces of Anhui, Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu and Jiangxi (Wang 2008:795-96).

As is mentioned above, the government requires schools at all levels to visit patriotic education bases (Wang 2006:12-13). These bases include not only war museums but also ancient sites providing proof of the great achievements of Chinese civilization.⁷³ Revolutionary and CCP-related sites, for example, places where revolutionary conferences were held, can be seen as another category. War museums make up a third type. Among these, some deal with the War of Liberation (解放战争), sometimes labelled the Chinese Civil War outside the PRC. Others concentrate on foreign aggression in the form of, for example, the Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and most commonly the War of Resistance. These wars are often conceptualized as part of the “century of humiliation”, lasting from the first Opium War until Japan was defeated in 1945. A brief analysis of the list of the 100 Patriotic Education Bases (百个爱国主义基地) shows that even though some of the museums listed as deal-

censored and <http://sweetandsoursocialism.wordpress.com/2011/02/18/father-of-chinas-great-firewall-speaks-out-peoples-daily/> (Both last accessed on 6 March 2011).

⁷³ Places such as the Great Wall, the Forbidden City and the site where the Peking man was discovered all fit into this category.

ing with the War of Resistance were built between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, the majority were constructed in the 1980s and 1990s. By contrast, most museums focusing on the War of Liberation were built between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s (China Culture Information Net 2009, Zhong Xuanbu 1998).

The role of museums in the CCP's patriotic education campaign and the close connection between these museums and the CCP are illustrated in several ways. Great communist leaders have written the names of several of these institutions in calligraphy.⁷⁴ Another feature connecting these museums to the CCP is the displaying of plaques proclaiming that the institutions have been certified by different bodies as "patriotic education bases". Such certifications are awarded by central organs such as the Propaganda Department as well as local and regional authorities. The walls of many museums are adorned with a large number of such tablets. The usefulness of patriotic education bases as educational tools was explained in the 1991 notice on patriotic education, which describes patriotic education bases as "vivid textbooks" with "better educational effectiveness" than the traditional classroom study of written material. Visits to these education bases have become a regular part of the school curriculum (Wang 2008:794, 796).

The *Red Tourism*, or patriotic tourism, campaign, which aims to attract tourists to revolutionary sites, was launched in 2004. According to an official with the national coordination group on red tourism, such sites contain "abundant facts ... showing the Party and socialism are the choice of history and the people". The campaign "will make people, especially the young people, to further consolidate their faith in pursuing the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and realizing the great rejuvenation of the nation under the leadership of the CPC". The official also described "the great national ethos that grew out of the fights to win national independence" as a "valuable asset in both the revolutionary war periods and present-day efforts to realize the rejuvenation of the country. Visits to these sites will infuse such elements in the youngsters" (Xinhua 2005a). There is considerable overlap between the list of 100 Patriotic Education Bases and the list of 100 Red Tourism Sites. The latter campaign can hence be regarded as an extension of the former as it attempts to disseminate the same values. However, there are some significant differences. As its name, the Red

⁷⁴ For example, the names of the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall and the Eighth Route Army Memorial Hall were all written by Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin has written the names of the Zhenhai Coast Defence History Museum on the outskirts of Ningbo, the September 18 Historical Museum in Shenyang and the New Fourth Army Memorial in Yancheng, as well as large texts at the Historical Museum for Japan's Occupation in North-east China in Changchun telling the visitor not to forget September 18th.

Tourism Campaign, hints, its focus is on modern history – or revolutionary history. This means that its focus is narrower, less on the Chinese nation and more concerned with the CCP. It consequently excludes some of the categories of the Patriotic Education Bases while still propagating similar qualities. The category “great achievements of Chinese civilization”, including such sites as the Great Wall and the site of the Peking man, are therefore not featured on the list. It also means that the Opium Wars and other conflicts that occurred before the start of the “red era” are omitted. This means that there are a larger number of sites dealing with the War of Resistance, the War of Liberation and “great comrades” on this list. (Zhongguo hongse luyou wang a). While it could be argued that the focus on the “red era” indicates a step away from the emphasis on the century of humiliation, it may also be contended that it further stresses the Japanese role in inflicting such humiliations on the Chinese people – as a significant number of these sites deal with the War of Resistance and sites dealing with other external enemies are rare.⁷⁵

The government allocated CNY 700 million for the development of red tourism in 2005, which was declared the year of red tourism. In the same year, the National Development and Reform Commission assigned CNY 232 million for the construction of 12 red tourism scenic spots related to the war of resistance to celebrate the 60th anniversary of victory (Xinhua 2005b). In December 2007 it was reported that the government had invested CNY 2.15 billion in the Red Tourism campaign since 2004. Between 2004 and 2007 the campaign attracted more than 400 million tourists (Xinhua 2007).

Among the private museums that have been established in China, some have focused on local non-communist war history (Reilly 2004:288-89).⁷⁶ This indicates that the narratives presented in such exhibitions differ from those at state-run museums. It could perhaps be said, then, that war museums are slowly emerging as an arena for civil society groups. However, in July 2008, 90 per cent of China’s 2400 museums in all categories were run by

⁷⁵ The *China Red Tourism Web* also provides a list of 12 key zones designated *Red Tourism* zones. These zones, which stretch across provinces and include a number of sites, can be visited as part of a trip to a region (Zhongguo hongse luyou wang b). It also provides a list of 30 suggested routes for travelling to quality red tourism sites (Zhongguo hongse luyou wang c). These 100 sites, 30 routes and 12 zones are part of the first phase of a campaign being implemented between 2004 and 2007, the aim of which is to establish a framework for red tourism. During the second part of the programme, from 2007 to 2010, the aim is to realize “all-round development” of the areas, many of which are quite remote, through the improvement of infrastructure. The government also adopted policies to support travel agencies (Xinhua 2005a).

⁷⁶ According to Reilly, these institutions often “begin with individual initiative, build upon local resources and connections, gain official support at the local level and then slowly expand using media, academic and Government resources to engage in public outreach and scholarship” (Reilly 2006:195). Such private museums often cooperate with local officials by providing venues and themes for patriotic education. Local education officials collaborate with museums in arranging school visits. Moreover, history activists, often academics, have influenced the content of state-run museums and have been involved in planning exhibitions (Reilly 2006:195, 197).

the government (*People's Daily* Online 2008b). Nonetheless, according to an article in the *People's Daily* Online written in 2006, there are quite a few small private museums in the PRC. In some cases people have gathered objects connected to the war to display in their homes. Such small-scale exhibitions account for most of the private exhibitions. Two large-scale private museums deal with the war: the Nanjing Private War of Resistance Historical Material Hall in Nanjing, and the Jianchuan Museum Cluster in Sichuan (Renmin Wang 2006). The latter actually surpasses the public museums in size. However, an entrance ticket to the private Jianchuan Museum Cluster cost CNY 80 in April 2009. This is in stark contrast to the government-run museums dealing with the same theme, which stopped charging entrance fees for schoolchildren accompanied by their teachers after a government decision in 2004 (Vickers 2007:366). In January 2008, it was decided that patriotic and other education sites were to become free of charge for all in 2009. This makes it difficult to make private war museums profitable.⁷⁷ The most important conclusion to be drawn from this state of affairs is probably that a large number of Chinese will visit the museums that have become free of charge. This certainly appears to be the case.⁷⁸

One last point should be added in this section. While some Japanese museums, as is shown in chapter 5, have been the targets of much domestic controversy, it has been noted that: “the content of war museums in Japan and China has yet to become the subject of a diplomatic upset between the two countries” (Rose 2005:118). However, the contents of some Chinese exhibitions have been discussed in the Japanese parliament, the Diet, and in discussions between Chinese and Japanese diplomats. These low-key diplomatic exchanges have not been given any attention in the scholarly literature and have received little attention in the media. Nevertheless, these negotiations are important as part of the Chinese context within which narratives about war are produced and exist because they can contribute to explaining the existence of some exhibits in Chinese exhibitions. These negotiations are discussed as part of the Japanese context since the discussions illustrate how some Japanese politicians and others perceive Chinese narratives as threats in a similar way to how Chinese gov-

⁷⁷ Fan Jianchuan, director of the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, notes on the website of the cluster that combining diversified content and style with different amenities and a mix of spiritual and material products – thereby creating a cluster – is the only way to survive for museums not sponsored by the government (The Jianchuan Museum Cluster's Website). This cluster is perhaps best described as a theme park. With its pleasant scenery complete with a small lake, a hotel, a restaurant, the Flying Tigers Bar and staff walking around dressed in old uniforms, it offers the visitor an experience that is quite different from a regular museum visit.

⁷⁸ For example, in November 2010 it was reported that since the Eighth Route Army Memorial in Wuxiang abolished entrance fees, it was receiving about 60,000 visitors a month (Hongse lüyou 2010). The New Fourth Army Memorial in Yancheng received 658,000 visitors in 2008. This was a 165 % increase over the previous year. The increase is attributed to the abolition of entrance fees (JSNews 2009).

ernment officials regard foreign discourses as threats. They are also discussed as specific contextual information in the analysis of Chinese narratives. For now it is sufficient to point out that changes have been made to some Chinese exhibitions in order to accommodate concerns voiced by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

4.3 Conclusions

This chapter contributes to the study of contemporary Chinese society by presenting an understanding of recent Chinese debates as a struggle over the meaning of patriotism. Just as there are those in China who are trying to define the meaning of this high-value word, the CCP is also making attempts to define the term in a way that suits its agenda. The negative press that the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations received internationally meant that the idea of patriotism held by the demonstrators had a damaging effect on China's international image. Some of those who have opposed the anti-Japanese faction have argued that violent demonstrations and vitriolic attacks against Chinese labelled as unpatriotic were in fact not patriotic and how to behave as a patriot. Different groups therefore participated in a discursive struggle to define what it means to be patriotic. In this struggle, some have resorted to branding their opponents as "traitors". The Japan-bashers were largely victorious in this struggle over meaning. Furthermore, and importantly, these developments constituted a domestic challenge domestically to the patriotic credentials and legitimacy of the CCP. Ever since the CCP started its patriotic education campaign it has tried to steer patriotic feelings in a certain direction. However, the CCP may have had more of the initiative when it initiated the campaign. As other players have entered the struggle to define the meaning of patriotism, it has become increasingly important for the CCP to manage this struggle in the direction that suits its purposes, and more importantly away from the direction that threatens its objectives. The CCP's patriotic education campaign of which the museums studied here are an important part, involves an attempt by the CCP to define and fix the meaning of the word patriotism for the purposes of the Party. The CCP, in other words, is participating in an ongoing struggle over the meaning of patriotism in the PRC.

This chapter, along with chapter 5, contributes to the study of narratives about war by illustrating how an explicitly defined theory of context can help understand such narratives. However, the full extent of this contribution will not become evident until the analysis of narratives has been conducted. Put differently, this chapter has revealed much about the

context in which Chinese narratives about war are produced, and touched very briefly on what such narratives deal with. However, little has been mentioned about the narratives per se. Even though we have learned from this chapter that many Chinese museums deal with the War of Resistance and that these museum exhibitions are part of a larger struggle about the meaning of this war, we do not know much about *how* the War of Resistance is depicted.

Chapter 5: Analysis of the Japanese context

Just as chapter 4 provides an account of the Chinese context, this chapter provides the historical and societal background needed to interpret the material analysed in the chapters below. While the Japanese context differs in many respects from the Chinese, the main logic underlining the structure of these chapters is the same. The chapter provides an analysis of the broader socio-political and historical context, including the history of the relevant discourses. Section 5.2 analyses the institutional context in which Japanese museums function. As the analysis is conducted, attention is paid to intertextuality. When the analysis of the material collected at museums in Japan is carried out below, the relevant context outlined in this chapter will help provide an understanding and explanation of some of the content of these exhibitions. This entails interpreting from which discourses an exhibition derives its understanding of history, that is, a form of intertextual reference. It may also involve referring to aspects of the societal context as crucial to an understanding of why a particular exhibit is on display at a museum.

5.1 The broader socio-political and historical context

Views of the war in Japan are closely connected with broader political agendas.

5.1.1 The historical context

During the war, the Japanese government made full use of censorship and surveillance of conversations between ordinary citizens. Propaganda was used to promote patriotism and control public opinion, and people who voiced dissent were arrested. The view of the war disseminated by the government through the mass media, school textbooks, popular magazines and comic books was one according to which it was Japan's mission to work against Western aggression and for peace in Asia. According to this logic, Chinese policies were incorrect and based on an anti-Japanese ideology. Chiang Kai-shek had reluctantly drawn Japan into a conflict with China in 1937 (Yoshida 2006:11-15).

The propaganda disseminated during the war period was based on the ideology of radical Shintô ultranationalism. In 1937, the Japanese government issued the document *Fundamentals of our National Polity (Kokutai no hongî)*. After a long ideological struggle concerning how to interpret the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, which was adopted in 1889, this government document established and explicated the principles of radical Shintô ultra nationalism as the orthodox ideology of the Japanese nation. Central to this struggle was how the role of the emperor and his relations with parliament, and hence the character of democratic politics, should be understood. The document in effect stripped the constitution of its constitutional power – the emperor’s rule was declared absolute and the constitution merely an imperial edict. No universalistic principles and no separation of powers could be allowed (Skya 2009:263-67, 278-79). The document “meant the demise of the nascent form of constitutionalism that had been developing in Japan since the promulgation of the constitution in 1889” (Skya 2009:265). Furthermore, the document attacked enlightenment and occidental ideologies, which were regarded as having penetrated Japanese society. These ideologies were seen as having caused the problems perceived to characterize Japanese society through individualism, which had given rise to parliamentary government as well as freedom and rights movements that had confused people and damaged their Japanese spirit (Skya 2009:265-67). “Since Japanese people in varying degrees had already been infected by the European ideologies based on individualism, radical Shintô ultranationalists were convinced that they had to be thoroughly re-educated on the basis of the fundamental Shintô ultranationalist ideology. In brief, they declared a holy war on rational discourse and the essence of modern Western society itself” (Skya 2009:267). Imperial subjects were supposed to exercise full loyalty to the emperor. The *Fundamentals of our National Polity* therefore stated that: “offering our lives for the sake of the emperor does not mean so-called self-sacrifice but the casting away of our little selves to live under his august grace and the enhancing of the life of the people of a state” (quoted in de Bary et al. 2006:279). The document was distributed to the masses for re-education purposes. The purpose of the war for the ideology of radical Shintô ultranationalism was to establish Japanese imperial rule as a new world order. The problem, however, was that the ideology lacked universalism as it was essentially ethnocentric. For this reason, it did not appeal to the conquered people in the colonies and occupied areas. For example, the fierce assimilationist policies adopted in Korea failed in the face of Korean nationalism and resistance, just as they did in China. Force alone was not enough to accomplish world domination (Skya 2009:316-26).

During the years of the occupation of Japan, from 1945 to 1952, SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) built on US wartime propaganda to present a small clique of Japanese military leaders as responsible for waging aggressive war. The Japanese people and the emperor were portrayed as innocents deceived by the military leaders. The Tokyo Trials of 1946-48, along with a purge of more than 200,000 people who had held important positions in the war years, were the main ways in which SCAP assigned responsibility for Japan's aggressive war. SCAP first purged those Japanese politicians who had been involved in the war effort, but later reversed its course and let many of them return, instead launching a "Red Purge" of left-wing elements accompanied by a move away from stressing demilitarization to what was seen by many as remilitarization. There were several reasons for this change in policy, including SCAP's own McCarthyism made stronger by its fear of Communist China and the outbreak of the Korean War. At the end of the occupation, some of the Japanese leaders who came to power had been involved in the war and still held right-wing opinions. These leaders propagated a brighter war narrative. This view of history, however, was not unopposed (eg. Yoshida 2006:45-50, Orr 2001:14-19, 71-78, Seraphim 2006:6-7, 317-19, Dower 1999:432-40).

It had already been decided in 1942, during US planning for a possible occupation of Japan, that the emperor's war responsibility would not be pursued. Instead, the emperor was to be separated from the ideology of Shrine Shintô (often labelled State Shintô) and recast as a symbol of the post-war civilian and democratic state. This created continuity between the war period and the post-war era and did not encourage trust in trials as a way to deal with issues concerning war responsibility. Shrine Shintô was abolished. It had been deeply involved in the state's nation building effort since the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and in disseminating radical Shintô ultranationalist ideology during the war. In its place, the Association of Shinto Shrines was established (Seraphim 2006:37-41). For the Shintô organization, this meant that a possibility opened up for remembering the war "as the people's sacrifice for the emperor and his empire, and core questions about war responsibility and the structure of imperial ideology remained above critical investigation" (Seraphim 2006:41). The Association of Shintô shrines stressed the continuity of its role as a spiritual leader but blamed the state for having distorted the shrines. It hence attempted to create a new self-identity by recasting itself as a pacifist institution of the people (Seraphim 2006:46-47). SCAP's reverse course made it easier for the Association of Shintô Shrines to more explicitly voice its nationalistic agenda. Important issues were demanding pensions for the war-bereaved and matters

related to rituals performed for the war-dead at shrines. The Association criticized occupation policies and the constitution and presented itself as the guardian of an eternal Japanese national essence embodied by the emperor who could hence not be criticized in any way for his role during the war (Seraphim 2006:54-59).

Whereas in post-war PRC the state played a central role in managing discourses about the war, in Japan the state did not assume such a leading role even though some ministries and groups of politicians were involved in battles over the meaning of the war. Instead, a number of interest groups played a mediating role between the state and civil society. The groups involved are sometimes divided into two main camps of what are often labelled progressives and conservatives (e.g. Rose 2006:135). The conservatives include the Japan Association of War-Bereaved Families (*Izokukai*), the *Tsukurukai*, the Association of Shintô Shrines, the Ministry of Education (MOE) (since 2001 the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, MEXT) and conservative politicians, mainly from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The opponents of the conservatives comprises many groups of activists, teachers and professors, the Japan-China Friendship Association,⁷⁹ the Japan Teacher's Union (JTU) and several non-governmental organizations (Seraphim 2006:4-14). The peace and the anti-nuclear movements have also been critical of conservative governments. Individual citizens also came to play important roles in post-war memory politics. Historian and textbook author Ienaga Saburô, for example, in 1965 sued the Ministry of Education for its censorship of history textbooks. The lawsuits would go on for decades and a movement of supporters of Ienaga's cause was formed. Journalist Honda Katsuichi's articles on Japanese atrocities in China were serialized in the *Asahi Shimbun* in 1972. Subsequently, books published on the topic became bestsellers (Honda 1972). The peace movement has been one of the central actors in Japanese memory politics and many peace museums have their roots in it. Until 1954, the anti-nuclear peace movement was run mainly by communists and socialists. After the Lucky Dragon Incident in 1954, when the crew of a Japanese fishing boat became the victims of a US hydrogen bomb test at the Bikini Atoll, however, the anti-

⁷⁹ The Japan-China Friendship Association directed the spotlight at Japanese wartime behaviour in China as it stressed the importance of a peace treaty that included communist countries, especially China. Peace, according to the Association, should be based on Sino-Japanese relations – not on an alliance with the USA. It protested against US policy towards the PRC, which involved dropping the issue of Japanese war reparations after the establishment of the PRC. Bonds with the PRC were forged through an emphasis on the Japanese and the Chinese people having been victimized by the Japanese state. The rhetoric of the Association was similar to that of the CCP, which provoked criticism and questions regarding the exact character of the relationship between the Association and the CCP. The association was involved in the repatriation of Japanese left behind in China after the war, constructed memorial monuments to Chinese victims of Japanese aggression around Japan, and

nuclear weapons movement was turned into a mass movement that came to focus on a wider anti-nuclear message (Orr 2001:47-64).

5.1.2 Meaning-making and societal struggles

Within Japanese society, struggles over how to interpret history have taken place in several fields. These struggles are important because they illustrate the wider context of meaning making in relation to the war in which the narratives analysed in chapters 7 and 8 are constructed. Those who construct narratives about war in museums are most certainly aware of these struggles and the narratives should be seen as part of them. These struggles within Japanese society are very much linked to the role of the state and its relationship to the individual.

Whereas Japanese politicians for a long time stayed away from issues concerning war memory and refrained from taking initiatives to create a consensus or clear official standpoint on these issues, parts of the bureaucracy got involved in the politics of war memory shortly after the end of the occupation. The Ministry of Health and Welfare had been responsible for providing pensions for the war-bereaved during the war, and close ties with the *Izokukai* were established after the occupation. This represented a continuity of sorts as the ministry favoured the military war-bereaved over other victim groups. Directly after the war, the main aim of the *Izokukai* was to receive welfare payments, after SCAP had withdrawn their pensions, and to mourn for the dead. With time, more emphasis came to be put on celebrating the war dead as honourable heroes who had given their lives for the country.⁸⁰ The acts committed by these honourable heroes were ignored as the war dead came to be commemorated as a homogeneous group of heroes. The organization aspired to have the spirits of the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. In 1953, the Military Pension Law was passed and the war-bereaved started to receive pensions again. In 1955, this law was revised so that the families of convicted war criminals also became entitled to pensions. Furthermore, the law stipulated that the executions of war criminals were to be regarded as having been in the line of duty. This decision was used by the Yasukuni Shrine to justify the enshrinement of Class B and C war criminals in 1966, as well as the 14 Class A war criminals enshrined secretly in 1978 (Seraphim 2006:61-85).

criticized Koizumi for visiting Yasukuni in 2005 as well as undertaking other activities to direct attention to Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia (Seraphim 2006:108-134).

⁸⁰ In 1993, then Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro described the war as a war of aggression. The *Izokukai* severely criticized Hosokawa and declared the war to have been one of self-defence.

The Yasukuni Shrine has occupied a central place in Japanese struggles over how to interpret war history. It was founded as the Tokyo Shrine for the Invocation of the Military Dead (Tôkyô Shôkonsha) in 1879 as the centre for the cult of the war dead and part of the Meiji nation-building project and renamed Yasukuni Shrine (Shrine of the Peaceful Country) in 1879. While a large number of local shrines existed for honouring the war dead, Yasukuni was the only national shrine of this kind and the only one in which the emperor would honour his national subjects. It was also central in defining core national values of loyalty towards the emperor. The shrine was thus a central symbol of imperial Japan and was important for the ideology of Shintô ultra-nationalism. This has made its existence in the post-war era extremely controversial (Seraphim 2006:230-32). The Yasukuni Shrine is often described as a symbol of Japanese militarism. Visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the controversial shrine have been severely criticized not just by the governments and citizens of countries that suffered from Japan's militarist aggression, such as the Koreans and China, but also by domestic opponents. There has been much discussion about the prime ministerial visits being unconstitutional because of the separation in Japan between religion and politics. Indeed, Koizumi's 2001 visit was deemed unconstitutional by the Fukuoka district court in 2004 and by the Osaka district court in 2005 (Breen 2008a:1-2, Rose 2008:26-27). This, however, did not stop Koizumi from visiting again (Seaton 2008:178, 188). The main reason the Chinese government has criticized visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the shrine since Nakasone's official visit on 15 August 1985 is the 14 convicted class A war criminals enshrined there among the some 2.5 million common soldiers killed in Japan's wars. When Japan and China restored diplomatic relations in 1972, it was based on an understanding that a few militarists had misled the Japanese people and led the country to war. Ordinary Japanese were hence regarded as victims while the militarists were blamed. If a Japanese Prime Minister visits Yasukuni Shrine, it is seen as absolving the war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni and as a denial of the foundation for relations between the countries. If Chinese leaders refrain from criticizing Japanese Prime Ministerial visits to the shrine they risk being criticized domestically (Rose 2008:29-32).

The Yasukuni Shrine issue has been explicitly related to the issue of the apologies issued by the Japanese government for the Japanese invasion of China. In 2001, then Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirô, in an atmosphere of bilateral tensions mainly due to his 13 August visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, delivered an apology during a visit to China (Xinhua 2001). This was interpreted by the Chinese government as a sign that he would refrain from

visiting the Yasukuni Shrine (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2001). To many Chinese, his subsequent visit to the shrine in April 2002 was difficult to understand (Wang 2008:76). Such mixed signals, actions that seem to negate the apologies made by Japanese leaders, have been described as a “backlash”. In this case this backlash came in the form of an action by the prime minister himself while in other cases an apology delivered by a prime minister has been followed by statements by other lawmakers denying atrocities or that the war was aggressive (Lind 2008). It has been argued that one of the main reasons for the failure of Japanese apologies is that they have been followed by actions that invalidate them (Yamazaki 2006:96). For some conservatives and right-wingers, making apologies is seen as dishonouring the sacrifice made by the Japanese war dead (Yamazaki 2006:72).⁸¹

After the war had ended, many Japanese pondered the question of who was responsible for the defeat, and many felt not just grief but also guilt towards Japanese who had died in the war. The crucial issue was how to interpret their deaths – what did their deaths mean? “The victors could comfort the souls of their dead, and console themselves, by reporting that the outcome of the war had been great and good. Just as every fighting man on the winning side became a hero, so no supreme sacrifice in the victorious struggle had been in vain” (Dower 1999:486). For the vanquished, such an interpretation was not possible. This was made clear by the victors who, by emphasizing Japanese atrocities and conducting military trials, denied Japanese the right to regard the war dead as heroes. Many Japanese, who because of strict censorship may not have been aware of atrocities committed during the war, denounced the war crimes when they were confronted with such information. However, this still did not satisfy their need to address the issue of their friends and family who had died in the war (Dower 1999:487). Many Japanese pondered this issue in the aftermath of the war. It was not until Japan’s post-war economic growth had taken off, however, that a really influen-

⁸¹ These are some of the reasons why the Japanese apologies so far have not been very successful. In other words, in contrast to what is sometimes suggested, it is not a lack of apologies that has been the problem. The Japanese government has issued a number of apologies, some general statements about the war in Asia and some directed to specific countries or victim groups. Japanese Prime Ministers delivered five official apologies to Chinese Heads of State between 1972 and 2005. In addition, statements of apology have been made in other contexts such as in the Diet and in connection with anniversaries of the end of the war (Mok & Tokunaga 2009:79). Chinese newspapers sometimes mention that no written apology has been given to China even though South Korea received one. The apology delivered by former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi on 15 August 1995 was given much attention. In the statement, Murayama said that: “During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology” (Murayama 1995). Subsequent governments have announced that they stand by this statement.

tial interpretation came to be presented linking economic prosperity (and peace) to the sacrifice made by those who died in the war.

In the 1960s, several groups of war victims, for example, atomic bomb survivors (*hibakusha*), landlords who had had to sell their land cheaply during the occupation and repatriates from Japan's colonies, struggled to receive reparations from the state to compensate them for their suffering, and loss of property and livelihood. The former group was aligned with the socialists while conservatives supported the cause of the latter two groups. By this time, what is sometimes described as an economic miracle had made Japan prosperous and this economic success was understood as becoming more and more central to Japanese national identity. While all three groups eventually did receive some kind of compensation, the two latter groups did so earlier largely because they were well organized and the potential source of a large number of votes in elections. They also differed from the *hibakusha* in the strategies they employed. The landlords and repatriates redefined their victimhood in terms of sacrifice for the state. According to the logic adopted, their sacrifices had contributed to Japan's post-war economic growth. The sacrifice was framed as having been made in the name of peace and prosperity. The victims were cast as patriotic heroes (Orr 2001:137-72). In other words, as these groups drew on the victimhood discourse that had its roots in the anti-nuclear movement, they made an effort to redefine it in line with the conservative political agenda, into *sacrifice for the state* rather than *victimization by the state*. This logic of connecting wartime sacrifices with post-war growth and/or peace is sometimes labelled cornerstone theory (礎論) since the sacrifices made by the war dead are regarded as the "cornerstone" of the nation's accomplishments (Breen 2008b:156-57). This is central to the historical views of conservative Japanese groups such as the Association of Shinto Shrines and the *Izokukai*. Conservative Japanese politicians have often made statements in accordance with this logic. For example, when Koizumi Jun'ichirô was prime minister, he explicitly referred to this line of argument when he justified his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. During a session of the 156th Diet in 2003, Koizumi said that today's peace is based on the "precious sacrifice" (尊い犠牲) made by those who lost their lives for the sake of the country. He wished to express his respect and gratitude to these people. He made similar statements in connection with visits to the shrine in 2001 and 2004 (Takahashi 2006:156). Takahashi argues that the function of these visits and Koizumi's accompanying statements "send the strongest message to the Japanese people that 'dying for one's country' is a 'precious' act and an act worthy of national

honour” (Takahashi 2006:157).⁸² This is exactly the role that Yasukuni played during the war when special ceremonies were held to enshrine diseased Japanese soldiers. Bereaved families were invited to attend the ceremonies, in which the emperor participated. In this way, sacrifice for the country was construed as honourable for the war dead and the bereaved alike (Takahashi 2006:160-67). Such large-scale ceremonies were first held in 1895, shortly after the Sino-Japanese War, after voices had been raised emphasizing the significance of honouring the war dead. Granting the highest possible honour to the war dead was a way of making their deaths meaningful, thereby making the bereaved families less prone to criticize the state for their hardships. More importantly, it was a way of fostering a national spirit involving a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the country (Takahashi 2006:168-73). The emperor, however, stopped visiting the shrine after it came to light that Class A war criminals had been secretly enshrined there in 1978. Takahashi argues that when Koizumi visited the shrine he was attempting to foster a similar kind of sacrificing spirit in a context in which the deployment of Self Defence Force (SDF) troops to Iraq was first put on the agenda and then realized and the revision of article 9 of the Japanese Constitution was being discussed (Takahashi 2006:155-59).

5.1.3 Education

Education has been one of the main ideological battlefields in post-war Japan. Education was identified by the occupation authorities as having been instrumental in indoctrinating ultra-nationalist values in imperial Japan before and during the war. Before and especially during the war, the idea of the *kokutai*, a mystical and uniquely Japanese “national polity”, “essence” or “entity”, was used to legitimize “national morals” for “fundamentalist nationalist purposes”. It came to consist of the two main elements of the “unbroken imperial line and the idea of the nation as family writ large” (McVeigh 2006:43). The *kokutai* was central to the Imperial Rescript on Education (McVeigh 2006:44), which articulates the notion of the nation as a family in a Confucian manner. The Imperial Rescript on Education, promulgated in 1890, “became the source of efforts to establish the tennô [emperor] as the moral head of the nation” (Doak 2007:93). The Rescript told imperial subjects that: “should emergency arise, offer

⁸² Some war-bereaved, most commonly Taiwanese, Koreans and Japanese Christians, have demanded that the spirits of their enshrined relatives be removed from Yasukuni. In the case of enshrined Taiwanese and Koreans, this is usually because they were semi-forcibly drafted. The Yasukuni Shrine ignores the feelings of the bereaved who wish for the souls of their relatives to be removed. Takahashi argues that this illustrates how the shrine prioritizes honouring the war dead over mourning them, because the feelings of mourning of the families are

yourselves courageously in service to the public; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of the Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful servants, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers” (quoted in Doak 2007:95). In other words, the Rescript was influenced by Confucian morals as it stressed the loyalty of the imperial subjects to the emperor to the extent that it “implied that disloyalty to the emperor was a betrayal of all one’s ancestors and an immoral act as well” (Doak 2007:93).⁸³ Until the war ended in 1945, schoolchildren had to recite the Rescript ceremoniously (McVeigh 2006:225) and were taught that the emperor was a deity (Skya 2009:45). The notion of *kokutai* was central to the statist patriotic discourse that developed from the Meiji period in which politics and religion were merged and state Shinto was promoted in a way that strongly privileged the state (McVeigh 2006:43, Doak 2007:94-95). This statism “appeared as a useful ideology for containing morals and politics within the same framework” (Doak 2007:94). This statist repression through patriotic education explains why some Japanese have such a deep-seated aversion to moral and patriotic education and to state control in general.

When the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) was enacted in 1947 it was intended to make impossible the kind of indoctrination of militarist and ultra-nationalist values that the Imperial Rescript on Education had supported. Cosmopolitanism and peace education were therefore given a central place in education. The importance of cultivating a love of peace was inscribed not just in the Japanese Constitution but also in the FLE, sometimes referred to as the “education constitution”. In the preamble to the FLE, its main principles are spelled out:

We have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination to create a democratic and cultured nation, and contribute to world peace and the welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal depends fundamentally on the power of education. We shall educate human beings who revere the dignity of the individual as well as seek truth and peace ardently (quoted in Saito 2010:8).

disregarded. They were enshrined, it is claimed, in accordance with the emperor’s wishes and their enshrinement cannot be undone (Takahashi 2006:175-79).

⁸³ The Japanese understanding of the nation that was developed in the late 19th century, at least for some state theorists, shared the contemporary Chinese understanding of the ethnic nation in terms of lineage. An ostensibly unbroken line of emperors could be traced directly back to the sun goddess, Amaterasu Ōmikami (Skya 2009:56-57), just as some Chinese traced the Chinese ethnic nation’s origins back to the Yellow Emperor. The imperial subjects were the emperor’s children.

This emphasis on peace has come to be firmly established in Japanese education. The following quote illustrates the centrality of the concept of peace in the Japanese debate over education:

Although peace education as an educational goal has been the subject of national consensus in post-war Japan, approaches for realising that goal have been subject to debate, especially in connection with the role of patriotic education. Some assert that patriotic education is an important factor in contributing to world peace (Ide 2009:61).

Patriotic education in the Japanese context has often been regarded as based on a concept of patriotism understood as obedience, authority and nationalism. The JTU has been one of the main proponents of anti-war and anti-nationalist education. The JTU and others that advocate and practice anti-war peace education understand patriotism as a cause of war. For them, patriotic education was key to the militarist war effort of Imperial Japan – the indoctrination of patriotic values based on the Imperial Rescript of Education led to aggression abroad and oppression domestically.⁸⁴ Any attempt to incorporate patriotism into education is regarded by these groups as a step towards the revival of militarism.

Critics of the FLE perceived it as a foreign imposition created by the US occupation authorities, embodying not Japanese morality, involving, for example, filial piety and loyalty to the state, but foreign values that stressed individualism to too large an extent.⁸⁵ Some of those active in the revision movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as former Education Minister (later Foreign Minister) Machimura Nobutaka, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzô and the Educational Reform National Council (ERNC), argued for the need to preserve Japanese traditions and foster morality and patriotism in order to deal with problems such as bullying in schools by giving students an improved sense of ethics (Okada 2002:427-32, Monbukagakushô 2007:1, 5-6, Takayama 2008:131-35, Rose 2006:144-47). Prime Minister Koizumi stated in 2001 that: “Educational reform is necessary in order to engender in youth both pride and self-awareness in being Japanese” (quoted in Okada 2002:437). In the final report submitted by the Central Council for Education (an advisory

⁸⁴ Some critics therefore regard all kinds of patriotic and moral education as a return to wartime education. Indeed, some of the people active in the process leading up to the revision of the FLE have expressed opinions reminiscent of, and even referring explicitly to, the Imperial Rescript. For example, when Kawamura Takeo, led the LDP’s FLE Research Group in 1999, he said “we want to debate the issues with a Heisei Imperial Rescript on Education in mind” (quoted in Takahashi 2006:159). Kawamura later became Education Minister.

⁸⁵ Attempts to revise it first failed in the 1960s. Later, in the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone, who regarded a revision of the FLE as one of several necessary reforms, along with a revision of article 9 of the constitution and a strengthening of Japan’s military capabilities, launched a new attempt by setting up a council for educational reform. There was strong opposition to the proposed revision, mainly from groups such as the JTU and the Japan Socialist Party, and it was therefore not realized until 2006.

board to MEXT) in 2003, bullying and truancy were presented as part of a larger crisis in Japanese society that needed to be dealt with in the area of education through revision of the FLE (Otsu 2008:77-78). Several organizations condemned the move to revise the FLE. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations criticized the report by the Central Council for Education for aiming to foster children useful for the state rather than nurture personal development, and warned that using public education to make people love the nation could violate the constitutional freedom of thought and conscience (Otsu 2008:78-79). The debate clearly demonstrates that the belief that education can be utilized to shape people's minds is widespread. This is explicit in the law itself as well as in statements by education ministers and prime ministers (Monbukagakushô 2006, Monbukagakushô 2007). The following statement made in the Diet in 2006 by Education Minister Ibuki in response to a question about what kind of people the revision of the FLE sought to cultivate is especially telling: "Because an international community is emerging, [we] hope for the revision of the law in order to strive for [the creation of] Japanese people who firmly acquire an identity as Japanese, in other words the traditions and culture that the citizens of our country, our nation have cherished and at the same time Japanese with an international sensibility" (Monbukagakushô 2007:3).

Those who advocate patriotic education, for example MEXT, contend that Japanese patriotic values are necessary in order to contribute to world peace (Ide 2009:63-67). This is demonstrated in the 2006 revision of the FLE. After the revision, the FLE still highlights cosmopolitanism and love of peace. The difference is that the revised law stresses that peace and cosmopolitanism should be embraced by *Japanese* citizens who love the nation and respect Japanese tradition and culture. Whereas the FLE of 1947 was concerned with cultivating world citizens without emphasizing nationality, the 2006 FLE stresses that the world citizens educated in Japan are Japanese. Of course, education reforms that prioritized patriotism were adopted earlier in the post-war era, but it was not until 2006 that such measures came to be included in the main law governing education (Saito 2010:1-18). The following sentence in article 2 of the revised FLE illustrates how patriotism is combined with an emphasis on peace by stating that it is an aim of education:

To cultivate an attitude that respects tradition and culture and love of our country and the hometown that have fostered them as well as respects other countries and contributes to the peace of the international community (Monbukagakushô 2006).

The reform, then, entails an increased accentuation of patriotism and morality but does not do this through a complete replacement of cosmopolitanism and peace education. The revision was still severely criticized for stressing patriotism and morality. Takayama, for example, argues that: “Instead of keeping state power in check, the revised FLE even legalises the imposition on children of a set of values, attitudes and dispositions which the state deems necessary” (Takayama 2008:138).

Education-related battles are waged not only concerning the content of school textbooks and education law but also the use of the national flag and the national anthem. Schools have also been at the centre of such conflicts. Until 1999, the *Hinomaru* flag and the *Kimigayo* anthem had no formal status as the national flag and anthem in Japan. These symbols had, however, been used in such capacities since the Meiji period when the government made conscious efforts to make Japan a modern nation state. The song has been sung in schools since the Meiji period and has been closely associated with the emperor, loyalty and patriotism. The increased emphasis on the ideology of the emperor system in the 1930s and 1940s meant that the song was increasingly regarded as a de facto national anthem (Cripps 1996:77-79). The *Hinomaru* is considered a symbol of Japanese imperialism and expansionism. MEXT regards the flag and anthem as instrumental to the fostering of a Japanese identity and insists that these symbols should be used during enrolment and graduation ceremonies. Teachers have been punished for refusing to sing the *Kimigayo* national anthem and for not standing up and singing the anthem when the *Hinomaru* national flag is raised during school ceremonies (Otsu 2008:84-85, 87, Ide 2009:62, 67). The President of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, in a 2007 statement marking the 60th anniversary of the Japanese Constitution, described forcing teachers to display the flag and to sing the anthem as a human rights issue and “an example that freedom of mind is violated at schools” (Nichibenren 2007).

The textbook issue is another education-related issue. It is often described as being linked to the issue of Japanese history textbooks being used in Japanese junior high schools that are considered to make light of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the war in Asia (see e.g. Nozaki 2002, 2005 or Nelson 2002). Although it is often traced back to the 1982 textbook crisis, the issue of school textbooks became a matter of Sino-Japanese relations, the issue of textbook content was already a domestic issue in Japan, with textbook authors complaining about being asked to remove or tone down content as a part of the MOE’s textbook supervision process (Nozaki 2008). Conservative groups first complained about what they considered “biased” textbooks in the mid-1950s and similar complaints, la-

menting the lack of patriotism in textbooks, were launched again in the 1980s (Rose 2006:135). Since 1965, Ienaga Saburô fought the MOE's textbook examination procedure, as the textbook author perceived the process as a form of censorship aimed at minimizing descriptions of Japanese wartime atrocities (Nozaki 2008).

In 1982, it was reported by some Japanese newspapers that the MOE had asked authors of history textbooks, as a part of the textbook review process, to replace the terms invasion or aggression (侵略) with advance (進出). This led to a diplomatic dispute between Japan and its neighbours, China and South Korea, even though the reports turned out to be false. Nonetheless, similar instructions had been issued at other points in time (Nozaki 2006). Following this dispute, the Japanese government passed the Neighbouring Countries Clause, according to which descriptions in textbooks had to take into consideration the views on history of its Asian neighbours (Nozaki 2006:127).⁸⁶ In the 2000s, the textbook issue resurfaced as the right-wing group, *Tsukurukai*, submitted a history textbook for screening that is often criticized for downplaying Japanese aggression. The textbook passed the screening process in 2001 after a process in which 137 corrections were made (Saaler 2005:51-64, Rose 2006:137-38). *Tsukurukai* worked hard to get schools to adopt its textbook, but labour unions, including the JTU, concerned citizens' groups, left-wing organizations, parents, renowned historians and the Nobel Laureate, Ôe Kenzaburo, organized campaigns against the society. The Chinese government criticized the Japanese government for letting it pass the screening process (Nozaki 2008:144-49, Saaler 2005:51-89, Rose 2006:137-43).⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Although this is the common understanding of the origins of the issue, it has been pointed out that issues involving educational content in Sino-Japanese relations did not start with the 1982 textbook crisis but in fact date back to the period after the signing of what was regarded by many Chinese as unequal treaties between the countries in 1915 (Kawashima 2006:347). Official Japanese protests against the use of what was regarded as anti-Japanese educational materials were delivered in 1915 and 1919 (Kawashima 2005:19). Some Japanese see anti-Japanese education in China as one of the reasons behind the problems in Sino-Japanese relations. According to the 2009 Genron NPO survey, anti-Japanese education was considered a major problem by 36.1 per cent of Japanese respondents, third after problems concerning the safety of Chinese products, at 46.2 per cent, and territorial issues at 39.1 per cent (*Genron NPO* 2009).

⁸⁷ In 2002, the textbook achieved a market share of 0.039 percent and 543 copies were used in schools. It passed the screening again in 2004-05 and increased its share of the market to 0.39 percent (4912 copies). Even though the *Tsukurukai* was able to persuade a small number of local boards of education and some private schools to adopt its textbook, this share is still so low that this part of the group's activities can hardly be seen as very successful. However, the *Tsukurukai*, along with other like-minded groups, has had more success in making Japanese atrocities controversial. Other textbook producers have become more careful and sparse in their depiction of Japanese atrocities. While the *Tsukurukai* has criticized LDP and government policies concerning, for example, apologies to foreign governments for the war and textbook screening, it has ties to some of the more conservative LDP politicians such as Machimura Nobutaka, who in 1998 said that history textbooks lacked balance, Abe Shinzô, Kawamura Takeo and Hiranuma Takeo, who later left the LDP.

5.1.4 Narratives as threats

Chapter 4 demonstrates that there are people within the Chinese government's propaganda apparatus who regard the soft power of other countries as a threat to China. In the Japanese context, it is possible to find similar arguments concerning Chinese war museums. The understanding of Chinese war museums held by Japanese pacifists and peace educators is largely positive. Members of such groups have, for instance, published guidebooks for school visits to China in which a number of famous war museums are listed (Heiwa · Kokusai kyôiku kenkyûkai 2004, Gustafsson 2010b:3-4). In contrast, conservatives have made attempts to politicize Chinese exhibitions. In a 2002 special issue of the Japanese magazine *Sapio*, which includes an extensive feature on anti-Japanese Chinese sites, it is claimed that the "make-believe of 30 years of Sino-Japanese friendship is a lie". It is written in the introduction that "even though successive prime ministers have repeated apologies and regret, been accused of conducting tributary foreign policy while giving huge amounts of aid, these buildings eloquently show the reality that China has obstinately kept making 'anti-Japan' the key word of Japan-China relations". The thrust of the museums is said to be to fan hatred and anger towards Japan (Shogakkan 2002:7). The first article in the special issue is called "China's policy of hatred and grudge as seen at the head temple of anti-Japanese exhibitions" (Komori 2002:8-11). In several of the articles included in this special issue, some of the central claims of the exhibitions are described as inventions, fiction, lies and fabrications (Tanabe 2002:21-23, Kô 2002:31, Sakaeda 2002:16-20).

This section discusses the debates about Chinese war museums in the Japanese Diet.⁸⁸ On 8 October 2001, Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi visited the War of Resistance Memorial Museum on the outskirts of Beijing and expressed his wish for bilateral relations to develop in a spirit of "sincerity and wholeheartedness" (MOFA 2001). Before the visit, on 5 October, during the 153rd Diet, the appropriateness of Koizumi's visit to the museum had been questioned. On 31 October, the museum was again discussed. The main focal point of the discussion was that many Japanese schoolchildren visit such museums on school trips. According to the speaker, LDP's Morioka Masahiro, the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzô, who had attended Koizumi on his visits to Beijing, had said that the exhibits were "grotesque". Morioka stated that the number of Japanese high schools conducting school trips to foreign countries increases every year and that at the time about 250 Japanese high schools went on trips to South Korea and around 200 to China each year. The problem, Morioka ar-

gued, was that “in the schedules for such trips, visits are incorporated to the kind of facilities Koizumi had visited”. Morioka had called a travel agent who had produced such a schedule. He had inquired about the inclusion of visits to the War of Resistance Memorial Hall and been told that all travel agents include such visits in their schedules. In the Diet, Morioka argued that it was a problem that even though the point of school excursions is to deepen the students’ love for history, visits to domestic historical sites have declined while students were made to go abroad to be “subjected to masochistic (自虐的) experiences”. He also argued that “the influence of school excursions is very strong” and that people “remember them for all their lives”. If such memories are made into “masochistic experiences”, he claimed, “Japanese children would not be able to take pride in being Japanese”.

During the 154th session of the Diet, on 31 May 2002, Tsuchiya Ryūshi of the LDP referred to a magazine as he mentioned that more than 50 anti-Japanese facilities in the form of memorial halls dealing with the war existed and that more were being constructed.⁸⁹ He argued that the feeling one gets is that through the use of these memorial halls, “anti-Japanese sentiments are being planted in Chinese people from the day they are born”. He went on to say that his own experiences had led him to feel that young Chinese are more anti-Japanese than those who actually experienced the war, and suggested that they have been influenced by these war museums – that such exhibits inflame anti-Japanese sentiments. He therefore recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) look into the issue.

On 9 November 2004, during the 161st Diet, Yamatani Eriko of the LDP suggested that the recent expression of anti-Japanese sentiments by Chinese football fans during the Asia Cup was linked to the existence of war museums. She also mentioned that children and foreigners as well as Japanese schoolchildren visit such museums as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial and the War of Resistance Memorial Hall and that they are given a misleading image of Japan. She stressed that in 2008, many foreigners were expected to visit China during the Beijing Olympics, and if they were to see exhibitions containing misleading and terrible captions this would be “a big minus for Japan’s national interest”; and that “an amplification of hatred against Japan would destroy Sino-Japanese friendship”. Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka responded that Japanese students going on school trips to China and South Korea should perhaps be given “proper material” containing historical facts to study

⁸⁸ The full Diet transcripts referred to can be found in the Gikai kaigiroku database at <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

⁸⁹ Even though the title of the magazine is not specified, the timing as well as the content of Tsuchiya’s statement strongly suggest that the publication was the special issue of *Sapio*, referred to above, released earlier that month, that lists more than 50 such locations.

ahead of the trips. According to Machimura, it was important to avoid a situation in which “one-sided information was planted into the heads of Japanese high school students”. He also mentioned that he had spoken to influential Chinese about anti-Japanese education but that they had said that only patriotic education, not anti-Japanese education, was conducted. Machimura did not see anything wrong in conducting education in “patriotism in a good sense”.⁹⁰ He also related that MOFA had highlighted some problematic exhibits at Chinese museums to the Chinese side. On 25 April 2007, during the 166th Diet, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) lawmaker Watanabe Shû presented similar arguments to those of Yamatani’s, which construed Chinese exhibitions as threats to Japanese interests. He stated that many exhibits were not based on facts at the museum in Nanjing and urged MOFA to do something about this because the Olympics would soon be held in Beijing and then there would be the World Expo in Shanghai. During these events, many foreigners who “know absolutely nothing about history” (まったく歴史を知らない) would come to China and visit the museum. These people would have a terrible image of Japan imprinted in their minds by the museum, and for this reason it was necessary to act.⁹¹

This section illustrates how conservative Japanese politicians regard narratives at Chinese war museums as threats to Japanese interests. These narratives are believed to have the potential to affect people’s minds, especially the minds of the malleable – a category of people consisting mainly of foreigners, young Japanese and Chinese. Because these narratives are potentially harmful, certain measures need to be taken – one of which is to try to persuade the Chinese authorities to change the exhibits. The other is to seek to immunize Japanese students against such narratives through education.

5.2 The institutional context

In wartime Japan, museums were set up at shrines as well as military and elementary schools to mobilize the populace for the war effort. These institutions were established not only in Japan proper but also in colonized areas such as Taiwan and Manchukuo. Examples of exhib-

⁹⁰ This is probably because he is a proponent of patriotic education. As Education Minister, Machimura had made efforts to “improve” history textbooks that he believed “lacked balance” (Nozaki 2008:144).

⁹¹ Watanabe also suggested that the expansion of the museum was aimed at getting it listed as a UNESCO world heritage site and wondered what MOFA was doing about the issue. The memorial hall in Nanjing is not the only Chinese museum that has been mentioned as a candidate for world heritage status. In March 2010, it was reported that the Heilongjiang provincial government was planning to build a park in 2010 at the site of the Unit 731 Criminal Evidence Hall in Pingfang on the outskirts of Haerbin to “mark the Japanese Unit 731’s notorious

its include displays focusing on military men who had participated in earlier wars. Men such as General Nogi Maresuke and Admiral Tôgô Heihachirô were portrayed as heroic figures embodying self-sacrifice for the nation (Yamabe 2002:144-62).⁹² Interestingly, these same historical figures nowadays fulfil the function of military deities (軍神) at many museums run by the SDF, especially at facilities located inside SDF bases.⁹³ The SDF museums make up one of the categories of Japanese museums connected to the national government, as the SDF is a branch of the Defence Ministry.

As in China, until the 1980s there were only a small number of museums in Japan that dealt with the war (e.g. van Bremen 2005:35). However, 100 Japanese peace and war museums are listed in a guidebook published in 2004 (Rekishi Kyôikusha Kyôgikai 2004). As is mentioned above, the Japanese central government has played a smaller role in domestic memory politics than its Chinese counterpart. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that some Japanese government agencies have been involved in the construction of museums even though their role has not by far been as large as the CCP's in China. It is notable that whereas there was a boom in the construction of peace museums growing out of citizen's movements in the early 1990s, there has also been a boom in the construction and reconstruction of war museums related to the SDF in recent years, with five new relatively large museums constructed between 1997 and 2007. During this time period, the SDF has put quite large sums of money into these public relations facilities (Minami 2009:36).

Just as in China, schoolchildren make up a large proportion of the visitors to many Japanese museums. This is especially true for institutions involved in peace education. The famous museums at Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Okinawa are often on the itineraries of educational school trips (修学旅行). These school trips are a Japanese institution and have a history that dates back to the Meiji period, the first recorded school trip of this kind having been conducted in 1875. During the first post-war decades, as the peace movement grew stronger, peace education emphasizing condemnation of war was gradually institutionalized. School trips to destinations such as Hiroshima became part of this educational effort (Ide

experiments during its aggression of China". It was also mentioned that there were plans to apply for world heritage status (*People's Daily* 2010a).

⁹²General Nogi was active during the Meiji period and participated in the Russo-Japanese War, in which his forces suffered heavy losses before finally defeating the Russians. When the Meiji emperor died in 1912, Nogi committed *seppuku*, ritual suicide, which was interpreted as the embodiment of loyalty. Admiral Tôgô participated in several wars, among them the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and was a particularly central figure in the Japanese naval successes in the Russo-Japanese War. He achieved much fame both within Japan and internationally.

2009:64). It could be argued that the framing of visits in the form of these school trips make them experiences that students will remember for a long time. Smaller museums often receive school visits from local schools.

It is been noted elsewhere that, compared to US museums dealing with the war, Japanese museums often have a greater “memorial function of consoling both elderly visitors and the souls of the dead” (Hein & Takenaka 2007). This function becomes evident in some of the museums constructed by the Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry, such as the Shōkeikan and the Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation.⁹⁴ While these museums are all connected to the national government, many Japanese museums are run by or funded by prefectural and/or local governments. However, while in China local government and central government both mean the CCP, in Japan there is a much more pronounced difference between local and prefectural governments, on the one hand, and the central, national government, on the other. Opposition parties may run local governments. Policies and priorities may hence differ from national ones. Moreover, local governments are often more actively involved in the Japanese peace movement. For example, in 2009, about 80 per cent of Japanese local authorities (more than 1400) had made nuclear-free pledges (Fukuyama & Umebayashi 2009, National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities). Many private museums, as well as those run by prefectural and local governments, sprang out of citizens’ movements (Hein & Takenaka 2007, Jeans 2005:167-83). Among these, several have their roots in the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s. Many peace museums were established by local governments in the 1990s after these governments had made nuclear-free declarations in the 1980s and early 1990s. In other words, establishing such museums might be seen as the institutionalization of anti-nuclear peace messages. It has also been claimed that some of the Japanese private peace museums were set up because citizens’ movements were

⁹³ Institutions located within the premises of SDF bases can be seen as focusing mainly on boosting the morale of the SDF’s personnel or recruits, while the public relations facilities usually situated outside the bases are more involved in disseminating a positive image of the SDF to the general public (Hertrich 2008:177-184)

⁹⁴ The Shōkeikan (Historical Materials Hall for Wounded and Sick Retired Soldiers), the Shōwakan and the Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation have all been set up by the Health Ministry to console specific groups. The objective of the Shōkeikan in Tokyo is said to be to pass on to posterity information about the suffering of Japanese wounded soldiers and their families. It also wishes to convey the importance of peace. The Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation in Tokyo is quite similar to the Shōkeikan in its institutional arrangements. It is run by a government agency under a law stipulating that its mission is to remember and console those Japanese who belong to three specific groups. These three groups are: those repatriated from abroad, that is, from Japan’s colonies and areas occupied by Japan; soldiers interned by the Soviet Union in Siberia after the war; and veterans who did not serve long enough to receive the pension they otherwise would have been entitled to. At the same time, it is meant to be a prayer (or symbol) for lasting peace. One purpose is to deepen the people’s understanding of the sufferings of the groups mentioned and pass this understanding on, from generation to generation (Heiwa Kinen Jigyō Tokubetsu Kikin 2007:1). This is similar to the Shōwakan, also created by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, but run by the Izokukai (Bereaved Families Association) (Smith 2002:35-64; Hein & Takenaka 2007).

unable to convince local authorities to found such institutions. An additional reason is said to be that private museums are able to present narratives that deal with Japanese aggression to a larger extent (Yamane 2009:27-29, 139-140). Private peace museums, however, often lack the financial backing that public ones have. Hence, some of these museums lack the resources that public museums have and do not receive as many visitors. In the late 1990s, several peace museums run by city or prefectural governments were fiercely attacked by right-wingers who criticized the use of the taxpayers' money for what were seen as masochistic exhibitions (Yamabe 1998:163-171). This resulted in some museums removing material depicting Japanese atrocities while others removed photographs the origins of which were not clear.⁹⁵

Several museums run by citizens' movements are actively engaged in reconciliatory projects with Chinese and South Korean groups. The Women's Active Museum on War and Peace in Tokyo, for example, has been cooperating with the Eighth Route Army Memorial Hall in Wuxiang in Shanxi province in China to arrange a special exhibition at the Wuxiang museum. The Grassroots House in Kôchi has conducted several field trips to China and South Korea and received visitors from these countries (Kim 2007). The Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum in Nagasaki cooperates with the Unit 731 Crime Evidence Hall in north-east China and with the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum. Cooperative activities include exchanges of information, mutual visits and presentations of research conducted (Personal correspondence). Such museums can therefore be seen as a platform for the activities of these citizens' groups. The activities of these groups are not limited to museum exhibitions. The exhibitions should be regarded as an institutionalization of the narratives to which these groups subscribe. Indeed, regardless of ownership, the construction of museums is an institutionalization of a certain kind of narrative for a certain political purpose.

The most prolonged museum controversy in Japan is the one involving the establishment of the Shôwakan. In all, the different events and turns surrounding the process of creating the museum took 20 years. The creation of the Shôwakan was the first time the national government made a "foray into the semi-permanent memorialisation of the war" (Smith 2002:37). Even though the project was started in 1979, the museum did not open until 1999. Critics representing both right and left disapproved of the plans for the museum. This resulted in a diluted narrative in which any material prone to stir controversy (and largely the war itself) was erased (Smith 2002:38, Ma 2007:172-73). This controversy illustrates that exhibi-

⁹⁵ Peace museums run by local and prefectural governments in Japan are often staffed and managed by career bureaucrats on short-term contracts who are seldom museum professionals and hence not trained to deal with the

exhibitions are the end-results of much discussion. The production process may involve input from many different groups. This is especially true when public funds are involved.

In 1995, the Tokyo metropolitan government decided to build a museum that would commemorate the victims of the bombing of Tokyo. The planning committee of the museum, to be called the Peace Memorial Museum of Tokyo (東京都平和記念館), considered contextualising the bombing of Tokyo by showing how Japan started the war. Exhibits dealing with Japanese wartime aggression were also part of the plan for the exhibition (Tsuchiya 1998:25-31). Right-wing groups, however, attacked these plans and exerted pressure on the metropolitan government, leading to the project being abandoned in August 1999 (Ma 2007:173-176). However, although the Metropolitan government did not realize the project, a citizens' network established a museum focusing on the air raids instead. Japanese aggression is also dealt with in this exhibition.

In 1996, several peace museums were criticized in a report prepared by conservative LDP lawmakers. These museums were then attacked by conservatives and right-wingers. The attacks took the form of threats, a campaign in the right-wing press and questions in the Diet concerning, for example, the use of the taxpayers' money to promote what were considered masochistic views of history and anti-Japanese exhibits. Among the museums attacked were Peace Osaka, the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Suita Peace and Prayer Room and the Sakai Peace and Human Rights Museum. All these museums contained descriptions of Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing Atrocity, the comfort women, Chinese and Koreans who were forced to do hard labour in Japan and the Japanese military's victimization of Okinawans (Yamabe 1998:163-170). In the case of Peace Osaka, nationalists attacked the truthfulness of the captions to three photographs, questioning the sources from which the pictures had been obtained. The overall perspective of the exhibition was also criticized. For example, regarding exhibits on the Nanjing Atrocity, it was claimed that "even though an objective and sufficient historical investigation had not yet been carried out, the exhibition, based on masochistic thinking and chiefly sources from other countries, displayed events as if they were the truth" (Yamabe 1998:166). The Association for Correcting Biased War Material was founded in 1997. It claimed that the kind of brutal acts that were shown in the exhibits at Peace Osaka were inappropriate as teaching material in peace education for

controversies that exhibitions sometimes give rise to (Hein & Takenaka 2007).

children and should therefore be removed. It also claimed that the exhibition only emphasized Japanese aggression and was hence biased and should include other perspectives. In the following year, the association attacked the basic idea of the museum, “to convey the tragedy of war and show the preciousness of peace”, advocating cuts in the funding to the museum (Yamabe 1998:166-67). After an investigation, Peace Osaka removed one photograph and changed the captions to two others (Yamabe 1998:166, Hein & Takenaka 2007:70-72).

In addition to campaigns such as the one mentioned above, the right-wing press attacked peace museums in several articles during this period. Many of the articles focused on the authenticity and origins of photographs on display at the institutions. One such publication featured an article with the title: “Protect the youth from the anti-Japanese war resource centers”. The article criticized a photograph exhibited at the Peace Museum of Saitama, which, according to its caption, showed corpses piled up on the bank of the Yangtze River two weeks after Nanjing fell. It was argued that this was not being proof that a massacre had taken place in Nanjing. Instead, as many soldiers were killed in the battle as Nanjing was taken. In other articles, peace museums were attacked for producing anti-Japanese and masochistic exhibitions and a change from the peace education paradigm was advocated (Yamabe 1998:167-68). A common tactic of Japanese nationalist groups has been to raise doubts about the authenticity of the whole, that is, Japanese wartime aggression in general, by questioning the accuracy of the part. (See Nozaki 2006:137 for an account of a similar use of this tactic.) By casting doubt on the photographs used in exhibitions at Japanese peace museums, such groups aim to discredit these institutions and the view of history they present.⁹⁶

These attacks on peace museums led some museums to remove photographs or change their captions (Yamabe 1998:170). In some cases, museums that used to have descriptions of Japanese atrocities no longer do. Other museums among those attacked, however, did not remove such descriptions as a result of the attacks, but instead made sure to provide labels showing the origins of the photographs on display. Peace Osaka, the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum all persisted in displaying Japanese aggression. It should be noted that the attacks mentioned were all directed against institutions run by or funded by local or prefectural governments. Private museums have also been harassed by right-wing groups. However, these

⁹⁶ These photographs were sometimes poorly labelled and it was not always clear where and when they had been taken or by whom (Yamabe 1998:170). In a book focusing exclusively on photographs ostensibly depicting the Nanjing Atrocity, some researchers who are known for attacking “masochistic” views of history conclude that

institutions are not dependent on government funding and have therefore not been attacked as fiercely. It has also been argued that the reason that some museums have been able to resist such attacks is that they have had strong citizens' networks behind them (Yamane 2009:309).

The risk of controversy is probably one reason why the Japanese Museum of History for a long time did not have an exhibition dealing with the war period. When a temporary exhibition on the war was held in 2006, it was criticized for failing to deal with Japanese aggression. A permanent exhibition called "Peace and War" (戦争と平和) opened in March 2010. Prominent historians such as Katô Yôko and Yoshida Yutaka were involved in the process of planning this exhibition, which includes a section dealing with the war in China.⁹⁷ In February 2011 it became clear that the amount of material dealing with Japanese aggression in the new exhibition was sufficient to incite the indignation and concern of the *Tsukurukai*. On 15 February, the *Tsukurukai* sent a proposal for improving what they described as anti-Japanese, masochistic, biased exhibits to the museum. In the document, it was said that the exhibits needed to be improved because "history textbooks and history museums are two important sources of information for the people to learn about history". On 14 February 2011, Fujioka Nobukatsu of the *Tsukurukai* appeared on the right-wing Channel Sakura, in a 25-minute long television programme attacking the exhibition (Tsukurukai website, last accessed 25 February 2011).

These examples show how the right wing or conservative side of the Japanese domestic conflict criticize peace museums, exhibits in which are regarded as threats because they are seen as masochistic and anti-Japanese. However, they also demonstrate that there is resistance to these attacks and that citizens' groups have been active in creating exhibitions. Citizens' groups have also criticized museums for not dealing with the negative aspects of war. In an incident that took place in Kure close to Hiroshima in 2006, citizens protested against the exhibits at the Yamato Museum, which focuses on the Yamato warship. The exhibition was criticized for failing to refer to either Japanese aggression or the 3 million Japanese war victims (Tanaka 2008). Finally, it should be noted that whereas the content of Japanese

none of these images can be shown to be authentic and hence none should be displayed or printed (Higashinaka et al. 2005:237-38).

⁹⁷ Speeches by Yasuda Tsuneo, Vice Director of the National Museum of Japanese History, Katô Yokô, Professor at the University of Tokyo and Yoshida Yutaka, Professor at Hitotsubashi University at the 70th National Museum of History Forum held on 1 August 2009. See also the brochure distributed at the forum. Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan *Dai 70 Kai Rekihaku Fôramu: Sensô to Heiwa*, Chiba: Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan, 2009.

exhibitions has been part of the struggle over meaning in Japan, international controversy has been scarce.⁹⁸

5.3 Conclusions

In the Chinese struggle over meaning, protesters have drawn on earlier patriotic discourses from the first half of the 20th century in order to legitimize their claims and challenge the CCP. In the Japanese context, on the other hand, the government and others advocating an increased emphasis on patriotism and morality in education have made attempts to downplay such connections (despite the occasional slip of the tongue). Instead, those who criticize attempts to increase the emphasis on patriotism and morality in education and other areas have done their utmost to make such connections. They have tried to explicate the intertextual and interdiscursive similarities between discourses dominant before and during the war era and those of present conservatives advocating patriotic and moral education. The discursive struggles in China and Japan thus follow very different logics. In China, patriotic discourses are based on continuity whereas in Japan anti-patriotic discourses are based on establishing and explicating continuity while proponents of patriotism deny or downplay the continuity that is arguably implicit in their reasoning. It has also been demonstrated that Chinese as well as Japanese political actors have constructed the soft power/propaganda of external actors such as other states as threats. Education of their own people, especially the youth, is sometimes framed as a necessary measure to immunize them from the detrimental effects of the narratives created by others. In Japanese struggles over the meaning of the war, different groups have connected their interpretations of the war with their wider political agendas. Central to the agendas of all these groups has been the issue of what it means to be Japanese and therefore also of how to act as a Japanese.

One of the central conclusions of the contextual analysis is that there are many actors involved in the politics surrounding the narratives to be analysed in the remaining

⁹⁸ Concern has, however, been expressed by US officials concerning the content of the Yūshūkan, the war museum operated by the Yasukuni Shrine. It was reported in the *New York Times* in 2006 that J. Thomas Schieffer, the US ambassador to Japan, described as “very disturbing” the view of history presented at the Yūshūkan – that Japan was tricked into war by the United States and occupied Asia to free it. It was suggested in the article that officials at Yasukuni, in response to complaints from the US government, decided to change an exhibit in which it was claimed “President Franklin D. Roosevelt forced Japan into war so that the United States could recover from the Great Depression” (*New York Times* 2006). It was also proposed in the same article that the Japanese Abe administration exerted some form of influence over shrine officials in order to effect the change. This implies that foreign governments might make attempts to influence the content of Japanese museum exhibitions

chapters of this study who believe that these narratives matter. Those who create these museum exhibitions, those who use them as educational facilities, whether for purposes of “peace” or “patriotic” education, those who try to affect the content of exhibitions and those who discuss the content in magazine articles or in parliamentary debates all express the belief that these exhibitions have the potential to profoundly affect the minds of visitors, especially if these visitors are young. In other words, it is not only constructivist researchers who suppose that narratives matter – practitioners do as well. There are, in other words, good reasons to analyse what these narratives consist of. If they do in fact shape people’s minds then it is necessary to know what is in them in order to understand *how* they may affect people. Without the contextual analysis presented in this chapter and chapter 4 it would not be possible to understand the politics surrounding the museum exhibitions analysed in the chapters below. On the other hand, whereas this chapter and chapter 4 have provided much contextual information surrounding the narratives – historical background dealing with the discourses about war, the actors involved in the struggles about meaning, and so on, they have revealed little about the narratives per se. How is war understood in these narratives? Who are the main protagonists and how are they depicted? How are narratives interpreted? To answer these questions properly and satisfactorily, it is necessary to analyse the narratives. However, when analysing the narratives it is crucial to be aware of the context in which they were created.

and that the Japanese government might attempt to pressure curatorial staff into making changes. However, this is the only case that has come to light.

Part III

Chapter 6: Analysis of topics

The analysis of narratives focuses on how participants are portrayed. The analysis of topics, on the other hand, concentrates on events and phenomena. An analysis of topics makes it possible to provide an overview of the topics displayed in a large number of exhibitions. Such an analysis is useful when dealing with a large amount of material and facilitates comparisons within and between the countries dealt with. It therefore makes it possible to determine whether certain themes dominate in one country while other themes are more common in the other. That a topic is mentioned, however, does not necessarily mean a great deal. Attention is therefore also paid to *how* these events are depicted in order to establish how the war, on a general level, is contextualized. Different ways of contextualizing the events that took place during the war affect the overall meaning of the presentation. In Tables 6.1 and 6.2, a “Y” indicates that a topic is mentioned in a specific exhibition. In addition, in the case of Japanese references to the Nanjing Atrocity, the Table 6.2 shows *how* the event is referred to. This is because the way in which this event is referred to is closely connected to overall views of the war and ascribes different meanings to the event – different ideological positions are reflected in different wordings. This issue is elaborated in greater detail below when the topic is discussed. The analysis of topics answers the following questions: Which topics, among the ones identified, are mentioned in the exhibitions? *How* are these topics depicted?

The war period is defined and contextualized differently in different narratives. This is an important aspect of the politics involved in creating such narratives. For example, some narratives regard the war as having started on 7 July 1937 whereas others consider 18 September 1931 to be the starting point. Regardless of when the war is taken to have started, the events leading up to it may or may not be traced back to the 19th century. The story told may stop with the end of the war in 1945, or post-war events may be part of the story. The framing and selection of the main events in a narrative are therefore of great significance for the meaning conveyed. Unlike treatments of World War II in Europe, war and colonialism are often entangled in representations of the war in East Asia.

Table 6.1 Overview of the topical analysis of Chinese exhibitions (Y=mentioned)

Chinese exhibitions	Sino-Japanese War (1894-95)	September 18 Incident	Marco Polo Bridge Incident	Nanjing Atrocity	Comfort women	Nuclear bombings	War crimes trials	Post-war era
1. Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y
2. Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. The "9.18" Historical Museum	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y
4. Eighth Route Army Memorial	-	-	Y	Y	-	Y	-	-
5. The New Fourth Army Memorial	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-	-
6. Pingdingshan Massacre Memorial Hall	-	Y	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y
7. Crime Evidence Exhibition Hall of Japanese Imperial Army Unit 731 in China	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. Ranzhuang Site of Tunnel Warfare	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-	Y
9. The North-eastern Martyrs Memorial Hall	-	Y	-	-	-	-	Y	-
10. Historical Museum for Japan's Occupation in North-east of China	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	Y	-
11. Site of the Eighth Route Army Xi'an Office	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	-	-
12. Dongjiang Column Museum (Luofushan)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
13. Shanghai Songhu Campaign Memorial Hall	-	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	-
14. Jianchuan Museum Cluster	-	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	-
15. Guangdong Memorial Hall of East River Column (Dongguan)	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y
16. Zhenhai Coast Defense History Museum	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	-	Y
17. Site of the Eighth Route Army Wuhan Office	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-
Total	4	12	13	9	5	5	8	8
Per cent of the Chinese exhibitions	23.5	70.5	76.5	52.2	29.4	29.4	47.1	47.1

Even though full-scale war between Japan and China did not break out until 7 July 1937, Japan had enjoyed extra-territorial rights in parts of North-east China since the Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905. Such rights were subsequently extended to elsewhere in China through treaties signed by the Japanese and Chinese governments. In China, these treaties were widely regarded as unequal and as having been imposed by force.

Table 6.2 Overview of the topical analysis of Japanese exhibitions (Y=mentioned)

Japanese exhibitions	Sino-Japanese War (1894-95)	September 18 Incident	Marco Polo Bridge Incident	Nanjing Atrocity	Comfort women	Nuclear bombings	War crimes trials	Post-war era
1. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum	Y	Y	Y	Massacre	-	Y	-	Y
2. Yamato Museum	Y	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	-
3. Himeyuri Peace Museum	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	-	-
4. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre Incident	-	Y	Y	Y
5. Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots (Chiran)	Y	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	-
6. Yūshūkan	Y	Y	Y	Incident	-	Y	Y	-
7. Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre	Y	Y	-	Y
8. Shōkeikan (Tokyo)	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	-	-
9. Hokuchin Museum	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	-	Y
10. Sendai War Damage and Recovery Memorial	-	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	Y
11. Suita War Material Room for Peace	Y	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	Y
12. Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation	-	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	-
13. Sakai Peace and Human Rights Museum	-	Y	Y	Incident	-	Y	-	Y
14. Kanagawa Plaza for Global Citizenship Peace Exhibition Room	-	Y	Y	Incident	-	Y	Y	Y
15. Himeji Historical Peace Center	Y	Y	Y	Massacre Incident	-	Y	-	Y
16. Kyoto Museum for World Peace	Y	Y	Y	Massacre	Y	Y	Y	Y
17. Saitama Prefecture Peace Museum and Reference Library	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre/ Incident	Y	Y	Y	Y
18. Grassroots House	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre Incident	-	Y	-	Y
19. Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room	-	Y	Y	Great Massacre	-	Y	Y	Y
20. Peace Osaka	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre	-	Y	-	Y
21. Women's active museum on war and peace	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre	Y	Y	Y	Y
22. Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum	Y	Y	Y	Great Massacre	Y	Y	-	Y
23. Kawasaki Peace Museum	-	Y	Y	Great Massacre	-	Y	-	Y
Total	17	23	23	12 (Massacre) 3 (Incident)	5	20	7	17

Per cent of the Japanese exhibitions	73.9	100	100	dent) 52.2 (Mas- sacre)	21.7	87	30.4	73.9
--------------------------------------	------	-----	-----	-------------------------------	------	----	------	------

6.1 The Sino-Japanese War

In the late 19th century, several countries, including the USA, Russia, Qing dynasty China and Japan, tried to gain influence over Korea. Frustration among Korean groups led the millenarian Tonghak movement to rebel. The Korean government responded by calling on the Chinese government to send troops to deal with the uprising. The Japanese government responded by sending troops to Korea and forcing the Korean Court to issue a declaration of war against China. The war that followed, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 – or the Jiawu War (甲午战争) in Chinese, referring to the year in which it took place according to the Chinese calendar, and the Japan-Qing War (日清戦争) in Japanese – was largely a naval confrontation between China and Japan in which the latter was victorious. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which followed the war, Japan was given control over Taiwan, the Liaodong peninsula and rights to construct a railway in southern Manchuria as well as a large indemnity (Jansen 2000:430-36, Gordon 2003:117-19). The treaty is often construed as a national humiliation in China. In 1895, Russia, France and Germany interfered and forced the Japanese government to return the Liaodong peninsula. This tripartite intervention, in turn, was portrayed as a national humiliation in Japan. For example, Japanese nationalist Tokutomi Sohō was “vexed beyond tears” and brought some gravel back with him to Japan from Port Arthur on the tip of the Liaodong peninsula to keep as a reminder of the humiliation (de Bary et al. 2006:133). The intervention is described as a humiliation (屈辱) at the Yûshûkan as well.

The following quote from the exhibition at the Dongjiang Column Museum in Luofushan neatly captures the way in which the Sino-Japanese War is used to contextualize the war in the 1930s and 1940s at the Chinese museums that mention it: “Japanese aggression against China was long premeditated. In late Qing, it launched the Jiawu war of aggression against China and for a long time forcibly occupied China’s Taiwan. On 18 September 1931, Japan outrageously launched a war and invaded and occupied the entire north-east area of China.” This understanding of the first Sino-Japanese War, as part of a longer pattern of Japanese aggression against China that starts not in 1931 but stretches back at least to 1894, appears in all Chinese exhibitions that mention this war, although only four Chinese exhibitions do. A similar understanding of this war as part of Japanese expansionist and imperialist poli-

cies can be found in several Japanese exhibitions, such as the Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum, Peace Osaka, the Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room and the Saitama Prefectural Peace Museum. Many other Japanese museums refer to the war but usually only as part of a timeline without describing it as a war of aggression.

6.2 The 18 September Incident

The September 18 Incident, or the Mukhden (or Liutiaohu, Ryûkôko, 柳条湖) incident, occurred on 18 September 1931. Japan had been given the right to operate the southern Manchurian Railway after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese Kantô (Guandong) Army blew up the railway outside Mukhden (now Shenyang) in Manchuria, blamed Chinese nationalists for the explosion and used it as a pretext to occupy Mukhden. In 1932, the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo was founded and the last emperor of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Pu Yi, was placed on the throne (Jansen 2000:576-86, Gordon 2003:188-89). Many see September 18 1931 as marking the start of what in China is often described as a 14-year long struggle of resistance against Japanese imperialism, and it has achieved symbolic significance.

The incident is described in terms of aggression in several Chinese exhibitions. Museums in the north-east in particular, among them especially the 9.18 History Museum and the Historical Museum for Japan's Occupation in North-east China in Changchun, pay special attention to this event. At the latter, large texts are clearly visible in former chairman Jiang Zemin's handwriting telling visitors not to forget 18 September. It is, however, the different ways in which this event is portrayed at some Japanese museums that is most noteworthy. In many exhibitions it is simply mentioned, often in a timeline, that the Manchurian Incident broke out on 18 September 1931. At the Yûshûkan, however, it is portrayed as a response to anti-Japanese activities and Chinese nationalism. Although this is obviously a way of attributing responsibility to the Chinese side and justifying the measures taken by the Japanese military, it does not overtly deny what is explicated in several other Japanese exhibitions – that the incident was orchestrated by the Japanese military. The Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum, the Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room, the Grassroots House, the Kyoto Museum for World Peace and Peace Osaka all clearly ascribe responsibility for the incident to Japan or the Japanese military. At the latter, for example, it is stated that: “Through a plot by the Kantô Army (the Japanese Army stationed in north-east China), on the outskirts of Mukhden (Shen-

yang), the Liutiaohu incident was caused. This was the start of the war of aggression against China that spanned 15-years”.

6.3 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident

On 7 July 1937, skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese troops took place close to the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao, Rokôkyô, 卢沟桥) on the outskirts of Beijing. Although historians are not clear about who initiated hostilities, the Japanese government sent additional troops after a cease-fire had been agreed, a move that was countered by the Chinese side. Additional clashes led to the outbreak of full-scale war (Jansen 2000:619-20, Gordon 2003:204). At the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing responsibility for the outbreak of war is ascribed to the Japanese Military as it is claimed to have used a pretext to enter the walled city of Wanping whereupon the Chinese soldiers fought back and full-scale war broke out. In many exhibitions, both Chinese and Japanese, however, responsibility for the event is not ascribed to either party. Instead, it is simply stated that the incident occurred and that it led to the outbreak of full-scale war. The war that broke out, however, is labelled differently in different Japanese exhibitions. In most exhibitions it is called the Japan-China War (日中戦争). However, the Yûshûkan and the Hokuchin Museum both use the term *Shina* incident (支那事変), the term used in Japan at the time of the war. The use of the term *Shina* when referring to China is usually regarded as derogatory, at least when written using Chinese characters, as is the case in both the exhibitions mentioned above (Wakabayashi 2007:395-98).

6.4 The Nanjing Atrocity

When the Japanese army captured the capital of the Chinese Nationalists, Nanjing, in December 1937, a large number of civilians and POWs were massacred (just how many has been the object of much controversy) and a large number of women were raped. The Nanjing Atrocity, often called the Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanjing, is another contentious issue that is sometimes seen as being part of the history problem. In 1994, Ian Buruma described the Nanjing Atrocity as a symbol of Japanese wartime aggression for Japanese leftists and many liberals (Buruma 2009:121). Nonetheless, Iris Chang, in her bestselling book, described it as “a forgotten holocaust” in 1997 (Chang 1997). Since then, it has become well-known in the USA as well (Yoshida 2006:165-79). In China, it has attained great symbolic importance and, ac-

According to some opinion polls, it occupies a central place in images of Japan and the Japanese in China (Genron NPO 2007:8. Yang, D. 2006:140, Yoshida 2006:164). The Nanjing Atrocity has become not just a symbol of Japanese atrocities and, according to some, a symbol of the war itself, it has also been subject of much controversy for quite some time. Domestic debates on the issue took place in Japan some time before it became an internationalized issue that plagued Sino-Japanese relations (Yoshida 2006:81-101, 129-53).

The death toll has been central to the controversy. The Chinese government rejects any figure below 300,000, branding those who do not accept this number as deniers of the Atrocity. Some Chinese scholars have reportedly raised doubts about this figure in private, and stated that doing so publicly could affect their careers (Shirk 2007:155, Ross 2006:2-3). Outside China, especially in Japan, there has been much research on the number of victims. The issue of numbers has divided Japanese scholars into several schools, depending on estimated death tolls.⁹⁹ These range from the Nanjing Incident as Illusion School's "several thousand at most" to between 13,000 and 38-42,000 among researchers in the Middle-of-the-Road-School, to over 100,000 to close to 200,000 or more according to scholars belonging to the Great Massacre School (Askew 2002). Japanese right-wingers, by casting doubt on the part, for example, the number of victims or photographs said to depict the Atrocity, have attempted to shed doubt on the truthfulness of the Atrocity as a whole and thereby on the war as a war of aggression.¹⁰⁰ As with other issues, some Japanese politicians have at times been the criticized in China and elsewhere for denying that the Atrocity occurred.

Before discussing how the Nanjing Atrocity is depicted in exhibitions it is necessary to briefly discuss the meaning of the different wordings used to refer to the event. Japanese leftists and others who believe that a large-scale massacre took place are inclined to use the term "great massacre" (大虐殺), "great massacre incident" (大虐殺事件), "massacre" (虐殺) or "massacre incident" (虐殺事件), while apologists tend to label it an "incident" (事件). Of course, there is also some difference between "great massacre" and "massacre". Whereas both clearly state that a massacre did indeed occur, the former suggests that the scale of it was great while the latter term could be interpreted as signifying a massacre of lesser proportions. Either way, both expressions clearly indicate that an atrocity was committed. The

⁹⁹ Obviously, it is not possible to discuss all the scholarly works dealing with the Nanjing Atrocity here. I am not concerned with drawing conclusions concerning what actually occurred in Nanjing in December and January 1937-38. Nor am I concerned with providing a full survey of the literature dealing with these events. My concern is with how the event is depicted in museum exhibitions.

word incident, on the other hand, is more obscure. The use of incident does not necessarily indicate denial or an apologist standpoint, even though those who deny that an atrocity took place certainly use the term and definitely do not refer to it as a massacre. Another way of interpreting the use of the word incident is that it may involve an unwillingness to take a stand. Using the term great massacre, on the other hand, entails a clear statement of position. The wording attached to this event therefore provides an indication of the ideological underpinnings of Japanese exhibitions. In contrast to the Japanese exhibitions, all the Chinese museums that mention the Atrocity refer to it in the same way.¹⁰¹ Wording there is not an issue: the term *datusha* (大屠杀), meaning “great massacre” or “great slaughter”, is employed when referring to the event. This is, of course, indicative of the fact that even though there may be some debate concerning war-related issues in China, there is a consensus about the particulars of the Nanjing massacre and that the Japanese invasion was a war of aggression.

In Japan, the Atrocity is referred to in 15 of the 23 museums. It is labelled a massacre in 12 of these. It is mentioned in 9 out of 17 Chinese exhibitions. In some exhibitions it is simply mentioned whereas in others a description of the events and images illustrating the cruel acts are sometimes provided. Seven Japanese and seven Chinese exhibitions display photographs showing, for example, piles of corpses next to the Yangtze River and Chinese being buried alive.¹⁰² While there is no Japanese equivalent to the museum in Nanjing (see chapter 7 for more on the exhibition on Nanjing), the main focus of which is the Nanjing Atrocity, there are Japanese exhibitions that provide relatively detailed descriptions of the Atrocity. For example, at the Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room it is stated that: “when Nanjing was occupied, the Japanese military conducted cruel acts, raped, assaulted and murdered a large number of Chinese, but did not inform the Japanese people about these facts”. Other Japanese exhibitions, such as the Kawasaki Peace Museum, Peace Osaka, the Kyoto Museum for World Peace and the Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum are equally or even more explicit. One notable difference between Japanese and Chinese museums is that whereas Chinese mu-

¹⁰⁰ As is discussed in chapter 3, similar tactics were used in Germany in attacks on the first *Wehrmacht* exhibition.

¹⁰¹ At the museum in Nanjing, the word *haojie* (浩劫), meaning “disaster”, “calamity” or “catastrophe” is also used at one place. The English text uses the word “Holocaust”. Apart from this instance, however, the word *datusha* is used consistently.

¹⁰² The Japanese museums displaying such photographs are the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Saitama Prefecture Peace Museum and Reference Library, the Women’s active museum on war and peace, the Oka Masaharu Peace Memorial Museum, Peace Osaka, the Grassroots House and the Kyoto Museum of World Peace. The Chinese exhibitions are the Site of the Eighth Route Army Wuhan Office, the Dongjiang Column Museum in Luofushan, the Guangdong Memorial Hall of the East River Column in Dongguan, the Museum of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japan, the Eighth Route Army Memorial in Wuxiang, the Memorial Hall to

seums give the number of victims as more than 300,000, Japanese ones are careful about giving such figures. This is because in Japan the number of victims is being heatedly debated while in China the number 300,000 is accepted as the truth and hence not questioned. (For a more detailed analysis of how the Nanjing Atrocity is depicted at Japanese and Chinese museums see Gustafsson 2010d.)

6.5 The “comfort women”

One of the most notorious issues related to the war is the issue of the so-called comfort women. In the media the issue is usually described as having to do with forced prostitution, forcing women into becoming sex slaves, and restitution and apologies to the victims of this practice (e.g. McCarthy 1993). These women were euphemistically called military comfort women and they had to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers in field brothels, called comfort stations. The first lawsuits against the Japanese government by victims took place in 1991. In 1992, the historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki discovered documents in the Self Defence Ministry’s archives proving that the military had at least monitored the comfort stations (Sand 1999:117-19). The existence of the comfort stations was known about before 1991, even though it was not given much attention. A book about them had been published in Japan in 1973 and the practice was common knowledge in Korea. However, it had not been regarded as a crime until a paradigm shift occurred in the 1980s (Ueno 1999:136, Nozaki 2005). Many of the victims were Korean and an apology was issued in 1992 by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi during a visit to South Korea. The issue had been pursued by several women’s rights groups but the South Korean government had been rather uninterested in pushing it (Yamazaki 2006:62). Chief Cabinet Secretary Katô Kôichi later issued a general apology to comfort women regardless of their nationality. In 1995, the Japanese government set up the Asian Women’s Fund, which was meant to provide restitution to former sex slaves. It was established as a private fund, however, and was therefore regarded by some as a failure by the government to take full responsibility (Mizoguchi 2007). Even though the largest group of women involved are often said to have been Korean, there were also many Chinese victims. However, the issue was not given much attention in Mainland China until quite recently. Indeed, even though research had been conducted in China since the early 1990s (Pan 2003:266), it was announced by *Xinhua* that the first Chinese report on “the first systematic

the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders and the Unyielding War Prisoner Hall at the Jian-

investigation on Chinese ‘comfort women’ was released” on 2 July 2007 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2007). On 6 July 2007, the first “Comfort women museum” in China was opened at Shanghai Normal University (*China Daily* 2007). There were calls for compensation by individual victims in China in the early 1990s but initially these did not receive support from the Chinese government (Isaka 1995). The official line concerning war reparations in general was that this had been settled when relations were re-established in 1972. According to the agreement reached at the time, China waived all reparations. However, in 1995, the Chinese government made clear that this only applied to government-to-government reparations and that Chinese individuals had the right to seek redress (Pan 2003:268). According to what has been described as a tacit understanding, Japan supplied China with development aid instead of war reparations (Isaka 1995). Chinese leaders have sometimes made references to the war when demanding Japanese aid. In 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō claimed, against the official position of the Japanese government, that there was no proof that Japanese soldiers had coerced the so-called comfort women. China responded that it was a historical fact that the women had been forced in what was “one of the most serious crimes committed by the Japanese imperialists in World War II” (Yardley 2007). In April 2007, while on a state visit to the USA, Prime Minister Abe was forced to apologize for his previous statement. On 14 June 2007, a group of Japanese lawmakers placed an advertisement in the *Washington Post* stating that no documents had been found to prove that the Japanese military had forced women into prostitution, and that those who had been comfort women had earned a lot of money. It also stated that the testimony of former comfort women was not reliable. On 30 July 2007, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution according to which the government of Japan “should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery”. Several previous attempts had been made to get a resolution passed but all had failed. After the advertisement in the *Washington Post*, however, the bill was finally passed (Tokudome 2007).

Whereas nine Chinese museums mention the Nanjing Atrocity only five refer to the comfort women. While most museums deal to some extent with Japanese atrocities, it is quite often the case that the focus is on atrocities committed in the region or local area in which the museum is located. The connection with the local is also clear in some exhibitions that contain exhibits related to the comfort women, in that photographs showing buildings

that were used as comfort stations are on display. In an exhibit at the Chinese People's War of Resistance Memorial Hall in Beijing it is stated that: "China is the country most injured by the Japanese military's comfort women system". This victim experience, then, is understood in national terms. All in all, however, the issue is not treated in much detail in Chinese exhibitions. In Japanese museums it is also the case that the Nanjing Atrocity is mentioned in a considerably larger number of museums than the comfort women. The reason for this may be that the Nanjing Atrocity has been given attention for a considerably longer time or that the issue is been regarded as particularly sensitive not just in Japan but also in the countries from which many of the women were taken or lured away, such as China and South Korea, whose governments for a long time were not particularly eager to push the issue. In the case of Japanese exhibitions, it may also be partly to do with the fact that many of these make use of timelines on which events are mentioned. Since the exploitation of comfort women was a phenomenon that took place over a long time period, it is difficult to place it on a timeline. Nevertheless, at the museum in Saitama, the debate over the issue after it surfaced in the 1990s is mentioned on the exhibition's timeline. At the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum, the topic is connected with the local through the display of a map showing places in Okinawa where comfort stations were located. Whereas none of the Chinese exhibitions analysed deals in much detail with the issue, there are museums in Japan that focus to a large extent on it.¹⁰³ It is more or less the sole focus of the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace and the Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum in Nagasaki has extensive exhibits on it. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace also treats the issue quite explicitly. In a panel accompanied by several images showing, for example, victims of the comfort women system, and Japanese soldiers standing in line outside a comfort station, it is stated that: "During the 15-year war, under the pretext of preventing rape and the spread of venereal diseases by soldiers, the military set up military comfort stations that it managed itself. The comfort women that were gathered there were deprived of their freedom, had no rights and were forced to serve the soldiers sexually under circumstances that should really be called sexual slavery". It should be noted that just as is the case with Chinese exhibitions, several Japanese exhibitions that do not mention the comfort women still feature displays about other atrocities. Importantly, some Japanese exhibitions that used to feature displays dealing with the comfort women and other atrocities removed these after having been subjected to attacks by right-wingers. For example, the museum in

¹⁰³ The museum in Shanghai is a small museum by Chinese standards, dealing specifically with the comfort women. It has not been visited by the author.

Sakai used to provide detailed accounts of atrocities committed by the Japanese military in China, including the Japanese tactic, used in some parts of China to burn all, loot all and kill all (三光), as well as a fairly detailed description of the Nanjing Atrocity. The museum in Suita used to feature displays on the comfort women (Yamabe 1998:165). These two museums have subsequently removed descriptions of Japanese aggression and in August 2008 the exhibitions dealt chiefly with local events. The Peace Exhibition Room at the Kanagawa Plaza for Global Citizenship was originally intended to include exhibits related to the comfort women, but these plans were abandoned after right-wingers came from around Japan to exert influence on the staff (Rekishi Kyôikusha Kyôgikai 2004:143). The right-wingers seem, at least partly, to have got what they wanted, since the museum now lacks any references to Japanese aggression. Moreover, after it was announced in 1996 that the new Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum would feature photographs of Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing Atrocity, the comfort women, and the biological weapons experiments carried out by the infamous Unit 731, protests, consisting among other things of articles in the conservative media, caused the museum to remove some of the exhibits (Yamabe 1998:163, Hein & Takenaka 2007:65). These cases exemplify how specific contextual information can help understand and explain why certain events are included or omitted from an exhibition.

6.6 The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On 6 August 1945, the US military dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima this was followed by another dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. These events were followed by a radio address to the nation by the emperor on 15 August and formal unconditional surrender by Japan on 2 September (Gordon 2003:223-24). Whereas most Japanese exhibitions mention the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and some deal in great detail with these events, especially the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, relatively few Chinese exhibitions mention them. When mentioned in Chinese exhibitions, these events are referred to in connection with Japan's surrender and there is no mention of victims. In Japanese exhibitions, the most significant aspect of exhibits related to the atomic bombings is probably the connection made with the post-war era and the nuclear arms race during the Cold War (see below).

6.7 War crimes trials

The International Military Tribunal of the Far East (sometimes referred to as the Tokyo Trial) was held in Tokyo between May 1946 and November 1948. Twenty-five Japanese leaders were convicted at the Tokyo Trial, seven of whom were sentenced to death. Additional trials were held in other Asian countries, for example, in China. Exhibits on the trials can be connected to issues such as responsibility for the war. One problem, however, is that the Tokyo Trial is often considered to have been an exercise in victor's justice (Minear 1971, Dower 1999:443-84). War crimes trials are treated in greater detail in the Chinese exhibitions than in the Japanese. In the several Japanese exhibitions that do mention the trials, they are usually only mentioned on a timeline among a large number of other events. At the Kyoto Museum for World Peace, however, the Tokyo Trial is included in a section on war responsibility. When treated in Chinese exhibitions, war crimes trials are given more prominence and the trials are stressed as having been just.

6.8 The post-war era

The post-war era is the least specific of the topics treated here. It can, of course, refer to many different events. The tables, then, merely show that some events of the post-war are mentioned in an exhibition. If it says in the table that the post-war is not dealt with it means that the end of the war, or the war crimes trials, are the last major events treated in the exhibition. In other words, when the war ends, the exhibition also ends. That post-war events are mentioned is not, however, very revealing. A discussion concerning which events are mentioned and whether they are simply mentioned or discussed to a greater extent is therefore crucial.

There is a large general difference between Japanese and Chinese museum exhibitions concerning the inclusion of post-war events. Generally, in Japanese exhibitions post-war events are treated to a relatively large extent compared to the Chinese exhibitions. The most common theme is the Nuclear Age, characterized by the Cold War nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the USA and the nuclear tests carried out by the nuclear powers. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often understood as the beginning of this Nuclear Age. Several museums, among them those in Kawasaki, Kanagawa, Takamatsu, Sakai and Suita, mention that the cities that run the exhibitions have made anti-nuclear declarations. Nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity is a common theme present not just in the exhibitions mentioned above but also in the exhibitions in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Himeji,

Kyoto and Osaka. This way of contextualizing the war is similar to the way in which the Enola Gay exhibition that caused so much controversy in the USA was intended to be framed. Another point connected to the post-war era that is made in several Japanese exhibitions is that peace is not merely the absence of war but is also linked to contemporary issues such as the destruction of the environment, poverty, starvation and discrimination as well as present-day conflicts and disputes. The museums that connect their post-war displays to their role in broader peace education include those in Kawasaki, Osaka, Takamatsu, Saitama, Kyoto and Kanagawa. The Women's Active Museum on War and Peace and the Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum both have post-war exhibits that deal with the lawsuits and struggle for compensation of victims of Japanese aggression, such as the comfort women and forced labourers from, for example, China and Korea. The Yamato Museum has a post-war section that deals with the reconstruction of Kure and peace and development, the Yūshūkan has a section on the independence of former European colonies in Asia, the Shōkeikan mentions the post-war suffering of wounded Japanese soldiers and the Hokuchin Museum deals with the development of and international contributions made by the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF). Perhaps it is the connection made between the nuclear bombings and the nuclear age that makes many Japanese exhibitions discuss the war crimes trials to such a small extent. The war crimes trials, of course, involve an opportunity to deal with war responsibility issues. When the trials are excluded from exhibitions, this means that war responsibility issues are given less prominence.

In general, few Chinese exhibitions cover post-war events whereas many Japanese ones do. Furthermore, in Chinese exhibitions, the first decades after the war are omitted, creating a gap between the war and post-war events. The Guangdong Memorial Hall of the East River Column in Dongguan, and the Dongjiang Column Museum in Luofushan, Guangdong, both concentrate to a large extent on the East River (Dongjiang) Column, which fought the Japanese in Guangdong. In 1945-49, soldiers who had belonged to the Column were mobilized in the civil war on the side of the CCP. These events are briefly dealt with at these museums. Most of the Chinese exhibitions that mention post-war events, however, only refer to two kinds of topic: Sino-Japanese relations and economic development. The museums in Nanjing, Beijing, Shenyang, Fushun and Ranzhuang briefly mention Sino-Japanese friendship, in what I discuss as friendship corners in the analysis of narratives below, and photographs showing Chinese and Japanese leaders shaking hands are displayed. Other exhibits related to China's economic development in recent years are also present towards the end of

some exhibitions, for example, in Beijing. In Dongguan, the city's local economic development is mentioned and at the Zhenhai Coast Defense History Museum in Ningbo, development and modernization, especially of the Chinese navy, are part of the final exhibits. Even the exhibitions that mention some post-war events, however, do this to a very small extent. Furthermore, when such events are mentioned there is always a huge gap between 1949 and 1972, and events such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution are never referred to.

The lack of treatment of, or problems related to depictions of, the post-war era in China is also visible in the joint history project conducted by Chinese and Japanese historians since 2006. Even though several reports have been published on ancient history, pre-war and war period history, the Chinese side has been unwilling to make public the results of the study on the post-war era (see e.g. MOFA 2010, Japan Today 2010). In a Kyodo news transcript dealing with the progress of the joint history project, Bu Ping, leader of the Chinese team of researchers, reportedly said that: "Despite a decision not to release their studies in postwar history, the two sides have agreed that China should give fair credit to Japan's post-war path as a peaceful nation and Tokyo's provision of official development assistance to Beijing to help its economic growth" (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2010). In China, then, exhibits on the post-war period can be controversial, to say the least. In Japan, and for the Japanese side in the joint history project, as well as the negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese ministries of foreign affairs concerning the content of Chinese exhibitions mentioned above, including the post-war period is thought to portray Japan in a more positive light and to show that Japan has changed fundamentally since the war into a peaceful and responsible member of international society.

6.9 Conclusions

The above analysis of topics, while not exhaustive in any way, indicates that there are some differences concerning how events are portrayed in Chinese and Japanese exhibitions, and that there are also great differences within these countries. Especially in Japan there are fundamental and significant differences over how responsibility is attributed in relation to events as well as concerning which events are portrayed. For example, if we summarize how specific exhibitions deal with the events with which this analysis is concerned, it is possible to detect patterns within particular exhibitions. It is then possible to see that at museums such as,

for example, Peace Osaka, the Oka Masaharu Peace Memorial Museum, the Kyoto Museum for World Peace and the Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room, several events are described in a way that ascribes responsibility to the Japanese military. At some other Japanese museums, such as the Hokuchin Museum, the Yamato Museum, the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots, the Exhibition and Reference Library for Peace and Consolation and the Yûshûkan, on the other hand, responsibility is never ascribed to the Japanese military and neither the Nanjing Atrocity nor the comfort women are mentioned. At the Yûshûkan, responsibility for some events is even ascribed to the Chinese. In other words, the analysis suggests that there are diametrically opposed approaches to the depiction of these events within Japan. The approaches of some Japanese exhibitions, it appears, have considerably more in common with their Chinese counterparts than they do with Japanese museums such as the Yûshûkan. This analysis effectively refutes one of the problems identified in chapter 1 concerning how the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations is often discussed – the claim that Japanese views and depictions of the war are more or less the same and that any references to atrocities carried out by the Japanese military are more or less omitted from Japanese representations.

Among Chinese exhibitions, there is a lot of variation concerning which events are included and which are omitted. Nevertheless, the kind of obvious irreconcilable differences found to exist between some Japanese exhibitions were not found in the analysis of the topics in Chinese exhibitions. This analysis, however, has concentrated on specific events in order to provide an overview of a large number of exhibitions. While this has provided some interesting indications, a more fine-tuned and in-depth analysis is necessary in order to determine how the war is depicted in the narratives presented at some of the more prominent of these museums. This analysis of topics, while providing a brief overview as well as some basic information concerning the central events, has not revealed a great deal concerning the narratives. Which groups are discursively constructed, how participants are depicted and how narratives are interpreted in terms of “historical lessons” is analysed in chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 7: Analysis of Chinese narratives

Before starting the analysis it is useful to briefly reiterate the questions that guide the analysis of the material collected at these museums. The questions guiding the analysis are: What kinds of identity category are constructed and stressed? Who are the main participants in the narrative? How are these participants and their actions portrayed? Does the portrayal of participants follow an in-group/out-group logic? In other words, is the visitor encouraged to identify or not to identify with particular participants? How is the story told interpreted? What is the main message delivered through this interpretation?

One question that is not easily dealt with concerns how to present the results of the analysis. Should one narrative be presented at a time or should the presentation be divided according to themes. Both approaches may have their merits. Three main analytical themes are discussed: the discursive construction of groups, the narratives or stories told and the interpretation of narratives in the form of historical lessons. The results of the analysis are divided according to these analytical themes. Arranging the results in such a way makes comparison easier than if results were presented case by case. Such an approach may potentially make it more difficult to follow how the different themes of the cases relate. In order to make this clear, cases are separated within each section dealing with an analytical theme. In addition, the main results of the analysis are gathered in Table 9.1.

The exhibitions analysed are quite extensive and it has therefore been necessary to both select which exhibitions are to be analysed comprehensively and make a selection of material within these exhibitions to be subjected to in-depth analysis. Special attention has been given to material that is prominent or highlighted in the exhibitions. Large images and objects that are likely to draw the attention of visitors have been given more attention than small ones that are less prone to do so. Textual material that is similarly prominent has been chosen for in-depth analysis. Many exhibitions, especially Chinese ones, are divided into sections that start with a summary of the contents of the section. These textual elements have been selected for detailed analysis. It needs to be stressed that different exhibitions are ar-

ranged in different ways. Some contain few images and objects, while such exhibits are more numerous in other exhibitions.

The results of the analysis of participants have been summarized in tables which show the number of times certain participants figure in the role of actor and patient. Because there are many participants in some narratives, participants that are similar in significant aspects have been grouped into categories. The creation of these categories could be seen as problematic, especially since scrutinizing which categories are created in narratives is central to the analysis. At the same time, however, if such categories were not constructed there would be so many participants in some of the tables that they would not illustrate any patterns. Put another way, it would not be possible to see the wood for the trees. In this case it is necessary to make a trade-off that prioritizes readability and simplification at the expense of transparency. Sometimes such simplification is necessary in order for patterns of significance to emerge. This does not, of course, mean that simplification has characterized the way in which the analysis has been carried out. Instead, it has been necessary to simplify some of the presentation of the results of the analysis in order to highlight significant aspects of these results while striving to uphold a high degree of transparency. The overall approach of the study is based on the principle of problematizing (especially problematizing what is considered unproblematic in mainstream approaches) rather than simplifying.

When the analysis of textual material is carried out, the material analysed is always material in the original language – when Chinese exhibitions are discussed, the textual material analysed is always the original Chinese language material. This makes sense for several reasons. To begin with, some exhibitions are monolingual. Moreover, when the exhibition is bi- or trilingual, it is not always the case that all the material appears in all languages. Furthermore, there are sometimes grammatical and other errors in the English language material on display that make it impossible to conduct a meaningful linguistic analysis and draw conclusions concerning the significance of linguistic and other choices. In addition, most visitors will read the texts available in Chinese or Japanese. In a few cases, English texts published by the museums are quoted, but only as supplementary material. The main analysis is still conducted on Chinese or Japanese material. The original language texts have been translated to make it possible for readers who do not know Chinese and Japanese to follow the analysis. An attempt has therefore been made to keep this translation as close to the original texts as possible. This means that the phrases used may not come across as the most natural expressions in English. When longer quotes are given, the original texts are supplied in foot-

notes. Finally, sometimes when the use of a specific word is discussed, the original Chinese or Japanese word will be provided in brackets. This is done when it may be unclear what this word is, perhaps because of the existence of several words in the original language that correspond to the English equivalent.

7.1 The discursive construction of groups at Chinese museums

Before moving on to the issue of how different participants are depicted it is crucial to know what types of participant appear in the narrative. Especially salient and fundamental is the issue of what kinds of group are discursively constructed in the narratives. If the exhibitions analysed typically contain the stories that a certain we-group tell about themselves, then the primary question to be addressed concerns who are perceived as belonging to this we-group. In other words, before it is possible to examine how self and other are depicted it is essential to determine who are regarded as self and who are seen as belonging to the other. This needs to be empirically established and cannot be assumed prior to conducting the analysis of the empirical material. The analysis in this section is based on the following analytical questions: What kinds of identity categories are constructed and stressed? To what extent is a group constructed? Does this group consist of the members of a nation, those who live in a particular city or some other community or group?

7.1.1 The 9.18 History Museum

The 9.18 History Museum in Shenyang originally opened in 1991 and reopened in 1999 after having been rebuilt and enlarged. In the first room the visitor enters, the preface hall, s/he is greeted by the following brief message:

September 18, 1931. This is a day that is forever firmly engraved in the heart of the Chinese people. On this day, the Japanese aggressors outrageously launched the "September 18" Incident. In the 14 years that followed, the Japanese aggressors committed all sorts of war crimes in China, inflicting unspeakable suffering on tens of millions of Chinese and frenziedly plundered countless material wealth. The dignity of the Chinese nation was wantonly trampled on. Starting on that day, for 14 springs, summers, autumns and winters, the raging flames of the Chinese people's resistance against the Japanese aggressors spread all over the vast lands of China and countless Chinese used their spirit of devotion [literally "hot blood"] and lives to compose a song of anti-Japanese resistance that moved the whole world. September 18 1931 is a national humiliation day for the Chinese nation. The Chinese people can never forget.....¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴1931年9月18日。这是一个永远凝刻在中国人民心中的日子。这一天，日本侵略者悍然发动"九.一八"事变。此后十四年，日本侵略者在中国犯下种种战争罪行，几千万中国人生灵涂炭，无数物质财富被疯狂掠夺。中华民族的尊严被肆意践踏。从这一天起，十四个春夏秋冬，中国人民反抗日本侵略者的烈火燃遍华夏大地，无数中国人用热血和生命谱写出感天动地的抗日之歌。1931年9月18日是中华民族的国耻日，中国人民永远不会忘却。。。。。

With its references to the “Chinese people” and “Chinese nation”, this preface hints at the centrality assigned to the national category in this narrative. At the same time, terms such as the “north-eastern people” are also employed quite often in the narrative, suggesting that a regional identity is being stressed. Indeed, in the preface hall, the walls are adorned with a white relief sculpture resembling mountains that is reflected in the black marble floor. In the museum brochure, it is explained that this is meant to symbolize the beautiful scenery of the north-east. In the room, a flame is burning on a copper tablet, which is said to symbolize the “unyielding fighting spirit of the north-eastern people and the everlasting noble spirit of the martyrs of the nation”¹⁰⁵ (“9.18” Historical Museum 1999:4). Furthermore, in the foreword to the exhibition, which the visitor encounters after having seen the preface hall, both categories are mentioned:

The “September 18” Incident was a major historical incident of the 20th century that astonished the country and the rest of the world. It was not just the start of Japanese militarism conquering China by force; it was also the first time in history that a fascist country lit the flames of war. Its eruption does not just mark that the prelude to the Second World War had already started; it also marked the start of the 14-year bloody struggle of the north-eastern people. Starting on that day, Japanese imperialism caused numerous atrocities that defied human morality and set a criminal record that up until now makes all of mankind absolutely horrified. From this day on, the Chinese people [the descendants of the Yan and Huang emperors] underwent more than 5000 days and nights of only hatred, no tears and angry waves unprecedented in the 5000-year history of Chinese civilization swept all over the Chinese country.¹⁰⁶

It appears, then, that even though the regional north-eastern identity is indeed stressed, the struggle of the heroic north-eastern people is part of the struggle of the Chinese nation just as the unyielding spirit of the north-easterners is related to that of the nation as a whole. This is underlined by the strong emphasis on the national category in the preface.

The national category is also stressed in the way participants are referred to. What could be labelled “we”-words, such as “our military” (我军) and “our country” (我国) are employed, thereby discursively creating a bond between visitors and certain participants by emphasizing the national category. As is mentioned above, this is a central strategy through which groups are discursively created. The labelling of participants as “patriotic youth” (爱国青年), “patriotic intellectuals” (爱国知识分子) and “patriotic students” (爱国学

¹⁰⁵ 东北人民不屈斗争精神和民族英烈浩气永存。

¹⁰⁶ “九·一八”事变是20世纪震惊中外的重大历史的事件。它不仅是日本帝国主义武力征服中国的开始，也是法西斯国家在世界历史上点燃的第一把侵略战火；它的爆发不仅标志着第二次世界大战的序幕已经拉开，更标志着东北人民14年浴血奋战的开始。从这一天起，日本帝国主义制造了一件件灭绝天理人寰的惨案，创下了一个个令整个人类至今毛骨悚然的罪恶记录；从这一天起，炎黄华胄经受了 5000多个只有仇恨没有眼泪的日日夜夜，整个中华大地卷起了 5000多年文明史上史无前例的怒涛。

生) also appeals to patriotic sentiments, which are also closely connected to and stress the national as a crucial category for identification. This kind of vocabulary is present not only in the textual material (treated when the analysis of the narrative of the exhibition is conducted) but also in the captions of some of the photographs on display. As well as the we-words mentioned above (such as “our military”), the we-word “our compatriots” (我同胞) is used when referring to participants in a number of the photographs on display. The employment of these terms, along with other vocabulary and constructions, such as the designation of 18 September as a “*national* day of humiliation”, the “everlasting noble spirit of the martyrs of the *nation*” and the reference to the “5000-year history of *Chinese* civilization”, emphasize the national nature of the events dealt with, thereby connecting past and present and encouraging the visitor to identify with the Chinese nation.

7.1.2 The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Museum

This museum, located on the outskirts of Beijing, close to the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) where skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese soldiers led to the outbreak of full-scale war on 7 July 1937, was opened on 7 July 1987 and has since been renovated twice. It reopened after the most recent renovation on 7 July 2005.

In the narrative, just as in the 9.18 History Museum, visitors are by several means encouraged to identify with the Chinese participants in the narrative. Whereas a narrative can appeal to any of a range of different identity categories, the category for identification in this narrative is the national one. The whole exhibition is in Chinese, indicating that the intended visitors are mainly of Chinese origin. While this in itself does not necessarily mean that the national category is stressed. Table 7.3 shows that the majority of participants in the narrative are labelled either as belonging to the category of Chinese nationals, or more explicitly as “Chinese”, “patriots”, “compatriots” or “people of all nationalities in the whole country”. All these labels emphasize the Chinese-ness of the participants.

In the foreword, visitors are encouraged to identify with the Chinese participants in the narrative. Here, several reasons are given for commemorating the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance (中国人民抗日战争) and the worldwide Anti-Fascist War (反法西斯战争). Among those listed are: “to use the vivid history of the War of Resistance to promote *patriotic* education”, to “develop the *national* spirit” (民族精神), to “heighten *national* self-esteem, self-confidence and sense of pride”, to “encourage and mobilize people of all

nationalities (各族) in the whole *country* and the sons and daughters of *China* (中华儿女) within the *country* and abroad to realize the great revival (伟大复兴) of the *Chinese nation* (中华民族)” and to “promote world peace and development” (emphasis added). The objectives, then, are national and the main intended recipients are articulated in terms of the category of the Chinese nation. The revival of the Chinese nation is framed as a joint endeavour in which all Chinese should take part, thereby further inviting identification on the basis of nationality. The events of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance are explicitly linked to the present condition of China. Commemorating the victory in this war also ties all Chinese living today, of all nationalities within China as well as the “sons and daughters of China” abroad, to this period in the past. The categories employed – people of all nationalities, the sons and daughters of China and the Chinese nation – are also used in the description of what happened in the past, thereby contributing to the construction of continuity between past and present. Those who are told that they belong to a certain category in the present are in this way encouraged to identify with the past incarnation of the same category. This national continuity between Chinese living then and now is defined as broadly as possible to incorporate compatriots of all nationalities within China’s borders as well as those living abroad. Chinese visitors, then, are urged, through several means, to identify with the Chinese participants in the presented narrative.

7.1.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders

The museum first opened in 1985 and has been expanded twice since. It has received 5 million visitors per year since it reopened after refurbishments in 2007 (*China Daily* 2010b, personal correspondence). Because of the sheer size of the exhibition, a selection had to be made of elements to focus on. As I was not allowed to take photographs or video footage inside the museum, the analysis is based chiefly on a book published by the museum, *Collective Drawings of Exhibitions of Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders* (Zhu & Zhang 2008). The main textual and other exhibits can be found in this large volume. In addition to the analysis of the content of the exhibition, a brief discussion of the grounds of the museum and the prominent statues and other material found outdoors is provided.

The book mentioned above contains photographs of the major exhibits and the most prominent textual material in both Chinese and English. On its cover, two pairs of large

Chinese characters hint at the aim of the museum – to cast (as in molten metal) history (铸史) and to educate people (育人). In the light of other references to “historical truth” and “iron-clad evidence” discussed below, it seems that casting here refers to the solidity of the facts presented. At the same time it, and probably unintentionally, it also highlights the fact that history can be moulded. The second pair of characters directs attention to the educational function of the institution. This is further enforced towards the end of the exhibition where Hu Jintao is quoted as having said on 4 May 2004 that: “This is a good place to conduct patriotic education. We must never forget to carry out patriotic education of young people. No matter the time, we can never forget this painful history” (Zhu & Zhang 2008:292).¹⁰⁷ Young Chinese, it is suggested, need patriotic education and the museum is a good place to conduct it. Moreover, the second “we” that Hu mentions seems to refer to the Chinese people. This suggests that the national category is central to the exhibition.

The official English name of the museum – “Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders” captures the meaning of the Chinese name (侵华日军南京大屠杀遇难同胞纪念馆) fairly well. However, in the English name the victims are simply labelled “victims” whereas the Chinese wording describes them as *tongbao*, “compatriots (“born of the same parents”, 同胞), who met with disaster” (遇难). The use of *tongbao* involves a relational identification – the relation stressed being one of siblings who are all children of the motherland (祖国), which is an extension of the kinship relation found in the concept of having been “born of the same parents” (cf. Van Leeuwen 1996:56 on relational identification). This highlights how the main category for identification is discursively constructed in a way that emphasizes the nation.

One striking feature of the narrative is the relative absence, compared to several other Chinese exhibitions, of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nanjing was the Guomindang’s (GMD) capital until the government left just before the assault on Nanjing. The soldiers who defended the city, described here as the China defence forces, belonged to the GMD’s army. However, the category stressed is the national. The we-group is constructed in inclusive nationalist terms using words such as China, the Chinese people and the Chinese government when referring to actors. National unity is also discursively created by emphasizing the contributions made by all societal groups:

¹⁰⁷ A year after Hu’s statement, relations between China and Japan would be seriously strained after large-scale anti-Japanese protests around China, and the Japanese foreign minister would express concern about the content

From 1931 when the 9.18 Incident started, the Chinese people rose vigorously and conducted a 14-year long war of resistance. The foundation of this war was the cooperation between the two parties, the GMD and the CCP. All circles in society, people of all nationalities, all democratic parties, anti-Japanese organizations, patriots of all social classes and overseas compatriots participated extensively in the war involving the whole nation.¹⁰⁸

In the above example, the cooperation between the CCP and the GMD as well as all groups in society is mentioned as a united national force. Often, however, the category mentioned is the national one. The above example seems to fulfil the function of asserting that all these groups are indeed included in the national community. It is also worth pointing out that even though the episode central to the narrative, the Nanjing Massacre, is a terrible event that took place in a city; the victims are never labelled “citizens of Nanjing”. Even though the main event is a local one, the category into which victims are placed is the national. That the national category is central, and indeed takes precedence over the local, also becomes clear in the conclusions of the exhibitions in which the narrative is explicitly interpreted in terms of lessons for the Chinese people.

7.1.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster

The Jianchuan Museum Cluster in Anren outside Chengdu is unusual in several ways. To start with, unlike other museums, it does not consist of one museum but of a vast area containing many museums and squares. Some of the museums are still under construction but five museums dealing with the Anti-Japanese war, three dedicated to the “red age”, displaying communist era nostalgia, and two dealing with Chinese folk-customs are already open to the public. It was created by Sichuan native Fan Jianchuan, who has been collecting the artefacts which are now on display since he entered the Xi’an Politics College in 1979.¹⁰⁹ It is also unusual because it is a large private institution. Large private war exhibitions are quite rare in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where most such museums are run by the government.

The halls in the Museum Cluster’s War of Resistance series, it is written in the museum brochure, “reproduce in a true and comprehensive way the Chinese *nation’s* vigorous war to defend the *country* more than half a century ago” (emphasis added).¹¹⁰ This suggests that the identity category stressed is the national one. This is the case in all the museums

of Chinese patriotic education.

¹⁰⁸ 从1931年九一八事变开始，中国人民进行了长达14年的奋起抗战，这场战争是以国共两党合作为基础，社会各界，各族人民，各民主党派，抗日团体，社会各阶层爱国人士和海外侨胞广泛参加的全民族战争。

¹⁰⁹ For an analysis of a book written by Fan about his collection of artefacts see Mitter 2007:172-191.

¹¹⁰ 真实全面地再现了中华民族半个多世纪前那场轰轰烈烈的卫国战争。

of which the cluster consists, as is shown in greater detail in the discussion of the narratives at each museum.

7.2 The narratives at Chinese museums

The analysis of Chinese narratives is guided by the following analytical questions: Who are the main participants, that is, agents and patients, in the narrative told? How are these participants and their actions portrayed? Are participants portrayed as heroes, aggressors or victims? Does the portrayal of participants follow an in-group/out-group logic? Is the visitor encouraged to identify or not to identify with particular participants?

7.2.1 The 9.18 History Museum

The exhibition consists of a foreword and an epilogue in between which there are six sections. These six sections make up the historical narrative. The headings of these sections and the number of sentences of which the textual material of each section consists are shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Sections and number of sentences in each section at the 9.18 History Museum

Section	Number of sentences
Section one: Historical background of the September 18 Incident (第一部分: “九·一八”事变的历史背景)	106
Section two: The September 18 Incident and the fall of the north-east (第二部分: “九·一八”事变和东北沦陷)	73
Section three: Japanese sanguinary rule in north-east China (第三部分: 日本在中国东北的血腥统治)	124
Section four: The anti-Japanese struggle of the north-east military and civilians (第四部分: 东北军民的抗日斗争)	154
Section five: Outbreak of the nationwide War of Resistance and the final ending of the Japanese aggressors (第五部分: 全国抗战的爆发与日本侵略者的最终下场)	122
Section six: Taking history as a mirror, anticipating peace and being on guard against the resurrection of Japanese imperialism (第六部分: 以史为鉴, 企盼和平, 警惕日本军国主义复活)	32
Total:	611

As the headings of these sections suggest, much of the narrative concentrates on events that occurred in the north-east China. It is not until section five that the national full-scale war breaks out (7 July 1937).¹¹¹ Much of the narrative therefore has a regional focus. However, the

¹¹¹ The regional events, that is, the anti-Japanese struggle of the north-east military and civilians, took place while the GMD government prioritized fighting the CCP. The GMD government thus did little to stop the ag-

regional struggle of the north-east people, as is mentioned above, is depicted as being part of the nationwide War of Resistance. Apart from the titles of the six main sections, there are also headings of sub-sections. In some cases, these headings allude to the main participants of a section. In the second and third sections, for example, many headings leave out the actor and only consist of an action, for example: “invading and occupying Shenyang city” and “plotting “north-eastern independence””.¹¹² Most of the actions mentioned in the headings of the second and third sections are carried out by the Japanese military, suggesting that it is the main participant in these sections. When it comes to the fourth and fifth sections, on the other hand, most headings explicitly mention participants that may be understood as playing central roles in these sections. Participants such as the CCP, the north-east anti-Japanese United Army, the North-eastern Army, the North-eastern Volunteer Army, the Soviet Union, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army figure in these headings.

In table 7.2, participants who appear in the narrative are listed in a simplified table. It has been simplified because of the large number of participants in the narrative. The large number of participants can be explained by the fact that the material analysed is very large (consisting of 611 sentences) and that during the time period leading up to the war in 1937, China was quite fragmented and characterized by power struggles between different parties and military cliques. It was not until 1936 that the united front between the GMD and CCP came about as a result of the Xi’an Incident. Without simplifying the table it would be difficult to identify the most significant features of the analysis.

gressive activities of the Japanese military in Manchuria. Indeed, it even concluded treaties with the Japanese that gave the latter far-reaching rights in northern China.

¹¹² 侵占沈阳城 ... 策划“东北独立”

Table 7.2 Participants in the narrative at the 9.18 Historical Museum

Participant	Actor	Patient
Japanese military participants ¹¹³	135	29
Japan and Japanese government participants ¹¹⁴	55	10
Japanese participants labelled with terms that have negative connotations ¹¹⁵	36	28
Other Japanese participants ¹¹⁶	17	6
Japanese and Puppet (Manchurian) participants ¹¹⁷	14	6
Puppet government participants ¹¹⁸	22	8
The enemy ¹¹⁹	6	12
Patriot and “we”-participants ¹²⁰	17	6
CCP participants and participants closely related to the CCP ¹²¹	93	15
Chinese civilian participants ¹²²	19	48
Other Chinese participants ¹²³	92	29
Chinese traitors	6	5
Other participants ¹²⁴	41	3
Total	553	205

The most common actors in the narrative are Japanese military participants. The CCP and participants closely associated with the CCP also appear as actors many times. The most common patients are Chinese civilians. Japanese military participants and Japanese war criminals also figure as patients in a large number of instances. Furthermore, it is notable that sometimes Japanese participants are labelled using terms that carry negative connotations, such as “aggressors” and fascists. There are Chinese collaborators in the narrative, labelled traitors (traitors to the *Han*, 汉奸), even though they do not play a very large part as they are often depicted as carrying out actions on the instructions of the Japanese.

When the analysis of participants is broken down into sections, it points in the same direction as the analysis of headings. In section two, Japanese military participants appear as actors 49 times (of a total of 70). In section three, Japanese participants and those belonging to the Manchurian puppet government account for 98 out of a total of 106 agents. In

¹¹³ For example “the Japanese Military” and specific generals.

¹¹⁴ For example “Japan”, “the Japanese government”, and specific ministers and officials.

¹¹⁵ For example “Japanese imperialism”, “Japanese militarists”, “fascists”, “Japanese aggressors” (日本侵略者), “bandits” (日寇) and “Japanese War criminals”.

¹¹⁶ For example “the Japanese people” (日本人民), “Japanese people” (日本人) and “Japanese war orphans”.

¹¹⁷ For example “Japanese and Puppet authorities (日为当局) and “the Japanese and puppet military” (日伪军).

¹¹⁸ For example (the Puppet emperor) “Pu Yi” (溥仪) and “the Puppet Manchurian army” (伪军).

¹¹⁹ 敌人。

¹²⁰ For example “our country” (我国), “our military” (我军), “our soldiers” (我官兵), “patriotic youths” (爱国青年), “patriotic intellectuals” (爱国知识分子) and “the save the nation-society” (救国会).

¹²¹ For example “the CCP” (中国共产党), “the Central Committee of the CCP” (中共中央), the North-east Revolutionary Army (东北人民革命军), “the North-east anti-Japanese United Army” (东北抗日联军) and specific leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

¹²² For example “Chinese” (中国人), “the Chinese people” (中国人民) and “innocent common people” (无辜平民).

¹²³ For example “the GMD government” (国民党政府), “the Volunteer Army” (义勇军), “anti-Japanese troops” (抗日武装), warlords and specific Chinese participants such as Chiang Kai-shek.

¹²⁴ For example “Koreans”, “Tsarist Russia”, “war crimes tribunals” and “the Soviet Union Government”.

other words, these participants dominate these sections. When it comes to patients, Chinese participants dominate. Especially in section three, the total number of patients is quite large – 54 in total, out of which 26 are Chinese civilian participants and only eight are non-Chinese participants. This points to the fact that it is chiefly in these two sections that Japanese aggression and Chinese victimhood are treated. Many of the acts carried out by Japanese actors are aggressive acts and several descriptions of these are characterized by the use of predication that further emphasizes the cruelty of the actors, as is the case in the following example (emphasis added to illustrate the role of predication):

After Japan invaded and occupied the north-east, the *cruel* Japanese aggressors carried out *many inhuman* massacres against the north-eastern troops and people who had risen to fight and orchestrated *appalling heinous tragic* incidents *one after another*. These *bloody* atrocities *that make one's hair bristle with anger* thoroughly revealed the nature of the Japanese aggressors.¹²⁵

The aggression emplotment can be found in a large number of images as well as in objects. For example, one photograph showing a dog standing in front of people lying on the ground is captioned in the following way: “The Japanese military let military dogs bite our compatriots”¹²⁶. It can also be seen in objects, for example, in the “rolling cage”, a cylinder-shaped cage with spikes pointing inwards, used, according to the caption, by the Japanese troops and troops of the puppet regime to torture prisoners.

In sections four and five, the tables have turned: there are 113 Chinese actors in section four as opposed to 30 Japanese and puppet actors. At the same time, Chinese participants figure as patients in 17 instances in section four whereas Japanese and puppet regime patients appear 23 times in this section. In section five, there are 53 Chinese actors and nine patients, while there are 38 Japanese and puppet regime actors and 55 patients. Furthermore, it is notable that CCP actors and actors belonging to the North-east Anti-Japanese United Army, which was, it is pointed out, organized by the CCP, account for 68 of the actors in section four. In section five, Chinese actors are more diverse and the Soviet Union plays a large part, figuring as an actor 14 times, as opposed to the USA, which appears only twice. Japanese participants still appear in these parts of the exhibition, although compared to the previous sections more commonly as patients and less frequently as actors. These changes in the depiction of Japanese and Chinese participants in these sections reflect a shift from an em-

¹²⁵日本侵占东北后，凶残的日本侵略者对奋起抗争的东北军民进行了多起灭绝人性的大屠杀，制造了一起又一起骇人听闻的滔天惨案。这些令人发指的血腥暴行，彻底暴露了日本侵略者的法西斯本性。

¹²⁶日军放军犬咬我同胞。

phasis on the aggressor and victim emplotments to a strong prominence of the heroic emplotment. This heroism is illustrated in the following example, stressing the role of the CCP:

After the “September 18” Incident erupted, the Chinese Communist Party represented the patriotic demand by the people of all of China and set out, from the position of safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and defending the dignity of the Chinese nation, to put forward an appeal to “persist in the War of Resistance against Japan and recover lost territory”.¹²⁷

In other examples, more specific acts are dealt with:

Between white mountains and black water, the North-east anti-Japanese United Army launched a long-term, adamant and extremely arduous struggle, eliminating a large amount of the Japanese and Puppet troops’ effective strength, using their lives and blood to write the most solemn and stirring page in the history of China’s War of Resistance, leaving a glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese nation’s War of Resistance.¹²⁸

In some cases in which the exploits of heroic Chinese soldiers are discussed, these soldiers fight bravely but are finally outnumbered and killed by the enemy. They are thus not victorious in these specific passages, although it might be argued that they contributed to the overall victory in the war. The point, however, is that they are vanquished and finally killed in the specific battles they fight. Despite this defeat, however, they and their actions are portrayed as heroic. In other words, heroism does not require victory. Central to the heroism of their deeds is that they “bravely sacrifice” (壮烈牺牲) themselves for the country. In this way, their deaths are made *meaningful*.¹²⁹ Heroic representations are found in the form of images showing resistance fighters attacking the enemy and cartoon drawings showing muscular Chinese beating down the Japanese enemy.

Many of the positive self-representations in the narrative portray Chinese participants as heroic. There are also some examples in which the Chinese government’s treatment of Japanese war criminals and Japanese war orphans left behind in China after the war is depicted positively. Under the heading “China reformed Japanese war criminals” it is mentioned that:

The Japanese war criminals that our country detained committed unforgivable crimes during its war of aggression, causing the Chinese people to suffer huge losses. Normally, such war criminals should be

¹²⁷“九·一八”事变爆发后，中国共产党代表全国人民的爱国要求，从维护中国领土主权完整，维护中华民族尊严的立场出发，提出了“坚持对日抗战，收复失地”的号召。

¹²⁸在白山黑水之间，东北抗日联军同日本展开了长期，顽强，艰苦卓越的斗争，消灭了日伪军大量有生力量，用生命和鲜血写下了中国抗战史上最悲壮的一页，在中华民族抗战史上留下了光辉的篇章。

¹²⁹As is noted in chapter 4, in previous research on narratives about war, so-called victor narratives are sometimes mentioned. In the framework employed here, however, no “victor” emplotment is used, as the heroic emplotment is considered more useful. This is because victory is not necessary for heroic depiction and heroic sacrifice is more important than victory for creating meaning.

punished without leniency. However, for the friendly relationship between the Sino-Japanese peoples the Chinese government gave them humanitarian, lenient treatment.¹³⁰

The “unforgivable crimes”, committed by the Japanese war criminals that were detained by “our country”, that really “should be punished without leniency” are juxtaposed with the “humanitarian lenient treatment” they received from the Chinese government. Since the Chinese government’s motivation for doing this was for the sake of the relations between the Chinese and Japanese peoples it could perhaps be argued that, in the narrative, it defines the moral status of the two peoples and its governments. In other words, the Japanese government and people should continue to respect the higher moral position of the Chinese side. An example of such proper behaviour from the Japanese people can be seen in the statue of the Chinese foster parents on display. It was given to the museum in 1999 by a group of Japanese orphans who were left behind in China after the war and taken care of by Chinese foster parents until they were given the opportunity to return to Japan after bilateral relations were normalized in 1972.

Towards the end of the exhibition there are other displays highlighting post-war peaceful bilateral relations. For example, in one panel is a statement made in 1997 by then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto when he visited the 9.18 Historical Museum. In the statement, Hashimoto mentions the necessity of facing history, shouldering the heavy responsibility of history and promoting Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of this. However, there are also exhibits stressing the need to “be vigilant towards the resurrection of Japanese militarism”. In this context, former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are mentioned as well as the activities of Japanese right-wingers.

In sum, the narrative includes examples of the aggressor, victim and heroic emplotments. As is demonstrated above, the heroic emplotment is, to a large extent, kept apart from the other two, even though Chinese victims are portrayed, in some sense, as heroic – as is seen in the sentence exemplifying Japanese aggression above in which the victims are depicted as having risen vigorously in resistance. Most importantly, perhaps, the CCP does not enter the stage until we reach section four. In other words, the Japanese aggressors are the main participants until the CCP comes to the rescue. One function of keeping the victim and aggressor emplotments to a large extent apart from the heroic emplotment is that the CCP is associated with the latter rather than the former. In addition, Chinese participants are por-

¹³⁰我国拘押的日本战犯，在侵华战争中犯下了不容饶恕的罪行，使中国人民蒙受了巨大损失。对这些战犯本应严惩不贷，但是中国政府考虑到中日两国人民的友好关系，对他们给予了人道主义的宽待。

trayed not just as heroic but also as magnanimous towards the Japanese aggressors. War criminals who have committed horrible deeds are treated with leniency and Japanese war orphans are taken care of. This positive self-representation contrasts sharply with the depiction of the Japanese aggressors as cruel, thereby placing the Chinese government on a higher moral ground in relation to its Japanese counterpart.

7.2.2 The Chinese People's War of Resistance Museum

Once again, the textual material is too extensive to be analysed in its entirety. For this reason, prominent or highlighted textual material was selected for in-depth analysis.¹³¹ An additional examination of other kinds of foregrounded material such as images and other exhibits, was also conducted.¹³²

Table 7.3 Number of participants in the narrative at the Chinese People's War of Resistance Museum (Numbers indicate number of times mentioned)

	Actor	Patient
Chinese participants ¹³³	17	3
Other Chinese participants ¹³⁴	1	3
Chinese patriot and compatriot participants ¹³⁵	6	
People of all nationalities in the whole country ¹³⁶	3	
Us (we) ¹³⁷		2
CCP participants ¹³⁸	10	
Japanese participants ¹³⁹	3	4
Enemies ¹⁴⁰		2
GMD participants ¹⁴¹	2	
Other participants ¹⁴²	3	
Total	45	14

¹³¹ The exhibition starts with a foreword and ends with a conclusion. Between these two texts, the story of the war is told in eight sections each starting with an introductory text. The initial analysis focuses on these ten arguably highlighted texts, which summarize the story told. Other textual elements are subordinate to these ones and deal with more specific events.

¹³² Participants (and their actions) are sometimes (although this is not so common) mentioned in subordinate clauses, while in other cases they are highlighted as the main participant in the main clause of a sentence. In the table listing participants, as is the case with other analyses, participants mentioned in both main and subordinate clauses have been included.

¹³³ For example "the Chinese nation" (中华民族), "the Chinese people", "sons and daughters of China" (中华儿女) and "China".

¹³⁴ For example "Innocent common people", "labourers" (劳工) and "Prisoners of War (POWs)" (战俘).

¹³⁵ For example "compatriots abroad" (海外侨胞) and "patriotic officers and men" (爱国将士).

¹³⁶ 全国各族人民。

¹³⁷ 我们。

¹³⁸ For example "the Chinese Communist Party", "the Eighth Route Army" (八路军), "the New Fourth Army" (新四军).

¹³⁹ For example "the Japanese military" (日军), "Japanese imperialism" (日本帝国主义), "Japanese aggressors" (日本侵略者).

¹⁴⁰ "The enemy" (Japan) (敌人) and "external enemies" (外敌).

¹⁴¹ "Chiang Kai-shek" and "the GMD".

¹⁴² "Many countries and international friends" (许多国家和国际友人), "the United States of America" (美国), "the Soviet Union" (苏联).

Table 7.3 provides several areas of interest for this study. To start with, the Japanese enemy only appears as an actor in three instances. Interestingly, in two of these cases, agency is ascribed to an ism, “Japanese imperialism”, rather than to an actor in the usual sense of the word. This could be interpreted as a way of diverting responsibility from the actual actors but a more appropriate interpretation would perhaps be that it draws attention to the fact that Japan at the time was an imperialist power carrying out imperialist policies as it invaded China. In the two cases in which “Japanese imperialism” is ascribed agency, the actions are on a rather high level of abstraction, as in the following example: “In 1937, Japanese imperialism created the Lugouqiao incident, launching an all-out war of aggression against China”.¹⁴³ In the case when agency is assigned to the Japanese military, the actions performed are of a more concrete nature (see below). The terminology here is interesting as the war launched by the Japanese (or by Japanese imperialism) is a war of aggression against China (侵华战争). The terminology used to refer to the war hence differs depending on the perspective – the out-group, or the other, launches a war of aggression whereas the in-group (the self) conducts the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japan (中国人民抗日战争), which is a part of the worldwide war against fascism (反法西斯战争). The former is said to have been an important part of the latter and through the War of Resistance, “the Chinese people made a huge national sacrifice for the victory in the anti-fascist war”.¹⁴⁴ Here, as in many other instances, the War of Resistance is stressed as being *national* in its character. At the same time, the enormity of the sacrifice made by the nation to the larger war is emphasized in a way that seems to fit the objective of strengthening national pride – those Chinese who participated in the war did not just save the nation but also contributed to saving the rest of the world. Stressing altruism in this way contributes to creating a positive self-image. Positive values are emphasized that the visitors are encouraged to adopt. Chinese righteousness and morality are further stressed by describing the war as just (正义) and by claiming that whereas “the moral (righteous) gain the support of many, those who lose morality will have scant support” (得道多助，失道寡助). The international support China received from the Soviet Union, the USA and other international friends is therefore understood as confirming the positive values expressed through struggle in the name of the Chinese nation.

¹⁴³ 1937年日本帝国主义制造卢沟桥事变，发动全面侵华战争。

¹⁴⁴ 中国人民为世界反法西斯战争胜利做出了巨大的民族牺牲。

Most of the participants mentioned are collective participants rather than individual ones. Only Chiang Kai-shek figures as an individual participant in the textual material dealt with here. Other material, especially images, however, draws attention to CCP leaders as individual participants. These are nominated, that is, their names are given, while most other participants are described as categories of people. Representing social actors in a generic way, as generalized classes of people, for example as the Chinese people, the CCP and the Japanese military, presents these categories of people in a generalized way – the impression is given that those belonging to a certain category all behave in the same conformist way and possess similar qualities.

Of great importance is the fact that an overwhelmingly large number of actors belong to the Chinese in-group.¹⁴⁵ Some international friends appear, belonging to a larger in-group of allies in the worldwide anti-Fascist war, although not in a significantly large number of instances. Among these collective actors belonging to the in-group we find different levels of specificity ranging from the “Chinese nation”, which includes all the other more specific subcategories such as “compatriots in Taiwan” and “people of all nationalities”. The vocabulary is noteworthy for its large number of terms stressing the national category. Participants are described as compatriots, patriotic and as belonging to the Chinese nation. There is no question that participants are stressed as belonging to the national category. Other categories are absent – other potential identity categories are suppressed as the national is constructed as the only relevant category for identification.

The following sentence exemplifies how predication of Chinese participants contributes to representing the victory in the war as something great (emphasis added):

This *earth shaking grand* achievement made the Chinese nation wipe out the century of humiliation and revealed a new image [of China] on the world stage.¹⁴⁶

The achievement, that is, victory in the war, is not just grand but earth shaking. In the next sentence, China’s international status is described as having been raised “unprecedentedly” (空前) as a result of this achievement. The Chinese people’s contribution to victory in the worldwide Anti-Fascist War is stressed explicitly in four sentences as having been a “huge national sacrifice” (巨大的民族牺牲) and in two of these as also having been historic. The

¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, Chinese participants are sometimes mentioned in an attributive function, for example in the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance”. Here the “Chinese people” are mentioned but only to define what kind of war is described. Such mentions of participants have not been included in the table listing participants.

¹⁴⁶ 这一惊天动地的伟业，使中华民族以洗百年耻辱，在世界上展示了新的形象。

war is described twice as a “just war” (正义战争) and once as “holy” (神圣). The struggle that the war entailed is sometimes described as “heroic” (英雄), “bloody” (浴血), a matter of “life and death” (生死存亡) and as characterized by “unsurpassed hardships” (艰苦卓绝). The CCP is portrayed in several ways as active both by casting it as an actor carrying out actions and by stressing its role as leader and initiator of the resistance. This is further stressed in two sentences by explicitly describing the actions of the CCP as “active” (积极).

The GMD’s contribution to the war effort is acknowledged even though it becomes obvious that it is subordinate to the role of the CCP as it appears only twice in the role of actor. This is confirmed in several sentences in the text in which the pivotal role of the CCP is stressed. This central role is emphasized not only in how the CCP figures in the role of actor in many sentences but also in other types of construction. Consider the following example:

Undergoing 14 years of brave fighting and bloody struggle, under the flag of the anti-Japanese national united front proposed by the CCP, the Chinese people, with backward weapons and equipment, defeated the economically strong enemy whose military equipment was much more powerful and worked the wonder of a semi-colonial weak state defeating a strong colonial state.¹⁴⁷

This is one among four similar sentences that emphasizes the centrality of the CCP as a leader in proposing the united front and leading the people to victory. Even though in recent years the GMD has been resurrected as a contributing force in the War of Resistance, its role, as shown here, is not that of an equal. The War of Resistance Museum, just like other state-run war museums in the PRC (as is demonstrated below), centres on and strongly emphasizes the role of the CCP. The CCP is highlighted as having played a pivotal role by stressing that it united the people in resistance at a time when the Chinese nation’s very existence was in imminent danger (民族危机)¹⁴⁸. While the “Chinese people”, in the above passage and similar examples, are certainly an actor they could also be said to occupy the role of beneficiary. The Chinese people benefit from the crucial leadership of the CCP. In other words, the Chinese people are not entirely autonomous as an actor. The relationship could perhaps be described as symbiotic. The above passage also stresses the heroic nature of the struggle not just by labelling it a “brave” struggle but also by emphasizing that the Chinese people achieved victory

¹⁴⁷经过十四年英勇斗争和浴血奋斗，在中国共产党倡导的抗日民族统一战线旗帜下，中国人民以落后的武器装备，打败经济实力和军事装备远比自己强大的敌人，创造了半殖民地弱国打败帝国主义强国的奇迹。

¹⁴⁸ This phrase, which is the heading of the second section of the exhibition, is reminiscent of the lyrics of the Chinese national anthem according to which “the Chinese nation reached the most dangerous moment in time” (中华民族到了最危险的时候).

despite having inferior equipment. Resistance in the north-east from 1931, when the GMD advocated a policy of non-resistance, is described as having been organized by the CCP. After the Lugouqiao Incident on 7 July 1937, the united front between the CCP and GMD against the Japanese invaders is stressed as having been the result of the CCP's leadership and initiative:

After the incident took place, the CCP appealed to compatriots all over the country to unite and rise up to resist the Japanese bandits' aggression.¹⁴⁹

Apart from calling attention to the centrality of the CCP in achieving national unity and inciting resistance, it should be noted that the Japanese responsible for the aggression are described as "bandits". The issue of how the Japanese invaders are depicted is discussed below. In terms of how the Chinese people are described in this narrative:

During the War of Resistance against Japan, the sons and daughters of China, millions of people all of one mind, shared a bitter hatred for the enemy, unafraid of bloodshed and sacrifice, feared neither hardships nor danger [as they] conducted a long-term struggle of extreme hardship against the Japanese aggressors.¹⁵⁰

In the above passage, the term "the sons and daughters of China" is used (in a way similar to other Chinese museums) with the result of framing nationality in terms of family relationships. These sons and daughters, number in the millions but are still presented as being "of one mind"¹⁵¹ and sharing their "bitter hatred". Sameness is strongly emphasized, and this is seen elsewhere as well. Descriptions are abundant of collective actors described as patriots forming a united national front and rising up together, at the initiative and under the leadership of the CCP, to fight the enemy. Unity is stressed linguistically in the choice of vocabulary used to refer to participants, the way these participants are predicated and the actions they perform. This quote also exemplifies another common feature of the description of those belonging to the Chinese in-group – they are often described as heroic, fearless and willing to endure hardships and even to sacrifice themselves for the nation. As is mentioned above, this sacrifice is not just for the nation but also for the greater war outside China. This is mentioned several times. It is described in one instance as a "huge national sacrifice and historic contribution" (巨大的民族牺牲和历史性的贡献).

¹⁴⁹ 事变发生后，中国共产党号召全国同胞团结起来抵抗日寇侵略。

¹⁵⁰ 在抗日战争中，中华儿女万众一心，同仇敌忾，不怕流血牺牲，不畏艰难险阻，与日本侵略者进行了长期艰苦卓越的斗争。

¹⁵¹ The same phrase (万众一心) is used in the Chinese national anthem.

In other exhibits, attention is drawn mainly to the CCP and its activities. Many large photographs and oil paintings depict CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De. The GMD is also mentioned along with such actors as overseas compatriots in Taiwan and elsewhere, minorities within China and international friends. One installation shows how a village is attacked by the Japanese aggressors who kill some of the inhabitants. The villagers, however, fight back making use of tunnels dug beneath the village. In the end they all cheer in victory. Although these actors are included and represented in images and other exhibits, the large number of exhibits that draw attention to the CCP ensures that the emphasis is still very much on the central position of the party.

While the Japanese enemy is featured relatively few times as an actor, it plays a much more prominent role as patient. At the same time, it must be stressed that the total number of patients is small, indicating that many of the actions performed by the actors are not directed towards a patient. The “Chinese people” and subcategories of this class (innocent common people, labourers) appear as patients in a few instances. Most of these occur in the same sentence, a very long sentence that forms the summarizing text of section four of the exhibition, which deals with the Japanese military’s atrocities (日军暴行). This sentence is provided in its entirety below.

During the war of aggression against China, the Japanese military, against more than 900 cities and numerous villages, conducted bombings, wantonly slaughtered innocent common people, cruelly killed POWs by maltreatment, forcibly enslaved labourers, carried out bacteriological and chemical warfare, conducted enslavement education in the occupied areas, used opium to poison the Chinese people, controlled China’s industries and mines, trade and other kinds of economic lifelines, plundered China’s economic resources and brought the Chinese people extremely serious suffering.¹⁵²

This is one long sentence in which one agent, the Japanese military, performs many horrific actions. It is a summary of what this section of the exhibition contains. The actions carried out by the Japanese military are both hideous and numerous, and the way in which some of these actions are predicated as well as the choice of wording add to the negative depiction of the aggressors. Regarding wording, the use of the word slaughter stresses the cruel way in which Chinese were killed. Describing the indoctrination attempts made in occupied areas through propagandizing the education system as “enslavement education” similarly calls attention to the cruelty of this policy by using a term that arguably has strong connotations of a more physical sort of abuse. Concerning predicational strategies, the Japanese military does not just

¹⁵²在侵华战争中，日军对中国900多座城市和广大乡村进行轰炸，大肆杀戮无辜平民，残酷虐杀战俘，强制奴役劳工，实施细菌战和化学战，在占领区推行奴化教育，用鸦片毒害中国人民，控制中国的工矿，贸易等经济命脉，掠夺中国经济资源，给中国人民带来深重灾难。

slaughter common people and kill prisoners of war (POWs) but “*wantonly* slaughtered *innocent* common people” and “*cruelly* killed POWs”. These linguistic choices represent the enemy other as an evil adversary that would stop at nothing. This depiction, when contrasted with the positive depiction of the in-group, serves the function of underlining the moral goodness of the positively portrayed in-group. The use of the word bandits, mentioned above, to refer to the Japanese military is an example of evaluation in terms of good and bad (cf. van Leeuwen 1996:58).

Other exhibits in this section draw attention to Japanese agency. There are maps showing where in China the Japanese military committed massacres as well as where in Japan Chinese forced labourers were taken, and where in China Japanese units involved in using biological and chemical weapons were located. Instruments used to torture Chinese as well as the bones and skulls of victims are also on display. The section contains texts that give more detailed accounts of the different kinds of atrocities carried out by the Japanese aggressors against the Chinese people. These atrocities are also illustrated in a large number of photographs. These images show piled up corpses of victims just killed, the remains discovered in mass graves as well as photographs of the perpetrators. Whereas in most other parts of the exhibition the CCP plays an important role as the main actor, in this section the CCP is not mentioned at all. Here, the Japanese military is the only actor. Similarly, the Japanese military rarely appears as an actor in other parts of the exhibition. One exception is mentions of the Japanese military’s “mopping up” operations against anti-Japanese bases. However, this is mentioned in connection with Chinese countermeasures that, under the leadership of the CCP, are described as having crushed the Japanese military effort. The Chinese forces fight the Japanese military (under the CCP’s leadership) and hence appear frequently as actors while the Japanese military acts as a perpetrator of atrocities mainly in one section of the exhibition. There appears to be a tension between the depiction of Japanese atrocities and Chinese heroic resistance that perhaps accounts for the separation of these elements of the narrative.¹⁵³ As is noted above, this separation also existed in the exhibition at the 9.18 History Museum.

¹⁵³ This way of separating the main narrative emplotments can be detected at other Chinese war museums as well. The most obvious example is perhaps the Dongjiang Column Memorial Hall in Luofushan in Guangdong. Here the main exhibition, as the name suggests, focuses on a military unit (belonging to the CCP), the Dongjiang Column. Without conducting an in-depth analysis, it can be stated that the heroic exploits of the column is the chief focus of the main exhibition. However, where the main exhibition ends there is an open door that takes the visitor to an outdoor exhibition consisting of panels attached to the wall of the building. These panels all deal with Japanese aggression without mentioning the Dongjiang column or the CCP. The Chinese in this outdoor exhibition are all victims of Japanese aggression while the Chinese depicted indoors all fight heroically against the enemy.

At the War of Resistance Museum, the atrocity section used to be located at the end of the exhibition but when the museum reopened after refurbishment on 7 July 2005, it had been moved and is now the fourth out of eight main sections. Since the renovations, the final part of the exhibition includes exhibits on China's post-war relations with Japan and Japan's recognition of history. This, it appears, was the result of efforts by Japanese diplomats. During the 163rd session of the Diet, on 13 October 2005, a representative from the Japanese MOFA informed the Diet of the results of the renovation of the memorial hall in Beijing. The representative, who had inspected the renovated exhibition in August 2005, mentioned three aspects that had been changed. First, before the renovation, the exhibition had ended with a section dealing with Japanese violence against Chinese that in the words of the MOFA official "gave a very bad impression and left a bad aftertaste". The new exhibition, in contrast, had been "organized so that a section on post-war Sino-Japanese friendship came last". Moreover, installations containing wax dolls illustrating the cruel behaviour of Unit 731 and the Japanese military during the Nanjing Atrocity had been removed. Furthermore, "in the final part of the exhibition, new exhibits on post-war relations with Japan, for example Japan's recognition of history including a detailed presentation of the Maruyama statement and a photograph from earlier that year showing Koizumi and Hu Jintao shaking hands are displayed". In conclusion, the official stated that even though some contentious exhibits remained, he thought "the Chinese side had shown consideration towards the Japanese side". This change to the exhibits had been preceded by discussions between representatives of the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministries concerning the content of this and other Chinese war museums. This episode is useful in deepening our understanding of this particular exhibition, but it is also important as a piece of general contextual information as it indicates that the position of the Japanese MOFA is that Chinese war museums should end with sections stressing the positive relations between Japan and China since the war, thereby contextualizing the war as an unfortunate period in bilateral relations that was succeeded by friendship. This belief according implies that such sections have the ability to mitigate any negative impact these exhibitions may have on the image of Japan held by visitors. As discussed earlier, Japanese politicians and the Japanese MOFA have requested that the Chinese government ensure that such material is added to exhibitions dealing with the war.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ These efforts seem to have had some success, as several Chinese museums, for example, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, the 9.18 History Museum, the Ranzhuang Site of Tunnel Warfare and the Pingdingshan Massacre Museum, contain such sections. At the same time, there are also museums that do not have such a section.

As is noted above, towards the end of the exhibition there is a peace and friendship corner that deals briefly with the post-war era. This, the eighth and final section of the exhibition, is labelled “Take history as a mirror Face the future” (以史为鉴面向未来). Here, the normalization of bilateral relations between China and Japan is mentioned and Chinese leaders can be seen shaking hands with their Japanese counterparts. The initial text introducing this part of the exhibition, however, is more about the Chinese than the Japanese:

The Chinese government and people, in order to defend the friendship of the peoples of China and Japan for generations, made great efforts unremittingly and continuously made a new contribution to promoting world peace and development.¹⁵⁵

It is hence stressed that the Chinese government and people have worked hard to improve relations but it is not clear here whether the Japanese side has made similar efforts. Within this section, Japanese apologies for the war are mentioned but, as the above quote hints, the efforts made by the Chinese side are given more emphasis.

In the last section of the exhibition there are also some photographs that are seemingly unrelated to Sino-Japanese relations such as the signing ceremony of China’s accession to the WTO, and Chinese celebrations in 2001 when it was announced that the 2008 Olympics would be held in Beijing. These images, however, illustrate the achievements of the CCP and how far the Chinese nation has come since the war. A quote from the seventh part of the exhibition is useful to understand the function of these images:

The great victory in the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japan became the major turning point when the Chinese nation moved from decline to revitalization.¹⁵⁶

This quote, along with the images illustrating the achievements of the CCP, exemplifies how the nation is created not just in relation to the external other but also in relation to its own past. A different way of putting it is presented in another passage quoted above, according to which the great victory in the war “made the Chinese nation wipe out the century of humiliation and revealed a new image [of China] on the world stage”. It has been shown above how the CCP is presented as having come to the rescue of the nation, united it and led it to victory, at a time when it was threatened with extinction. It was a time of decline. The CCP, according to this narrative, did not just lead the nation to victory in the war but also continued to lead it

Perhaps this difference depends on whether an exhibition has received attention from and been made into a diplomatic issue by the Japanese MOFA.

¹⁵⁵ 中国政府和人民为维护中日两国人民的时代友好进行了不懈努力，为促进世界和平与发展事业不断做出新的贡献。

¹⁵⁶ 中国人民抗日战争的伟大胜利，成为中华民族由衰败走向振兴的重大转折点。

towards revitalization after the turning point. Images illustrating the CCP's achievements also illustrate the revitalization of the nation, a revitalization that is contrasted with the dark times before the CCP unified the nation and led it to victory. It hints at the necessity of CCP rule, thereby legitimizing it.

7.2.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders

The exhibition hall is divided into two main parts. The first, called “A Human Holocaust – An Exhibition of the Historical Facts of the Nanjing Massacre Perpetrated by the Japanese Invaders” (人类的浩劫—侵华日军南京大屠杀史实展), deals with local events while the second, “Victory 1945” (胜利1945) contextualizes the Nanjing Atrocity into a longer story of Japanese militarism, expansion and aggression in China. Of all the many atrocities committed by the Japanese army against China, the Nanjing Massacre is said to be “the most savage and ruthless example”¹⁵⁷ (Zhu & Zhang 2008:249).

The title of the first exhibition draws attention to several noteworthy points. First, the use of the word holocaust in the English title is a reference to the Nazi genocide of Jews in Europe during World War II that could perhaps be interpreted as an attempt to give the Nanjing Atrocity the same status. The Chinese term, *haojie* (浩劫), means “great calamity”. Second, qualifying this term with “human” or “humanity” indicates a wish to present the event as a crime against and disaster suffered by humanity and not just narrowly by the Chinese people. There is therefore a tension here between the narrow national focus implied by the use of compatriot in the name of the museum as a whole, and the more universal connotations of the name of this exhibition. Third, *qinHua Rijun* (侵华日军), “invade-China Japanese-military”, like the title of the museum, draws attention to the perpetrators of the Atrocity, thereby enforcing the suggestion that the aggressor employment is central to the narrative. Fourth, the mention in the title of historical truth (史实), can be seen as a reference to the activities of Japanese revisionists and right-wingers trying to cast doubt on parts of or all the claims about the Atrocity. This reading is enforced by the explicit explanation of the reason the name of the exhibition is engraved in bold letters on an 8-metre high steel plate – the aim being to suggest “ironclad evidence” (Zhu & Zhang 2008:50-52). The title of the second part, Victory 1945, on the other hand, suggests an emphasis on heroism and the act of defeating the enemy rather than the enemy's atrocious behaviour.

¹⁵⁷ 最凶残，最典型的一例。

The name of the museum and the titles of the two exhibitions therefore contain allusions to the three major narrative emplotments – victim, perpetrator and hero. The first of these three emplotments is highlighted in many of the statues that greet the visitor before entering the building in which the exhibition is housed. Outside the gates to the museum grounds, where visitors line up if the museum is crowded, there are a number of statues depicting victims. The emphasis here is on civilian victims, and most of the statues depict what might be labelled prototypical victims such as old people, women and children. While the statues show victims, the text at the base draws attention to the perpetrators. These perpetrators are described, or evaluated, in quotation marks as “devils” (恶魔) and “beasts” (禽兽). For example, it is written that it is from “the devils’ bloody smell” (恶魔的血腥) that the 80-year old mother is told to quickly run. Descriptions at Chinese museums in which Japanese soldiers are referred to as “devils” and “bandits” are quite rare. It seems that such labelling is regarded as breaching the rules for “objective” description.¹⁵⁸ The use of quotation marks, however, could be interpreted as a way of circumventing these rules. Texts that purport to simply describe will avoid such language, but it can be used in quotes. Another important aspect of these sculptures and the quotes inscribed on their bases is that they contain the feelings of grief and anger felt by those who have lost their loved ones. Several kinds of human relationship are represented here – grandfather and grandchild, mother and child, husband and wife. A baby is sucking on a dead mother’s breast. A grandfather carries a dead grandchild. A 13-year old boy is carrying his dead grandmother. The largest sculpture, located furthest from the entrance, represents a mother standing facing the sky, holding a dead child. The texts read: “Family ruined”;¹⁵⁹ “The son killed never comes to life again”;¹⁶⁰ “The husband buried alive never comes to life again”;¹⁶¹ and “Suffering and sorrow left behind the wife raped by the devils”.¹⁶² This way of stressing blood relationships, or relational identity based on kinship (cf. Van Leeuwen 1996:56), arguably evokes emotion and increases the likelihood of identification with the victims. The victims are all civilians – none of them are soldiers. As is the case with more or less all sculptures on the grounds of the memorial hall, these all show the Chinese victims, not the Japanese perpetrators. The victim emplotment is further stressed by large captions at several places on the walls within the grounds that read “victims 300,000” in sev-

¹⁵⁸ As is mentioned in chapter 5, some Japanese people have criticized such descriptions.

¹⁵⁹ 家破人亡。

¹⁶⁰ 被杀害的儿子永不再生。

¹⁶¹ 被活埋的丈夫永不再生。

¹⁶² 悲苦留给了被恶魔强暴了的妻。

eral languages. Towards the end of what is called the Peace Park, however, a sculpture shows a Chinese man standing victoriously with his foot on the head of a Japanese soldier in front of the “Wall of Victory”. The peace park, then, ends with a reference to the hero rather than the victim emplotment. Furthermore, as Callahan has pointed out, peace, as understood here, “is intimately tied to military strength” (Callahan 2010:178).

Like the museum in Beijing, the one in Nanjing is divided into a number of sections that all begin with an introductory text. Before discussing the introductory texts per se, I briefly discuss what is highlighted by virtue of being included in the headings of these main texts. All these headings are listed below. Since the names of the two exhibitions are discussed above, they are not dealt with here.

The Nanjing Massacre (南京大屠杀)

Prologue (前言)

1. The Situation in China before the Downfall of Nanjing (南京沦陷前的中国形势)
2. Japanese Troops Attack Nanjing from Shanghai (日军从上海攻向南京)
3. The Assault on Nanjing by Japanese Troops and the Defence of Nanjing by the Chinese Defence Army (日军入侵南京与中国守军南京保卫战)
4. The Nanjing Massacre Committed by Japanese Troops (日军在南京的大屠杀)
5. Rape and Looting in Nanjing Committed by the Japanese Troops (日军在南京的奸淫与掠夺)
6. Setting Fires and the Destruction of Nanjing Committed by Japanese Troops (日军在南京的焚烧与破坏)
7. Nanjing’s Unsafe International Safety Zone (国际安全区不安全)
8. Destruction of the Victim’s Corpses by Japanese Troops Versus the Burial of Corpses by Charities (日军毁尸灭迹与慈善团体掩埋一体)
9. The Trial of the Japanese War Criminals who launched the Nanjing Massacre (对制造南京大屠杀的日本战犯审判)
10. Historical Witnesses to the Nanjing Massacre (南京大屠杀的历史见证)
11. Past Experience, if not Forgotten, Serving as a Guide for the Future (前事不忘后事之师)

Epilogue (结束语)

Prologue (前言)

1. The Atrocities Committed by the Japanese Army (日军侵华暴行)
2. 14-Year Long Fierce Anti-Japanese War (14年艰苦抗战)
3. Victorious Acceptance of Japan’s Surrender (胜利大受降)
4. Trials of Justice (正义的审判)
5. Cherish Peace and Create a Better Future (珍爱和平开创未来)

Epilogue (结束语)

Numerous headings draw attention to Japan, and especially the Japanese military, either as a participant performing an action or mentioned in a way that assigns responsibility in a less direct way. The Japanese military (日军) is mentioned in seven headings. That the Japanese military is mentioned seven times in headings and always initially indicates the centrality of this participant in the overall narrative of the exhibition. In these headings, the Japanese mili-

tary attacks Nanjing (from Shanghai), it invades (入侵) Nanjing, it is responsible for the massacre, rape, looting, arson, destruction and destroying corpses and the evidence, for atrocities as well. In other words, the headings draw attention to the Japanese military and its crimes.

Table 7.4 Participants, in main and subordinate clauses (Numbers indicate number of mentions)

	Actors in exhibition 1	Patients in exhibition 1	Actors in exhibition 2	Patients in exhibition 2
Chinese participants ¹⁶³	3	3	9	2
Other Chinese participants (whose Chinese-ness is not explicated) ¹⁶⁴		5	4	2
The GMD government	1			
Chinese military participants ¹⁶⁵	1	2	1	
Patriotic participants ¹⁶⁶			2	
Taiwan			1	
Japanese military participants ¹⁶⁷	18	2	1	
Japanese militarism	2		2	
Japanese participants ¹⁶⁸	3	1	4	1
Japanese participants (whose Japanese-ness is not explicated) ¹⁶⁹			1	1
Japanese war criminals				3
Other participants ¹⁷⁰	9		6	
Total	37	13	31	9

Table 7.4 illustrates some of the differences between the two exhibitions. Obviously, while the Japanese out-group clearly plays a larger role in the first exhibition than in the second, the Chinese in-group plays a larger role in the second exhibition than in the first. At the same time, it should be noted that in the second exhibition there is one sentence (discussed below) that includes seven actors that basically perform the same action. In general, however, it is much more common for one actor to perform several actions. Moreover, it should be noted that while the out-group is represented as an actor relatively few times in the second exhibition, the first part of this exhibition, “The atrocities committed by the Japanese Army” (日军侵华暴行), is more extensive than the other parts.¹⁷¹ Just as in the headings discussed above, the Japanese military is by far the most commonly mentioned actor in these texts. If one were

¹⁶³ For example “China”, “the Chinese people” and “the Chinese government”.

¹⁶⁴ For example “innocent people”, “anti-Japanese groups”, “all circles of society” (社会各界) and “the country” (国家).

¹⁶⁵ “The Chinese defense army” (中国守军) and “the Chinese expeditionary force” (中国远征军).

¹⁶⁶ “Patriots of all social classes (社会各阶层爱国人士) and “patriots abroad” (海外侨胞).

¹⁶⁷ For example “the Japanese military” and “the Japanese army that invaded China” (侵华日军).

¹⁶⁸ For example “Japan”, “the Japanese people” (日本国民, 日本人民) and “Japanese media” (日本媒体).

¹⁶⁹ “Militarist thinking” (军国主义思想), “war criminals” (战犯).

¹⁷⁰ For example “the allied countries” (盟国), “charity groups” (慈善团体) and different “military tribunals” (远东国际军事法庭, 南京审判战犯军事法庭, 中华人民共和国最高人民法院特别军事法庭).

¹⁷¹ This is demonstrated in that in the book on the exhibition, this part takes up 17 pages whereas the second and third parts are both given seven pages, the fourth three pages and the fifth six pages.

to include the headings in the list of actors above, the relative prominence of the Japanese military as an actor would become even clearer.

Again, it has to be stressed that the frequency with which a participant is mentioned does not provide a sufficient basis for drawing far-reaching conclusions about the depiction of that participant. It is also necessary to investigate what actions participants conduct and how these actions as well as the participants are predicated and described. The list of participants above does, however, provide some indications. To start with, participants that are mentioned in many instances can be assumed to play an important role in the narrative. Participants not mentioned, or only mentioned once or twice, can be assumed not to play a major role or to not play a role at all in the narrative. However, that certain participants are mentioned many times does not tell us much about what these participants do in the narrative and how they are depicted. In other words, an analysis that takes account of how participants are depicted as performing actions is crucial. The discussion below illustrates through examples how the actors mentioned are depicted.

The actions of the Chinese participants are quite diverse in nature. This contrasts with the actions of the Japanese participants, which are all rather similar. The actions performed by Japanese participants all have negative connotations. At the same time as these acts are inherently negative they are also often predicated in a way that stresses their severity. The word “wantonly” (大肆) is one of the most common predications. The massacre is described as both “planned” and “conducted frenziedly”. The perpetrators, in other words, were both calculating and wild. The following sentence exemplifies how the Japanese enemy is depicted:

The Nanjing (great) massacre was committed by the Japanese invaders who openly violated international treaties and the basic moral principles of humanity. For six weeks from December 1937 to January 1938, [Japanese] soldiers were set loose on a rampage and massacred innocent persons through barbaric and cruel means, as well as advancing side-by-side committing deeds such as rape, plunder, arson and destruction [of the city].¹⁷²

The example above, taken from the first introductory text of the exhibition, labelled “The Nanjing Massacre”, is important as it condemns the Japanese military’s actions not just for violating international treaties but also, and more importantly, for violating the basic moral principles of humanity. As is demonstrated below, Chinese actions are described as exemplifying moral behaviour, for example in the magnanimous treatment of Japanese war criminals. Negative other-representations such as the one above, according to which Japanese actions

are described as breaching “basic moral principles” exemplify a negative strategy of teaching desired values. Whereas the Chinese participants in the narrative exemplify and embody “good” and “moral” behaviour, the kind of behaviour Chinese citizens should embrace and act in accordance with, the Japanese participants epitomize immorality – they function as negative examples (Gustafsson 2010a). The excerpt above includes a number of predicates that contribute to creating a very strong image of the cruelty of the aggressor. Not only do the perpetrators commit a number of appalling deeds, they do so for six whole weeks. Furthermore, the victims were innocent and the means through which the victims were massacred were both barbaric and cruel. Describing these means as barbaric is of course in line with the claim concerning the Japanese military’s violations of the basic moral principles of humanity. In the narrative at the Nanjing museum, the higher moral ground is claimed for China in relation to Japan just as it is at the Shenyang and Beijing museums discussed above.

There are also other participants in the narrative, such as, for example, the war tribunals, the International War Tribunal for the Far East and the Nanjing War Crimes Military Tribunal. The tribunals function in the narrative mainly to corroborate the claims of the exhibition – the “ironclad proof” (铁证) mentioned above. Foreign personages also appear in the narrative. They perform actions such as condemning (with indignation) the Japanese military as a “gang of beasts”. This is another example of how quotes are used to evaluate participants in terms of good and bad.

Table 7.4 provides some clues about who the main actors are. It also supplies information about who the main actors are not. Compared with the Beijing museum, one striking difference is the absence of the CCP. Nanjing was the GMD’s capital until it moved to Chongqing just before the assault on Nanjing. The soldiers who defended the city, described here as the Chinese defence forces, belonged to the GMD’s army. However, the category stressed is the national, as is indicated by the choice of terms for reference of participants – actors as well as patients. The Nationalist government is said to have moved the capital to Chongqing but apart from this reference the we-group is constructed in inclusive nationalist terms. The blurring of domestic agency is accompanied by selectivity in the information given. This selectivity is in accordance with the strategy of positive self-representation. Details about the death sentences handed down to Japanese war criminals by the Nanjing War

¹⁷²南京大屠杀是侵华日军公然违反国际条约和人类基本道德准则，于1937年12月至1938年1月的六周内，在南京纵兵屠杀无辜，手段野蛮残忍，且奸淫，掠夺，焚烧和破坏并举。

Crimes Tribunal, held by the GMD, are excluded, while the leniency of the trials held by the CCP in 1956 are explicitly stressed as a sign of Chinese magnanimity:

From June to July 1956, the People's Republic of China's Highest People's Special Military Court brought Japanese war criminals to trial in Shenyang and Taiyuan. It only meted out punishment (and no death sentences) to a small number of war criminals. By April 1964, the more than 1000 war criminals had all been set free and [allowed to] return to Japan. That the Chinese government miraculously reformed more than 1000 war criminals into anti-war, peace-loving personages was a miracle in human history.¹⁷³

It would of course have been possible to mention the executions and ascribe responsibility to the GMD government and still portray the CCP as magnanimous. Had the narrative been based on a strategy meant to differentiate between the CCP and the GMD the obfuscation of agency and exclusion of information mentioned above would not have been necessary. However, since the category stressed is the national one, it is crucial to avoid making, or at least to downplay, such distinctions. The positive self-representation is a representation of the Chinese nation as a whole. Other actors belonging to the in-group are described in the second exhibition as conducting heroic actions such as achieving victory in the War of Resistance against the Japanese.

The depiction of patients is also illustrated in some of the sample sentences above. This in itself points to how descriptions of agents and patients, as well as perpetrators and victims, often go hand in hand. This is also the case in the example given below which elucidates how Chinese patients are represented:

After the Japanese military occupied Nanjing, it used military power to force "China into subjugation through fear", tried in vain to attain the objective of destroying China, promptly set soldiers loose on a rampage to massacre innocents, created extreme terror, launched a planned large-scale massacre. Innocent common people and Chinese soldiers who had laid down their arms were tragically killed by the Japanese military, 190,000 in mass shootings, more than 150,000 were killed in scattered massacres. These corpses were buried by charities, the total number of victims reached more than 300,000.¹⁷⁴

In all the cases in both parts of the exhibition when a participant belonging to the in-group figures in the role of patient this is as a victim of aggression, massacre or disaster. While the actions that patients in the in-group are subjected to victimize them, for the out-group the case is different. For example, war criminals are punished by the tribunals even though it is said that they were given lenient punishment and then set free in a gesture of magnanimity by the

¹⁷³1956年6月至7月，中华人民共和国最高人民法院特别军事法庭在沈阳和太原两地审判日本战犯，只对少数战犯处以刑法（没有一例死刑），至1964年4月，1000多名战犯全部被释放回日本，中国政府传奇般地把上千名战犯改造成了反战的和平人士，创造了人类的奇迹。

Chinese government. The depiction of Japanese patients, in other words, sometimes functions as positive self-representation, presenting Chinese participants in a positive light by concentrating on their “good” actions in relation to Japanese participants, the negative depiction of whom further accentuates the magnanimity of the Chinese participants. Towards the end of the exhibition, there is one instance in which the Japanese people are said to have suffered from the disaster of the war. This, however, is the only case in which a Japanese patient is depicted as a victim.

In the first exhibition, there are two large installations that are clearly based on the victimhood emplotment. The first is the preface hall at the beginning of the exhibition. The room is dark and solemn with a text saying “victims 300,000” in white floating on the ceiling. The names of victims are written on the walls to the left and right. Below the wall at the far end of the room, a white marble altar with a red flame is meant to symbolize a memorial ceremony for the victims. The wall above the altar is decorated with a wreath of about 2 metres in diameter. The photograph of a victim is displayed within the wreath changes every 12 seconds. This 12-second interval symbolizes 300,000 victims in a six-week period. The wreath is surrounded by running water, created using multimedia image-making techniques, to represent the river Changjiang, which floats through Nanjing, thereby memorializing the victims who were thrown into the river. Smaller photographs of victims float out of the water. The surging river water and the accompanying sound of a bell enhance the sombre mood of the room.

Similarly, at the end of the first exhibition, there is another installation that soberly calls attention to the victims. The installation consists of two high walls decorated with photographs of victims. The sound of a clock ticking is heard and every 12 seconds a drop of water falls making a loud echoing sound. Each time a drop falls, a lamp illuminates a photograph of a different victim. In both these installations, the victims are shown in portrait photographs as they looked when they were alive, thus focusing on the victims themselves rather than on those who killed them and the atrocity in which they were murdered. They are hence humanized in a way that increases the likelihood that visitors will identify with them. This exemplifies how the victim emplotment can be emphasized without a simultaneous reference to the aggressor emplotment.

¹⁷⁴日军占领南京后，为用武力迫使“中国畏服”，妄图达到三个月灭亡中国的目的，及纵兵屠杀无辜，制造极端恐怖，开展了有计划的大规模屠杀，无辜平民以及放下武器的中国军人惨遭，日军集体射杀有十九万余人；遭日军零散屠杀，其尸体经慈善机关掩埋有十五万余具，被害总数达三十万人以上。

Portrait photographs can be found throughout the exhibition. These photographs often show eyewitnesses and accompany their stories. There are also more in-depth accounts focusing on historical figures and the terrible plight of the victims. As was the case with the sculptures outside the museum, discussed above, these stories often involve the murder and/or rape of close family members. Foreign witnesses are portrayed in a similar way – with photographs accompanied by their eyewitness accounts, sometimes labelled “historical figures”. One difference, however, is that the foreigners are portrayed not as victims, but as heroes. It is mentioned that several of these foreigners were awarded medals by the Chinese GMD government for helping the Chinese in Nanjing. The American Minnie Vautrin, who protected 10,000 refugees, including 9000 women and children, is even described as a goddess. Other historical figures include the Chinese judge at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Mei Ruao, Azuma Shirô, who participated in the Nanjing Atrocity as a Japanese soldier and in 1987 published his wartime diary, which included his account of the Atrocity, and Iris Chang, the Chinese American journalist and writer whose bestselling book *The Rape of Nanking* gave much attention to the Atrocity in the USA and elsewhere.

Photographs of civilians trying to avoid air raids and fleeing the city can also be found in the exhibition. The Chinese generals who participated in the battle to defend Nanjing that preceded the Atrocity are also labelled historical figures. A reading of the descriptions of 12 generals, however, reveals that only one of them died in Nanjing. Most of them died in Taiwan long after the war had ended. Elsewhere, martyrs (烈士) who died in the battle are remembered as heroes (Zhu & Zhang 2008:85). However, nowhere is it mentioned that the General appointed to defend Nanjing after the GMD had moved its capital to Chongqing, Tang Shengzhi, fled the scene and left his troops disorganized. Nonetheless, that 11 of 12 generals died long after the battle to defend Nanjing was over suggests that a story other than the one being told is hidden there – a story in which those who fled the city were those who had the means to do so and those who were left behind had nowhere to go. It is a story about class that sits uneasily with interpretations in which the experiences of certain groups are denied as victimhood is appropriated for the nation. It suggests that it is possible to stress identity categories other than the national. Of course, the suffering of specific individuals rather than just the suffering of the nation are the focus of the stories told by the historical figures, but we learn little about these victims other than their terrible fate. They are first and foremost compatriots.

Portraits of soldiers and generals belonging to the invading Japanese army can also be found in the exhibition. However, they are never labelled historical figures, an epithet seemingly reserved for the “good guys”. Several of the Japanese generals are described in these portraits as the chief criminals (罪魁祸首) of the Atrocity. However, seldom is any additional information given about the Japanese perpetrators. They become known to the visitor through their acts – it is their acts that define them. They are shown in photographs as they lead away Chinese to execution grounds or as they carry out the executions. In one sensational exhibit, a large oil painting, two Japanese soldiers stand seemingly unaffected holding their bloodstained swords in front of what is perhaps best described as a small hill consisting of the corpses of victims. Many of the victims have their hands tied behind their backs. On top of the hill of bodies, a small child can be seen screaming. The painting has been added to the exhibition, it is said, to increase the power to shock (震撼力) of the historical facts of the exhibition. Agency in images is most clearly expressed in the photographs that show Japanese soldiers as they execute Chinese. In some photographs agency is explicit as they show Japanese soldiers in the moment of executing Chinese. In other cases, agency is implied, as in the oil painting mentioned above. Some photographs show corpses without the perpetrators present in the images. In such cases, agency is less direct but is still expressed in captions or in the overall context in which these images appear. Captions and texts are present in abundance throughout the exhibition. The texts that precede each section of the exhibition are analysed below.

Like the Beijing museum and some other Chinese museums dealing with the War of Resistance, towards the end of the second exhibition there is what could be called a “friendship corner”. This corner is comparatively small and might more suitably be labelled a “friendship wall”. On this wall, the four great leaders of the PRC – Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu – can each be seen in photographs with a Japanese prime minister. The normalization of relations, the signing of the treaty of peace and friendship, the issuing of a China-Japan joint declaration and joint statements are mentioned along with a panel on economic and cultural exchange, people’s diplomacy and a text with the title “past experience, if not forgotten, serving as a guide for the future”. This, according to the CCP, is what Sino-Japanese relations should be based on. There is also a small panel dealing with Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the PRC. As the discussion in chapter 6 indicates, such friendship corners have been constructed, it appears, at the request of the Japanese MOFA. The MOFA’s efforts

have been spurred by repeated requests in the Japanese Diet that it do something about Chinese exhibits. Such discussions have often specifically targeted the Nanjing museum.¹⁷⁵ Groups consisting of conservative politicians and academics have also made efforts to change exhibits at the museum.¹⁷⁶

The Japanese consul in Shanghai is said to have pointed out some questionable elements in the exhibition in Nanjing to the vice director of the museum during a visit in 2005. During the autumn of 2007, ministerial parliamentary secretaries, MOFA officials and the ambassador are said to have met and negotiated over the arrangements in the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall a total of 13 times. The Chinese side allegedly responded that the theme of the new exhibition is peace, that the contents are based on historical facts and that there is thus no need for concern on behalf of the Japanese side. What were described as three “improper” photographs are said to have been removed (Hiranuma 2009:2-3). It appears that the results of these talks were not entirely satisfactory for the Japanese side since the consul in Shanghai launched a protest after the museum reopened in December 2007 according to which the exhibits were “unbalanced” and did not sufficiently deal with the friendly relations established after bilateral relations were normalized (Kato 2008). This specific contextual information is important as it shows that some of the changes that were made to the exhibition were done to please the Japanese side. Since the consul was not entirely pleased with the results, however, it is likely that additional attempts to influence the content of the exhibition will be made.

¹⁷⁵ For example, on 17 March 2008, during the 169th Diet, LDP lawmaker Kanô Tokio mentioned that according to a public opinion poll about images of Japan among Chinese taken in the autumn of 2007, many Chinese associated Japan with the Nanjing Atrocity and Japanese aggression during the war. He connected this to exhibitions such as the one in Nanjing and wondered what effect exhibits portraying Japanese as cruel will have on Sino-Japanese friendship.

¹⁷⁶ In March 2009, the Citizens’ society for removing improper photographs from China’s anti-Japanese memorial halls (an association consisting of conservative politicians and academics) released a book about these memorials. On its website, the society claims that at anti-Japanese memorial halls around China, photographs that have not been subjected to any examination concerning their truthfulness are being used in anti-Japanese education for political purposes. To leave such exhibits alone is described as broadening a mistaken historical awareness and amounts to a degradation of Japanese honour. The group therefore demands that photographs exhibited despite “a lack of insufficient evidence concerning their authenticity” be removed. The group’s political connections are illustrated by their cooperation with the Diet member’s society for removing improper photographs from China’s anti-Japanese memorial halls, which consists almost entirely of LDP members (Motomeru kai 2008). Hiranuma Takeo is the head of the Diet group and author of a book published by the society. In the book, some of the group’s activities and accomplishments are mentioned. In addition, the efforts by “our country” and China’s responses are summarized. In the autumn of 2008, the society held a symposium about problems related to Chinese exhibitions. At the symposium, complete agreement was reached that what is most important is to protect the honour of the homeland (Hiranuma 2009:134). This purpose is even mentioned on the cover page of the book.

7.2.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster

Because of the sheer size of the museum cluster, which is more like a theme park of museums than a regular museum, when analysing the narratives it is necessary to make a limited selection of textual material to be analysed. Prominent textual elements along with other prominent exhibits are therefore analysed. Five halls have been finished and two are still under construction. The names of the museum halls highlights the participant-centred logic according to which the Museum Cluster has been designed. The War of Resistance series consists of the following museums:

The Hall of the Core (or mainstay) of the Resistance, also The Hall of the CCP anti-Japanese Army (抗战文物陈列中流砥柱馆, 中国共产党抗日军队馆)

The Hall of the Frontal Battlefield, also the Hall of GMD anti-Japanese Army (抗战文物陈列正面战场馆, 中国国民党抗日军队馆)

The Hall of the Sichuan Army in the War of Resistance (抗战文物陈列川军抗战馆)

The Hall of Unyielding Chinese Prisoners of War (抗战文物陈列不屈战俘馆)

The Hall of the Heroes of the “Flying Tigers”, also The Hall of the American Military that helped China, (抗战文物陈列飞虎奇兵馆, 援华美军馆)

The Hall of the Japanese Invader (or Aggressor) Army (侵华日军馆) (under construction)

The Hall of the Quisling Army’s Infamous Acts, also The Hall of the Traitors (to the Han) (伪军丑行馆, 汉奸馆) (under construction)

Some of the halls have two names. It is notable that all halls have names that explicitly mention a participant – we are dealing with the halls of the CCP, the GMD, the Sichuan Army, the Chinese POWs, the “Flying Tigers”, and the Japanese Invader Army and Chinese Traitors.

The Hall of the Core of the Resistance

Close to the entrance to the Hall of the Core (or mainstay) of the Resistance, the lyrics of the national anthem of the PRC are written on a wall:

Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves! With our flesh let us build our new Great Wall. The Chinese people have reached the moment of greatest danger; each of us is forced to let out a final roar. Arise! Arise! Arise! Ten thousand people with one heart, together let us brave the enemy’s cannon fire, forward! Let us brave the enemy’s cannon fire, forward! Forward! Forward!¹⁷⁷

The song, “The March of the Volunteers”, was originally written in 1935 as a movie theme for the patriotic film *Children of the Storm* (风云儿女), dealing with anti-Japanese resistance. The song was not just part of the effort to mobilize the Chinese people during the War of Resistance after the war broke out in 1937, but was also sung in 1935 by students protesting

against Japanese activities in north-eastern China and the lack of resistance by the GMD government. This and many other patriotic songs were important to the mobilization efforts during the war (Chi 2007:217-42, Hung 1996:901-29).

Just inside the Hall there is a large pillar. The part of the name of the hall translated as “mainstay” (中流砥柱) is a proverb, the literal meaning of which is closer to “stone pillar in the middle of a torrent”. The pillar at the museum is said to “symbolize that the anti-Japanese military strength of the Chinese Communist Party and other leaders were the stone pillar in the middle of a torrent of the whole nation’s anti-Japanese War of Resistance”¹⁷⁸. The CCP is also described as the “backbone of the nation” (民族的脊梁), rescuing the people and the country at a time when “national calamity was right overhead” (国难当头). It is also made clear that the united front against the Japanese invaders between the CCP and the GMD was created at the initiative of the CCP.

The hall emphasizes the role of the CCP throughout the exhibition. For example, the communist leaders, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, are shown in large photographs and praised in written material. In addition, songs, in this case the songs of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, are displayed complete with notes. Songs played an important role in mobilizing the masses, especially since many were unable to read and hence could not be mobilized through the use of written propaganda.¹⁷⁹ Heroic resistance and military victory is the theme, leaving out Japanese atrocities.

Table 7.5 Participants in the narrative of the Hall of the Core of the Resistance

	Actor	Patient
The Chinese Communist Party and the CCP Leaders	13	
Military actors led by or closely related to the CCP ¹⁸⁰	11	1
The military and the people	8	1
The masses	2	3
The families and sons and daughters of soldiers	2	
The Chinese nation	1	
The GMD and the Military Committee of the GMD	2	
Puppet troops		1
Civilian Japanese (A little Japanese girl and her sister)	1	2
The Japanese aggressors	1	3
The Japanese Military, the enemy	1	3
Total	42	14

¹⁷⁷ 起来！不愿做奴隶的人们，把我们的血肉筑成我们新的长城。中华民族到了最危险的时候，每个人被迫着发出最后的吼声。起来！起来！起来！我们万众一心冒着敌人的炮火，前进！冒着敌人的炮火，前进！前进！前进！进！

¹⁷⁸ 象征着中国共产党及其领导的抗日武装力量是全民族抗战的中流砥柱。

¹⁷⁹ For more on the CCP’s use of songs for mobilizing the masses, see Hung 1996:901-22.

¹⁸⁰ The Armed Forces under the leadership of the CCP, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, guerrilla troops.

The textual material analysed comprises 58 sentences in which 42 actors and 14 patients appear. What is striking about the sentences is that they are very long and that agents, especially the CCP, often perform several actions in one sentence. As for the patients in the narrative, all Chinese patients except the “puppet troops” figure as patients in that they are led by or rescued by the CCP. Hence, there is little emphasis on the Chinese as victims. The civilian Japanese are also rescued by soldiers belonging to the CCP’s Eighth Route Army. The only patients who are violently acted on are the Japanese military and the puppet troops. The “military” mentioned in the construction “the military and the people” are troops affiliated with the CCP. The reason that the phrase “the military and people” is used as a noun in this way is that they are described as being “like fish and water” (鱼水情) and hence as having acted in concert. The Japanese military (and aggressor) only appears as an actor twice, once when it “divides its troops to attack Taiyuan” and once when it “carried out cruel mop-up operations and the ‘burn all, kill all, loot all’ policy”. In other words, there is little emphasis on the aggressor employment. The heroic employment, on the other hand, is strongly stressed throughout the exhibition. All kinds of achievements are emphasized of the CCP and its armies, including the military and the people led by the CCP. For example, the CCP “mobilized the masses” and “promoted culture and education”, and the masses “killed and wounded the enemy and wiped out aggressors”. The epilogue of the exhibition summarizes the achievements of the CCP:

In the 8-year War of Resistance, the troops of the Chinese Communist Party fought the enemy more than 125,000 times, extinguished more than 527,000 people belonging to the Japanese military, more than 1 180,000 puppet troops and in all liberated more than 150 cities larger than counties. [It] made a tremendous contribution and a tremendous sacrifice for the War of Resistance. During the 8-year War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party trained its own troops, won the support and backing of a great many people, to finally seize the victory in the people’s war of liberation and laid down a solid foundation for the New China. Today, the Chinese Communist Party again leads people of the whole country on a new journey in order to realize the great revival of the Chinese nation.¹⁸¹

The CCP’s heroic achievements in leading the War of Resistance are linked to its current role in leading the Chinese nation to realize its “great revival”. The interpretation of the narrative can hence be regarded as not just celebrating the leadership of the CCP in the past but also supporting it in the present.

¹⁸¹抗战八年，共产党军队对敌作战 12.5 万余次，消灭日军 52.7 万余人，伪军 118 万余人，共解放县以上城市 150 余座。为抗战作出了巨大贡献，也付出了巨大牺牲。经过八年抗战，共产党锻炼了自己的队伍，赢得了广大人民的拥护与支持，为最终夺取人民解放战争的胜利，建立新中国打下了坚实的基础！今天，中国共产党又带领全国人民为实现中华民族伟大复兴而走在新的征程上！

The Hall of the Frontal Battlefield

In the hall of the Frontal Battlefield or Hall of the GMD anti-Japanese Army, as the name suggests, the GMD's contribution is praised. The foreword to the exhibition stresses unity – the War of Resistance was fought under the United Front, which was advocated by the CCP, and brought together not only the CCP and the GMD but also all social classes and all the Chinese nationalities:

The Chinese nation's War of Resistance against Japan was a war of national liberation under the banner of the anti-Japanese national united front proposed by the Chinese Communist Party and based on co-operation between the CCP and GMD, in which all circles – industry, agriculture, academia and the military, the people of all nationalities, all democratic parties and all classes participated.¹⁸²

The national category is hence stressed in that everyone united as members of the same nation for a common purpose. The national category is also stressed through the wording used to label participants. The terms “our military” (我军) and “our side” (我方) make it obvious which participants visitors (at least Chinese visitors) are supposed to identify with. This is underscored in that in some instances the Japanese military is labelled “enemy military” (敌军). It is notable that the war is described as a “war of national liberation” (民族解放战争), whereas usually the civil war between the CCP and GMD between 1945 and 1949 is labelled the War of Liberation (解放战争) in the PRC. The foreword explains that the war was fought in two battlefields – while the CCP conducted a guerrilla war behind enemy lines, the GMD fought a conventional frontal war.

¹⁸²中华民族的抗日战争，是在中国中产党倡导的抗日民族统一战线旗帜下，以国共合作为基础工农学兵各界，各族人民，各民主党派，社会各阶层广泛参加的一次民族解放战争。

Table 7.6 Participants in the narrative of the Hall of the Frontal Battlefield

	Agents	Patients
Chinese (GMD) military participants (except “our military”)	46	5
“Our military” (and “our side”)	10	2
GMD government participants ¹⁸³	10	2
The GMD and CCP and troops led by the GMD and CCP	3	
CCP participants ¹⁸⁴	3	
The north-eastern people	1	
China	2	
Both sides	2	
Japan	3	2
Japanese military participants (except “aggressors”) ¹⁸⁵	47	20
(Japanese) aggressors		2
The enemy and the enemy military		4
The Puppet Army	1	
Other participants ¹⁸⁶	4	
Total	132	37

The exhibition is divided into three main sections. The first deals with the origins of the war treating events leading up to the outbreak of full-scale war on 7 July 1937. The 22 main campaigns or battles fought by the GMD are dealt with in the second part. The third section, which is quite small compared to the previous two, deals with the Chinese air force. The textual material analysed is quite extensive and consists of 146 (often long) sentences. The Japanese and the Chinese (GMD) militaries (sometimes labelled “our military”) both occupy the role of actor a very large number of times, reflecting the focus on military operations and battles. This can also be seen in the almost total absence of non-military/government participants, the “north-eastern people” being the sole exception to this. It is also significant that the Japanese military participants figure in the role of patient considerably more often than their Chinese counterparts. Even though in a few cases the Japanese military is labelled “aggressor” (侵略者), aggressive acts are almost entirely excluded. Furthermore, those being acted on – the patients in the narrative – are not depicted as victims. The victim employment is almost completely missing and the aggressor employment is not emphasized. Instead, the heroic employment is central to the narrative. This is apparent in how the battles, in which the GMD troops took part, are described.

The descriptions of the battles usually follow the same pattern. The Japanese military usually gathers a large number of troops and attacks a city or an area. It seldom attacks other participants. The Chinese military gathers troops and resists or launches a counter-

¹⁸³ For example “GMD”, “GMD government” and specific leaders such as “Chiang Kai-shek”.

¹⁸⁴ “The CCP” and “the Eighth Route Army”.

¹⁸⁵ “The Japanese military” and “Japanese spies” (日本特务).

attack on the Japanese military. The Chinese military often acts on a participant, the participant being the Japanese military. The achievements of the GMD military are mentioned in terms of the number of the enemy killed, the enemy planes or boats destroyed and how the battle delayed the Japanese military's advance or shattered its plans. In other words, the positive results of battles, some of which were lost, are stressed in this heroic depiction of the GMD military. The number of Chinese casualties is also given. Casualties are sometimes referred to differently depending on whether they belong to "the enemy army" or "our army". Enemy deaths are referred to using the term *bi* (毙), which contains a meaning of contempt when used for humans. For "our army" the more neutral *wang* (亡) is always used whereas it is only sometimes employed when dealing with the Japanese military. Here, as in several other exhibitions, the way in which killing is understood is noteworthy – it is an achievement when the enemy is killed whereas when the enemy kills it is an act of aggression. In other words, no universal principle against killing is referred or alluded to. This way of understanding the act of killing needs to be based on an understanding of self and other as moral and immoral, as good and bad. The description of the first battle of Changsha is quite typical:

The Japanese military's 11th Army concentrated 100,000 troops under the command of General Okamura Yasuji, adopted a tactic of quick attack and attacked Changsha. The Chinese 9th War Zone acting General Xue Yue commanded the 16 armies and more than 30 divisions consisting of about 400,000 troops and adopted a war tactic of resistance by luring the enemy deep in one by one and eliminated the advancing Japanese military in the vicinity of Changsha. In this battle, the Chinese troops killed and captured altogether more than 20,000 Japanese troops, blew up more than 20 Japanese military planes and shattered the Japanese military's scheme to eliminate the main force of the 9th War Zone. In the battle, the casualties of the Chinese armed forces exceeded 30,000.¹⁸⁷

Images and objects draw attention to the main participants – the GMD troops – even though this is an exhibition that is dominated by text. There are no concluding comments. Instead, there is a wall on which is a large number of names of "anti-Japanese martyrs" (抗日烈士), underscoring the heroic plotment which dominates the exhibition. There is no explicit interpretation of the narrative. The foreword, however, ends with the following two sentences, in the first of which the actions of all Chinese participants in the war are depicted as expressing the "spirit of the Chinese nation". In the second sentence, "the spirit of the patriotic GMD soldiers" is praised:

¹⁸⁶ "The UK", "the USA", "the Soviet Union".

¹⁸⁷ 日军第11军集中10万兵力，在司令官冈村宁次指挥下，采取奔袭攻击的方针，进攻长沙。中国第9战区代司令长官薛岳指挥16个军30多个师约40万人的兵力，采取逐次抵抗诱敌深入的作战方针，在长沙附近消灭进攻的日军。此役，中国军队共毙俘日军2万余人，炸毁日军飞机20余架，粉碎了日军消灭第9战区主力的企图。作战中，中国军队伤亡3万余人。

The frontal War of Resistance, the War of Resistance in base areas behind enemy lines and the spontaneous anti-Japanese struggle by the masses all gave expression to the Chinese nation's unyielding spirit of resisting foreign humiliation. The spirit of those patriotic GMD soldiers who bravely sacrificed themselves for the country on the frontal battlefield for the independence of the nation still make people respect them endlessly.¹⁸⁸

Through predication, the heroism of the soldiers (who bravely sacrificed themselves) and the “unyielding spirit” of the Chinese nation are emphasized. The soldiers of the GMD, furthermore, are described as still making “people respect them endlessly”. They are respected because they were patriotic and willing to sacrifice themselves for the nation, thereby becoming martyrs. This emphasis on the contribution to the nation is similar to how regional actors are depicted as contributing to the nation in the narrative at the 9.18 History Museum. This kind of patriotic behaviour is portrayed as desirable. In order to be equally patriotic Chinese people are implicitly encouraged to act in accordance with this spirit of self-sacrifice for the nation.

The Hall of the Sichuan Army in the War of Resistance

The hall, as the name suggests, highlights the role of the Sichuan Army in the Chinese war effort. The categories constructed are both regional (Sichuan) and national (China). Most actors in the narrative are described as Sichuanese. However, they are also Chinese, something that is indicated many times when the contribution by the Sichuanese Army to the national effort is emphasized, as in the following quote:

The Sichuan Army is an outstanding representative of China's devoted soldiers who would rather die than yield. Their lofty patriotic spirit and brave self-sacrificing noble moral character will go down in history.¹⁸⁹

The relation between the national and regional seems to be one in which those belonging to the regional group contribute to the national effort in a way that resembles how the GMD military is depicted. This suggests that it is through such contributions that people from different regions can assert their status as great patriots.

¹⁸⁸ 正面战争的抗战与敌后根据地战场的抗战，以及人民群众自发的抗日斗争都体现了中华民族为抵御外辱不屈不挠的斗争精神。那些在正面战场上为了民族独立而英勇殉国的国民党爱国将士的精神，至今仍令人崇敬不已。

¹⁸⁹ 川军是宁死不屈的中国热血军人的突出代表，他们崇高的爱国主义精神和英勇献身的高尚品德永垂青史！

Table 7.7 Participants in the narrative of the Hall of the Sichuan Army in the War of Resistance

	Actors	Patients
Sichuan Army participants ¹⁹⁰	25	2
We-participants ¹⁹¹	3	
China	1	1
Sichuan	4	
Sichuanese participants ¹⁹²	4	1
The citizens of Chongqing	1	1
Japanese military participants ¹⁹³	5	8
The enemy		6
The aggressors		1
Other participants ¹⁹⁴	1	1
Total:	44	21

The textual material analysed consists of 49 sentences, many of which are quite long. Most participants are Sichuanese and the most common actors belong to the Sichuan Army, an army that is also referred to as “our” army. Most other exhibits also stress the role of the Sichuanese Army – they are shown in photographs and there are statues of them. The Japanese military is the most common patient, sometimes labelled enemy indicating that it should be negatively identified with. Japanese aggression is dealt with in a section dealing with the large-scale bombings of Chongqing. There are quite a few images illustrating the results of the bombings, including photographs of victims. In one such description, however, the “Chongqing great tunnel air raid shelter massacre” is described in a way that complicates the circumstances surrounding the events somewhat. Japanese aircraft obviously conduct the bombing and are ascribed responsibility for it. Nonetheless, the residents of the city are described as having “squeezed into the shelter in confusion”, after which a massacre due mainly to suffocation occurred because “anti-aircraft measures were insufficient and ignorant guards locked the gates to the tunnel”, inside which people panicked and trampled each other to death. Accounts such as this one, in which the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Chinese people are described in a more complicated way and not depicted as entirely due to Japanese actions, are extremely rare. This section shows that both victim and aggressor emplotments are present in the narrative.

The victim and aggressor emplotments are, however, given considerably less space than the heroic emplotment, which dominates the exhibition. The descriptions of the

¹⁹⁰ “The Sichuan Army” and different divisions and commanders within the Sichuan Army.

¹⁹¹ “Our army”, “our rear defence line”, “our sons and daughters of China”

¹⁹² “The Sichuanese masses”, “the Sichuanese people”, “young Sichuanese people who volunteered to be recruited” and “the Governor of Sichuan Liu Xiang”.

¹⁹³ “The Japanese military” and “Japanese invaders/bandits”.

heroic soldiers of the Sichuan Army are characterized by a high degree of predication – they are filled to the brim with words and phrases stressing the extent of the contribution made to the national war effort. The following excerpt is just one among a number of similar sentences:

The officers and men of the Sichuan Army, in order to loyally dedicate themselves to the cause of the country, fearing neither hardships nor danger, defied brute force as they engaged in fierce battles with the Japanese invaders [or “bandits”] and made tremendous sacrifices to save the country from extinction. They used their flesh and blood to make a Great wall, defended the independence of the Motherland and the respect of the Chinese nation; their celebrated names will go down in history.¹⁹⁵

In addition, it is mentioned that Sichuan provided the largest number of soldiers (more than 3 million) of all the provinces and suffered more casualties (more than 640,000) than any other province. In other words, a positive self-identity is constructed for Sichuanese people. It is significant, however, that this regional identity is given a positive meaning precisely because of the province’s tremendous contribution to the *national* cause. This is stressed in the afterword to the exhibition:

During the eight long years of the War of Resistance, the inland of Sichuan made a tremendous contribution to the Chinese nation’s War of Resistance. At the front, the Sichuan Army bravely killed the enemy on the blood-spattered battlefield and repeatedly accomplished many outstanding achievements as many Sichuanese anti-Japanese officers and soldiers sacrificed their precious lives. The Sichuanese people in the rear area enthusiastically contributed everything from labour power to material and economic resources and aided the front in several ways.¹⁹⁶

In this afterword, there is no explicit interpretation of the narrative in the form of a message. Nor can such a message be found in the foreword. It seems that the implicit message is that the heroic contribution made by the Sichuanese to the national war effort should be remembered. The heroic demeanour of the members of the Sichuan Army, of course, can be seen as providing a positive role model – Chinese people, not only those from Sichuan but people from all over China, should be equally self-sacrificing as they contribute to the nation. How to make such a contribution, however, is not specified.

¹⁹⁴ “Ignorant guards” (in Chongqing) and “allied countries”.

¹⁹⁵ 抗战八年，川军将士为了精忠报国，不畏艰险，不畏强暴，与日寇鏖战，为挽救国家危亡，作出了巨大牺牲。他们用血肉作长城，捍卫了祖国的独立和中华民族的尊敬，他们的英明永载史册！

¹⁹⁶ 抗战八年，岁月漫漫，大后方的四川为中华民族的抗战作出了巨大的贡献。在前线，川军英勇杀敌，血溅沙场，屡建奇功，许多川籍抗日将士献出了宝贵生命。在后方的四川人民，踊跃捐献，从人力，物力，财力各方支援前线。

The Hall of Unyielding Chinese Prisoners of War

Here, the category emphasized is the national. This becomes quite clear in the textual material on display. Words such as “our military”, in which the word “our” obviously refers to the Chinese, are used. In an introductory text, the question of how many Chinese soldiers were taken prisoner by the Japanese military is pondered:

In a period of less than five years, 5,750,000 Soviet soldiers who fought against fascist Germany were taken prisoner by the German military. And we fought the Japanese fascists for 14 years!¹⁹⁷

The use of the pronoun we in the quote above connects the Chinese people who actually fought the Japanese fascists in the 1930s and 1940s with Chinese people living today. A temporal continuity between past and present is thereby constructed, uniting Chinese people of several generations in one community. It is also mentioned in connection with the Chinese POWs that they “are our elder generation and martyrs”. They are said to have been “national heroes” and to have “defended the country”. In other words, vocabulary stressing the national category is abundant.

Table 7.8 Participants in the narrative of the Hall of Unyielding Chinese Prisoners of War

	Actors	Patients
Chinese POWs and (forced) labourers ¹⁹⁸	5	13
Chinese military participants	8	5
Our military participants ¹⁹⁹	1	4
We	1	
National heroes ²⁰⁰	1	
Chinese civilians		1
China		1
The people’s of China and Japan		1
Japanese military participants ²⁰¹	13	4
Japanese aggressors and bandits	3	1
The enemy	2	1
Japanese POWs		3
Japan	1	
Other participants ²⁰²	1	1
Total	36	35

The written material analysed consists of 50 sentences. Interestingly, the total number of actors and patients is almost the same – 36 actors and 35 patients. This distribution between

¹⁹⁷ 与德国法西斯交战的苏军，在不到五年的时间里，被德军俘虏了 575万之众。而我们与日本法西斯交战长达十四年！

¹⁹⁸ (“POWs” (俘虏), “Resistance prisoners” (抗俘) and “labourers” (劳工)).

¹⁹⁹ “Our military” (我军，我国军队) and “officers of men of our military”.

²⁰⁰ 民族壮士

²⁰¹ “The Japanese military”, “the Japanese and puppet army”, “Japanese militarism” and “Japanese fascists”.

²⁰² “The Soviet military” and “the German military”.

agents and patients is more even than in most narratives. Japanese military participants are the most common actors whereas Chinese military participants, including those referred to as POWs or forced labourers, most frequently appear as patients. At the same time, Chinese military participants still figure as actors in quite a few sentences. This reflects a tension between the depiction of the main participants in the narrative, that is, the Chinese soldiers who are taken prisoner, as victims as well as heroes. This tension is mirrored in the brief foreword to the exhibition:

At the time of China's War of Resistance, while protecting the country and resisting the enemy, many anti-Japanese soldiers, for various reasons were taken prisoner by the Japanese military. We should call them "resistance prisoners". A great number of resistance prisoners were cruelly murdered by the Japanese military and many resistance prisoners were taken away by the Japanese military to do hard labour. After having been taken prisoner, most of the resistance prisoners did nothing to shame their title of soldiers in the War of Resistance.²⁰³

The term selected to refer to the Chinese POWs, "resistance prisoners" (抗俘), in itself stresses heroism at the same time as it embodies the fundamental tension in the narrative between being taken prisoner and heroically resisting. This is a contradiction between being an agent and a patient – between heroism and victimhood. In the extract above, victimhood is clear in how the POWs are "murdered" and "taken away" and heroism is clear in that they protected the country and resisted the enemy. The above quote also includes the aggressor plotment as the aggressive actions towards the prisoners are carried out by the Japanese military. The prisoners, it is said, were "cruelly murdered by the Japanese military". The passive form keeps the focus on the prisoners but still highlights the brutality of the Japanese military. It is mentioned in several panels that the Japanese military mistreated and murdered Chinese POWs and there are quite a few images that illustrate and call attention to the cruel behaviour of the aggressors. While the hall focuses on Chinese POWs, in one section the "lenient treatment of Japanese POWs" by the Chinese is described. The "magnanimous policies adopted by the Chinese military towards Japanese POWs" are juxtaposed with the cruel ways in which Chinese POWs were treated. In this way a positive self-image is created. Nevertheless, even though aggressor as well as victim plotments are present and stressed to a fairly large extent in the narrative, the heroic plotment is arguably somewhat more important. This heroism is expressed in many places in the narrative, for example, under the heading "great heroes":

²⁰³中国抗日战争时期，有很多抗日战士在卫国御敌的战场上，由于各种原因被日军俘虏，我们将其称之为“抗俘”。大量抗俘被日军残忍杀害，许多抗俘被日军驱作劳工。绝大部分抗俘被俘后的表现无愧于抗日战士的称号。

During the Chinese nation's War of Resistance, national heroes emerged in an endless stream. Whether from the north or south, whether young or old, all willingly fought life and death battles against the invading Japanese bandits. Even though they were taken prisoner, they still displayed the brave spirit of soldiers.²⁰⁴

So how is the narrative interpreted? This becomes quite clear in the first introductory text the visitor encounters at the museum. The text explains who the resistance prisoners were:

At the time when the country and nation were faced with subjugation and extinction, they vehemently went into battle; they went into battle, summoned their courage and fought heated battles against the Japanese military. They were involuntarily taken prisoner by the enemy and most of them were murdered by the enemy. They are our elder generation and martyrs. They were heroes who protected our homes and defended our country. They are Chinese soldiers who suffered too many hardships, difficulties and misunderstandings. Without their contribution and sacrifice, we would not have the peaceful, harmonious and happy life of today. Therefore, it is indispensable and necessary to remember them.²⁰⁵

Earlier in the same text it is claimed that the “imprisoned soldiers are a group that has been forgotten by history” and that “we have adopted a collective position of avoidance, indifference, concealment and aphasia”. Elsewhere, it is mentioned that it has been seen as shameful to be captured by the enemy (Fan 2005:66, 70). To die in action would be more glorious for a soldier. This seems to be the reason that these soldiers were consigned to oblivion. The museum therefore aims to honour the imprisoned soldiers and make sure that they are no longer forgotten. An additional aim is obviously to depict them as heroes. Part of the message appears to be that even though they were taken prisoner they were no less heroic than other soldiers. In the narrative, the hero, victim and aggressor emplotments all take up quite a lot of space. Among the halls at the Jianchuan Museum Cluster so far open to the public, this one deals with Japanese aggression to the largest extent. Nevertheless, the main theme and aim of the narrative seem to be to resurrect the Chinese POWs. As the name of the hall, containing the epithet “unyielding” (不屈), suggests, the heroic credentials of the POWs are stressed. As is mentioned above, the narrative is characterized by a contradiction between the main participants – the Chinese POWs – as agents and patients, and as heroes and victims. The interpretation presented, however, stresses the role of hero and presents an interpretation based on a “cornerstone theory”, which resembles the way in which war is interpreted in some Japanese exhibitions (see chapter 8), according to which without the “contribution and sacrifice”

²⁰⁴中华民族抗战时期，民族壮士层出不穷。地不分南北，人不分老幼，与入侵倭寇拼个鱼死网破，你死我活。即使他们被俘虏了依然表现出了壮烈之士的气概。

²⁰⁵当国家民族面临亡国灭种之时，他们慷慨从军上阵，他们上阵与日军奋勇搏杀了，他们身不由己被敌人俘虏了，他们中大部分人被敌杀害了。他们是我们的先辈，先烈，他们是保家卫国的壮士。他们是受

of the “resistance prisoners”, “we would not have the peaceful, harmonious and happy life of today”. The resistance prisoners become positive role models who exemplify contributions to and sacrifice for the nation. There is no explicit message, however, concerning what exactly this entails. Whereas museums run by the CCP are usually very explicit that contributing to the nation means supporting the policies of the CCP, such overt messages are absent here. This suggests that other interpretations regarding how to contribute to the nation are possible. What is presupposed, of course, is that one should contribute to the nation. Obviously, this is in line with the discussion in chapter 5 about the importance of patriotic discourse in the PRC.

The Hall of the Heroes of the “Flying Tigers”

The Hall of the Heroes of the “Flying Tigers”, or Hall of the American Military that helped China, calls attention to US aid to China during the war, and especially to the US pilots in the Flying Tigers who fought against the Japanese Military in China. The foreword to the exhibition summarizes the main thrust of the narrative:

After the Pacific War broke out, the USA declared war on Japan and officially entered the anti-fascist camp. In order to defeat the common enemy, China and the USA cooperated in waging war and at the same time forged a deep friendship. The Chinese battlefield became an important component in the worldwide anti-fascist war and had great strategic significance for the US war in the Far East. The large-scale US aid to China vigorously spurred the Chinese victory in the anti-Japanese War of Resistance and promoted the raising of China’s international status. In particular, the Flying Tigers were active in the battlefield of China’s skies and carried out the deeds of a lifetime and at the same time also came to deeply love this land. They are heroes in the hearts of Chinese people and China is their second homeland. The history of US aid to China’s War of Resistance against Japan is a part of the history of Sino-US friendship that should be commemorated!²⁰⁶

If the museum stresses a certain identity it is one of Sino-US friendship. Chinese and Americans are depicted as having forged a profound friendship by battling the fascist enemy together. In contrast to some other museums, this one contains relatively few longer textual elements. Instead there are many images accompanied by shorter captions. Nevertheless, the longer textual elements that do form part of the exhibition have been analysed. This material consists of 44 sentences.

了太多艰辛，艰苦和误解的中国军人。没有他们的奉献和牺牲，我们就没有今天和平，和谐，幸福的生活。所以，记住他们是必要的，必需的。

²⁰⁶太平洋战争爆发后，美国对日宣战，正式加入世界反法西斯阵营。为了打败共同的敌人，中美两国协同作战，同时结下了深厚的情谊。中国战场的抗战作为世界反法西斯战场的重要组成部分，对美国远东作战有着重要的战略意义。美国对中国的大规模援助有力地推动了中国抗日战争的胜利，促进了中国国际地位地提高。特别是活跃在中国空中战场上的美国飞虎队员们，他们在中国书写了人生精彩的一笔，同时也深深地爱上了这片土地。他们是中国人民心中的英雄，中国是他们的第二家乡。抗日战争美国援华的历史是一段值得纪念的中美友好历史！

Table 7.9 Participants in the narrative of the Hall of the Heroes of the “Flying Tigers”

	Actors	Patients
US military actors ²⁰⁷	13	1
Commander Claire Lee Chennault	8	
US government participants ²⁰⁸	9	
Japanese military participants	4	3
Japan		3
Chinese military participants	2	1
Chinese civilian participants	1	
China	2	
Total	39	8

As Table 7.9 illustrates, most of the participants in the narrative either belong to the US government or are US military actors. Death is only dealt with in a few instances in the narrative, but when it is treated it is significant. It is conceived of in terms of neither the victim nor the aggressor emplotments. Instead, the deaths of the US soldiers who fought in China are interpreted as expressions of their heroic deeds: “many of them sacrificed themselves on the Chinese battlefield”.²⁰⁹ There are, as is mentioned above, a large number of images on display. For example, there are photographs of Chinese leaders meeting US military officials. The symbol of the Flying Tigers, which was designed by the Disney Corporation in 1942, is also on display. This theme of Sino-US friendship is stressed through many of these exhibits, for example in photographs of Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhu De seen laughing together with visiting US officials. The importance of remembering this friendship, along with the heroism of the US troops who fought in China appears to be the main historical lesson delivered by the exhibition.

The Hall of the Japanese Invader (or Aggressor) Army (under construction)

Even though the Hall of the Japanese Invader (or Aggressor) Army has not yet been constructed, printed material briefly describing the ideas behind it and showing some of the exhibits to be displayed provides some idea of what is likely to be the focus of the exhibition. The following quote, for example, is quite instructive:

On 7 July 1937, the Japanese militarists caused a long premeditated full-scale war of aggression against China. This was the only time in the last century that aggression posed a threat to the existence of the Chinese nation. The hall comprehensively presents the Japanese military’s aggressive actions. It makes us

²⁰⁷ Mostly “the US Volunteer Air Force” (The Flying Tigers).

²⁰⁸ “The USA”, “the US Government” and “President Roosevelt”.

²⁰⁹ 其中很多人牺牲在中国战场上。

always remember this passage in history, always remember them, instructs ourselves to be vigilant, for the peace of tomorrow (Fan 2005:50).²¹⁰

The severity of the threat is emphasized as a threat posed by an aggressor to the Chinese nation. Furthermore, an interpretation of this aggression as a message is presented to “us”, that is, those belonging to the Chinese nation. Peace is mentioned in the message. However, this peace is to be attained or upheld through vigilance.

Most of the objects to be included in the hall are artefacts that used to belong to what is sometimes referred to as the Japanese military (日军) but usually labelled the Japanese invading (or aggressor) army (or military) (侵华日军). One copper artefact made in Japan is said to show “a devil soldier trampling on the Great Wall”.²¹¹ Photographs show Japanese lieutenants signing capitulation and surrender letters. A copy of the Mainichi Shinbun from 15 August 1945 shows the Japanese Emperor’s decree of unconditional surrender (Fan 2005:50-56). The images and objects shown in the book all draw attention to the Japanese aggressors. It appears, then, as if the exhibits in this hall will focus on the aggressive actions and the fate of the Japanese invading army, the fate of which was to be defeated and to capitulate (Shi & Liu 2008:199). It seems likely that the focus on the Japanese military as the main participants in the hall means that it will deal extensively with Japanese aggression and that Chinese heroism, if it is part of the narrative at all, will be of secondary interest – even though the exhibits dealing with the Japanese military’s surrender may highlight Chinese heroism. The material available also suggests that the victim emplotment will be subordinate to the aggressor emplotment as the museum “comprehensively presents the Japanese military’s aggressive actions”.

The Hall of the Quisling Army’s Infamous acts (under construction)

The Hall of the Quisling (or Puppet) Army’s Infamous acts has yet to be constructed but the printed material produced by the Jianchuan Museum Cluster nevertheless provides information on what the museum will look like. The following quote is informative concerning the depiction of what appears to be the main participant in this exhibition:

²¹⁰1937年7月7日，日本军国主义者发动了蓄谋已久的全面侵华战争，这也是上个世纪一次危及中华民族兴亡的侵略，本馆全面展现了日军侵略行为。让我们铭记这段历史，铭记它们，警示自己，为了今天的和平。

²¹¹ 踩在长城上的鬼子兵。

It was an army made up of more than one million Chinese. Yet, they caused internal strife, turned lackeys for the Japanese and attacked their own compatriots – this is the Puppet Army. They used to be the elite of society, the pillar of the state. Later, however, they turned into the scum of the nation, the disgrace of the country. Their names are despised by the Chinese, their history is shady, and their lives were also shady. There is a form of address for all of them: traitor to the Chinese [or to the *Han*] (Fan 2005:58).²¹²

Strong words expressing strong feelings are used in describing the traitors, who appear to be the main participants in the narrative. They are “the scum of the nation, the disgrace of the country”, their “names are despised by all Chinese” and they are *hanjian*, (汉奸) – “traitors to the *Han* Chinese”. The word is not a general word for traitor but is usually translated as “traitor to China” or “traitor to the Chinese nation”. This meaning, however, only really makes sense if the meaning of China is limited to the *Han* nationality (or if the meaning of *Han* is extended to signify all Chinese regardless of ethnicity). A *hanjian* is hence a traitor to the *Han* nationality rather than to the Chinese state as it exists today, with a large number of minority nationalities. This is not clear in the usual translation of the term. What is clear from the wording used in the quote above, however, is that the main participant in the narrative is portrayed in a very negative light.

There are photographs of the leaders of the puppet governments, Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu (1932-35) of the Manchurian puppet government, and Wang Jingwei, Chairman of the Nanjing Nationalist Government (1940-44). Other photographs show scenes such as: policewomen in the puppet regime training in Beijing; civilians delivering water to Japanese soldiers; a Chinese woman entertaining Japanese military officers by playing the *erhu*, a stringed musical instrument; the founding of the Japanese school in Nanjing; and Liang Hongzhi, the Chairman of the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (1938-40), a puppet government set up in China by Japan during the war, being taken away to be executed for treason (Fan 2005:58-64). All the images and objects shown in the book draw attention to the traitors. In another book published by the Museum Cluster, questions are raised such as “how can so many people from the Chinese nation lack a backbone?” and “how could a group of elite intellectuals so willing to serve the Japanese military could come from the Chinese nation?” (Shi & Liu 2008:195). It is also said that the reason why some Chinese betrayed their nation is unintelligible and that “we [that is, the Chinese] must remember these lessons for posterity to prevent that in the future people will cause an abnormal spiritual change” (Shi &

²¹²一支上百万由中国人组成的军队，却同室操戈，为日本人当走狗，去攻击自己的同胞，这就是伪军。他们曾经是社会的精英，国家的栋梁，后来却成了民族的败类，国家的耻辱。他们的名字为国人所不齿，他们的历史是灰色的，他们的人生也是灰色的。他们有一个统一的称呼：汉奸。

Liu 2008:193). In other words, the existence of traitors during the war is interpreted as a historical lesson according to which similar events need to be prevented.

What is perhaps most notable about the focus on traitors as the main participant in a narrative from a theoretical perspective is that it differs from other narratives dealt with in this investigation. Obviously, the traitor is neither hero nor victim. It seems that the traitor is not so much an aggressor as an anti-hero. This is because it is not the aggressiveness with which compatriots are fought that is condemned. Indeed, not all traitors fight their compatriots using violence. Instead it is the betrayal involved in aligning oneself with the enemy that is significant in the meaning ascribed to the acts of the traitor. The traitor is someone who has belonged to the in-group but has turned on it, thereby becoming an “other” who is strongly despised and hence negatively depicted. The traitor represents a threat to the in-group since its members can potentially become one, and hence it needs to be fiercely condemned. The existence of traitors in a narrative obviously strengthens the emphasis on the national category as the main category for identification. Whereas many Chinese participants are depicted as contributing to the nation, here we encounter the opposite – betrayal of the nation. If patriotism is highly desirable in the PRC, then betrayal of the nation is the worst possible act.

7.3 The interpretation of narratives at Chinese museums

The analysis conducted in this section is guided by the following analytical questions: How is the story told interpreted? What is the main message or historical lesson delivered through this interpretation?

7.3.1 The 9.18 History Museum

On a large signboard at the entrance to the museum area it is said that the museum “is a historical picture scroll comprehensively reflecting that the north-eastern people tragically suffered the aggression of Japanese militarism, then rose up to fight and won the final victory”²¹³ and that it is a “large-scale modern base for patriotic and defence education”.²¹⁴ Furthermore, in the museum brochure it is explained that the museum “educates the people not to forget national humiliation and to revitalize China” (“9.18” Historical Museum 1999:3). The exhibition ends with this following concluding comment:

²¹³ 是一部全面反映东北人民惨遭日本军国主义侵略，继而奋起抗争，最终取得胜利的历史画卷。

²¹⁴ 是一座大型的现代化的爱国主义教育和国防教育基地。

As we are about to exit the exhibition hall, everyone's hearts probably bleed. Moreover, it seems as if every drop of blood solidifies into the following question: How did Japanese imperialism dare to wield its butcher's knife against great China? All the images here are solid facts, why are there up until now people that cannot face them squarely? Even distort them? Tamper with them? Those who are backward will be beaten. How (did we) become weak? All the portraits of the deceased here cry out. What do these cries tell us? Do they tell us "a nation that forgets its heroes is a degenerate nation"? Or do they tell us "if misery is forgotten it might come knocking heavily on the country's door"? Do they tell us "it starts with me, it starts now"? Or does it tell us "rejuvenate China, everyone shares responsibility"?²¹⁵

That the existence of people in Japan who are unwilling to face history squarely, mentioned in section six of the exhibition, is referred to in the conclusion suggests that one historical lesson to be drawn is that it is necessary to be "on guard against the resurrection of Japanese imperialism". There are, however, other lessons, perhaps more important ones, to be drawn. Even though these last sentences end with question marks, thus giving a somewhat vague impression, it still seems that they all point in the same direction. In other words, they are probably not meant to be mutually exclusive. The nation's heroes should hence be remembered along with the misery that the nation suffered in the past. If not, "it might come knocking heavily on the country's door" again. In order to avoid the return of such misery, everyone has to contribute to the rejuvenation of China, since "everyone shares responsibility". It is not explicated just what this rejuvenation, in which everyone shares responsibility, entails. However, since, like the historical other, the "backwards will be beaten", a slogan that has roots that go back to the 1920s,²¹⁶ it appears to involve development and reforms. While this is not entirely clear, it seems that it is a collective endeavour in which everyone is supposed to act in accordance with the "ever-lasting noble spirit of the martyrs of the nation". Heroic sacrifice by the individual facilitates the rejuvenation of the nation.

7.3.2 The Chinese People's War of Resistance Museum

An explicit interpretation of the story told is delivered in the last written section of the exhibition – the conclusion (结束语). It is mentioned in chapter 3 that the modality of the museum exhibitions studied here is objective, giving the impression that these exhibitions simply provide accounts of what actually occurred in the past. This is very much true for Chinese exhibitions in general and certainly for the War of Resistance Museum. What should be added, re-

²¹⁵当我们即将走出展厅，大概每个人的心中都在滴血，而且每一滴血似乎都凝固成一串问号：日本帝国主义何以敢对我泱泱大中华举起屠刀？这里的每一幅图片，都是一串铁打的事实，为何有人至今不能正视它？甚至歪曲它？篡改它？落后就要挨打，何以落后？这里的每一尊遗容都在呐喊，这呐喊在告诉我们什么？是告诉我们“忘记英雄的民族是堕落至邦”？还是告诉我们“忘记苦难，苦难就会重叩国门”？是告诉我们“从我做起，从现在做起”？还是告诉我们“振兴中华，人人有责”？

²¹⁶ The idea that the weak will be bullied was connected with images of China as the "sick man of Asia" (Callahan 2007).

garding this point, is that there is some difference in modality in the conclusion from the other parts. In the other parts, the story of what happened in the past is told in a way that presents it as an objective truth. In the conclusion, lessons to be learned from this historical episode, that is, interpretation of the story told, are provided. Here, the tone is more hortative, telling the visitor what must be done. In other words, the visitor is not just told how to interpret the story but also that it is of the essence that s/he acts in accordance with the interpretation provided.

The conclusion starts by stating that the “Chinese people have always ardently loved world peace”.²¹⁷ It is then repeated that the Chinese nation, through its War of Resistance, made a great national sacrifice and a historic contribution to world peace. This positive self-representation is followed by an instruction not to forget history. Towards the end, the visitor is given clear instructions concerning the future:

To accelerate the promotion of modernization, complete the unification of the motherland, defend world peace and promote joint development is the solemn mission history and this era has bestowed on us.²¹⁸

In this sentence, the word “women” (我们), meaning we or us (in this case us), obviously refers to all Chinese, as indicated by the use of the word “motherland” (or “ancestor land”). In the following and final sentence, “we” (我们) are told to unite around Hu Jintao and to persist in taking the theories of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin as guiding principles. Furthermore, “we” are told to “persist in walking the road of peaceful development, uphold the fundamental national policy of opening up to the outside world”²¹⁹ and to “make an even greater contribution to the lofty cause of promoting peace and development for humanity”.²²⁰ Again, the “we” means those belonging to the Chinese nation, a nation the travails of which have been dealt with in the exhibition. Here, after the role of the CCP as saviour has been stressed throughout much of the exhibition, the importance of uniting around the CCP leaders and their policies is presented. Here, as in the foreword to the exhibition, world peace is mentioned together with development. Just as the Chinese people’s war effort, at the CCP’s initiative, has been portrayed as a great contribution to the world, Chinese development, under the CCP’s leadership, is framed as part of a solemn mission that will become another great contribution to the world. The “unification of the motherland” is also mentioned as part of the Chinese nation’s “solemn mission”. This unification, it seems, is only possible if all of “us”

²¹⁷ 中国人民一向热爱世界和平。

²¹⁸ 加快推进现代化建设，完成祖国统一，维护世界和平与促进共同发展，是历史和时代赋予我们的庄严使命。

²¹⁹ 坚持走和平发展的道路，坚持对外开放的基本国策。

²²⁰ 为促进人类和平与发展的崇高事业做出更大的贡献。

support the policies of the CCP. Just like during the War of Resistance, sacrifices may have to be made, but the people should persist and continue to have faith in the party that made it possible for the nation to “move from decline to revitalization”.

7.3.3 The Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders
As is mentioned in the discussion of the narrative of the museum, Hu Jintao is cited in the exhibition as having said during a visit in May 2004 that the Memorial hall is “a good place to carry out patriotic education” and that the patriotic education of the young must not be forgotten. Patriotic education is mentioned elsewhere as well. In the initial text of the eleventh part of the first exhibition the following sentence can be found:

The history of the Nanjing Massacre is an important theme for conducting patriotic education of the broad masses of the people, especially teenagers, and for conducting peaceful exchange with other countries. It is also a precious spiritual wealth for drawing historical lessons and for sticking to peaceful development.²²¹

It is thus explicitly stated that historical lessons should be drawn from the story told. Each of the two exhibitions end, as is customary at Chinese war museums (and many other Chinese museums) with a “conclusion” in which an explicit lesson is presented. Indeed, the first conclusion begins by stating that history is a mirror, and that “we” should not forget the lesson of history. The text starts out being general in its approach – it portrays the Nanjing Massacre as a disaster against humanity and asserts that: “aggression and massacre inevitably cause a disaster for the victimized nation”. Then, however, it becomes more specific and addresses Chinese people rather than humanity as a whole:

We can never forget the historical lesson that the weak will be beaten, can never forget that in an overturned nest no eggs stay intact, can never forget how the country suffered aggression, the people suffered disaster, hold high the banner of patriotism, strive for improvement without resting, open up and be enterprising, develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, realize the unification of the motherland and make great efforts to safeguard world peace.²²²

Again, the use of we is important. “We” in this case, obviously refers to the Chinese people, as indicated by the request to “hold high the banner of patriotism” and to “develop socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In other words, whereas reference is made to world peace, the message is not so much a general and universal one but rather a particular national one. The

²²¹南京大屠杀史是对广大人民群众尤其是青少年进行爱国主义教育，对外进行和平交流的重要题材，也是吸取历史教训，坚持和平发展的宝贵精神财富。

²²²我们永远不能忘记弱国就要挨打，永远不能忘记覆巢之下无完卵，永远不能忘记国家受侵略，人民遭劫难的历史教训，高举爱国主义旗帜，自强不息，开拓进取，为建设中国特色社会主义，实现祖国统一，维护世界和平而努力。

tone is rather hortative with several constructions stressing what cannot be done if disaster is to be avoided. While elsewhere in the exhibition it is said that modern China adopted a policy of seclusion, which led to China being victimized by other countries, here references are made to the current policy of opening up, a diametrically different strategy that will ensure, it seems, that China does not become weak again. The weak will be beaten and “we” should hence be patriotic by sticking to the CCP’s policies of opening up and socialism with Chinese characteristics, and realize the unification of the motherland. Unification discourse is important in present day PRC. Taiwan is often represented as the last missing piece – the last remaining humiliation that needs to be wiped out through reintegration with the motherland.²²³ Such discourse also stresses that a strong China is a united China. A reference to the need to work hard for the reunification of the motherland hence also stresses unity within the motherland. The need for the improvement and strengthening of the nation is emphasized through reference to the weakness of the historical other, which is similar to the interpretation of the narrative of the exhibition at the 9.18 History Museum.

The conclusion to the second exhibition does not differ fundamentally but rather underlines the message of the first exhibition. It ends with the following lines:

An economically prosperous, politically stable, powerful China can play an even greater role in safeguarding world peace. Makes us hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, unswervingly pursue the policy of independent peaceful diplomacy, persist in walking the road of peaceful development, unceasingly promote equal cooperation and mutually beneficial common gain among all countries of the world and make an even greater contribution to the lofty cause of developing the peace of humanity!²²⁴

Again, the importance that “we” make another even greater contribution is emphasized along with peaceful development and developing peace. This contribution is made, the first sentence suggests, by creating “an economically prosperous, politically stable, powerful China”. China’s role in the world will be greater. However, it needs to be economically prosperous and politically stable. Visitors are hence requested to contribute to creating such a country by working together to realize it.

²²³ Elsewhere in the exhibition, it is mentioned that after the victory in the War of Resistance, Taiwan held a ceremony for receiving Japan’s surrender and “returned to the motherland’s embrace” (祖国母亲的怀抱), literally “the motherland mother’s bosom”. Here, the contemporary issue of Taiwan’s status is touched on in nationalistic language that again, rather tautologically, draws on the metaphor of family relationships.

²²⁴ 一个经济繁荣，政治稳定的强大中国，将会对保障世界和平发挥更大的作用。让我们高举和平，发展，合作的旗帜，始终不渝地奉行独立自主地和平外交政策，坚持走和平发展的道路，不断推进同世界各国的平等合作和互利共赢，为促进人类和平的崇高事业做出更大的贡献！

As is noted in the analysis of narratives, the CCP is not mentioned much in the narrative. Instead, the story told is one about the Chinese people. However, the lessons to be learned are closely connected to the importance of patriotically sticking to the CCP's policies, which can ensure that China's international status becomes higher, thereby giving the people reason to be proud. This both requires and ensures political stability. It could perhaps be argued that by telling a story about China as a nation, rather than as a nation led by the CCP, and still connecting the fate of the nation to the CCP's policies, the CCP is implicitly portrayed as being the *natural* leader of the nation.

7.3.4 The Jianchuan Museum Cluster

The museum cluster's website reveals that the museum collections provide historical lessons, and knowledge about wars and folk-customs for the future, as well as about peace and the national spirit. It is also said that lessons learned from past mistakes will function as a teacher for later generations (Jianchuan Museum website: Guanzhang zibai (Introduction to the curator)). In the epilogue to the exhibition about the CCP, the achievements of the party during the War of Resistance are praised. The account of these achievements is followed by a final sentence that connects these accomplishments with the present state of affairs in China: "Today, the Chinese Communist Party again leads people of the whole country on a new journey in order to realize the great revival of the Chinese nation". This suggests that one historical lesson is that the CCP's agenda should be supported. At the same time, however, the themes and lessons delivered in the other museums differ from this lesson.

The Museum Cluster is largely a tribute to heroes that are understood as having been forgotten. While some of these heroes, mainly the USA and the GMD, have been resurrected to some extent in narratives at museums connected to the CCP, the Jianchuan Museum Cluster goes further by giving them their own exhibitions. Moreover, groups that are more or less omitted elsewhere, such as prisoners of war and the Sichuanese Army, are praised as heroes. Even though the CCP is depicted heroically, the narrative is still potentially subversive since the CCP's near monopoly on the heroic role is implicitly being questioned through dilution. The role of the CCP is almost reduced to that of one heroic group among several. The narratives are nationalistic in that they stress sacrifice for the nation. In this aspect, they do not differ from government-run museums stressing heroism. Nevertheless, the interpretations of the narratives refrain from explicitly specifying what sacrifice for and contributions to the nation involve in the present-day PRC. This is a significant difference from government-

run exhibitions in which patriotic behaviour is defined explicitly in terms of endorsing the CCP's policies. The two halls that are not yet open are potentially the most interesting ones in that they will not deal with Chinese heroes. How will the Japanese invaders be portrayed and how will the Quisling Army be dealt with? How will these exhibitions be interpreted? While the material discussed above provides some clues pertaining to these questions, the final answer will not be known until the halls are opened to the public.

7.4 Conclusions

In the Chinese exhibitions analysed, the national category is strongly stressed, by several means, even though other identity categories, such as the local and regional, exist in some exhibitions. The means employed to stress the national category mainly involve categorizing participants according to nationality and using other vocabulary and examples emphasizing sameness, cooperation, patriotism and the fate of the nation. The relation between the local/regional, where they exist, and the national, however, is sometimes shown to be one in which the former contributes to the fate of the latter. In this way, the possible contradictions and tensions between local/regional and national identities are resolved.

The narratives share many similarities – as they all tell a story in which the main protagonists with which visitors are encouraged to identify are labelled as either belonging to and/or contributing to the fate of the Chinese nation. These central characters are depicted as moral and good whereas it is emphasized that their adversaries are immoral and bad. The heroic, aggressor and victim emplotments are all present at most museums, even though the former is usually separated from the latter two. The way in which the depiction of the CCP, often in a heroic way, is almost entirely insulated from the aggressor and victim emplotments is conspicuous. Japanese participants usually appear as aggressors who victimize Chinese participants, and there are few exhibits that give nuance to these dominant portrayals. Indeed, the case is rather the opposite – through the use of predication, the acts of the Japanese aggressors, inherently hideous, are further emphasized as having been terrible. In other words, the presentation follows the ideological square to a large extent with few examples in which this sort of representation is challenged or problematized. This is especially the case in the state-run exhibitions. Of course, “friendship corners” that have been incorporated towards the end of the state-run exhibitions, as is discussed above, at the request of Japanese diplomats, and these show that since the war bilateral relations have been characterized by friendship.

These exhibits, however, usually occupy little space and are preceded by an overwhelmingly negative depiction of Japanese participants. The exhibitions at the private Jianchuan Museum Cluster, even though they are as enmeshed in a patriotic discourse and stress the national category quite as much, do contain some, albeit not many, exhibits that complicate this picture. The Hall of the Quisling Army's Infamous acts, in particular, although not yet open to the public, is potentially subversive as an increased focus on Chinese traitors may challenge the emphasis on national unity prevalent in the state-run exhibitions.

Interestingly, even though different narrative emplotments dominate the exhibitions analysed, the interpretations in the form of lessons to be learned from history do not differ significantly among the state-run exhibitions. They all quite explicitly emphasize the need to work hard together under the leadership of the CCP, just like during the war, in order to strengthen and revitalize the Chinese nation. The private Jianchuan Museum Cluster is less explicit in its interpretations, but exhortations about the need to revitalize the nation can still be found, highlighting to the dominance of patriotic discourse in the PRC.

Chapter 8: Analysis of Japanese narratives

The analysis of Japanese narratives is conducted in the same way as that of the Chinese ones. The analysis is guided by the following questions: What kinds of identity categories are constructed and stressed? Who are the main participants in the narrative told? How are these participants and their actions portrayed? Does the portrayal of participants follow an in-group/out-group logic? In other words, is the visitor encouraged to identify and not to identify with particular participants? How is the story told interpreted? What is the main message delivered through this interpretation?

8.1 The discursive construction of groups at Japanese museums

The analysis of the discursive construction of groups is the most fundamental part of the overall analysis of narratives. Before we can address the question of how “self” and “other” are represented we need to know if there is a self and if there is an other and, in that case, who the self and the other are. The analysis is based on the following analytical questions: What kinds of identity categories are constructed and stressed? To what extent is a group constructed and does this group consist of the members of a nation, those who dwell in a particular city or some other community or group?

8.1.1 The Yûshûkan

The Yûshûkan, located in central Tokyo, differs from other museums dealt with in that it is run by a religious organization, the Yasukuni Shrine. While it is not possible to deal in much detail with the belief system of Shintô and the Yasukuni Shrine, some basic points concerning the enshrinement of the war dead at the Yûshûkan in particular and shrines for the war dead (護国神社) in general need to be made since the exhibits, in part, deal with those enshrined. The war dead enshrined are sometimes labelled *kami* (神), or *kamigami* (神々) when the plural is stressed, and sometimes *eirei* (英霊), spirits or souls of dead soldiers, (translated as “divinities” in the Yûshûkan’s English leaflet) or just *rei* (霊) (spirit or soul). In the written ma-

terial produced by the Yûshûkan in English, *kamigami* is, in some cases, translated as war heroes. While this translation differs from the way in which the term is usually translated (as spirit or divinity) it does indicate that the *kami* are regarded as heroic.

In a leaflet printed by the Yasukuni Shrine in English, Korean and Chinese, it is explained that the shrine was built “to honour the memory of those who had died for their country”. It was finished in June 1869. In the leaflet, it is also noted that “the only purpose of the shrine is to commemorate those who sacrificed their lives for the nation. That is, the 2,466,000 divinities enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine all sacrificed their lives to the public duty of protecting their motherland” (Yasukuni Shrine Office). The Yûshûkan was opened in 1882 and is claimed to be the oldest museum in Japan. Since then, it has been through many twists and turns. It was closed after Japan’s defeat in 1945 not to be reopened until 1986. “To say that the one thing that has not changed during this history of the Yûshûkan is its mission – to honour the spirits of the war dead would be no exaggeration” (Nanbu 2008:2). The relation between the spirits of the war dead and the Yûshûkan is further explained in the following passage, which also, it should be added, contains several words stressing the national category (Nanbu 2008:2, emphasis added):

No matter the era, the sincerity of the spirits of dead soldiers who sacrificed their precious lives for the sake of the *motherland* while holding earnest feelings towards their blood relatives can never be denied. Yûshûkan is the place where the sincerity of these spirits of dead soldiers is conveyed in line with the truth. The spirits of dead soldiers enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine were all people born into this world. They lived in several eras and sacrificed their lives for the *nation*. In other words, the achievements of these spirits of dead soldiers are told together with the history of *our country*. With what feelings were the spirits of dead soldiers sent to the front to what battle in each era? What kinds of feelings did they leave to their beloved *motherland*, for their beloved family? In those feelings lies the manifestation of their sincerity.²²⁵

The first section of the exhibition, called “Spirit of the Samurai” (武人のこころ), is also instructive concerning the relationship between the enshrined spirits, the Japanese state and Japanese living in the present, and also contains several references to the national category (Yasukuni Jinja 2008:11, emphasis added):

Since the founding of the *nation* long ago *our country* has nurtured culture in independence in this beautiful archipelago in the East Sea. However, this independence has not been self-evident. During the history of *this country*, called Ôyashima, several battles took place. In the big currents of world history, there

²²⁵いつの時代であっても、肉親に対する切なる思ひをお持ちになりながらも祖国のために尊い生命を捧げられた英霊のまごころは決して否定されるものではありません。この英霊のまごころを事実として伝える場所が遊就館なのです。靖国神社に祀られる英霊は、いずれもこの世に生を享け、それぞれの時代に生き、そして国家のために尊い命を捧げられた方々です。つまり、英霊の御事蹟は我が国の歴史とともに伝えられているのです。英霊が、それぞれの時代にどのやうな戦ひにどのやうなお気持ちで出征され、愛する祖国、愛する家族にどのやうな思ひを残されたのか、そこにこそ英霊のまごころの発露があるのです。

were ancestors who desperately defended and supported *this country*. When the existence and independence of *this country* was endangered, at all times there were soldiers who took up arms and went to the frontline. These soldiers *died at their country's command*.

Soothe *the country*. Yasukuni Shrine is a place for praising the accomplishments and for praying for the comfort and peaceful pacification of the spirits of the officers and soldiers, who risked their lives to defend *their country*, protect their hometown, protect their home and thereby became the cornerstone of modern *Japan*. In this holy place stands the Yūshūkan. ... To touch on the spirits of the ancestors, to learn about their wishes is also a way for those of us who live in the present to learn a way to live.²²⁶

Parts of this, especially the part about learning from the spirits, are echoed in a short text that introduces the Yūshūkan in its guide leaflet as well as in the beginning of the *Illustrated book of the Yūshūkan* (Yasukuni Jinja 2007, 2008):

“Yūshū” in the name of the museum means to associate with and learn from honourable figures. Each article on display is filled with the wishes of the ancestors who came up with the name Yūshūkan and sincerity of the spirits of the war dead who sacrificed their precious lives to “build a peaceful nation”. By directly touching the sincerity and achievements of the spirits of the war dead who sacrificed their precious lives for their beloved country, beloved hometown and beloved family you may learn something precious.²²⁷

In these texts, it becomes quite clear that the we-group created is the Japanese nation. This nation is constructed as one that encompasses those Japanese alive today as well as their ancestors. Continuity between past and present is stressed through the emphasis on the connection between those who live today and their ancestors as well as in that those who sacrificed themselves did so in “several eras”. In other words, just as in some Chinese exhibitions, a national community is constructed that encompasses not just those living in the present but also those who lived in the past – the ancestors. Words central to the construction of a national we-group, such as “our country” (我が国) and motherland (祖国), literally ancestor country, are employed in all these passages. The term our country is used frequently throughout the exhibition. In these excerpts, little is said about any others. Instead, an insular preoccupation with “our” nation is revealed. There is no mention of who were responsible for endangering the nation. It appears that what is important is the ultimate sacrifice made by those who defended the nation and “died at their country’s command”.

²²⁶建国の昔より東海の良い列島に、我が国は独立して文化をはぐくんできた。しかし、この独立は当然にしてあったのではない。大八洲と称されるこの国土には、歴史上いくつもの戦いがあった。世界史の大きな潮流のなかで、必死にこの国を守り支えてきた先人たちがいた。この国の自存独立が危うくなったとき、つねに矛をとり第一線に赴いたつわものたちがいた。つわものたちは国家の命ずるところに殉じた。国を鎮め。命をかけて国を護り、郷土を守り、家をまもり、近代日本の礎となった将兵たちのいさおしをたたえ、霊を慰め、安らかに鎮まるのを祈るところが靖国神社である。この聖なるところに遊就館は建つ。...先人の魂にふれ、その志について学ぶことは、現代に生きる私どもが生き方を学ぶことでもある。

²²⁷館名の「遊就」は、高潔な人物に交わり学ぶという意味ですが、展示された一つひとつの品々には、遊就館と命名した先人の願いや「安らかな国づくり」のために尊い命を捧げられた英霊のまごころがこめられています。愛する祖国、愛する郷土、愛する家族のために、尊い命を捧げられた英霊のまごころやご事蹟に直接触れることによって、大切な何かを学ぶことができるのではないのでしょうか。

8.1.2 The Yamato Museum

The Yamato Museum, which opened in 2005, is located in the port city of Kure, close to Hiroshima. The foreword to the illustrated book containing the museum's permanent exhibition contains the following passage (Kure-shi kaiji rekishi kagakukan: Yamato myûjiamu 2006:3):

After the war, technology that had been cultivated since before the war was joined with new technology and a large number of the world's largest tankers were constructed as Kure developed as a leading coastal industry city that played a part as *our country* developed into the world's number one shipbuilding country about ten years after the war. It also played a great role in the modernization and post-war reconstruction of Japan. The Yamato Museum introduces the history of Kure, which is really the history of Japan since the Meiji Restoration, the various technologies of shipbuilding, starting with steel, which became a cornerstone of modernization, while the efforts of the ancestors and life and culture at the time are touched on. Then, (we wish) for everyone to understand *our country's* history and the importance of peace and convey to the children, who carry the future of Japan, which aims to become a country that creates technology, on their shoulders, the greatness of technology.²²⁸

The passage contains several revealing statements. For example, even though the museum is concerned to a large extent with local history – the history of the city of Kure, it is actually more ambitious than that. The local history dealt with here, the history of Kure, “is really the history of Japan since the Meiji Restoration”. The local narrative, in other words, is presented as representative of the modern history of Japan. The local and the national are merged into one, the former epitomizing the latter. That the visitors (at least the bulk of them) are encouraged to identify with the national experience as embodied in the local narrative as Japanese is also indicated by the use of the term “our country” (我が国) twice in this section. It is suggested that it is possible “to understand our country's history and the importance of peace” by learning about the history of Kure. That “the children, who carry the future of Japan ... on their shoulders” are seen as central targets of this narrative further implies that the story told is indeed a national one and that the identity category, which those who created the narrative aim to construct and stress, is the national.

8.1.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots

The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots is located in Chiran in southern Kyûshû. It was first opened in 1975 and enlarged in 1991. In the foreword to the exhibition, it is mentioned that:

²²⁸戦後は、戦前から培われてきた技術が、新しい技術と結びつき、世界最大級のタンカーを数多く建造するなど有数の臨海工業都市として発展し、我が国が戦後約10年ほどで世界一の造船国へ発展する一翼を担い、日本の近代化や戦後の復興にも大きな役割を果たしてまいりました。大和ミュージアムは、こうした明治以降の日本の近代化の歴史そのものである「呉の歴史」と、その近代化の礎となった造船、製鋼を始めとした各種の「科学技術」を、先人の努力や当時の生活・文化に触れながら紹介しています。そして、皆様に、我が国の歴史と平和の大切さについて認識していただくとともに、科学技術創造立国を目指す日本の将来を担う子ども達に科学技術の素晴らしさを伝え。

“*We* were kept alive through the noble sacrifice of the members of the Special Attack Corps”.²²⁹ Furthermore, gratitude is expressed “that *the country* proceeds on the path of prosperity and that the peaceful Japan of today exists” (emphasis added). The “country” (国) referred to here is Japan and it seems to be the case that the “we” used here does not just signify the people who created the exhibition but denotes either the Japanese who survived the war or the Japanese nation as a whole, including those born after the war. The word “country” (国) is used to refer to Japan elsewhere in the exhibition as well. This indicates that the intended recipients of the story told are Japanese. This is also indicated by the fact that in some panels in the exhibition, the word “our country” (わが国) is employed.

8.1.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was first opened in 1949 but changes were made in 1955, 1975 and 1996. The narrative features a relatively large number of participants, most of whom only appear once in the narrative. No single identity category is emphasized. At the same time, the first section of the narrative makes clear that what we are dealing with are to a large extent local events – the history of Nagasaki is briefly outlined. Nonetheless, participants in the narrative are referred to as neither citizens of Nagasaki nor Japanese citizens. In images people are referred to as boys, men, girls, and so on. It seems as if the victims of the atomic bomb are mainly depicted in their human capacity rather than as Japanese or Nagasaki citizens. Still, there are aspects of local identity construction in that “the citizens [of Nagasaki] have made ‘Peace starts in Nagasaki!’ their motto as they appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons”. There is hence an aspect of positive self-representation in this portrayal of Nagasaki citizens as peace-loving people wanting to lead the world in abolishing nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, this local identity is not consistently stressed and it could be interpreted as a way of distinguishing the peace-loving self not only from those who conduct nuclear tests but perhaps also from a historical other – the Japanese aggressor during the war.

8.1.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

The most visited Japanese museum dealing with the war is the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. The museum is located in the Hiroshima Peace Park, which houses the A-Bomb

²²⁹ 私たちは、特攻隊員たちの崇高な犠牲によって生かされ。

Dome, one of few structures that survived the blast on 6 August 1945. The museum was originally opened in 1949 and was renovated and redesigned in 1955 and 1994.

A large number of participants appear in the narrative. Many of these only appear once or twice. There is hence, just as is the case at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, a relative lack of continuity in participant categories. The continuity that can be found is mainly at the local level – participants belonging to the local category (Hiroshima) can be found in almost all sections and throughout the period of time dealt with. It is also quite common for participants to be described using their names and/or their occupation. *Hibakusha* (atomic bomb victim or atomic bombed person) is a term that appears several times. Most importantly, participants are seldom described in terms of nationality. In other words, the national category is not stressed. Other constructions emphasizing the national category are also infrequent. The relationship between humans and the atomic bomb is a central component in the narrative and message of the exhibition. This means that, to some extent, the category of human beings is stressed.

8.1.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum

The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was first opened in 1975 and rebuilt in 2000. It is, as the name suggests, located in Okinawa. The identity constructed is not a Japanese one but an Okinawan (or Ryûkyû, another name for Okinawa) identity. This becomes clear in some central passages, such as for example the prologue to the exhibition:

Long ago our Ryukyuan ancestors, a truly peace-loving people, crossed the ocean and engaged in trade with Asian nations. The ocean, a source of golden life, a bridge of peace and friendship, still lives in the hearts of our people.²³⁰

The in-group, we, is depicted positively here as a “peace-loving people” who see the sea not as dividing people but as joining them together. Historical ties to Asian nations, victimized by the Japanese military (just like the Okinawans), are also stressed. That we are the Okinawans also becomes clear at the end of the fourth part of the exhibition where a text resembling a poem (written by the Management Committee of the museum) ends with the following words:

Since the end of the war
We have abhorred all wars
Long yearning to create a peaceful island.

²³⁰かつて琉球の先人は平和をこよなく愛する民として海を渡りアジア諸国と交易を結んだ海は豊かな生命の源として平和と友好の掛け橋としていまなお人々の心に息づいてる。

To acquire
This
Our unwavering principle
We have paid dearly.²³¹

The people of Okinawa, then, are joined in victimhood as well as in their abhorrence of wars and efforts for peace. Furthermore, and perhaps most explicit, in the text, “The Basic Concept of the Okinawa Peace Memorial Museum”,²³² which can be found both in the exhibition and in the museum brochure (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:2), Okinawan identity is further emphasized. This becomes quite clear in the following excerpt from the statement (emphasis added):

Under the most extreme and unimaginable circumstances, *we citizens of Okinawa prefecture* directly experienced the absurdity of war and atrocities it inevitably brings about. This war experience is at the very core of what is popularly called *the “Okinawan Heart,”* a resilient yet strong attitude to life that *Okinawan people* cultivated as they struggled against the pressures of US military rule. *The “Okinawan Heart”* respects human dignity above all else, rejects all acts related to war, demands peace and truly cherishes culture, which is a supreme manifestation of humanity.²³³

In the narrative, these Okinawans are most commonly referred to as “local residents” (住民). While the first part of the exhibition contextualizes local events into the larger story of Japan’s colonial expansion, starting in the Meiji period, and WWII, later sections deal mainly with local events. In other words, the Okinawan experience is central. Okinawans are victimized not just by Japanese colonialism and the Japanese military but also by the US military during the long occupation, which did not end until 1972 with Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Moreover, the continued US military presence and the existence of large US military bases in Okinawa even after reversion means that the Okinawan struggle continues.

8.1.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum

The Himeyuri Peace Museum is located in Okinawa, not far from the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum. It is run by a private foundation and was opened in 1989. In what, since it is what the visitor first encounters, could be regarded as the foreword to the exhibition, a text, *Foundation of the Himeyuri Peace Museum*; ends:

²³¹ 戦争このかた 私たちは あらゆる戦争を憎み 平和は島を建設せねば と思いつづけてきました
これが あまりにも大きすぎた代償を払って得た ゆずることのできない 私たちの信条なのです

²³² 沖縄県平和祈念資料館 設立理念

²³³ 私たち沖縄県民は、想像を絶する極限状況の中で戦争の不条理と残酷さを身を持って体験しました。この戦争の体験こそ、とりもなおさず戦後沖縄の人々が米国の軍事支配の重圧に抗しつつ、つちかっていた沖縄のこころの原点であります。沖縄のこころ”とは人間の尊厳を何よりも重くみて、戦争につながる一切の行為を否定し、平和を求め、人間性の発露である文化をこよなく愛する心であります。

40 years have gone by since then but the brutal conditions of the battlefield do not leave our minds. Without having any doubts, on the contrary, we have not forgotten the horror of the education of the period when we were forced to actively face the battlefield. More than a majority of the population belongs to the generation that does not know war. Still, when we think about the domestic and international situations in which disputes have not ceased, we cannot but fully realize that it is necessary that we each hand down to the next generation the horror of the war we experienced. We have established the Himeyuri Peace Museum here to continue to appeal for the importance of peace because we believe it will soothe the spirits of our dead schoolmates and teachers.²³⁴

Here, the pronoun we is used several times. This we, however, appears to refer to those who have created the exhibition rather than to a larger collective. In the last sentence it becomes clear that the people who created the museum, the we referred to, are surviving members of the Himeyuri students. A similar use of the word we also occurs towards the end of the exhibition in a section called “Reminiscence” (回想).

The “domestic and international situations” mentioned in the above text, suggest that even though a group identity is not stressed in the narrative, Japanese people, especially those belonging to the “next generation” are seen as the primary targets of the story. It seems reasonable to believe that those belonging to the next generation, many of them visiting the museum on school trips as either junior high or high school students, may identify with the students in the narrative. The national identity of the students in the narrative is, it appears, less important than their identity as students. As becomes clear when the narrative of the exhibition is discussed below, the national identities of the US and Japanese military participants is emphasized to some extent. However, the visitor is encouraged to identify not with them but with the students.

8.2 The narratives at Japanese museums

The following analytical questions guide the analysis below: Who are the main participants, that is, agents and patients, in the narrative told? How are these participants and their actions portrayed? Are participants portrayed as heroes, aggressors or victims? Does the portrayal of

²³⁴あれから40年以上たちましたが、戦場の惨状は、私たちの脳裏を離れません。私たちに何の疑念も抱かせず、むしろ積極的に戦場に向かわせたあの時代の教育の恐ろしさを忘れていません。戦争を知らない世代が人口の過半数を超え、未だ紛争の絶えない国内・国際情勢を思うにつけ、私たちは一人ひとりの体験した戦争の恐ろしさを語り継いでいく必要があると痛感せざるをえません。平和であることの大切さを訴え続けることこそ亡くなった学友・教師の鎮魂と信じ、私たちはこの地にひめゆり平和祈念資料館を建設いたしました。

participants follow an in-group/out-group logic? Is the visitor encouraged to identify or not to identify with particular participants?

8.2.1 The Yûshûkan

The excerpts in the section dealing with the discursive construction of groups at the Yûshûkan indicate who the main actors in the narratives are. Since it is said that: “the only purpose of the shrine is to commemorate those who sacrificed their lives for the nation”, it seems reasonable to believe that those who are claimed to have sacrificed themselves for the nation do indeed play the lead roles in the narrative presented.

Our main concern is how Japan’s invasion of China is portrayed. In the exhibition, sections 8, “From the Russo-Japanese War to the Manchurian Incident”, and 10, “The China Incident”, are hence most important and will therefore be subjected to an in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, exhibits in other sections provide a context for these sections and the analysis of the depiction of participants in sections 8 and 10 needs to be supplemented with a brief account of the contents of some of the other parts of the exhibition.

Sections dealing with the Meiji Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War precede the sections with which we are most concerned. The sections relating the war in China are then followed by several exhibition rooms dealing with the Greater East Asian War. The part dealing with the Meiji Restoration begins with an account of the measures taken by the Tokugawa government to strengthen national defence in response to the arrival of foreigners making demands that Japan open up the country. This is described as a national crisis (国難). Western colonialism in Asia is part of the background given – it is said that: “Asia in the 19th century was being devoured by the Western powers”. Treaties were signed that included unequal provisions such as extraterritorial rights. These intrusions exacerbated domestic problems and led to civil war. The sections on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 focus on the military operations in these wars and the main participants are the military actors involved. The sections on the Greater East Asian War similarly concentrate on military operations and military participants.

Table 8.1 Participants in the narrative at the Yûshûkan (actors not in brackets, patients in brackets)

	Section 8	Section 10	Total
Japan ²³⁵	3	1	4
Japanese government participants	5 (1)		5 (1)
Japanese military participants	6 (2)	16 (7)	22 (9)
Our country ²³⁶	7	5	12
Our military ²³⁷	1		1
Japanese civilians ²³⁸	(4)	(1)	(5)
The Japanese people	2		2
Manchurian government actors	1		1
China and the Han-Chinese	3	2	5
Chinese civilians	1 (1)		1 (1)
Chiang Kai-shek		8 (1)	8 (1)
Other Chinese leaders ²³⁹	1	3	4
The GMD government	1		1
Chinese military participants	1	16 (4)	17 (4)
The CCP		1 (1)	1 (1)
The Qin Empire	(1)		(1)
Western countries and governments ²⁴⁰	11 (3)	2	13 (3)
Other participants	8 (1)	7 (1)	15 (2)
Total	51 (13)	61 (15)	112 (28)

Quite a few participants figure in the narrative. Chinese participants in particular are very diverse. The large number of different Chinese participants highlights the fact that China was not a unified country at the time. The relatively low number of different kinds of Japanese participant, in contrast, depicts Japan as a nation that was, at the time, unified and united. Some Japanese military participants are described in more specific terms, for example using the number of the division. Some Japanese military actors who become victims of attacks by Chinese actors are described by name although there are few such cases and Japanese participants are most often depicted as collective actors. Most important, perhaps, is the frequent use of “our country” (我が国), and in one case “our army” (我が軍). The use of these kinds of such phrases encourages Japanese visitors to identify with, and creates continuity between the present and the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s. It becomes very clear that the narrative is a national one when the national identity category is emphasized in this way.

The most common actors are military ones. Japanese military actors are described as carrying out actions commonly associated with war, such as advancing, attacking and most commonly capturing different areas. Chinese military actors perform similar actions

²³⁵ 日本、日本側。

²³⁶ 我が国。

²³⁷ 我が軍。

²³⁸ 在留邦人、居留民。

²³⁹ “Mao Zedong”, “Yuan Shikai”, “Wang Zhaoming” (Jingwei), “Zhang Xueliang”.

but are more often ascribed responsibility for unprovoked attacks on Japanese troops and civilians. The issues of responsibility and how different actions are legitimized are central to how participants are depicted. It is not the case that the Japanese military does not carry out violent acts. It does use force against, attack and even wipe out sections of the Chinese military. However, in such cases, the description of the context in which these actions are carried out often serves to provide mitigating circumstances or to normalize the acts. The Japanese military hence uses force to protect the lives and property of Japanese people living in China when these are threatened. The Japanese military also conducts a “mop-up war” (掃蕩戦) in which it “mopped up the Chinese military” (中国軍を掃蕩した). In the narrative, however, this mop-up war is preceded by accounts of several incidents in which Japanese military personnel had been attacked by Chinese troops. Furthermore, it is unclear from the narrative exactly what these “mop-up operations” involved, suggesting that the term has a euphemistic function. When Chinese actors perform violent acts, on the other hand, there are no justifications or mitigating circumstances – these acts are described in a more explicit and specific way.

There are relatively few patients in the narrative. Military participants being acted on by other military actors are common patients. Apart from these, Japanese civilians also figure as patients in a number of cases. Chinese civilians, on the other hand, do not seem to be affected by the war. In fact, Chinese civilians appear only once in the narrative and this is in connection with an incident that took place in Korea in which Koreans attacked Chinese civilians. The Japanese military deals harshly with Chinese soldiers in a few instances and is described as having used force but the depiction of the Japanese military’s activities is portrayed in terms of legitimate military operations and the depiction of more sensitive episodes is characterized by a high degree of obfuscation. Just as in Chinese narratives, positive self-description as well as negative other-depiction can be found. The ideological square is followed in that “our” bad actions are deemphasized through exclusion and obfuscation. At the same time, “our” good actions are stressed, as in the following example:

The victory in the Russo-Japanese War gave the nations of Asia, who were under the weight of Western powers, a hope of independence. The Chinese nation, through the Xinhai revolution, overthrew the Qin Dynasty and established the Republic of China.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ For example “Germany”, “France”, “the US”, “Russia”, “England” and “Allied countries”.

²⁴¹ 日露戦争の勝利は、西欧列強の重圧下にあったアジア諸民族に独立の希望を与え、漢民族は辛亥革命で清帝国を倒し中華民国を建国した。

In another example of positive self-representation, the Japanese government carries out positive actions:

At the Paris peace conference in 1919, the Japanese government suggested the inclusion of a clause calling for the abolition of racial discrimination in the Articles of the League of Nations but this was dismissed because it was opposed by the US and nations of the Commonwealth.²⁴²

There are also examples of how the Japanese military's actions in China are portrayed in a positive light:

The Central China Expeditionary Army captured the whole Wuhan area. The safety of the people residing in the area and historical heritage was completely ensured and protected.²⁴³

There are several examples of how “our” bad actions are played down or obfuscated. In the description of the Japanese operation to capture Nanjing, the Chinese commander is said to have ignored Japanese military advice to surrender, told his subordinates not to give up and then fled the battlefield. The lack of command led to confusion among the Chinese forces and on 13 December Nanjing fell. The Nanjing Atrocity, referred to as “the Nanjing Incident”, is described in the following way:

On 12 December 1937, General Matsui Iwane, who had surrounded Nanjing, distributed a map on which the foreign interest and refugee areas had been marked in red and the instruction “strict military discipline, no unlawful behaviour“ had been written. Defeated officers and soldiers of the Chinese military who poured to the way of retreat at Xiaguan were all wiped out. In the city, the exposure of stragglers who had changed into civilian clothes and become special plain-clothes forces was strictly carried out.²⁴⁴

That Matsui was sentenced to death by hanging by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for his responsibility for the Nanjing Atrocity is not mentioned. In its account, while omitting the Atrocity as such from its rather vague narrative, the *Yûshûkan* still manages to deny claims made by its ideological opponents. If any civilians were killed, this was, according to the story told, because many Chinese soldiers were disguised as civilians. Furthermore, if civilians were killed, the commander, Matsui Iwane, was not responsible since he had issued an order saying that the city was to be captured in an orderly and lawful fashion. Visitors who are not familiar with the Atrocity will not learn about it at the museum, and those who do know about it are implicitly told that Matsui was not responsible and was hence wrongly con-

²⁴²日本政府は、パリ講和会議において、国際連盟の規約に人種差別撤廃条項を入れることを要求したが、アメリカと英連邦諸国の反対により棄却された。

²⁴³中支那派遣軍は、10月武漢三鎮全域を攻略したが、住民の安全と歴史的遺産は徹底的に保証され、保護された。

victed as a Class A war criminal. Chinese soldiers who retreated are said to have been “wiped out” or “annihilated” (殲滅). The same wording is used in a description of how the German military wiped out its Russian counterpart at Tannenberg. The wiping out of the enemy military does not appear to be extraordinary in war. Words with more negative connotations, such as massacre, are reserved for actions that Japanese patients are subjected to (see below).

There are also several examples of negative other representation. In the following sentence, the negative other representations involving anti-Japanese sentiments has a legitimizing function – it serves to motivate the actions taken by the Kantô Army in Manchuria. These actions are depicted as necessary under the circumstances in order to attain security:

However, China directed the national consciousness and anti-foreign sentiment after the Xinhai revolution towards getting rid of existing treaties. The anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria and sense of crisis among Japanese living there triggered the Kantô Army-led Manchurian Incident that resulted in the establishment of the Manchurian state.²⁴⁵

To protect Japanese residents, the Japanese government sent the 6th division [of the army] to Shandong. ... Around this time, a massacre of Japanese residents was discovered, which infuriated the Japanese people.²⁴⁶

After the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, our country held rights and had interests in Manchuria. However, Chinese nationalism sought the withdrawal of foreign interests without regard for existing treaties, threatening the lives and property of Japanese residents.²⁴⁷

On 29 July, the Chinese security forces of the autonomous government of east Hebei caused a revolt and attacked the Japanese garrison in Tongzhou. (They) massacred 223 out of 385 Japanese residents. This incident infuriated the public opinion in our country.²⁴⁸

Japan-China relations, which had been stable since the Tanggu treaty of 1933, deteriorated again because of the Japanese military's manoeuvres in north China and the intensification of anti-Japanese terrorism by the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of the Comintern.²⁴⁹

In addition to the emphasis on the need for security, the choice of vocabulary is important. In the last sentence, for example, responsibility for the deterioration in bilateral relations is as-

²⁴⁴昭和12年12月、南京を包囲した松井司令官は、隷下部隊に外国権益や難民区を朱書した要図配布して「厳正な軍規、不法行為の絶無」を示達した。敗れた中国軍将兵は退路の下関に殺到して殲滅された。市内では私服に着がえて便衣隊となった敗残兵の摘発が厳しく行われた。

²⁴⁵しかし、中国は辛亥革命以来の民族意識と排外感情を既存条約の打破に向けた。満州における排日運動と在満邦人の危機感が関東軍主導の満州事変の契機となり、満州国の建設となった。

²⁴⁶日本政府は邦人居留民を保護するため、第六師団を山東省に派遣した。...この間、邦人居留民の虐殺事件が発見され、日本国民を憤激された。

²⁴⁷我が国は日露の戦勝で満州に権益を有していたが、中国のナショナリズムは現行条約にかかわらず外国権益の回収を求め、在留邦人の生命財産を脅かした。

²⁴⁸7月29日、冀東自治政府の中国保安隊が反乱を起こして通州の日本軍守備隊を襲撃。在留邦人 385名のうち223名を虐殺した。この事件は我が国の世論を激昂させた。

²⁴⁹昭和八年の塘沽協定で安定を見た日中関係は、現地日本軍の北支工作とコミンテルン指導下の中国共産党による抗日テロの激化により、再び悪化した。

cribed to the actions of both the Japanese military and the CCP. However, the Japanese military's actions are labelled "manoeuvres" whereas the CCP is engaged in "anti-Japanese terrorism". For a military to carry out manoeuvres, even though it remains unclear what these entail, does not seem out of the ordinary – the wording is quite neutral. Terrorism, on the other hand, is a conspicuous term with decidedly negative connotations.

Most of the events that occur in the narrative are described in terms of military operations and words such as massacre (虐殺) and murder (殺害、射殺) are used quite sparsely. When they do occur in the sections of the exhibition discussed here, however, the victims, that is, the victims of these acts, are Japanese. The occurrence of such incidents as well as anti-Japanese activities and sentiment in general serve, in the narrative, to legitimize Japanese military action to protect Japanese civilians and property. The actions of the Japanese military are hence given an air of necessity and the war is portrayed not as a war of aggression but as a "normal war".

That a central purpose of the narrative is to portray the Japanese war effort in terms of a normal war is indicated by other exhibits as well. For example, in June 2005, a stone tablet in memory of Judge Radhabinod Pal, who acted as a judge representing India at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, was erected outside the Yûshûkan. According to the text on the tablet, a text that has been printed in both Japanese and English on paper free for visitors to take, it is stated that Judge Pal was the most outstanding among the judges on the bench. It goes on to claim that he saw through the uncivilized, formalized vengeance sought on the defeated Japan by the victorious, arrogant Allied countries. He also allegedly demonstrated that the indictment, which was full of misconceptions regarding facts, completely lacked legal grounds and that the accused should hence all be found not guilty (Nanbu 2005). Although Judge Pal considered the trial an expression of victor's justice and believed that if Japan was prosecuted, the Western colonial powers should also be indicted, it has been argued that he did not deny that the Japanese military committed atrocities (Brook 2007:150-51, 158-174). An additional reason for erecting the monument is said to be to "engrave, in the minds of all Japanese, the precious teachings" left behind by the now deceased Judge Pal (Nanbu 2005).

Several other exhibits point in the same direction. Maps show how troops advanced and where battles took place. Timelines show the course of operations battle after battle. Photographs focus on Japanese troops marching and parading after having occupied Chinese cities. Old newspaper clippings from Japanese newspapers relating the events of the war

are also on display. In one dealing with the Lugouqiao Incident the heading says: “shots were suddenly fired at our troops”. The heading of a newspaper published after the fall of Nanjing says: “Nanjing – peace restored”. There are also many weapons on display. All in all, the emphasis is very much on military operations and experiences. The plight of civilians is dealt with not for its own sake but as background, providing motivation for military action. Towards the end of the exhibition, there are several rooms in which the walls are covered with photographs of Japanese war dead. As is mentioned above, that the Yûshûkan’s mission is to honour the spirits of the war dead. In these exhibits, the visitor comes face to face with the war dead.

8.2.2 The Yamato Museum

The historical narrative contains 174 sentences. In these we find 51 actors and only five patients. Much of the narrative is made up of descriptions and passive constructions in which things simply happen. The low number of patients is perhaps the most notable result of the linguistic analysis – in only a very small number of instances are participants acted on. Patients are acted on mainly when the Yamato Battleship is attacked by the US military. Actors do of course act – Japanese military actors carry out military operations. However, military operations are seldom described as having a major impact on civilians or on the enemy. In other words, the most negative aspects of war are largely avoided or obfuscated. Civilians, furthermore, play only a minor role in the story told. Factories and companies – the producers of ships, and to a lesser extent aircraft, play a central role. This points to the narrative’s focus on technology – in which positive aspects of war are found.

Table 8.2 Participants in the narrative at the Yamato Museum

	Actors	Patients
Japan	5	
Japanese military participants ²⁵⁰	16	4
Factories and companies in Kure ²⁵¹	14	
Kure City ²⁵²	4	
Kure citizens ²⁵³	3	
US military participants ²⁵⁴	4	
Other participants	5	1
Total	51	5

²⁵⁰ E.g. “the Japanese Navy”, “the Yamato battleship”, “the crew”, other ships and individual officers.

²⁵¹ E.g. “the Kure Arsenal”.

²⁵² 呉市。

²⁵³ 呉市民。

²⁵⁴ 米軍、アメリカ軍。

In contrast to the foreword discussed above, in the historical account presented, phrases such as our country are not used. There are local as well as national participants. National participants include Japan and Japanese military participants. The most common local participants are factories such as the Kure Arsenal. The city of Kure itself also occurs as a participant as well as the citizens of Kure. The contribution of local participants to the national effort is stressed in several places in the narrative. This can be interpreted as a way of creating a positive local identity. The local is part of the national and contributing to the national effort reflects positively on the local. The relation between the local and national is, in other words, perceived in a way similar to that found in several Chinese exhibitions. The economic boom of the early 1930s is described as having originated in the Kure Arsenal. Sports and culture are also said to have prospered in Kure during this time. The local contributes not just to this pre-war economic boom but also to the national war effort by building and repairing battleships, and to the national post-war reconstruction effort. One heading, for example, reads: “Kure, which supported rapid economic growth”.²⁵⁵ Moreover, when recession hit, Kure was in a good position because of its legacy:

In the midst of a worldwide wave of change to low growth, recession also came to Japan. However, Kure City made use of the technological might it had cultivated up until then to overcome the difficulties and developed traditional industries together with new ones.²⁵⁶

This illustrates the continuity between the pre-war, war, and post-war periods, which is central to the narrative. This continuity becomes explicit in the following excerpt:

The Battleship Yamato can be said to have been a ship that crystallized the most recent technology at the time through which, in the area of national power, Japan countered the American side’s quantitative supremacy with quality. This technology has been inherited by present day Japan and supported Japan’s reconstruction and rapid growth.²⁵⁷

Furthermore, the historical account ends with the following statement: “In present-day Kure, various companies exist that have made the shipbuilding, steel and machinery technology inherited from the navy arsenal central”.²⁵⁸ Even though in some cases the national is stressed whereas in other cases the local category is emphasized, most participants in the narrative are

²⁵⁵ 高度経済成長を支えた呉。

²⁵⁶ 世界的な低成長の転換の波の中で日本にも不況が訪れました。しかし、呉市は、これまでに育んだ技術力を活かし、これを克服し伝統産業とともに新しい工業も発展しました。

²⁵⁷ 「大和」は、国力面におけるアメリカ側の“量”に対し、日本が“質”で対抗しようとした艦であり、当時の最新技術の結晶と言えるものでした。その技術は日本の復興と高度成長を支え現代にも受け継がれています。

²⁵⁸ 現在の呉は、海軍工廠の技術を受け継いだ造船・鉄鋼・機械といった企業を中心に様々な企業が存在します。

Japanese. Non-Japanese participants are few. Nonetheless, the narrative departs from a mention of an external threat:

When Japan was faced with the remarkably developed shipbuilding technology of the Western European powers, it felt a strong sense of crisis. Therefore, it created a navy in order to introduce technology for constructing and operating advanced Western types of boat. Admiralty ports were established as bases [for the navy] in many parts of Japan.²⁵⁹

Significantly, it is Western *shipbuilding technology* that constitutes the threat that causes “Japan” to feel “a strong sense of crisis”. Since technology is portrayed as the key to economic development – and it seems, to national security – it makes sense that not having it results in national crisis.

Even though the Japanese military wages war, few non-Japanese participants appear in the narrative. The war in China is mentioned but not dealt with in detail. A map shows areas occupied by Japan and an arrow indicates that the Japanese military moved towards Chongqing. The Manchurian Incident is mentioned on a timeline, but it is not explained. Descriptions without participants are common, for example, “the frontline expands southwards” and “the war progresses to a standstill”. War, then, is often portrayed as something that simply happens. In sentences in which participants do appear they often move into geographical areas or act without acting on a patient:

The Japanese military occupied many parts of South East Asia in a short time. When the frontline expanded southwards, the US military’s counterattack started.²⁶⁰

The depiction of the war is hence characterized by an absence of both victims and perpetrators. This contributes to a narrative that avoids addressing issues concerning responsibility. As long as there is no good and no bad – no perpetrators and no victims – there is, it might be argued, no need to deal with such issues. For example, the tribunals held after the war are not treated. It is mentioned that the facilities of the Kure arsenal were used for reparations but it is not disclosed what this entailed or why reparations were necessary. That victims as well as perpetrators are absent from the narrative has the consequence that war is not condemned or even portrayed as negative. Obviously, death is not absent from the narrative. One section

²⁵⁹西欧列強の著しく発達した造船技術を目にした日本は、強い危機感を抱きました。そこで西洋型の進んだ船の建造・運用技術を導入するため海軍を創り、その拠点としての鎮守府を日本の各地に設置しました。

²⁶⁰日本軍は、短期間のうちに、東南アジア各地を占領しました。戦線が南方へ拡大するなか、アメリカ軍の反撃が開始されます。

deals with the “life of Battleship Yamato” (「大和」の生涯) in an anthropomorphising way. It ends with the following sentence: “At the time of the end of the war, it [Yamato] charged into the Okinawa special attack operation and met with death.”²⁶¹ Not only ships but also people (soldiers) die in the narrative. The section about the life of the Yamato, for example, ends with a display containing a list of the names of all the war dead from the Battleship Yamato. “At the time of the special attack (operation) at Okinawa, the crew left their feelings for their families in notes containing their last words, letters and postcards and went to attack.” While there are relatively few participants in the text, there are many photographs – portraits showing mostly Japanese military personnel or people involved in the construction of battleships. Many of these contributed to the development of the technology involved in the construction of the Battleship Yamato. Several senior officers on board the Yamato are described as having “made their fates one with the Yamato’s”.²⁶²

These deaths are not depicted in terms of victimhood. In fact, in some cases the deaths of soldiers have a heroic air to them. The most explicit example is the story of “Submarine number 6”, which is quite unambiguous in its depiction of heroic sacrifice:

On 15 April 1910, off the new harbour in Iwakuni City, during an underwater navigation drill, water flooded in through a ventilation pipe and the submarine sank 16 meters to the bottom of the sea. The captain, Sakuma Tsutomu, and the 14-member crew all died in the line of duty. Under these crisis circumstances, in the last words left behind by Captain Sakuma, the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the ship, the cause of the accident, suggestions for future submarine technology and even requests for relief for the bereaved of the crew, were written down. This made a deep impression on the people of the world.²⁶³

Photographs of the captain and his crew, along with a reprint of Captain Sakuma’s last words, are on display. Significantly, the submarine sank during a drill, not during battle. Nevertheless, the actions of the captain are described in a heroic way, indicating that it is not necessarily obligatory to engage in battle to be heroic. Rather, it is the exhibiting of a spirit of sacrifice that is central to the meaning-making at work. Although these elements of the heroic emplotment exist, such representations are not abundant in the narrative. However, nor are they insignificant, especially considering the absence of the other main emplotments. It could perhaps also be argued that the Yamato and the technology closely connected with it are heroically portrayed. The Yamato, the “world’s strongest and greatest battleship”, and the technol-

²⁶¹ 戦争終局時には沖縄特攻作戦に出撃、最期を迎えました。

²⁶² 「大和」と運命を共にしました

²⁶³ 明治43（1910）年4月15日、岩国市新湊沖で潜航訓練中、通風筒から浸水し、16メートルの海底へ沈没、佐久間勉艇長をはじめとする乗組員14名の全員が殉職しました。危機的状況に際して佐久間艇長

ogy associated with it, which “supported Japan’s reconstruction and rapid growth” are depicted, if not as heroic, then at least in a positive way – as something for Japanese to be proud of.

8.2.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots

The narrative of the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots can be divided into two parts. The first deals chiefly with the main focus indicated by the name of the museum – the Kamikaze Pilots (or Special Attack Corps). The second, smaller part briefly deals with the wider context providing a short account of the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese War, the Greater East Asian War and life behind the frontline during the Greater East Asian War. This section consists of 17 sentences whereas in the case of the larger section focusing on the Special Attack Corps, 43 sentences have been analysed. All in all, the textual material of the exhibition is relatively limited. Objects used by the Special Attack Corps – ranging from maps to aircraft – have been given prominence in the exhibition. Furthermore, there are walls adorned with photographs of the young pilots and letters written by the pilots are displayed. Since most of the objects on display are in some way related to the pilots, they serve to draw attention to these participants. The participants are also, as becomes clear in Table 8.3, the most common agents in the textual material analysed. The central place occupied in the narrative by the Special Attack Corps also becomes obvious in the headings of the sections in the larger part of the exhibition: “The spirits of the young members of the Special Attack Corps”,²⁶⁴ “Special Attack brave soldiers”,²⁶⁵ “the life of the members of the Special Attack Corps in Chiran”²⁶⁶ and “the backgrounds of the members of the Special Attack Corps”.²⁶⁷

が記した「遺書」には、沈没状況、事故原因、今後の潜水艦技術への提言、乗組員遺族への救済依頼までが書き遺され、世界の人々に深い感銘を与えました。

²⁶⁴ 若き特攻隊員の英霊。

²⁶⁵ 特攻勇士。

²⁶⁶ 特攻隊員の知覧での生活。

²⁶⁷ 特攻隊員の経歴紹介。

Table 8.3 Participants in the first section of the exhibition

	Agents	Patients
Special Attack Corps ²⁶⁸	12	
Other Japanese military participants ²⁶⁹	3	
US military participants ²⁷⁰	1	1
Other participants ²⁷¹	5	
Total	21	1

Table 8.4 Participants in the second section of the exhibition

	Agents	Patients
Japanese military participants	4	1
Our country	2	
Japan	3	
Other Japanese participants ²⁷²	1	1
The USA	1	
US military planes	1	
Other participants ²⁷³	3	
Total	15	2

As is mentioned above, the group discursively constructed at the museum in Chiran is the *national*. The members of the Special Attack Corps are depicted as belonging to this group – it is for this group that they *sacrificed* themselves. It is clear from the tables of participants that almost all participants belong to this national in-group. This preoccupation with the national or Japanese self and relative absence of others is especially striking in the first section of the exhibition. Furthermore, there are few patients in the narrative. With only one notable exception, the few patients that can be found all belong to the in-group. The following exception is the only example of how members of the Special Attack Corps directly attack and do damage to the enemy:

On 21 June 1945 in the vicinity of Okinawa, Lieutenant Nishimiya Tadao and Lieutenant Nagasaki Fukujirô of the 26th unit carried out a special attack using the style four “Shippû” combat plane on the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Curtiss. One of the planes dashed into the side of the ship, causing great damage.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁸ 特攻隊員、特攻隊、隊員たち。

²⁶⁹ 軍、軍部、陸軍。

²⁷⁰ “The US Military” and “the USS Curtiss”.

²⁷¹ “Local residents” and “local high school girls”.

²⁷² “University students” and “men”.

²⁷³ “Holland”, “the UK”, “China”.

²⁷⁴ 昭和20年6月21日第26振部隊西宮忠夫大尉（茨城県）及び永崎福次郎大尉（栃木県）が、沖縄周辺において、アメリカ海軍水上機母艦USS Curtiss を、4式戦闘機『疾風』で特攻攻撃、その内1機が艦側に突入、大きな損害を与えた。

This sentence is, however, an exception. Indeed, it is the only case in which members of the Special Attack Corps directly fight the enemy. Most descriptions of the activities of the Corps focus on the pilots themselves and what they did before they departed on their last missions:

When the time to leave the base drew closer, the members of the corps all lined up in front of the battle command centre and received encouraging words from the commander or strategic staff and after facing east, where the Imperial palace is, in worship, drank a parting cup.²⁷⁵

The enemy, in other words, plays only a very minor part in the narrative. This is also the case in the second part of the exhibition where the Japanese military performs actions that do not directly affect patients, such as invading geographical areas, and in the early phase of the war when they continue to win battles.

It is the loyalty and morality of the pilots that matters, as demonstrated in their worship of the emperor before their departures. The existence of enemies is toned down whereas the devotion of the pilots is stressed. These pilots, as is indicated by the headings mentioned above, are presented as “brave soldiers”. They are, however, portrayed not as invincible heroes that defeat their enemies but rather as tragic heroes, whose heroism rests more on them fulfilling an obligation through making the ultimate sacrifice. This becomes clear in the following text explaining a map on display:

The members of the Special Attack Corps depended only on this map and compass as they flew the one-way 600 kilometres above the sea to Okinawa while enduring the loneliness and tension involved in fulfilling their duty.²⁷⁶

The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots, then, provides a narrative in which the Special Attack Corps play the lead role in a story that largely excludes the effects of the actions carried out by participants. The suffering involved in war is hence left out, as the Special Attack Corps becomes the focal point of the narrative.

8.2.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

An in-depth analysis at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was carried out on 77 sentences from the main textual exhibits. The exhibition consists of three main sections. The first and smallest of these is called “9 August 1945”. The textual material in this section consists of seven sentences. In it, the “scenery of the Urakami area before the bombing is shown at the

²⁷⁵ 出撃の時刻が近づくと隊員たちは、隊ごとに戦闘指揮所前に整列して、軍司令官や作戦参謀から激励の言葉を受け、皇居のある東方を向かって遥拝した後、別れの盃を交した。

²⁷⁶ 特攻隊員たちは、この地図とコンパスだけを頼りに、沖縄までの片道コース 600kmの洋上を、孤独と任務達成の緊張に耐えながら飛んだ。

entrance of the museum and on the right-hand side photographs of the districts of Nagasaki and the daily lives of people in Nagasaki before the bombing are shown” along with a wall clock that stopped at 11:02 a.m., the time of the blast. The second section, “Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombing”, is the largest one and 45 of the analysed sentences can be found in this section. It contains large sub-sections containing many objects and pictures showing the different kinds of damage inflicted on material objects and humans by the bomb – damage caused by heat rays, damage caused by the blast and damage caused by radiation. Other sub-sections include “The Nagasaki Atomic Wasteland”, “Rescue and Relief Activities”, “Appeals by the Atomic Bomb Survivors” and “Events Leading up to the Nagasaki Bombing”. The events referred to are mainly the decision-making process within the US military. The third and last section is quite large – 24 of the analysed sentences can be found in this section. It offers a broader context after the local story of Nagasaki has been told. It begins with a small sub-section called “The War between China and Japan and the Pacific War”. Another part of this section, “The Road to the Atomic Bombing”, shows pictures of people understood as having played a part in the process leading up to the atomic bombings. The rest of this section shows the history of nuclear weapons after the war, including nuclear tests, the victims of these tests and a world map showing the number of nuclear warheads around the world in 2006.

Table 8.5 Participants in the narrative at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

	Actors	Patients
Citizens (of a city)	1	
Citizens' movements	1	
The USA	1	
Hibakusha	1	2
Rescue party	1	
The B-29 Bockscar	1	
People ²⁷⁷	1	3
Surviving doctors and nurses	1	
The Soviet Union	1	
Kuboyama Aikichi		1
Nagai Takashi		1
Soldiers thrown into nuclear tests		1
Japanese		1
Many peoples in Asian countries ²⁷⁸		1
The people (The Japanese people) ²⁷⁹		1
Injured people		1
Japan		1
Total	9	13

²⁷⁷ 人、人々。

²⁷⁸ アジア諸国の多くの民衆。

²⁷⁹ 国民。

Among the 77 sentences analysed, participants figure in 18. Only in two of these sentences does an actor directly act on a patient – the Soviet Union declares war on Japan and the surviving doctors and nurses begin first aid measures on the *hibakusha* (被爆者), the people who were bombed. What is perhaps most striking about Table 8.5 is the large number of participants and the fact that few of these participants figure more than once. Furthermore, the most commonly used term to refer to a participant – “people” – refers to different people in different sentences. In one case it refers to people living close to nuclear test sites in the former Soviet Union who are said to still be suffering. In other cases, it refers to victims of the atomic bombing in Nagasaki. The story told, then, does not focus on or stress the identity of any particular participant. The main thrust of the narrative, it seems, is that atomic bombs hurt people – they hurt humans and they do so in many different ways. This becomes clear in sentences that describe in a more general manner the effects of atomic weapons on the human body: “The atomic bomb radiation pierces into the human body, destroying all sorts of cells”.²⁸⁰ It is also indicated in headings such as “Damage caused by heat rays”, “Damage caused by the blast” and “Damage caused by radiation”, and in the contextualization of the local events focusing on the Cold War period and nuclear tests with headings such as “The Nuclear Age” and “The victims of nuclear tests and accidents”. Nuclear weapons, in other words, do harm not just when used in wars but also when they are tested – their very existence is depicted as a threat. These exhibits focus to a large extent on the effects of the bomb on humans and could hence be seen as emphasizing the victim employment. There are a large number of images illustrating the different kinds of wounds inflicted on human beings by the bomb. Nonetheless, it appears that what is stressed is the effects of the bomb rather than the experiences of the victims of the bomb. This interpretation seems particularly plausible since the victims are not emphasized as belonging to one specific national group. The bomb killed people in the past and may hurt humans again in the future. Providing a systematic account of the effects of the bomb seems to have higher priority than accounts of the victims. Of course, the number of victims is mentioned and there are certainly exhibits that draw attention to the victims. However, many exhibits deal with the effects of the bomb on objects rather than people. These exhibits sometimes draw attention to the owners of the objects but this is often not

²⁸⁰ 原爆の放射線は人体に刺し貫き、そのときいろいろな細胞を破壊する。

the case. This, it appears, is due to the main priority being to provide a systematic account of the effects of the bomb.

Local events are also contextualized as part of the war outside Nagasaki, as in the sub-section “The War between China and Japan and the Pacific War”. This part of the exhibition offers a retrospective historical context starting with “the Sino-Japanese war” and “the Russo-Japanese war”, moving on to the “colonies and occupied territories” and mentioning “the colonisation of Korea” as well as “the war in China”. In this section, the aggressor emplotment can be detected even though it is not emphasized – Japanese aggression is mentioned, even though it does not occupy a central position in the overarching narrative. The local narrative showing the nuclear devastation of Nagasaki along with its connection to nuclear weapons in general is given priority while the parts dealing with the war outside Japan are given less attention. This part dealing with the war outside Japan can be said to be somewhat detached from or at least not clearly integrated with the rest of the exhibition. The museum leaflet highlights the priority given to showing the nuclear devastation of Nagasaki. The text dealing with the second section of the museum, “Damage caused by the Atomic Bombing”, occupies about three-quarters of the section of a leaflet made up of texts and pictures of the exhibits. The section showing “The War between China and Japan and the Pacific War” is not mentioned in the text but only on the map of the exhibition rooms (Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum). This part of the exhibition is clearly being downplayed or backgrounded. This is also the case elsewhere as responsibility for the war is obfuscated, as in the following sentence: “Not only Japanese people but the people of other Asian countries were caught up in the war and became victims in various ways”.²⁸¹

There is also a timeline in which the use of fragments and short sentences has consequences for agency. Nominalisations are frequent, leading to the exclusion of agents. Notable examples are “(1937) December Nanking captured, great massacre takes place”²⁸² and “(1938) February bombing of Chongqing starts”.²⁸³ However, the Nanjing Atrocity is mentioned as a “great massacre” (大虐殺) and agency is differently presented in the short films that the visitor can watch in this part of the exhibition. Here, it is quite clear who perpetrated the massacre in Nanking: “When taking Nanking, the Japanese military murdered and vio-

²⁸¹ 日本人だけでなく、アジア諸国の多くの民衆が戦争に巻き込まれ、さまざまな形で犠牲となった。

²⁸² (1937) 12月南京占領、大虐殺事件おこる

²⁸³ (1938) 2月重慶爆撃始まる

lated Chinese prisoners and civilians, causing a great massacre”.²⁸⁴ An active verb form is used to show who did the killing as well as who were killed. The wording employed is one often associated with progressive views of the war. This is the case not only when referring to the Nanjing Atrocity but also when referring to the Japanese invasion of China. The more progressive choice of words is used in the film shown, that is, “*shinryaku*” (侵略) meaning “aggression” or “aggressive invasion”: “Japanese aggression spread from Manchuria to all of China”.²⁸⁵ Responsibility is downplayed not only when dealing with Japanese actions but also, for example, when US actions are discussed. The decision-making behind the dropping of the bomb is dealt with but in a way that divorces it from the actual dropping and the effects of the bomb.

8.2.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

The museum is divided into two connected buildings each of which houses one exhibition. The East Building “[t]ells the story of Hiroshima before and after the bombing”, whereas the Main Building “[t]ells the story of August 6 in photographs, the belongings of A-bomb victims and other artifacts”. The exhibitions are divided into sections:

The East Building (東館)

1. Hiroshima before the atomic bombing (被爆までの広島)
2. The atomic bomb (原子爆弾)
3. Hiroshima in ruins (廃虚の広島)
4. War, the atomic bomb and citizens/city people (戦争・原爆と市民)
5. The nuclear era (核時代)
6. Steps towards peace (平和への歩み)

The Main Building (本館)

1. 6 August 1945 (1945年8月6日)
2. Damage from heat rays (熱線による被害)
3. Damage from the blast (爆風による被害)
4. Damage from conflagration (高熱火災による被害)
5. Damage from radiation (放射線による被害)
6. First aid and relief activities (救援救護活動)
7. A-bomb drawings by citizens/city people (市民が描いた原爆の絵)
8. Recorded testimony of atomic bomb survivors (被爆者は語る)
9. Messages for peace (平和へのメッセージ)

Visitors first enter the East Building, which consists of three floors. On the third floor the visitor enters the Main Building through a bridge that connects the two structures. The exit is

²⁸⁴南京占領では、日本軍は中国兵捕虜や一般市民を殺害・暴行するなど、大虐殺事件を引き起こした。

²⁸⁵日本の侵略が満州から中国全土へ広がった。

in the Main Building. In other words, the visitor will first see the contextualizing section before being exposed in greater detail to the local events, that is, the dropping of the bomb and the effects of the bomb. The headings listed above indicate that the focus, especially in the second exhibition, is very much on the bomb and its effects. In these headings, moreover, few participants can be found. Citizens are mentioned in heading number four of the exhibition in the East Building, and in the headings in the Main Building we come across citizens and “atomic bomb survivors”. The latter could be seen as referring to patients, that is, those who have been acted on (by the bomb).

There are a large number of participants featured in the narrative of the East Building, reflecting the long time span dealt with. Many participants only appear once or twice and many only appear in one section or in one of the time periods treated.

Table 8.6 Participants in the narrative at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

	Actor	Patient
Hiroshima (city) and local and prefectural government participants	15	
Citizens of Hiroshima	17	8
Victims ²⁸⁶	16	6
Japanese military and government participants whose Japanese-ness is not explicated ²⁸⁷	19	5
Japan	6	1
Japanese	3	
The Japanese military	3	
The Japanese government	2	
Koreans	1	4
Chinese people		2
US participants ²⁸⁸	20	
The Soviet Union	6	
Other participants ²⁸⁹	40	7
Total	148	33

There is relatively little continuity in participant categories between different sections. The continuity that can be found is in the local category – participants tied to the local, to the city of Hiroshima, can be found in almost all sections and throughout the time period dealt with. This goes both for civilians and the military. Japanese participants are numerous and never lumped together into a united national group. The Japanese military, and different military units, especially the fourth division, a unit which had its home base in Hiroshima, is the most commonly mentioned participant in the first part of the exhibition but is hardly mentioned

²⁸⁶ People described as victims, for example Atom-bombed people (被爆者) and “victims” (犠牲者).

²⁸⁷ For example “the fifth division” (第五師団) and the “Imperial General Headquarters” (大本營).

²⁸⁸ “The USA”, US military participants, “Truman” and “Eisenhower”.

²⁸⁹ For example “foreign countries”, “citizens’ groups”, “children and unborn babies” (児童、子供たち、胎児), “repatriated people” (for example from Manchuria) (引揚者).

after this period. Local civilians are mentioned only a few times in the first part but become an increasingly common participant. Especially in the last section, “Steps towards peace”, local people as well as the local government dominate. Different actors belonging to the central government are mainly mentioned in the first part.

What is perhaps most noteworthy concerning the participants in the narrative in the East Building is that the number of sentences in which one participant acts on another, that is, an agent does something to a patient, is extremely small – there are only four such instances in the whole exhibition, which consists of 401 sentences. Often, agents act but not on other participants. Sentences in which a patient is being acted on, but not by an agent mentioned in the sentence (agent exclusion) are numerous. Furthermore, in a large number of sentences things happen without either agents or patients being mentioned. The overall effect is that history is portrayed as something that is not made but happens. One of the four sentences in which an agent does act on a patient is quoted below. The sentence appears in the section dealing with the war in China. It is said that after the Japanese military captured Nanjing the Japanese people (国民), who believed the war was a sacred war (聖戦) cheered and the citizens of Hiroshima celebrated the event by organizing a lantern parade. “In Nanking at that time, however, many Chinese people were being massacred by the Japanese Army”.²⁹⁰ The text goes on to say: “regarding the number of victims, there are several theories that give numbers between tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands depending on the area and time period”. It is mentioned that “the Chinese side says the number of victims was 300,000”.²⁹¹ The only image is a photograph showing the lantern parade held in Hiroshima.

However, Nanjing is further connected to local events in that the exhibition also mentions that some of the Japanese military’s Fifth Division troops, who were based in Hiroshima, were in Nanjing in December 1937. It has been argued elsewhere that a focus on local events at Japanese peace museums makes possible the creation of comfortable narratives in which aggression can be avoided (Seaton 2007:170-71). However, the treatment of the Nanjing Atrocity at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum shows that the local can also be tied to atrocious acts committed on the continent. In other words, the aggressor emplotment is present here. At the same time, while the photograph in the Hiroshima exhibition connects the local with the most infamous atrocity committed in China, the photograph of the lantern pa-

²⁹⁰ しかし、その南京では、当時、日本軍により多くの中国の人びとが虐殺されていました。

²⁹¹ 中国側は、犠牲者数を30万人と言っています。

rade does not underline and illustrate the horror of the event in the way that images showing victims arguably would.

China is mentioned elsewhere in the section dealing with Hiroshima during the war. In this section is the heading: “Forced labour of Koreans, Chinese and others”.²⁹² The text mentions that on the basis of the National Mobilization law, which was adopted in April 1938, an order to conscript the people (国民) was administered. Labourers working in private factories were therefore forcibly conscripted to work in military factories. This, it is said, also applied to Koreans and others. Thousands of people were brought to the prefecture and forced to work at a power plant in the northern part of the prefecture and at military factories in the city. It is said that: “Some of these people, who worked under inferior conditions, became victims of the atomic bomb”.²⁹³ While this passage highlights the wartime practice of forcibly bringing Koreans, Chinese and others to Japan to work in inferior conditions, it also exemplifies the use of passive forms and nominalizations enabling agent deletion. Such constructions are extremely common throughout the exhibition and serve to obfuscate agency and responsibility. Here, the agents who drafted and adopted the law, as well as those administering the order, are excluded just as are those who brought and forced Koreans, Chinese and others to labour in Japan. Furthermore, as some of these people are described as having become “victims of the atomic bomb”, the agent behind the dropping of the bomb is, of course, also excluded.

The Japanese military’s war in China is similarly portrayed in a way that, in some instances, makes responsibility rather vague. For example, it is said that: “the 1931 ‘Manchurian Incident’ became a trigger for the Japanese military’s war in China” and that in 1937, this “expanded into a full-scale Sino-Japanese war”. Here, human agency is hidden by linguistically ascribing agency to an incident. The visitor thus receives no information concerning who caused the incident. This kind of unclear depiction of agency, however, occurs in descriptions not only of the behaviour of Japanese actors but of agency in general. This is very much the case concerning US agency. The USA figures as an agent mainly in two parts of the exhibition in the East Building: the second, “The atomic bomb”; and the fifth, “The nuclear era”. The first of these sections deals with US agency in the decision-making concerning the development of the bomb, the choice to use it against Japan and the choice to drop it on Hiroshima. The decision to use the bomb against Japan is depicted most explicitly in the

²⁹² 朝鮮人・中国人などの強制連行。

²⁹³ 劣悪な労働条件のもとで就業していたこれらの人たちの一部は、原爆で被災することになりました。

sentence saying that in September 1944 “the leaders of the USA and the UK agreed on the use of the atomic bomb against Japan”.²⁹⁴ While responsibility for the decision to drop the bomb is therefore made clear, the depiction of the decision-making is divorced from the actual act of dropping the bomb and more importantly from the effects of the bomb on the victims on the ground. Although it is mentioned that: “the Japanese government, on 10 August 1945, protested that this new type of bomb was a cruel, inhumane weapon and its use against international law”, such a description does not occur elsewhere.

In the section on the nuclear era, the USA is again the main actor, this time together with the Soviet Union. The section depicts the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers during the Cold War, and the development of more advanced weapons. The problems surrounding nuclear weapons are discussed, such as their negative effects on the environment. In this section, just as in the other sections of the exhibition, the scarce use of predication is noteworthy. Actors and the actions performed by actors are only rarely predicated. The most commonly predicated participants are the victims. For example, the radiation is said to “injure even *completely guiltless* unborn babies” (emphasis added).²⁹⁵ However, even in depictions of victims, predication only seldom occurs. Partly because of this low occurrence of predication, the boundaries between self and other and between good and bad are not clearly drawn. The large number of participants and relative lack of continuity throughout the historical period also contribute to this. In the sixth part of the exhibition, however, a local positive self-identity is created for the city of Hiroshima and its citizens as playing a pivotal role in the anti-nuclear peace movement: “Whenever a nuclear test is reported, the city of Hiroshima objects to the government of the country conducting the test”.²⁹⁶ In this sentence, those conducting the tests function as others, whose objectionable actions contribute to defining the positive nature of the self, whose mission it is to work for the righteous goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. While it is mainly the *local* self that is positively represented, in one instance, in the section on the nuclear era, it is mentioned that Japan in 1968 adopted the three principles of not manufacturing, not possessing and not harbouring nuclear weapons. In this section, the Japanese act of adopting these non-nuclear principles is contrasted with the arms race in which the USA and the Soviet Union are engaged, thereby contributing to the construction of a positive *national* self-identity. Having pointed out the existence of such constructions, however, it must be emphasized that the main other in the narrative appears to be

²⁹⁴ アメリカとイギリスの首脳は日本への原爆使用を合意しました。

²⁹⁵ まったく罪のない胎児でさえも傷つける。

the bomb itself rather than any foreign country. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the kinds of construction discussed above are rare and that negative descriptions of Japanese participants are also part of the story in the depiction of the Japanese military's occupation of Nanjing and the treatment of forced labourers from Korea, China and elsewhere. This suggests that maybe the current peaceful local self is partly being defined in relation to the past warmongering national self. In addition, agency is, as is mentioned above, relatively uncommon in the narrative.

Images in the first part of the exhibition mostly show Hiroshima in the period before the bomb was dropped. Other sections are similarly predictable in that they illustrate the themes dealt with – the third and fourth sections show photographs of Hiroshima as a wasteland after the bomb was dropped and the last section includes photographs showing those taking the steps towards peace. The largest exhibit in the East Building consists of two large models of Hiroshima: one showing the city before the bombing and one after. This installation, located on the first floor in the middle of the first room that visitors enter, uses contrast to demonstrate the extent of the destruction that the city was subjected to. It hence draws attention to the local – the effect of the bomb and the victimhood employment.

The headings, into which the exhibition in the Main Building is divided, like those of the first exhibition, never mention any agency behind the dropping of the bomb. These headings instead draw attention to the bomb itself and the damage caused by it. This is very much the impression given – that the damage was caused by the bomb rather than by the agents who dropped it. The opening texts that follow the headings in each section of the Main Building could be said to have a highlighting function. These texts are summarizing introductions to each section. Among these initial texts, only in the first is the agent behind the dropping of the bomb mentioned, although not explicitly as the agent behind the dropping of the atomic bomb: “At the end of the Pacific War, all of Japan day after day underwent the US military's bombing”.²⁹⁷ The text goes on to explain that Hiroshima, however, had not undergone air raids and that it is probable that more than 300,000 people were living in the city.

Discussion of the results of the bomb starts in the second section. After the introduction to each section, the visitor encounters large numbers of objects in classificatory, static displays. The first section of the second exhibition contains about 30 objects that used

²⁹⁶ 核実験が報道されるたびに、広島市は実験国の政府に抗議しています。

²⁹⁷ 太平洋戦争末期、日本全土は連日アメリカ軍の爆撃を受けていました。

to belong to victims, including a clock stopped at 8.15 a.m., the time the bomb was dropped, uniforms worn by schoolchildren, a lunchbox carried by a child on his way to school and a three-wheeled bicycle that belonged to a 3-year old child. The descriptions of all these objects include the names of the owners, their location at the time of the blast and how far they were from the epicentre. These tragic descriptions typically feature the story of what the owner was doing at the time s/he was bombed as well as the time of death. The ordinariness of the activities in which the victims were involved at the time they were exposed to the atomic bomb, such as schoolchildren walking to school, adults on their way to work and small children playing outside their homes, invite identification. The extreme effects of the bomb are shown in the large number of displays of objects that people recognize and may themselves often use in their daily lives. This arguably brings the experience “closer to home” – it becomes easier to relate to. Visitors would most probably understand the objects on display as having been affected by the dropping of the bomb even without the captions. However, these captions function as more than labels that merely tell visitors what these deformed objects used to be. They also provide information concerning to whom these objects used to belong, who the owner was and what happened to the owner following the blast. These stories often end with the death of the owner of the object.

In this part of the exhibition, the only place in which the existence of an actor behind the dropping of the bomb is hinted at is a passage that mentions that just before the blast, some people in Hiroshima saw the B-29 drop small parachutes. Immediately after this, the atomic bomb exploded. Apparently, the parachutes were equipped with wireless devices used to measure the change in air pressure and temperature following the blast. The B-29 is also mentioned in some of the testimonies by atomic bomb survivors towards the end of the exhibition. Elsewhere in the exhibition in the Main Building, however, the agent behind the dropping of the bomb is left unmentioned. In some of the testimonies, the discriminatory policies and behaviour towards Koreans in Hiroshima at the time is mentioned and one survivor describes the war as a war of aggression before moving on to the events of 6 August. The point is, however, that the exhibits highlight the victims and the impact the bomb had on the victims, whereas the perpetrator is not just backgrounded but almost excluded entirely. This is not true for all parts of the museum exhibition, as is shown above in the analysis of the exhibition in the Eastern Building. However, on the whole, the role of the perpetrator is minimized.

Participants in this exhibition are often labelled with their names and/or their occupations. The term *Hibakusha* (被爆者, atomic bomb victim or atomic bombed person) is frequently used. Doctors, nurses and other people who took part in the relief work are also mentioned. These participants are not described in terms of nationality except when it is pointed out that there are also *hibakusha* who are not Japanese. This could, of course, be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese nationality of many participants is taken for granted. Yet, and crucially, it is not emphasized. On the contrary, words highlighting the local category are more frequently used.

The pattern described above as dominating the first part of the exhibition in the Main Building also governs the rest of the exhibition. The focus is on the damage done by the bomb and the effects on the victims, whereas the actors behind the dropping of the bomb are excluded. Linguistically, this results in several constructions in which agency is ascribed to “the bomb” and “the blast”. The following excerpt found under the heading “People who became victims of fires”²⁹⁸ is a typical construction: “The fires caused by the atomic bomb, did not just burn down buildings, the fires caused people to be burnt to death and caused burn injuries”.²⁹⁹ Both the heading and the sentence that follows it illustrate how agency is commonly ascribed to the bomb itself. In this case, the bomb causes fires, which in turn kill and injure people. In the heading, people become victims of fires. Similar constructions are abundant in the exhibition in the Main Building. In other words, people are victimized by the bomb and the fires caused by the bomb, while the agents who actually dropped it are concealed. This is also the case in the museum brochure, as well as in a booklet called *The Outline of Atomic Bomb Damage in Hiroshima* compiled by the museum in 1999. Both texts start with sentences that focus on the bomb while excluding human agency. According to the brochure, for example, “At 8.15 a.m. on 6 August 1945, Hiroshima became the first city in the world to be damaged by the atomic bomb”.³⁰⁰ This is indicative of the emphasis put on the bomb and the damage done by the bomb, rather than on human responsibility, throughout the exhibition. This, as is noted above, is a pattern that can be seen on all levels in the two exhibitions – in headings, in textual material, and in the installations, objects and images on display.

²⁹⁸ 火災の犠牲になった人びと。

²⁹⁹ 原子爆弾による火災は、建物を焼失させただけでなく、人びとには火災による焼死や火傷などの被害をもたらしました。

³⁰⁰ 1945(昭和20)年8月6日午前8時15分、広島は世界で初めて原子爆弾による被害を受けました。

8.2.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum

In the analysis of the narrative at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, 500 sentences were closely analysed. In Table 8.7 it is possible to see how the main actors and patients change in the five different parts of the overall narrative. In the first part, “the road to the Battle of Okinawa”, Japanese colonial expansion in Asia is traced back to 1879, when the Meiji government turned the Ryukyu kingdom into Okinawa prefecture and started its Japanization efforts through a “policy of making imperial subjects” (皇民化政策). The large number of Japanese actors in this section reflects Japanese policies towards Okinawa as well as its “policies of aggression towards foreign countries” (海外への侵略政策). The US military becomes a more central actor towards the end of the first section when Japanese and US military confrontation increases. In the second section, “The Battle of Okinawa as witnessed by local residents: The Typhoon of Steel”, which concentrates on the events during the Battle of Okinawa, the US and Japanese militaries continue to play the lead roles as they fight each other on Okinawan soil. In both these sections, Okinawan participants are the main patients of the narrative – they are the ones most commonly being acted on. This reflects the role of Okinawans as victims. They sometimes get caught in the crossfire and they are sometimes victimized intentionally, most commonly by the Japanese military. In the third and fourth sections, the textual material to analyse in detail is quite scarce. It consists mainly of testimony by surviving Okinawans, telling their stories of what happened during the battle. These point to the victim emplotment and sometimes also to the perpetrator emplotment. The last section, “Keystone of the Pacific”, deals with the post-war period. Here, Okinawan participants become actors to a significantly larger degree than before, reflecting mainly the struggles of Okinawans demanding compensation for land confiscated to build US military bases and for reversion of the islands to Japan. Thus, while some US post-war policies are positively portrayed, the US actors are depicted in this section in part as oppressors ruling through the “suppression of human rights” (人権の抑圧).

Table 8.7 Participants in the narrative at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (actors not in brackets, patients in brackets)

	Section 1: the road to the Battle of Okinawa	Section 2: The Ty- phoon of Steel	Section 3: A hell on earth	Section 4: Testimony	Section 5: Keystone of the Pacific
Japan	16				2 (2)
Japanese government participants ³⁰¹	10				1
Japanese military participants ³⁰²	15	14 (1)	2		
The USA and US government participants	2				11
US military participants	10 (1)	12			17
Okinawan participants ³⁰³	3 (29)	2 (20)	(1)		19 (6)
Other participants	24 (8)	(1)			6
Total	80 (38)	28 (22)	2 (1)		56 (8)

Much of the presentation can be described as a matter-of-fact account. The heroic emplotment is largely missing. The approach seems to be that there are no heroes in war. The closest we get to a heroic depiction is when the Okinawan reversion movement is described, but even here the descriptions are quite sombre. The following description of the reversion movement is perhaps the most heroic description in the narrative: “Together with the land struggle it is ranked as the most magnificent movement in Okinawa’s post-war history”.³⁰⁴ This kind of predication is, however, an exception. Furthermore, even though reversion and therefore life under the peace constitution was achieved, US bases remained in Okinawa and Japanization after reversion is described as having threatened Okinawan identity: “the fading of Okinawan-ness was clamoured against and people sought the establishment of an Okinawan identity. They felt a local distinctiveness and there was a tendency to feel the need to value this”.³⁰⁵

It follows from the overview above that the US as well as Japanese governmental and military actors to some extent function as “others” with which “we” and “our” qualities are contrasted. While the we, the Okinawans, have always loved peace, the Japanese and US militaries and governments have waged war and victimized “us” and others. It needs to be stressed, however, that such negative other representations of US and Japanese actors are not consistently employed – not all their actions are negative. The level of predication is low and participants are almost always described using rather neutral terms. Value-laden lan-

³⁰¹ For example “the Meiji government” and “the Japanese government”.

³⁰² For example “the Japanese military”, “the Japanese navy” and “the Okinawa defence army”.

³⁰³ For example “local residents”, “civilians”, “the reversion movement” and “Ryûkyû”.

³⁰⁴ 土地闘争とともに沖縄の戦後史の壮大な運動として位置づけられている。

³⁰⁵ 沖縄らしさの風化が叫ばれ、沖縄のアイデンティティーの確立を求め、地域の独自性を自覚し、それを大切にしていこうとする傾向もおこった。

guage is not common and the US and Japanese military actors are not depicted as evil. In other words, the ideological square is not employed to a very great extent. Nonetheless, the perpetrator emplotment does figure in the narrative. This is most obvious when it comes to the depiction of Japanese military actors. For example, “the Japanese military viewed Okinawan local residents as spies and tortured and massacred (拷問や虐殺をしたり) [local residents]”. There are a number of sections in which such atrocities and atrocious acts are described.³⁰⁶ There are also several headings that draw attention to the behaviour of the Japanese military in an explicit way: “Local resident victims of the Japanese military”,³⁰⁷ “Massacres of civilians seen as spies”,³⁰⁸ “Group deaths forced by the Japanese military”,³⁰⁹ “Massacres of babies and infants”³¹⁰ and “Massacres of Koreans”.³¹¹

While Japanese military actors are ascribed responsibility for the most hideous and atrocious acts, Japan and Japanese government actors are depicted as carrying out actions linked mainly to national policies regarding, for example, colonies and expansion. This includes adopting policies of aggression against neighbouring countries, and assimilation policies such as building Shinto gates and shrines in colonies and forcing people in these colonies to pay homage at shrines.³¹² It should be noted that “Japan” functions as an actor in additional sentences but is not explicitly mentioned. It is, however, clear from the context, for example, that in a paragraph in which “Japan” is mentioned as an actor in the first sentence it is also the

³⁰⁶ The actions of the Japanese military include the following: Japanese military actors conquered territories, retreated, transferred brigades to Okinawa, forcibly mobilized large numbers of local residents including elementary school children, cracked down on spies, severely oversaw the local residents to the point of issuing a notice according to which “anyone speaking the local dialect would be dealt with as a spy”, attacked the US air task force, organized kamikaze special attack corps, lost greatly, mobilized students, avoided confrontation and barricaded themselves underground for a war of attrition, resisted fiercely but retreated to the South in late May, ousted them from trenches and, in order not to have their locations revealed to the US military, even killings (殺害) of infants occurred, robbed food supplies from civilians and forced those who were seen as a burden on the battlefield to die (死を強要した).

³⁰⁷ 日本軍による住民犠牲。

³⁰⁸ スパイ視虐殺。

³⁰⁹ 日本軍による集団死。

³¹⁰ 乳幼児虐殺。

³¹¹ 朝鮮人の虐殺。

³¹² The actions of Japan and Japanese government include the following: carried out the Okinawa disposition against the Ryukyu kingdom backed by force, schemed to invade neighbouring countries, carried out the Ryukyu disposition to make Ryukyu Japanese territory, carried out an assimilation policy in Okinawa, tried to expand its influence and clashed with Qing (China) over Korea, Japan won (the Sino-Japanese War), Japan and Russia clashed, moved to expand its interests in China, plotted to advance (進出) into the continent (in other words China) and therefore instigated the Manchurian Incident in 1931, launched Southern advance to seek resources for the war effort, adopted emigration as a national policy, the fascist Japanese state withdrew from the League of Nations, prohibited teaching in the local language in Korea and Taiwan, forced people in the colonies to speak Japanese, forced people in Korea to change their names (into Japanese names), made school children (in Korea) recite the “Oath of Imperial Subjects” every morning, entered into a total war system, developed the “National movement for full spiritual mobilization” to heighten the fighting spirit of the people, decided to evacuate women, children and elderly, instituted universal male suffrage, accepted the Potsdam declaration.

actor in the following three sentences even though direct mention of this is excluded. The actor is not excluded to avoid ascribing responsibility for the acts dealt with. This is the case in eight sentences in the first section. This kind of agent exclusion occurs in the depiction of other agents as well. However, “Japan” is excluded in this way in a larger number of sentences than is the case when other actors are treated.

US military actors are not depicted as negatively as their Japanese counterparts. Nonetheless, a few headings draw attention to the fact that the US occupation is seen in a negative light: “Suppression of human rights” (人権抑圧), “Suppressing freedom of speech” (言論抑圧) and “Pressure towards the reversion movement”.³¹³ It is stated that the US military “used ‘horse-rider tactics’, throwing explosives into cavities in which Japanese soldiers and local residents were hiding, making many people victims”. Nonetheless, the actions of the US military differ from those of the Japanese military in that they do not include as many atrocious acts. Its military actions may have had serious consequences but this does not become as explicit as is the case with the Japanese military’s actions.³¹⁴ Similarly, the portrayal of the USA and US government actors includes somewhat authoritarian policies in ruling Okinawa after the war but the colonial policies of the Japanese government are arguably portrayed as having been considerably worse.³¹⁵

Okinawans appear as actors, mainly in the last part of the exhibition but also in the first section. The image painted of the Okinawan reversion movement is one that grows stronger and more convinced with time. While it may seem strange to some that Okinawans wanted to be part of Japan after many had been victimized by the Japanese military, it is claimed that one reason was that people wished to live under the peace constitution.³¹⁶ Okina-

³¹³ 復帰運動への圧力。

³¹⁴ The actions of US military actors include the following: won a decisive victory at Midway, prepared to invade, attacked Naha in five waves with more than 1000 planes causing large damage, conducted a preparatory assault on Leyte, began air raids on Taiwan and Yaeyama, landed on Leyte, mobilized 189 ships and 1300 planes for major battle, planned meticulously for the invasion, used its material superiority to indiscriminately bomb Okinawa through air raids and from battleships, carried out landing operations, subdued the whole area (central Okinawa) in a week, launched an attack on Shuri, hunted the Japanese military in mop-up operations, attacked with all kinds of modern weapons, set up refugee camps after the war, appointed mayors and police in refugee camps, set up newspapers, encouraged the arts, opened orphanages, distributed free food, started building roads.

³¹⁵ The actions of the USA and US government actors include the following: adopted New Deal policies, tightened sanctions against Japan, proclaimed the “Truman doctrine”, created USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands), put financial pressure on cities in which mayors advocating reversion had been elected, severely pressured the reversion movement.

³¹⁶ The following sentences exemplify how Okinawans figure as actors: Okinawan groups are described as having criticized government approved textbooks and carried out anti-war activities, but their leaders were suppressed. Okinawans became intensely concerned about their rights (under US rule). They came to know the reality of military rule in the 1950s. They took part in the Koza riot and burned US cars. They demanded the removal of B-52s and poison gas (from Okinawa) and started a strong movement. They participated in the reversion movement. 85 000 people participated in protest rally (after a school girl was raped by US soldiers).

wans are by far the most common patients in the narrative and in many cases these patients are victimized, most commonly and brutally by the Japanese military, but in some cases by US soldiers. In one example, it is mentioned that in 1995 an Okinawan schoolgirl was raped by US soldiers. This led several local groups to organize a large rally in which 85,000 people participated. Nonetheless, it is considerably more common in the narrative for Okinawans to be victimized by the Japanese than the US military. A number of sentences stress Okinawan victimhood: “There were also cases in which local residents in possession of leaflets from the US military recommending surrender or advocating surrender themselves were considered traitors (非国民) and were killed in massacres”.³¹⁷ Okinawan victimhood is also illustrated in other kinds of exhibits, such as a map, which shows where Okinawans died in the Pacific. Another map shows where ships carrying evacuees from Okinawa were sunk, and the number of victims is shown in a table. There is also a table in a display in which the crimes of and accidents caused by the US military before reversion are listed. Many cases are listed of local civilians killed by US soldiers. There are also many images showing civilian victims.

Not all victims are Okinawans, although many of them are. Other victims of Japanese aggression who share experiences similar to those of the Okinawans are also dealt with. China is not mentioned much in the narrative. Japan is, however, said to have moved to expand its interests in China and to have confronted China in 1915 with the Twenty-One Demands. It is also mentioned that, using the threat of force, Japan made China accept most of these demands. This is said to have given rise to opposition among the Chinese people and triggered an anti-Japanese movement. In 1931, Japan is said to have plotted to advance (進出) into the continent (China) and therefore instigated the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Furthermore, in 1936, Japan adopted emigration as a national policy. As part of this emigration policy, many were sent to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, partly to function as rear support for the Kwantung Army. The Nanjing Massacre (南京大虐殺) is mentioned on a map illustrating the 15-year war in China. However, Taiwan and Korea are given more attention than China.

³¹⁷ The following sentences exemplify how Okinawan patients are depicted: As in Taiwan and Korea, people were forced to change their names. They became victims when evacuation boats were sunk. They were caught up in the battle and lost their lives. They were forced to bear the heavy burdens of providing “soldiers, industrial workers and food” (for the military). They were conscripted for labour. They were forced to cooperate with the military on the battlefield. They were organized into ‘patriot corps’ (国士隊) whose ‘special mission’ it was to spy on other local residents. They were drafted. School children were mobilized. They starved. Apart from victims of the indiscriminate shell bombing by the US and Japanese militaries, murders of local residents by the Japanese military occurred in many places. Where the US military was approaching, the policy of instructing people that “soldiers and civilians must live and die together” had been adopted and in many places parents, children, relatives and acquaintances were hence ordered and forced to kill each other in large groups (集団死). Because of orders from the Japanese military many local residents became victims of malaria because they were evacuated to malaria-infected areas.

This seems to be because the Taiwanese and Korean colonial experiences had more in common with Okinawa, since similarly oppressive colonial policies were adopted in these colonies. For example, it is mentioned that: “as in Taiwan and Korea, people were forced to change their names”. Koreans also figure as victims in other ways. For example, it is mentioned that many “comfort women” were forcibly sent from the Korean peninsula. Since the women were forced to travel with the troops many of them became victims on the battlefield. There is also a map showing the distribution of “comfort stations” in Okinawa and it is mentioned that many people were forcibly taken from Korea to work for the military. About 10,000 of these are said to have become victims.

In sum, it can be said that the victim and perpetrator emplotments are both present in the narrative. The main victims are Okinawans while the most common perpetrators are Japanese military actors. US military actors also figure as perpetrators in some sections while being depicted in a more “neutral” way elsewhere. Since the level of predication is low and actors are seldom described using value-laden terms, the effect is that those who commit terrible deeds are not ascribed the identity of perpetrator. They may have committed horrific deeds but they are not stressed as necessarily being horrible people. They may have committed these deeds under extreme circumstances.

8.2.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum

In all, 259 sentences were analysed. In some sections there are few participants whereas in others the number of participants is quite high. Sections with few participants are, for example, those dealing with the education system. Sections in which there are many participants are those that deal with what happened on the battlefield. Table 8.8 shows that the Himeyuri students are the main participants in the narrative. They are the most common actors as well as the most common patients. Japanese military participants also figure quite prominently in both roles while US military participants are almost always agents.

Table 8.8 Participants in the narrative at the Himeyuri Peace Museum

	Actors	Patients	
Himeyuri student participants (students, pupils)	42	34	
Japan	5	2	
Japanese military participants (The Okinawa Defence Army)	15	14	
Japanese government participants	3		
US military participants	15	2	
Teachers	5	5	
Okinawan civilians and local residents	2	6	
Other participants	4		
Total	91	63	

Even though the students are the most common actors many of their actions are conducted against the background of militaristic education and coercion. The chores that the students were forced to carry out under extreme and dangerous conditions are described in the sections in which the students are actors. The function is chiefly to depict the terrible circumstances under which these young students of between 15 and 19 years old risked and in many cases lost their lives. There are many Japanese military patients. This is because they are patients not just linguistically but also in the medical sense of the word. These military participants are, however, usually labelled “wounded soldiers” or “patients”, whereas when Japanese military participants figure as actors they are usually labelled “Japanese military”. The students took care of the wounded soldiers – hence the large number of Japanese military patients.

The Japanese military is not demonized but it is ascribed culpability. Japanese military actors figure as victimizers several times in the narrative. Responsibility is dealt with in the narrative although it is not always very explicit:

The US military regarded the Battle of Okinawa as the most significant operation to secure a base for the capture of Japan proper and used all resources at their disposal. Against this, the Japanese military, if only to delay the US military’s landing in Japan proper for one day, lurked in caves adopting a defence strategy of attrition. In order to defend Okinawa, the military, while undertaking a full mobilization of the people in the prefecture, formed a student corps and forced the students into battlefield mobilization. The defence strategy of attrition and the full mobilization engendered more than 120,000 victims among the Okinawan population.³¹⁸

Here, it is clear that the actions of the Japanese military caused the victimization of a large number of Okinawans. Responsibility is not emphasized, however, as it is ascribed to the nominalizations of the Japanese military’s actions. Of course, responsibility is clear as to the

³¹⁸米軍は沖縄戦を日本本土攻略の拠点を確保する最重要作戦と位置づけ、物量のある限りを使い、対する日本軍は米軍の日本本土上陸を一日でも遅らせるために壕に潜んでの防衛・持久作戦をとりました。沖縄を守備するため、軍は県民の根こそぎ動員を企てると同時に、学徒隊を編成して生徒たちの戦場動員を強行しました。持久作戦、根こそぎ動員は、12万人余にのぼる沖縄県民の犠牲をうみました。

Japanese Military's forced mobilization of students. Other constructions in which responsibility is ascribed but not in a crystal clear way include the following sentence: "In small islands in which the military and civilians intermingled, there occurred tragedies in which the mass deaths of villagers were ordered".³¹⁹

When it comes to the portrayal of the US military, it is evident that responsibility is sometimes clear even though it is not consistently stressed. In fact, passive constructions focusing on the experiences of the victims, such as the following, are more common:

The students on treatment patrol duty carried the heavy treatment box and hurried from trench to trench together with the nurses. Carrying food, pouring water, burying corpses and other fatigue details were also the students' job. These jobs required leaving the trenches to where bombshells came flying – these were very dangerous tasks. During these tasks (students) came across bombardment and suffered gas attacks. In the Haeburu area, two teachers and nine students were killed.³²⁰

In the narrative, there are several episodes similar to the one above in which the deaths of students and teachers from the Himeyuri School are recounted. However, even though the students are the main participants of the narrative, they are not the only victims. Civilians and wounded soldiers (that the students treated) are also described as victims. For example, in a section called "The actual circumstances of the wounded soldiers", the following account is given:

Inside the trench, which smelled of stench, the moaning and yelling did not cease. All patients wanted water and screamed: "water, water, give me water". Among the patients there were those who said: "Student, I was so thirsty that I drank my own pee". They were also tormented by maggots that crawled around in their wounds.³²¹

The reason for describing the "actual circumstances" in this way, it seems, is not to depict the soldiers as victims so much as to show the raw ugliness of war. This, however, entails showing that in war there are no heroes – there is little space for the heroic emplotment.

In some sections there are few participants. Instead, the focus is on description. In the beginning of the exhibition, for example, education before and during the war is described. This education is described as a form of inculcation of militarist values, with textbooks having a "thick military flavour" and national language textbooks featuring phrases such as "advance, advance soldiers advance". It is said that:

³¹⁹ 軍・民が混在した小島では、命令による村民の集団的な死という惨劇が発生しました。

³²⁰ 治療班勤務の学徒らは、重い治療箱を持ち、看護婦と共に壕から壕へと駆けずり回りました。食事の運搬・水汲み・死体埋葬などの雑役も学徒らの仕事でした。それらの仕事は砲弾の飛び交う壕の外に出ていかなければならない、とても危険な任務でした。任務の途中で砲撃に遭ったり、ガス 弾攻撃を受けるなどして、南風原一帯では教師 2名、生徒9名が亡くなりました。

The Imperial Rescript on Education was issued in 1890 and came to order all education thereafter. The idea that the Japanese people were infants who had made the emperor their patriarch was hammered in.³²²

English classes were abolished, hostility towards enemy countries such as the USA and the UK was fanned and loyalty was stressed: “To sacrifice one’s life for the country and be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine was regarded as the greatest honour and glory”.³²³ There are also explanations of terms used during this period. Among these, several slogans used by the militarist government for propaganda purposes are included. For example, the slogan *hakkō ichiu* (八紘一宇) is explained in the following way:

It means “to make the world (*hakkō*) one family (*ichiu*) with the emperor at its top”. During the Pacific War period, this slogan was used to justify Japan attacking and ruling other countries. It is a quote taken from *Nihon shoki*.³²⁴

A number of examples are provided of slogans and terms central to the ideology and legitimacy of the wartime state and the education to which the main participants of the narrative were subjected. There are also examples of how the government and military withheld information from the Japanese people:

The former PM Konoe Fumimaro said to the Emperor “defeat is inevitable, in view of the risk of a communist revolution accompanying defeat, the war should quickly be ended” but this was not looked into. The people had absolutely no idea of this anxiety about defeat in high places and the students headed for the battlefield without doubting that Japan would be victorious.³²⁵

The Himeyuri students, who in some cases had asked to be evacuated but been refused, were not aware of what it meant for them to be mobilized:

When they heard that they would be drafted to the Haeburu Army Hospital, the students thought they would be working at a clinic flying a Red Cross flag doing nursing activities without bullets flying around.³²⁶

³²¹薄暗く悪臭ただよう壕の中はうめき声が絶えませんでした。どの患者も水を欲しがって「水、水、水くれ」と叫んでいました。中には「学生さん、あまり水が欲しいからおしっこ飲んだよ」と言う患者もいました。皆、傷口にわいた蛆虫にも苦しめられていました。

³²²1890(明治23)年に発布された「教育勅語」がその後のすべての教育を律していきました。日本国民は天皇を家長とする赤子であるとの理念が教え込まれました。

³²³お国のために命を捧げ、靖国神社にまつられることは最高の栄誉とされました。

³²⁴「世界(八紘)を天皇を頂点とした一つの家(一宇)にする」という意味。太平洋戦争期に、日本が外国を攻撃し支配することを正当化するために用いた標語。日本書紀から引用された言葉である。

³²⁵1945(昭和20)年2月14日、近衛文麿元首相は、「敗戦は必至であり、敗戦に伴う共産革命を警戒する現地から、速やかに戦争を終結すべきである」と天皇に上奏しましたが、採り入れられませんでした。上層部の敗戦に対する憂慮など国民は全く知らず、生徒たちも勝利を疑うことなく、戦場へと向かって行ったのです。

³²⁶陸軍病院に動員されると聞いた時、生徒たちは弾の飛んでこない、赤十字の旗が立てられた病棟で看護活動をするものだと思っていました。

In this way, responsibility for the victimization of the students is ascribed to the government and the military. Responsibility, in other words, is connected not just to acts committed on the battlefield but also to propaganda policies in the areas of education and information. In addition to the textual material closely analysed and accounted for in the tables, there is also a lot of testimony from surviving students. This testimony vividly exemplifies the students' experiences mentioned in the other textual material.

8.3 The interpretation of narratives at Japanese museums

The analysis conducted in this section is guided by the following analytical questions: How is the story told interpreted? What is the main message or historical lesson delivered through this interpretation?

8.3.1 The Yûshûkan

The quotes discussed in the section on the discursive construction of groups in the Yûshûkan's narrative, highlight how the narrative is meant to be interpreted. Central to the story are the spirits of the war dead, who are understood as having sacrificed their precious lives for the motherland, their home town and their family. The theme of sacrifice is explicit in the textual material and alluded to in the objects on display. For example, a large *kaiten* submarine of the kind used for suicide missions is centrally displayed in one of the exhibition halls. Through their willing sacrifice, the war dead "became the cornerstone of modern Japan". This interpretation is based on the logic of cornerstone theory, according to which those who died in Japan's wars sacrificed themselves for the nation, thereby providing the cornerstone on which the prosperity of post-war Japan is based (Breen 2008b:156-57). Those who live today are said to be connected with those who sacrificed themselves in the past and it is suggested that they should be grateful to their ancestors for sacrificing themselves for those who live in the present. It is also claimed that those who live today can learn something by "directly touching the sincerity and achievements of the spirits of the war dead who sacrificed their precious lives". It appears that the most central quality embodied by the war dead is their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the motherland. It does not seem too far-fetched to conclude that this is exactly the precious something that visitors to the Yûshûkan are supposed to learn from the spirits of the war dead whose achievements are displayed. These achievements cannot be depicted in a negative light. The main function of the narrative is

therefore to present the actions of the Japanese military as acceptable and legitimate. It therefore aims to teach a version of history that is free of war guilt, that is, a history in which Japanese people can take pride.

The narrative, however, does not stop at presenting the actions of Japanese military actors as acceptable and legitimate. There are also, as is mentioned above, exhibits that go further by presenting either the positive actions of the Japanese military or the positive results of its actions. One of the most important and prominent of these types of exhibit can be found towards the end of the exhibition's historical narrative. A map shows the Asian and African countries that gained independence after World War II. It is accompanied by a text saying that:

The victory in the Russo-Japanese War gave the people of the world, especially those in Asia, a dream of independence. Many pioneers visited Japan as a model of independence and modernization. However, even after WWI ended, the road to independence did not open for the nations of Asia. It was after the Japanese military's battles that overthrew colonial authorities during the Greater East Asian War that the independence of Asian nations was realized. The flame that once flared under the Japanese military's occupation did not fade out when Japan was defeated and through independence wars nation states were born one after another.³²⁷

Even though it is not explicitly stated that this is what the war dead sacrificed themselves for, the implicit connection certainly serves to portray them in a positive light. Most importantly, however, the ultimate sacrifices of the war dead were for the motherland, for "our country". If the "sincerity and achievements" of the war dead, from whom those alive today can learn something precious, really means this spirit of sacrifice for the country, then it means learning to sacrifice oneself for the nation.

8.3.2 The Yamato Museum

In the museum brochure, just as in the foreword and the narrative, stressing the role of ship-building technology creates continuity between Kure's pre-war and post-war history:

Kure flourished as the city of the greatest navy arsenal in Japan and the greatest naval port in the East, which built the battleship Yamato. It played a part as Japan developed into the world's number one ship-building country about ten years after the war when technology that had been cultivated since before the war was joined with new technology and a large number of the world's largest tankers. Since then, it has

³²⁷日露戦争の勝利は、世界特にアジアの人々に独立の夢を与え、多くの先覚者が独立、近代化の模範として日本を訪れた。しかし、第一次世界大戦が終わっても、アジア民族に独立の道は開けなかった。アジア民族の独立が現実になったのは、大東亜戦争緒戦の日本軍による植民地権力打倒の後であった。日本軍の占領下で一度燃え上がった炎は、日本が敗れても消えることはなく、独立戦争などを経て民族国家が次々と誕生した。

developed as a leading special industry city and has contributed not just to regional industry development but also to Japan's modernization.³²⁸

This passage illustrates the interplay between the local and national identity levels that is discussed above. The story is about how the local, Kure, contributes to the national, Japan. This is also quite clear in the foreword, parts of which are provided in section 8.1.2. As is mentioned above in the discussion of the discursive construction of groups, this is similar to the relationship between the local/regional and national in Chinese narratives.

Moreover, the focus is on the positive aspects of the technology used in the construction of battleships while any references to human suffering and Japanese aggression are omitted. The “importance of peace” is mentioned in the foreword and it is claimed in the museum brochure that the 26.3-metre long model of the Yamato on display “hands down the importance of peace and the greatness of technology to future generations”. While lip-service is paid to the importance of peace, a vivid imagination is necessary to see how the model of a battleship “hands down the importance of peace” to future generations. The connection between the “world’s strongest and greatest battleship” and peace is all the more elusive because no argument linking the two is provided. The narrative contains no mention of the negative aspects of war and the suffering that battleships may cause (cf. Tanaka 2008). Obviously, that would not sit well with what appears to be the main aim of the exhibition – to provide a positive narrative about the war (or at least some aspects of it), based on the importance of the “greatness of technology” with which people can identify and be proud of. The Yamato Museum presents a kind of cornerstone theory, according to which the history of the Yamato battleship and the city of Kure are interpreted as the history of superior technology that contributed to Japan’s recovery and development after the war. The Japanese post-war miracle is hence attributed to the technology developed for the war effort (Kure-shi kaiji rekishi kagakukan: Yamato myûjiamu 2006:3):

After the war, technology that had been cultivated since before the war was joined with new technology ... as Kure developed as a leading coastal industry city that played a part as our country developed into the world’s number one shipbuilding country about ten years after the war. It also played a great role in the modernization and post-war reconstruction of Japan.³²⁹

³²⁸戦艦「大和」を建造した東洋一の軍港、日本一の海軍工廠のまちとして栄えた呉。戦前から培われてきた技術が新しい技術と結びつき、世界最大のタンカーを数多く建造するなど、日本が戦後約10年ほどで世界一の造船国へ発展する一翼を担いました。その後、有数の臨時工業都市として発展し、地域の産業発展のみならず、日本の近代化に大きく貢献しました。

³²⁹戦後は、戦前から培われてきた技術が、新しい技術と結びつき。。。有数の臨海工業都市として発展し、我が国が戦後約10年ほどで世界一の造船国へ発展する一翼を担い、日本の近代化や戦後の復興にも大きな役割を果たしてまいりました。

In this way, a peculiar continuity is created between the pre-war, the war and the post-war periods. It is one in which the negative aspects of war are excluded while sacrifice and hard work are stressed. The implicit message is that those belonging to the in-group, the citizens of “our country”, should also devote themselves to contributing to the development of the country. The highest form of contribution one can make as a citizen, it appears, is within the field of technology. The museum therefore aims to “convey to the children who carry the future of Japan ... on their shoulders, the greatness of technology”. The children, as well as other visitors, need “to understand our country’s history”. The history of Kure is presented as representative of “our country’s history”: “the history of Kure, which is really the history of Japan since the Meiji Restoration, the various technologies of shipbuilding, starting with steel, which became a cornerstone of modernization”. Similarly, the history of the war is largely reduced to the story of technological greatness serving the nation, eschewing any references to aggression and suffering.

8.3.3 The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots

The foreword to the exhibition contains a somewhat vague interpretation of the narrative:

We were kept alive through the noble sacrifice of the members of the Special Attack Corps. We are grateful that the country proceeds on the path of prosperity and that the peaceful Japan of today exists. While we quietly look back on the virtue left by the members of the Special Attack Corps, we exhibit, with a pathos that Japan shall never again create Special Attack Corps, with the understanding and cooperation of the bereaved families and people concerned, the precious relics and material. We believe that the Special Attack Corps, when they faced the journey from which they would not return prayed that peace and prosperity would once again return to this country.³³⁰

The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots was built to “always honour the members who were bravely scattered like petals in the sky and save the true appearance of those days in the form of relics and records for future generations and pray for eternal peace”.³³¹ The heroic employment is the only one that figures in the narrative. The heroic employment also becomes explicit in the museum brochure in which it is stated: “While thinking of their country, thinking of their parents and wishing for eternal peace, the brave soldiers——” (Kagoshima-ken Minamikyûshû-shi).³³² The last part of the sentence is left out, hinting at the last actions of the

³³⁰私たちは、特攻隊員たちの崇高な犠牲によって生かされ、国は繁栄の道を進み、今日の平和日本があることに感謝し、特攻隊員のご遺徳を静かに回顧しながら、再び日本に特攻隊をつくってはならないという情念で、貴重な遺品や資料をご遺族の方々のご理解、ご協力と、関係者の方々のご協力、ご支援で展示しています。特攻隊員たちが帰らざる征途に臨んで念じたことは、再びこの国に平和と繁栄が甦ることであっただろうと思います。

³³¹雄々しく大空に散華された隊員をとこしえに顕彰し、当時の真の姿、遺品、記録を後世に残し、恒久の平和を祈念すること

³³² 国を思い、父母を思い、永遠の平和を願いながら勇士たちは_____。

brave soldiers – their final mission and their death. Whereas the depiction of the young men of the Special Attack Corps as heroes is often quite implicit, labelling them brave soldiers (勇士) makes explicit the belief that they were heroes and their acts heroic. This is not the only place in which the pilots are described (or predicated) as heroic. For example, in a leaflet available at the museum it is said that it was built in 1975, “to pray for the bravery of the pilots and their eternal peace” (Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho:15). Furthermore, these heroes are said to have done what they did for the sake of “eternal peace” and for their country and parents.

Similar interpretations of the actions carried out by the pilots can be found elsewhere. An English-language leaflet distributed by the museum is quite explicit: “The kamikaze pilot’s last wish was that Japan would be peaceful and prosperous once more. Today Japan is very prosperous. We should be thankful to the pilots for this” (Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho:3). In the same leaflet it is mentioned that Japan made a final attempt in 1945 to fight the Allied forces by sending tiny aircraft carrying young soldiers with the hope of destroying larger US vessels: “The attempt was futile resulting in the deaths of 1036 soldiers in Okinawa”. The attempt was futile because “[d]amage to US vessels was minimal” (Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho:14). On the next page, it is mentioned that a Buddhist Kannon statue has been built on the grounds of the peace park, where the museum is located, “to honor the souls of the army’s and navy’s special soldiers. It offers a prayer to their souls and praises their great accomplishment” (Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho:15). It is not said here what this great accomplishment is but since it is disclosed that the damage the pilots did to US vessels was minimal, that cannot be it. It appears more plausible to conclude that the accomplishment is linked to the sacrifice made by the pilots for their country and parents, a sacrifice that is construed as having contributed to Japan’s post-war peace and prosperity. This cornerstone theory is echoed in another publication printed by the Peace Museum: “These pilots understood and appreciated the importance of their responsibilities and their morale was very high. They believed that it would be worth dying for the future of Japan and their parents” (Kawatoko 2008:15). These, then, are the values that the heroic pilots are portrayed as embodying. Visitors are not explicitly encouraged to act in the same self-sacrificing way as the pilots did, but it is tacitly suggested. The Kamikaze pilots are depicted in a way that constructs them as role models not because of their accomplishments but because of the ostensible motives behind and the results of their actions.

8.3.4 The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

On the museum website the interpretation of the narrative becomes quite explicit:

The *hibakusha* overcame their hardships. We, who have handed down the peace message from Nagasaki, will continue to convey this message. This is in order to make the people of the world join hands and head for a future without nuclear weapons.³³³

The interpretation of the narrative and the message also becomes quite clear towards the end of the exhibition:

In 1949, during the recovery after the atomic bomb disaster, the “Law for the Founding of Nagasaki as an International Culture City” was approved and Nagasaki started over again as a special city symbolizing peace and culture. Since then, the citizens have made “Peace starts in Nagasaki!” their motto as they appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons.³³⁴

The war experience is interpreted as a reason to abolish nuclear weapons and make the world a peaceful place. This is to be accomplished by appealing to the people of the world to join the citizens of Nagasaki in their efforts. This interpretation is facilitated by the narrative’s strong focus on the effects of the nuclear bomb rather than on human action. This is also indicated by the depiction of how the negative effects of nuclear weapons are not limited to their use in war but also discussed in the treatment of nuclear tests and the very existence of nuclear weapons.

8.3.5 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

The historical lesson presented becomes quite explicit in the foreword to the final section of the exhibition in the East Building, “Steps towards peace” (平和への歩み). It is stated that the damage done by the bomb was so terrible that a way of thinking took root in people, according to which humans “cannot coexist with nuclear weapons”. It goes on:

From this kind of “spirit of Hiroshima” that wishes for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of everlasting world peace, Hiroshima’s steps towards peace started headed for the world. The atomic bomb is a weapon that was used in war. To make sure it is not used a third time, it is important that nuclear weapons are eliminated from the face of the earth and to be determined not to fight with other

³³³被爆者が苦難を乗り越えて、語り伝えてきたナガサキからの平和のメッセージをわたくしたちは、これからも伝えていきます。核兵器のない未来に向かって世界の人々が共に手をつないでいくために。

³³⁴原爆被災後の復興の中で、1949年（昭和24年）には「長崎国際文化都市建設法」が成立し、長崎市は、平和と文化を象徴する特別都市として再出発した。以来、市民は「平和は長崎から！」を合言葉に、世界に核兵器廃絶をうたっている。

countries.³³⁵

It could be argued that the first sentence of this passage constructs a positive self-identity for Hiroshima as a cradle of the peace movement. The terrible and tragic experience that Hiroshima suffered is interpreted as a reason to embark on a quest to abolish nuclear weapons and achieve everlasting peace. That the narrative focuses on the victims and on the victimizing bomb, to the extent, as mentioned above, that the latter is attributed agency, is consistent with the message delivered. If the interpretation is that the tragic experience dealt with in the story told should never be repeated and that this can only be achieved by abolishing nuclear weapons and working hard for peace, then it makes perfect sense that the “bad guy” in the narrative is the weapon itself. As John Dower has put it elsewhere: “The weapon itself, rather than those who deployed it, largely absorbed the characteristics of being cruel and inhuman; and from this, what came to be indicted was the cruelty of war in general” (1999:493). The universal peace message arguably becomes more credible by emphasizing the weapon as a threat to humanity rather than demonizing a particular state or group. It also helps not to stress nationality as a category for identification in the narrative. Moreover, it is mentioned above that the issue of responsibility, both for the war in its entirety and for the dropping of the bomb, is given little treatment. Instead, it seems that the approach to responsibility advocated has to do with humankind’s present responsibility for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the accomplishment of world peace.

The anti-nuclear peace message can be linked to Japanese policies, such as its Three Non-nuclear Principles according to which Japan cannot possess, manufacture or harbour nuclear weapons and article 9 of the constitution which states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. The museum therefore presents a message that is closely related to debates concerning the future course of Japan. In order to realize the goal of a peaceful world free from nuclear weapons, article 9 of the constitution cannot be repealed nor the Three Non-nuclear Principles abandoned. The peace message of the first exhibition is underlined at the end of the Main Building in a section called “messages for peace”, which contains short messages emphasizing the need for peace left behind by Japanese, such as Ôe

³³⁵ こうした核兵器廃絶と世界恒久平和の実現を願う「ヒロシマの心」から、広島への歩みは世界へ向かって始まりました。原子爆弾戦争で使われた兵器です。三度さく裂させないためには、核兵器を地上からなくし、他国と戦わない決意が大切です。

Kenzaburô and Koizumi Jun'ichirô, as well as foreign dignitaries, such as former President of the United States Jimmy Carter and the Dalai Lama.

8.3.6 The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum

The text, “The Basic Concept of the Okinawa Peace Memorial Museum”,³³⁶ can be found both in the exhibition and in the museum brochure (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:2). The purpose of establishing the museum is explicitly stated:

The “Okinawan Heart” respects human dignity above all else, rejects all acts related to war, demands peace and truly cherishes culture, which is a supreme manifestation of humanity. We hereby establish the Okinawa Prefecture Peace Memorial Museum, displaying the individual war experiences of people in this prefecture, in order to mourn for those who perished during the war, correctly pass on to future generations the historical lessons of the Battle of Okinawa and appeal with our hearts to the peoples of the world and thereby contribute to establishing permanent peace.³³⁷

The belief that “historical lessons” are being passed on to future generations is explicitly expressed. These lessons need to be “correctly passed on”, which implies that they can also be incorrectly passed on. The lessons seem to be concerned with what the “Okinawan heart” is about: “respecting human dignity”, “rejecting all acts related to war” and “demanding peace and cherishing culture”. In other words, the correct historical lesson appears to be a peace message. In other parts of the exhibition there are exhibits that similarly indicate that this is the case.

This interpretation also becomes explicit in the last part of the exhibition: “Building peace for the future” (未来への平和創造) (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:145-49). This section notes that there have continued to be wars and conflicts since the end of World War II, as well as other urgent problems, such as, starvation, human rights violations and environmental problems. These urgent problems, it is argued, “defy solutions within or between nations, and demand holistic remedies. Global problems are the focus of international organizations, especially the United Nations, of organizations within countries and of citizens’ groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Activist and research organizations play an important role in dealing with these problems” (Okinawa Pre-

³³⁶ 沖縄県平和祈念資料館 設立理念。

³³⁷ “沖縄のこころ”とは人間の尊厳を何よりも重くみて、戦争につながる一切の行為を否定し、平和を求め、人間性の発露である文化をこよなく愛する心であります。私たちは戦争の犠牲になった多くの霊を弔い、沖縄戦の歴史的教訓を正しく次第に伝え、全世界の人々に私たちの心を訴え、もって恒久平和の樹立に寄与するため、ここに県民個々の戦争体験を結集して、沖縄県平和祈念資料館を設立いたします。

fectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:148). The permanent exhibition rooms end with the “Okinawa Prefecture Declaration for Nuclear-Free Peace” (非核・平和沖縄県宣言). The declaration is provided in Japanese with an English translation (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:149). In the declaration, agency is ascribed to the war itself: it is the war that destroys “[u]tterly and without discrimination”. Human agency, however, can be seen in the present activities of the Okinawan people, “we”, who through the declaration appeal to the “the people of the world” to “[a]bandon all weapons of war, conventional and nuclear” and embrace peace like the Okinawans. A positive Okinawan self-identity is hence created and mixed with the anti-war and anti-nuclear peace message delivered. Furthermore, it is said in the Children’s Exhibition Room that the room has been created “so that the children who will shoulder the future will actively nurture peace-loving hearts”³³⁸ (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:151). It is, in other words, believed that the exhibits are able to contribute to moulding people’s, and especially children’s, minds. Here, children are taught about problems in the world today, such as wars, disputes, poverty, human rights abuses, environmental pollution and bullying, and urged to take part in peace activities (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:151-65). This points to a broader political agenda in which the peace message encompasses not only “rejecting all acts related to war” but also fighting environmental pollution, poverty and other problems, preferably through NGOs. It is an interpretation that legitimizes the role of the United Nations in such activities.

Finally, the peace message delivered by the museum is embodied in the Cornerstone of Peace (平和の礎) in the grounds of the museum. The names of all of those who died in the Battle of Okinawa, regardless of nationality, are inscribed on memorial tablets, (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2001:10, see also Ishihara 2001:100). However, even though those who died are remembered regardless of their nationality, they are still ordered according to nationality. Korean victims are divided into two categories – those belonging to the Democratic Republic of Korea (朝鮮民主主義人民共和国) and those belonging to the Republic of Korea (大韓民国) even though Korea was a Japanese colony at the time of the Battle of Okinawa and was not divided until 1948. This illustrates not only the problems involved in categorizing people according to nationality, but also how past events are interpreted in the light of current concerns and understandings. Furthermore, Okinawans who died outside the prefecture are included on the memorial while people of other origins are only

³³⁸ 未来を担う子どもたちが、積極的に平和を愛する心を育むため。

included if they died in the Battle of Okinawa. There seems, in other words, to be some kind of tension between the universal peace message delivered and the collective identity of the we-group being constructed.

8.3.7 The Himeyuri Peace Museum

In section 8.1.7 above, dealing with the discursive construction of groups it is noted that the pronoun “we” is used to refer to the people responsible for creating the exhibition, the former Himeyuri students. It is said in the excerpt from the foreword to the exhibition, “Foundation of the Himeyuri Peace Museum”, that: “the brutal condition of the battlefield does not leave” their minds and they “have not forgotten the horror of the education of the period when” they “were forced to actively face the battlefield”. No explicit references are made to the present educational debates discussed in chapter 5. However, it is implicit that students should not be subjected to education similar to that conducted in the past and it becomes explicit that peace education is regarded as important.

The peace message stressed in the foreword is returned to at the end of the exhibition, both in the section “Reminiscence” (回想) and in the text explicating the purpose of the “Square for peace” (平和への広場). In the former, it is said:

We left for the battlefield not knowing the truth
War is a cruel thing that kills everything
We will continue speaking the truth about war that we came to know through our experiences³³⁹

Even though it is implicit in the above quotes that the Japanese government and military were responsible for the students having to undergo militaristic education and forcibly having to face the battlefield, it is ultimately stressed that war in general is bad, not just these particular victimizers. Although the identities of the specific victimizers are hinted at here and made clear in sections of the narrative, their roles as aggressors are not emphasized throughout the narrative and in the interpretations made. The “Square for peace” is said to have been built because the survivors are aging and the time is approaching when they will no longer be able to hand down their stories. In order to be able to still tell the young generation about their war experiences, an all-out renewal of the exhibits was conducted and the “Square for peace” was

³³⁹ 私たちは真相を知らずに戦場へ出て行きました
戦争は命あるあらゆるものを殺すむごいものです
私たちは一人ひとりの体験をとおして知った戦争の実体を語り続けます

created to “expand the wish for peace to the world and connect with the future”.³⁴⁰ The horrific experiences of the students, the survivors among whom have now not only grown up but also grown old, are interpreted as reasons to make an appeal for peace. It is believed that this appeal for peace “will soothe the spirits of our dead schoolmates and teachers”.

8.4 Conclusions

In some studies, it is assumed prior to the execution of the analysis that narratives about war are *national* stories – that narratives found in Japan necessarily stress Japanese identity and that those found within China’s borders emphasize Chinese identity. While this may well be often the case, it should be treated as an empirical issue. However, perhaps because of the influence of (nation) state-centrism, it is seldom treated as an empirical question. Instead, it is often assumed, especially when analyses are conducted in a generalized and not very meticulous way, that narratives about war will be based on the national category and that different narratives will stress this more or less equally. As the saying goes, when you have a hammer, everything starts resembling a nail. In this study, however, the first step in the analysis of narratives has been to first determine which groups are discursively constructed before going on to analyse the narratives per se, that is, the stories told about the groups discursively constructed.

Regarding the discursive construction of groups in Japanese exhibitions, it is quite clear that there is much diversity and three main approaches can be said to exist. The first, present in the exhibitions at the Yûshûkan, Yamato Museum and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots, stresses the national category by telling stories about heroic sacrifice by people belonging to “our” country. The second approach, adopted by the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Himeyuri Peace Museum, does not stress one particular identity category to a great extent, although local identity is emphasized to some extent at least at the former two museums. Finally, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum stresses the Okinawan identity category.

In the narratives of the three museums in which the national category is stressed, the main participants are Japanese – they belong to the main identity category stressed. These participants are portrayed heroically and atrocities committed abroad are excluded from the narratives in order to facilitate this heroic depiction. In particular, the sacrifice made by these

³⁴⁰ 平和への思いを世界に広げ、未来へつなげていく。

heroes is interpreted as having laid the foundations for Japan's post-war peace and prosperity. In the other exhibitions, atrocities committed by the Japanese military at home and abroad are dealt with, even though they are not the main focus of the narratives. The victim emplotment occupies quite a lot of space, even though these victims are not emphasized as being Japanese. Indeed, in the case of the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum most victims are Okinawan. In this narrative, perpetrators are not demonized but they are depicted as culpable. In other words, responsibility is ascribed. War, in these narratives, is depicted as inherently bad and victims are often portrayed as human beings. Obviously, in such narratives, according to which war is described as bad to the point where agency is even ascribed to the war itself, there can be no heroes.

When it comes to the interpretation of narratives in the form of lessons, Chinese exhibitions are usually considerably more explicit than their Japanese counterparts. Chinese exhibitions, especially those run by the government, end with "conclusions" in which it is explicitly explained how narratives are to be interpreted. Japanese interpretations are less explicit and it may therefore be more difficult for the visitor to identify them as interpretations. In the three exhibitions that stress heroic sacrifice made for "our country" in the past, those who sacrificed themselves are made to exemplify desirable behaviour. Members of the imagined community constructed in the narrative should be equally willing to sacrifice themselves for the country. The other narratives do not focus narrowly on the national in their interpretations. Instead, the interpretations consist of universal peace and anti-nuclear messages that can easily be connected to contemporary domestic issues concerning, for example, the revision of the Japanese constitution and Japan's role in the world. The Himeyuri Peace Museum's focus on wartime education can also be connected with current debates concerning moral, patriotic and peace education.

Finally, in relation to the previous research on narratives about war discussed in chapter 3, some of the merits of the approach used here should be highlighted. It is mentioned in chapter 3 that most studies dealing with narratives about war tend to identify certain types of narrative in a rather blunt and generalizing way. It is often not entirely clear exactly how it has been determined that a narrative is, for example, a victim narrative. It has been claimed that victim narratives dominate in Japan and that a victim narrative has come to replace a heroic one in China, even though sometimes it is said that these (uneasily) coexist. In the present study, emplotments, based on the depiction of participants, are looked for within narratives. An approach that looks for emplotments within narratives rather than trying to classify

narratives as wholes is able to show how different narrative emplotments are present within narratives. Moreover, the use of this method makes it possible to firmly anchor such interpretations in the material analysed – it makes an empirically sensitive systematic analysis possible instead of simply making interpretations based on unsystematically selected examples. The method used thus makes it possible for us to see that different emplotments exist in the same narrative, and also *how* these elements coexist. In the case of Chinese narratives, for example, we have seen that in several cases the heroic emplotment and CCP participants are dissociated from the victim and aggressor emplotments by placing them in different sections of an exhibition. However, the heroic emplotment is very much alive and well. When it comes to Japanese exhibitions, it has been shown that it is not just all about the victim emplotment – some exhibitions are based to a large extent on the heroic emplotment and several exhibitions that deal to a large extent with victimhood also contain elements highlighting the aggressor emplotment.

Furthermore, by starting off by analysing how groups are discursively constructed it has been possible to see that in Japanese narratives that stress the victim emplotment to a large extent, the national identity of these victims is not emphasized to as large an extent. Moreover, even though agency is typically suppressed in such narratives, it is, in several cases, most explicit when it comes to the depiction of atrocities and atrocious acts committed by the Japanese military. Approaches that are not based on a detailed and meticulous analysis of the depiction of participants across narratives are likely to overlook these points, and even if they are noticed it will be difficult to draw conclusions concerning their significance and representativeness.

Chapter 9. Comparison and conclusions

Some of the main results of the analysis of narratives are summarized in the Table 9.1. In this chapter, these results are compared and discussed.

Table 9.1 Summary of the results of the analysis of narratives

Museum	The discursive construction of groups	Narrative	Interpretation
9.18 Historical Museum	The national category is strongly stressed.	Includes examples of the aggressor, victim and heroic emplotments. The Japanese aggressors dominate until the CCP enters the stage. Positive self- and negative other-representations are not uncommon.	Everyone has to contribute to the rejuvenation of China. Otherwise, misery will come knocking on the door again.
War of Resistance Museum	The national category is strongly stressed.	The heroic emplotment dominates. The aggressor and victim emplotments dominate in one section. Positive self- and negative other-representations are not uncommon.	Revitalize the Chinese nation by adhering to the policies of the CCP.
Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders	The national category is strongly stressed.	The aggressor emplotment dominates even though the heroic and especially the victim emplotments can also be found. Positive self- and negative other-representations are not uncommon.	It is necessary to be patriotic by sticking to the CCP's policies to revitalize the nation because the weak will be beaten.
Jianchuan Museum Cluster	The national category is strongly stressed.	The heroic emplotment dominates. The aggressor emplotment and, to a lesser extent, the victim emplotment, can also be found. Positive self- and negative other-representations can be found.	The CCP's policies are supported in one museum. Elsewhere, patriotic behaviour is encouraged but it is often unclear what this entails.
Yūshūkan	The national category is strongly stressed.	The heroic emplotment dominates. Positive self- and negative other-representations can be found.	Cornerstone theory – sacrifice for the nation is stressed. Continuity created.
Yamato Museum	The national category is stressed. The national and local are connected.	The heroic emplotment can be found. War is portrayed as having little impact on people. Technology is positively depicted.	Cornerstone theory – sacrifice is implicitly stressed. Continuity between the war and post-war periods is created.
Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots	The national category is stressed.	The heroic emplotment is the only one that appears in the narrative. Heroism through sacrifice.	Cornerstone theory – the adoption of values, including sacrifice, embodied by the brave pilots, is implicitly encouraged.

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum	The national category is not stressed.	Agency downplayed. The victim emplotment dominates. Japanese aggression is mentioned but back-grounded.	Anti-nuclear pacifist peace message: Nuclear weapons need to be abolished.
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum	The national category is not stressed. The local category is more commonly mentioned.	History is not made as much as it happens. The victim emplotment dominates but the aggressor emplotment is also present to some extent.	Anti-nuclear pacifist peace message: Nuclear weapons need to be abolished.
Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum	The Okinawan category is stressed.	The victim and perpetrator emplotments dominate. The heroic emplotment is largely missing. Positive self- and negative other-representations can be found.	Anti-war and anti-nuclear pacifist peace message.
Himeyuri Peace Museum	The national category is not stressed.	The victim and perpetrator emplotments dominate. The heroic emplotment is absent.	Pacifist peace message. Not only war but militarist education is described as horrible.

9.1 Similarities and differences among the Chinese exhibitions

Table 9.1 summarizes the results of the analysis of narratives. It shows that all the Chinese exhibitions analysed emphasize the national category. This is done through several means – by using words that encourage identification with the nation, such as “our country” when referring to China, “our military” when referring to Chinese troops, and “patriots” and “compatriots” when referring to Chinese participants in narratives. Moreover, the nation is stressed when war history is described as important for developing “the national spirit” (民族精神). Representations about taking on arduous tasks together make up another strategy employed to invite identification with the national category. For example, the revival of the Chinese nation is presented as a joint project to which all Chinese should contribute. Some of the vocabulary used when referring to participants is employed not just in descriptions of what happened in the past but also in describing present-day circumstances. The Chinese nation is hence constructed as existing in both past and present. In the three government-run exhibitions, the national category is defined broadly as encompassing compatriots of all nationalities in the whole country. In other words, national unity is emphasized. This means that while Japanese aggression, along with Chinese heroism, are common themes, Chinese collaboration with the Japanese invaders, on the other hand, is a theme largely omitted from such exhibitions. While there are occasional references to “puppet troops”, the topic is never really dealt with and the main enemy is always the invading Japanese aggressors. Nonetheless, collaboration, Mitter argues, was not an uncommon phenomenon. It was one strategy adopted by some to deal with

a difficult and complex situation (Mitter 2000b). It has also been pointed out that in some places Chinese spent more time fighting each other than the Japanese (Mitter 2005:537).

As for the contents of the narratives, there are differences concerning dominant emplotments. Even though it is sometimes claimed in the literature that narratives of Chinese victimhood and Japanese aggression have come to replace the heroism that used to dominate, it is quite clear that heroism still plays a major role in several narratives. It has also been argued that victimhood undermines heroic accounts because it suggests weakness, and that there is therefore a tension between these emplotments. It seems that this tension is dealt with by separating the emplotments into different sections of the exhibitions. This is quite clear in the exhibition at the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing, where Japanese atrocities are concentrated in one section and the other sections present a heroic narrative in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leads the Chinese people to victory. At the 9.18 History Museum in Shenyang, the CCP enters the narrative after Japanese atrocities have been treated. At the Museum for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre, the CCP is largely missing from the narrative, which stresses Japanese aggression. In other words, the CCP often appears when heroism is emphasized whereas its presence is separated from accounts drawing on the aggression and victim emplotments. The Japanese aggressors victimize the Chinese people and nation but the CCP heroically comes to the rescue and leads the nation to victory.

It is perhaps especially striking that the heroic emplotment largely dominates the narrative at the private Jianchuan Museum Cluster. If victimhood had come to replace heroism then one would expect a privately funded and newly constructed museum to be dominated by the former rather than the latter. However, even though Japanese aggression is certainly not omitted from the narratives at the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, heroism dominates. The treatment of heroism at the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, however, differs significantly from how it is dealt with in the narratives of the state-run museum exhibitions analysed. The hall dealing with the CCP's role in the war might give the visitor the impression that the difference is small. In fact, in this hall, the role of the CCP as the main heroic force of resistance is almost presented as greater than at some government-run institutions. However, the CCP's role is undermined through dilution by the stories told in other museums in the cluster, which could be regarded as tributes to heroes understood as having been forgotten. While some of these heroes, mainly the Americans and the Guomindang (GMD), have been resurrected to some extent in narratives at museums connected to the CCP, the Jianchuan Museum Cluster goes further by giving these heroes their own museums. Moreover, groups that are more or

less omitted from accounts at state-run institutions, such as prisoners of war (POWs) and the Sichuanese Army, are praised as heroes. Even though the CCP is depicted heroically, the narrative is subversive because the CCP's near monopoly on the heroic role is implicitly being questioned. It is diluted and the CCP is almost reduced to being one hero among several. The two halls at the Jianchuan Museum Cluster that are not yet open, and will not deal with Chinese heroes, are perhaps most interesting. How will the Japanese invaders be portrayed and how will the Quisling Army be depicted? The material discussed above provides some clues to the answers to these questions, but the final answer will not be known until the halls have opened to the public. However, it is noteworthy that one of the halls is set to deal with Chinese traitors. Accounts of traitors, as is clear from the contextual analysis, have a subversive potential since the meaning of "traitor", just like the meaning of "patriot", can be redefined. Such accounts also challenge the emphasis on unity that is central to official narratives. In state-run exhibitions, as is mentioned above, collaboration is largely omitted. Collaboration and traitor discourses, it appears, are downplayed because they threaten unity and even have the potential to threaten the legitimacy of the CCP.

All three state-run Chinese exhibitions explicitly present interpretations in the form of historical lessons, according to which it is necessary to be patriotic in order to revitalize the nation because if the nation is weak it will be victimized again. The revitalization of the Chinese nation can only be achieved if everyone works hard and adheres to the CCP's policies. This may entail making sacrifices. The narratives are nationalistic in that they stress sacrifice for the nation. Nevertheless, the interpretations of the narratives at the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, in contrast to the messages delivered in government-run exhibitions, refrain from specifying what sacrifice for and contributions to the nation involve. This is a significant difference from the government-run exhibitions. What the Jianchuan Museum Cluster and government-run exhibitions have in common, then, is that they are enmeshed in the same patriotic/nationalistic discourse discussed in the contextual analysis. They all encourage patriotic behaviour but whereas the government-run museums overtly define it, the Jianchuan Museum Cluster does not. This leaves room for interpretations that do not necessarily sanction CCP policies. In the present-day People's Republic of China (PRC), the CCP, as is demonstrated in the contextual analysis, cannot strategically "drum up nationalist support" for its own specific purposes when it pleases and then simply calm it down at will. That these exhibitions make up important components of the CCP's patriotic education campaign and tools for disseminating propaganda does not mean that the CCP controls Chinese patriotic and na-

tionalistic sentiments, even though the campaign has most certainly contributed to the surge in expressions of nationalistic and anti-foreign sentiment since it was launched. Now that patriotism is central to Chinese politics and fierce debates about what it means to be patriotic have become something the CCP needs to take into consideration, the narratives presented in Chinese museums and the interpretations of these narratives can also be regarded as being part of the debate itself rather than something that constitutes these debates. These narratives and interpretations are, according to this contextualization, an attempt to impose an interpretation on visitors, an interpretation that attempts to steer visitors in the direction desired by the CCP. Government-run exhibitions present and interpret history in line with the CCP's domestic policy agenda. Even though the CCP controls narratives and hence has the power to define patriotic behaviour, these definitions are not necessarily accepted by everyone and can even be challenged. Of course, it is difficult to present such challenges in an institutionalized form, such as museum exhibitions. This is partly because it has become more difficult to run private museums since most state-run museums have stopped charging entrance fees. Such challenges are more likely to appear in Internet chat rooms and other online forums. The narratives analysed here, as is suggested in the contextual analysis, should be understood as attempts by the CCP to define patriotism in a way that serves its purposes. The definitions of patriotic behaviour found in narratives at government-run museums are hence a way of trying to pin down the meaning of patriotism in an environment in which it is necessary to be patriotic but the meaning of patriotism is open to different interpretations.

Of course, there is no guarantee that the visitor interprets an exhibition in the desired way or that the (often quite rational) message is what influences the visitor and her/his identity, that is, interpretative framework, the most. These exhibitions consist of many vivid descriptions and exhibits and, even though the CCP insists that patriotic education is not anti-Japanese education, the way in which the atrocious acts of the out-group are often dramatically contrasted with the moral behaviour of the in-group seems to suggest that an emotional interpretation – in contrast to a rational one – is not impossible. Indeed, as becomes clear from Table 9.1, positive self- and negative other-representations exemplifying desirable and undesirable behaviour, respectively, can be found in all the Chinese narratives analysed. This is discussed in greater detail below.

9.2 Similarities and differences among the Japanese exhibitions

While there are some points on which the Chinese exhibitions all share some basic assumptions, perhaps most evidently with regard to the categories stressed, a brief look at Table 9.1 makes it evident that there are far greater and more fundamental differences between the Japanese narratives analysed. Concerning the discursive construction of groups, there are two main approaches: one that stresses the national category and one that does not. Although there is a difference of degree among those that do stress this category, these exhibitions are similar when it comes to other features as well. The three museums that emphasize the national category, the Yûshûkan, the Yamato Museum and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots, use words that encourage identification with the nation, such as “our country” and “motherland”. Especially at the Yûshûkan, the Japanese nation is constructed as encompassing the Japanese alive today as well as their ancestors. Continuity between past and present is emphasized by stressing the connection between those who live today and their ancestors, including those who sacrificed themselves for their families and the nation. In some of the other exhibitions, the local category is emphasized to some extent, most notably at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. At the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, Okinawan identity is emphasized to quite a large extent. The most salient difference, however, is between the narratives in which the Japanese national category is emphasized and those in which it is not.

The dividing lines regarding the discursive construction of groups are largely mirrored by the focus of the narrative and the ways in which the narratives are interpreted. The narratives of the exhibitions that stress the national category are all dominated by the heroic emplotment. These narratives are all devoid of elements that highlight the negative effects of war. The kind of heroism represented is sometimes nostalgic and almost tragic, especially at the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots. Nonetheless, what is emphasized is loyal sacrifice, not victimhood. The heroes may not always have achieved much militarily but there are stories of bravery on the battlefield. However, and more importantly as it is closely connected to meaning-making, the heroes are portrayed as loyal and willing to sacrifice themselves for the nation. Therein lies their bravery. Furthermore, the heroism of the departed soldiers is closely connected with the interpretations of the narratives. These narratives are all interpreted as historical lessons in the form of “cornerstone theory”, according to which the sacrifice made by those who gave their lives for the nation during the war is the foundation for the prosperity and peace enjoyed by post-war Japan. The cornerstone theories differ some-

somewhat in the three narratives: the Yûshûkan celebrates the spirits of all soldiers who gave their lives for the motherland during the war; the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots focuses on the Special Attack Corps; and the Yamato Museum connects post-war prosperity with the shipbuilding technology used to build Japanese warships. In this way, continuity between past and present is further created. The Yûshûkan and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots both emphasize the moral values embodied by the heroes they celebrate. The most central among these values are loyalty and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation. The adoption of these values is, implicitly at least, encouraged.

The other four exhibitions differ starkly from the three discussed above in both their narrative content and their interpretations. In both the Nagasaki and Hiroshima exhibitions, human agency is overall less common and less clear than is often the case elsewhere. It is easy to get the impression that in these exhibitions history is not made so much as it happens. The main focus in both exhibitions is, of course, on the nuclear catastrophes. The emphasis is very much on the effects of atomic bombs on humans. The agency behind the dropping of the bombs is downplayed even though the decision-making processes behind the development of and decision to use the bombs are dealt with. The overall lack of agency is connected with issues concerning responsibility or lack thereof. This is also reflected in the scarce coverage of the war crimes trials. Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia is treated in both exhibitions, even though at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum it is discussed in less detail and after the local events are depicted. In Hiroshima, on the other hand, the exhibition begins with a larger contextualizing picture, which includes discussion of Japanese atrocities in China. Interestingly, one of the most explicit depictions of human agency at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum appears in its discussion of the Nanjing Atrocity. In other words, the aggressor emplotment (Japanese aggression) is not absent from these narratives. However, the victim emplotment (local victimhood) dominates and Japanese aggression is overshadowed by the interpretation of the narratives in the form of a universal anti-nuclear peace message. It makes sense that such a strong universal peace message is based on a narrative in which the national category is not stressed and the enemy other is the nuclear bomb rather than a nation state. Nuclear weapons are presented as threats to the human species that therefore need to be abolished. This message is closely connected to Japanese domestic debates concerning constitutional revision, an issue that has been the focus of Japanese political debates in recent years. The main target of moves to revise the constitution has been the pacifist article 9. The anti-nuclear peace message presented at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial

Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, as well as several other Japanese peace museums, can therefore be understood as support for article 9 and the Three Non-nuclear Principles.

The two remaining Japanese exhibitions, both located in Okinawa, provide similarly pacifist peace messages. They differ, however, from the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, in that the narratives at the Himeyuri and Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum are not dominated to the same extent by the victim emplotment. The victim emplotment is, it needs to be stressed, still important in these narratives but compared to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum there is considerably more emphasis on the aggression emplotment. At the same time, however, those victimized by mainly Japanese aggressors, but also to some extent by the US military, are local people. Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia is not discussed in much detail. Instead, Japanese aggression in Okinawa and the general horror of war are the centre of attention. In the case of the Himeyuri exhibition, the victims are mainly students and they are not stressed as belonging to any other category than that of students. The Japanese military and government are depicted as aggressors not only because they are held responsible for the deaths of students and other locals, but also because the Japanese government subjected the students to militarist education. The connection to education can be seen as important in the context of debates concerning Japanese education. The revision of the Fundamental Law on Education (FLE) in 2006 has been criticized by some as strengthening state involvement in education and as a return to an education similar to that of the pre-war and war eras. The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum equally emphasizes Japanese aggression but the Okinawan identity of the victims is emphasized to a greater extent. At the same time as Okinawan identity is emphasized, however, the universality of the message of the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum is underscored by its inclusion in the black marble tablets of the names of all the people who died in the Battle of Okinawa regardless of nationality.

At the Himeyuri and the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum there is no doubt that the Japanese military is depicted as an aggressor and to some extent also as an “other”, in relation to which the peacefulness of the self is accentuated. This is especially the case at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum where the peacefulness of the Okinawans and their historical bonds to China are stressed. At the Himeyuri museum, Japanese soldiers appear not just as aggressors but also as victims as the students take care of wounded

soldiers. Positive self- and negative other-representations can be found at other Japanese museums as well. At the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, the post-war anti-nuclear peace activism in which these cities and citizens of these cities have been involved, arguably present these local peace activists in a positive light. At the same time, although such elements exist, they are not emphasized. Hence, these elements cannot be said to be part of a macro-strategy of positive self- and negative other-representations. Positive self-representations are part of the narratives at the Yûshûkan, Yamato Museum and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots. The aims of these exhibitions include, it seems, presenting a positive narrative about the Japanese wartime past. To this end, any negative conduct on behalf of Japanese soldiers during the war is glossed over. Instead, positive values that the soldiers are seen as embodying are emphasized. Negative other-representations, on the other hand, are absent from the Yamato Museum and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots. This is done through the virtual exclusion of others in general from these narratives – even though these are narratives about war, there are hardly any enemies in the narratives. Whereas a war without enemies is certainly not a normal war, the absence of enemies becomes a way of depicting the war as “normal” as opposed to a war of aggression. This points to the difficulty in presenting the Japanese war effort in a positive light – it is difficult to achieve such a portrayal without the absence of the other. The Yûshûkan goes further and actually presents a narrative in which the Japanese military encounters enemies. Through several means, including selectivity concerning events and information, as well as a strategic choice of wording, the Japanese military operations in China are depicted as part of a “normal war”, whereas Chinese participants are, in several cases, depicted using a strategy of negative other-representation, with the aim of seemingly legitimizing Japanese military operations in China. The positive self-representations in the Yûshûkan’s narrative do not stop with the glorification of the Japanese military’s actions in China. In what is sometimes labelled consequentialism or hindsight-based opinion (結果論), the Japanese military is given credit for the realization of the independence of Asian nations from Western colonialism, through its “Greater East Asian War” in rhetoric that is quite similar to the discourses employed by Japanese militarists and nationalists during the war.

It should be mentioned that in addition to the exhibitions analysed in detail in chapter 8, there are many other Japanese exhibitions dealing with the war. The analysis of topics indicates that some of these focus to a considerably larger extent on Japanese aggression abroad than the ones that are dealt with in the analysis of narratives. Even though the

analysis of topics did not involve in-depth analysis, it nonetheless indicated that among the exhibits on display at museums such as Peace Osaka and the Kyoto Museum of World Peace, the Grassroots House Peace Museum in Kôchi and the Oka Masaharu Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki, the Women's Active Peace Museum on War and Peace in Tokyo and the Takamatsu Peace Memorial Room, are quite explicit displays dealing with Japanese atrocities. While the existence of such exhibitions needs to be mentioned, those museums are not as prominent and do not receive as much publicity or as many visitors as the ones that are analysed in detail in the analysis of narratives. The narratives analysed in chapter 8 could, in contrast, be said to be more influential as they receive considerably larger numbers of visitors. Among these visitors, the museums that emphasize the national category receive considerably fewer schoolchildren than those that do not. If schoolchildren are indeed more receptive to the content of exhibitions, then this suggests that these narratives matter more.

9.3 Similarities and differences between the Chinese and the Japanese exhibitions

Whereas there certainly are differences among the Chinese exhibitions, these are not anywhere near as great as those found among the diametrically opposed narratives in the Japanese exhibitions. It can be concluded that Chinese exhibitions all operate within and are constrained by a patriotic paradigm, whereas their Japanese counterparts represent radically different and opposing paradigms. This is suggested not only by the analysis of the narratives analysed in detail, but also by the results of the analysis of topics. Differences exist not only among narratives within China and Japan but also between Chinese and Japanese exhibitions. This section discusses the latter type of differences.

In Japan, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum receives the largest number of visitors whereas the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders receives by far the largest number of visitors among Chinese institutions. For this reason, it is meaningful to briefly highlight some differences between the exhibitions at these two museums. Both exhibitions deal with events in which a city became the scene of a terrible act of violence. Despite this similarity, the identity categories constructed differ in that the Nanjing exhibition consistently stresses the national category whereas in Hiroshima this is not the case. The analysis of how identity categories are discursively constructed in these exhibitions therefore demonstrates two very different strategies. A brief look at the headings of the

sections of the exhibitions illustrates this point. Both are analytical in their descriptions of the horrific events dealt with. The Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders has sections describing the different ways in which the Japanese perpetrators did damage, for example, by bombing, raping, looting and setting fires. This is similar to how the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum deals in separate sections with different kinds of damage done by the atomic bomb – damage from heat rays, damage from radiation, and so on. The difference is, of course, that in the latter case human agency is obfuscated and the destruction is ascribed to an object, the atomic bomb, whereas in the former human agency is highlighted. Both, to some extent, deal with victimhood and the source of this victimhood is also stressed, especially at the museum in Nanjing. As the analysis illustrates, these approaches are not just detectable in headings but make up patterns that govern the narratives and are crucial to the interpretation of the narratives as well. The way in which the local is appropriated for national purposes in the Nanjing exhibition is not unique. It exists not just in Chinese narratives but also in Japan at the Yamato Museum in Kure, not far from Hiroshima. The local narrative at the Yamato Museum is presented as representative of the modern history of Japan in a move that presents the local as embodying the national, thereby stressing the national category.

There are other similarities between the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders exhibitions. In both exhibitions, as is demonstrated in the analysis, portraying participants as ordinary people encourages identification. At the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum it is the ordinariness of the activities in which victims were involved at the time they were exposed to the atomic bomb that is central. At the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, the ordinariness of the participants depicted in statues outside the museum resides in the family relations stressed – the effect achieved is that it could have been anyone's grandmother or grandson. Anyone can identify with the participants portrayed. However, the two differ significantly in that the statues in Nanjing draw attention not only to the victims but also to the perpetrators.

In the Chinese exhibitions, Chinese participants often function as moral role models – they embody certain qualities that are desirable in Chinese citizens. By contrast, Japanese participants exemplify and embody the kinds of attributes that are undesirable. The positive characteristics of participants belonging to the in-group, then, are contrasted with the negative features of the participants belonging to the out-group. In the exhibitions at the

Yûshûkan, the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots and the Yamato Museum, morality and values are central just as they are in Chinese exhibitions. However, while the heroes in these narratives exemplify what are understood as desirable values, such as loyalty and willingness to self-sacrifice, negative role models are, in contrast to the Chinese narratives, more or less absent. The values promoted as well as the overall strategy of stressing the national category, are, however, aspects that these Japanese exhibitions have in common with their Chinese counterparts. Of course, there are some differences in style – the Chinese ones are very explicit whereas their Japanese counterparts are quite implicit or vague. However, the aim of disseminating patriotic values involving self-sacrifice for the nation is shared by the Chinese exhibitions and the Yûshûkan, Yamato Museum and the Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots. That they share a similar nationalist ideology is slightly ironic as these narratives are incompatible because the Chinese ones emphasize Japanese aggression whereas the three Japanese ones not only omit Japanese aggression and portray Japanese soldiers as heroes, but, in the case of the Yûshûkan, interpret the same events in ways that are fundamentally different from Chinese narratives.

The interpretation of war as largely non-national experiences is not to be found among the Chinese narratives analysed here but is quite common at Japanese museums. Whereas references to peace can certainly be found at Chinese museums, the peace message is not stressed but rather muted by the nationalist message delivered. Peace is understood as something that a stronger China can contribute to, perhaps through the use of force. This understanding of peace is fundamentally different from the pacifist understanding of peace evident in the interpretations at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum and the Himeyuri Peace Museum. Peace messages, it appears, are more likely, compatible and credible if the national category is not stressed. Of course, it might be argued that these peace messages are part of a “peace nationalism” but if that is indeed the case it is a peace nationalism that does not emphasize the national category. The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum’s Cornerstone of Peace, which lists the names of all who died in the Battle of Okinawa, regardless of nationality, is a further step away from the national category even though it does divide the dead according to nationality, and Okinawans who died outside the prefecture are included whereas people of other origin are only included if they died in the Battle of Okinawa. The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum is also interesting because it shows that narratives about war do not need to be about a nation or a nation state but can focus on a

minority group, the members of which lack a state of their own. The in-group created at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum is, as is discussed above, the Okinawan – not the Japanese people. This raises the issue of what a narrative created by one of China’s many minority groups would look like and further highlights to the fact that narratives in the PRC are largely appropriated by the party state, which, in an effort to emphasize unity, creates and imposes a national category, comprising “people of all nationalities in the whole country”, from above while suppressing alternative and potentially subversive ways of understanding the experiences dealt with.

9.4 Conclusions

Chapter 1 examined the way in which the “history issue” in Sino-Japanese relations is commonly discussed and defined. It was concluded that the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations is often represented in a way that is problematic and which has several consequences. The following main problems and consequences were mentioned:

1. The focus is, to a very large extent, on Japan, within the context of the history issue.
2. The focus is chiefly on the *behaviour* of leaders, especially Japanese leaders but also on Chinese leaders in relation to the so-called history card.
3. Chinese representations are rarely dealt with in the context of the history issue.
4. The actions and views of different Japanese actors – politicians, right-wingers and the people – are often bundled together, resulting in a generalized depiction of the views and behaviour of “the Japanese”. In some cases, the assumption or claim is made that Japanese depictions are more or less the same and that any references to atrocities carried out by the Japanese military are eschewed from Japanese representations.
5. There is a lack of research that deals with both the Chinese and Japanese contexts.

In order to address these problems and consequences, this study has carried out a rethinking of the history problem that has addressed and moved away from the preoccupations of the discourse. This rethinking has entailed a departure from the preoccupation with Japan to an approach that pays equal attention to the Chinese and Japanese contexts, thereby also addressing the fifth point mentioned above. Second, the fixation with behaviour, especially the behaviour of leaders, has been abandoned and instead the focus has been on narratives. This does not mean that behaviour has been ignored. Indeed, behaviour in relation to narratives is been part of the focus of the contextual analysis performed in chapters 4 and 5. This analysis demonstrates, among other things, how political actors have created, and attempted to affect and change, the content of narratives that instantiate collective identities. Put differently, the

behaviour of actors supports the contention that narratives matter. The contextual analysis also demonstrates that both contexts are considerably more complex than sometimes appears to be believed, especially by the adherents of approaches that assume that actors are free to do more or less what they please. It was established that the CCP is not able to play the history card as it pleases and that narratives constructed by the CCP need to be understood as part of a domestic debate, which is informed and affected by previous debates and articulations, in which other actors participate, concerning the meaning of patriotism. An overly state-centric approach to Chinese society is, in other words, just as problematic as such an approach to Japanese society is. That the CCP runs most museums and uses them for propaganda purposes does not mean that it is all-powerful or that it does not need to take account of the views of other actors when creating narratives. That the Japanese government has taken a more hands-off approach and has not launched any propaganda campaigns similar to the CCP's patriotic education campaign does not mean that the government is uninvolved in the identity politics of war memory. The SDF in particular, a government entity under the ministry of defence, runs several exhibitions. The word propaganda is not used. Instead, these are called public relations facilities (広報施設).

Moreover, since equal attention has been paid to the Japanese and Chinese contexts and narratives, the consequence that Chinese representations are rarely dealt with in the context of the history issue has also been addressed. Finally, the simplistic understanding of Japanese debate and views on history-related issues, which sometimes represents an atrocity-denying right-wing view more or less as *the* Japanese view or at least the only view that needs to be taken into consideration, has been refuted both through the contextual analysis and the analysis of narratives. Instead, the analysis in the chapters 6 to 8 has demonstrated that, in contrast to what is sometimes asserted in discussions concerning the history issue, the Japanese context is characterized by the existence of narratives that can be divided into two conflicting paradigms. Furthermore, of these paradigms, it is the one that does not stress the national category and is hence incompatible with the right-wing views of the past that is more powerful, at least if it is assumed that it is the exhibitions that receive the largest number of schoolchildren that are most influential.

One of the central conclusions of the contextual analysis is that many of the actors involved in the politics surrounding narratives about war strongly *believe* that these narratives matter. This is the rationale for creating museum exhibitions in the first place. It is also the reason that actors use them for educational purposes, whether for “peace” or “patriotic”

education, that attempts are made to affect the content of exhibitions and that the content of exhibitions is fervently discussed in magazine articles and parliamentary debates. The actors involved all express, through words and deeds, the belief that these exhibitions have a significant impact on the minds of visitors, especially if these visitors are young, which many are, as is demonstrated above. Put differently, it is not only constructivist researchers who suppose that narratives matter: politicians, bureaucrats and activists do too. Indeed, they are *made* to matter by these political actors. This is a good reason to analyse the narratives. If they do in fact shape people's minds then we need to know what is in them. If politicians, bureaucrats and activists believe that they matter then there is good reason for analysts to make similar assumptions. This is an important result of the contextual analysis and also the rationale for the theoretical framework discussed in chapter 2 – the stories “we” tell about “our” past are important components in, and instantiate the abstract images that are, identities. Of course, it can also be supposed that such narratives affect these actors. They may subscribe to one particular narrative and therefore construe opposed narratives as threats to their identities. Examples of this are provided in both the contextual analysis and the analysis of narratives. Narratives also illustrate the values that members of communities should possess and provide models for how they should behave. What do these narratives imply about Sino-Japanese relations? How do they portray “us” and “them” and what do these depictions imply? In these ways, narratives are related to behaviour.

In Chinese exhibitions, more or less all Chinese are depicted in the same way – “millions of people, all of one mind”, effectively erasing any differences, subtleties and complexities. What we are dealing with is therefore not just a stereotypical portrayal of the out-group but to a very large extent a stereotypical depiction of the in-group. The stark contrast between the two defines the self by starkly contrasting it with the other. One stands for the positive moral values desired in those belonging to the in-group while the other defines what the in-group is not and should not be. The negative values embodied by the past aggressors risk being associated with the descendants of these aggressors. This is the logical conclusion if one is to follow the same logic for the out-group that governs the relationship between past and present for the in-group, as Chinese in both past and present are depicted as belonging to the same national category. If we assume, like the people involved in the politics of war exhibitions do, that the minds of at least some of the visitors, and the identities or interpretative frameworks by which they make sense of the world, are affected by the narratives analysed in the chapters above, then we can assume that many Chinese visitors to these exhibitions will

get a negative image of Japan and Japanese people and that there is a risk that they will interpret Japanese behaviour and act accordingly.

Most Japanese exhibitions, in one way or another, deal with local events. These local events are often contextualized. Such contextualization provides a framework for understanding local events within a larger context. While such contextualization can elucidate certain aspects it may also obfuscate others at the same time. At some Japanese museums, for example, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, local events are contextualized into a historical narrative that exceeds a century. Both the events that immediately preceded the war, which ended shortly after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and the events subsequent to the nuclear explosion occupy a large part of the exhibition. One effect of this is, arguably, that the war itself is backgrounded. The local events, the dropping of the bomb and especially its after-effects, are given much space. The period after the bomb was dropped performs an important function as it contributes to the interpretation of the local events as the harbinger of the nuclear age. The events that preceded the dropping of the bomb and the subsequent nuclear arms race, especially the war in China, the treatment of which is of central concern to this dissertation, are not omitted. One atrocity committed in China is even mentioned in a relatively explicit way – and responsibility regarding this particular atrocity is ascribed clearly. Nonetheless, the overall issues of responsibility for the war in its entirety as well as for the dropping of the bomb are not really addressed. The anti-nuclear peace message might be described as drowning out the issue of war responsibility at the same time as the contextualization consigns the war to the background. The analysis of topics suggested that this way of contextualizing events is not uncommon in Japanese exhibitions. Japanese exhibitions, even the ones that include Japanese aggression in their narratives, are concerned to a large extent with advocating peace, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, depiction of which would lead to a discussion of responsibility, is given little treatment. Furthermore, in narratives at some of the Japanese museums that receive the largest numbers of visitors, Japanese aggression is often directed against domestic victims, whereas atrocities committed abroad are given less attention. In this way, the Japanese military is often depicted as an aggressor and the Japanese government may be portrayed as oppressive. However, the role of the Japanese military as an aggressor in China is not always emphasized to the same extent even though, as is illustrated above, there are exhibitions, especially among those that receive smaller numbers of visitors, that deal frankly and in much detail with Japanese atrocities abroad. If it is assumed that the narratives analysed contribute to moulding the minds of visi-

tors as well as the identities that are the interpretative frameworks they use to make sense of the world, then the Japanese narratives analysed in detail will, even if some of them contribute to the creation of pacifist values, not do a great deal that will be appreciated in China.

The connection between narratives and ideas concerning the moral status, for example, of China vis-à-vis Japan, as is discussed above, can be linked to a sense of entitlement if one party in a relationship believes its moral standing to be higher than that of the other party. For example, the Chinese government has often commented in relation to Japanese apologies that: “stating one’s position is important but expression through action is more important”. In other words, discourse and action are tied together. Japanese leaders should not just apologize but also act in certain ways. What actions are considered appropriate is not always made clear in statements by Chinese leaders, but an identity, which involves such a sense of entitlement based on an understanding of morality may affect Chinese behaviour towards Japan and interpretations of Japanese behaviour by Chinese. Such understandings of morality in the bilateral relationship may or may not be shared by the Japanese side. It is quite clear that it did guide Japanese behaviour towards China after the violent crackdown on students at Tiananmen Square in 1989, when Western countries adopted measures towards China that were considerably harsher than the more restrained course taken by Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister at the time, Uno Sosuke, commented that: “I say clearly that Japan invaded China 40 [sic] years ago. Japan cannot do anything against a people who experienced such a war. Sino-Japanese relations differ from Sino-United States relations” (quoted in Ijiri 1990:656). It is, however, often argued that Japanese views of the PRC deteriorated considerably after the Tiananmen crackdown. Japanese may hence be less inclined to see China as morally superior. The Japanese narratives analysed in detail in this dissertation, even though few of them depict China negatively and some of them certainly portray the Japanese military and government as aggressors, still focus primarily on Japanese aggression towards Japanese (or Okinawan) victims, and often only secondarily or to a relatively small extent address Japanese aggression towards Chinese. In other words, the narratives do not go very far in contributing to the creation of ideas about morality in the relationship that are compatible with such Chinese understandings. At the same time, Japanese views of the PRC and the CCP are influenced by other sources, for example, the media’s portrayal of current events, that further affect ideas concerning the moral status of the PRC and the CCP. From such a perspective, all of the competing Japanese narratives are likely to clash with those of their Chinese counterparts. In addition, if Japanese stress Japan’s peaceful post-war record (and especially if they

compare it to the CCP's record) they are even less likely to accept the PRC's moral superiority.

It is discussed in chapter 1, with regard to Japanese behaviour, that many newspaper articles and scholarly texts assume or imply that a change in Japanese (government) behaviour would lead to improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. Of course, the behaviour of Japanese (and sometimes Chinese) politicians deserves to be scrutinized and is sometimes – maybe often – extremely problematic. Moreover, it is quite possible that some kind of reassurance or apology on behalf of the Japanese government is necessary in order for the bilateral relationship to improve. However, this would not be sufficient to make issues concerning war history vanish forever. There are other factors that need to be taken into account. Even if the Japanese government made an apology that was understood as sincere and coupled this with compensation for victims of Japanese aggression, this would not necessarily mean that the history-related problems would disappear. This becomes quite clear when the history issue is understood as linked to how history is represented in narratives about war in both Japan and the PRC.

The chapters in this dissertation have illustrated the need for a context-sensitive analysis. The narratives analysed can only be understood against the background of a comprehensive contextual analysis. It is mentioned in the discussions of the role of context in the chapters above that, at a fundamental level, context helps to understand or explain features of a phenomenon in terms of some aspects of its environment. The “friendship corners” in Chinese exhibitions need to be understood against the background of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs's (MOFA) discussions with and requests to its Chinese counterpart concerning the content of Chinese war exhibitions. It is noted in chapter 5 that the Japanese MOFA has expressed its concern to the Chinese MOFA about the content of exhibitions. Specifically, requests for the inclusion of material dealing with Japan's peaceful post-war policy and Sino-Japanese friendship have been presented. Without this contextual background knowledge, a full understanding of these aspects of the exhibitions would not be possible. Moreover, such discussions illustrate how the content of war museums becomes the centre of attention in the politics of war memory. Because they believe that exhibitions and the narratives presented in other media are important in shaping the hearts and minds of both friend and foe, indeed, for turning them into friend or foe, political actors will not only continue to create such narratives but also persist in trying to affect the content of the narratives created by their ideological

opponents. The contextual analysis has provided plenty of previously untapped empirical evidence to confirm this.

The messages often explicated towards the end of exhibitions are another feature that cannot be understood without being contextualized. These texts explicitly link the story told about the past with the present. In the case of Chinese government-run exhibitions, continuity is constructed between the Chinese nation in the past and the present and proper patriotic behaviour is defined as working hard to create a strong Chinese nation based on peaceful development. This requires a stable society – something that can only be realized on the basis of the policies of the CCP. This message should be understood against the background of the changes in Chinese society since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping. These economic reforms, based on (peaceful) development and a policy of “opening up” creates large cleavages in society between those who are allowed to become rich before others and those who are not. In such a situation, in which those left behind may feel discontented with the state of affairs, stability is of the essence. These messages also need to be understood in the context of the domestic debates concerning what it means to be a patriot in China. Even though the patriotic education campaign launched by the CCP in the early 1990s has most probably contributed to strengthening patriotism in the PRC, the CCP’s control over information and debate has loosened. This means that a space has opened up for other actors to express opinions and try to define what it means to be patriotic in China. Against this background, the interpretations or messages delivered in the Chinese exhibitions discussed above should be regarded as attempts by the CCP to steer patriotism in a direction that favours its policies of continued development and social stability.

Regarding intertextuality, it is possible to see that it is at work not just between museum exhibitions and other arenas but also between exhibitions. For example, even though there are large differences between the Beijing and Nanjing exhibitions, there is also much evidence of intertextual relationships. For example, the first exhibition at the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders deals mainly with local events. The second exhibition could be said to contextualize the local events dealt with in the first exhibition into a larger framework of nationwide and worldwide war, on the one hand, and foreign and especially Japanese aggression, and Chinese national struggle dating back to the 19th century, on the other. The second exhibition deals with some of the themes, for example heroism, treated to a considerably larger extent but in a very similar way and by depicting the same events at the War of Resistance Museum in Beijing. A main theme in one exhibition is

often treated in less detail elsewhere. Intertextuality perhaps becomes most evident in the concluding texts of the state-run Chinese exhibitions. The wording and messages delivered in these texts have much in common. It is also possible to see that intertextuality functions not only between exhibitions but also between exhibitions and other media. Expressions common in government-run Chinese exhibitions, for example, concerning the need to “take history as a mirror and face the future”, can be found not just in these exhibitions but also in official government documents, utterances and speeches by Chinese leaders and in newspaper articles. The narratives found at these and other museums, in other words, are entangled in a discursive web of texts found in different media throughout Chinese society. These utterances, speeches and newspaper articles are connected to and, in a way, based on the narratives presented, in a comparatively elaborate form, in the exhibitions analysed here. This points to an area for further research – an area that has the potential to further illustrate the significance of the narratives analysed in detail above. Through systematic analyses of how the narratives analysed here are discussed and how elements from these narratives are picked up, drawn on and used in other settings, it is possible to more clearly determine whether and how these narratives matter, or rather are made to matter, in different settings. In addition, it is possible through intertextual and interdiscursive analysis to illustrate and elaborate on the meanings of utterances made and actions taken by, for example, politicians by connecting them to elaborate narratives that explicate the meanings and implications of their statements.

In chapter 1, it was stated that the overarching aim of this study is to present a framework that makes possible an understanding of bilateral relations in a way that challenges and highlights the consequences of mainstream approaches. A case study of the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations was carried out to achieve this aim. The case study has illustrated how this framework can be employed to analyse a specific issue. The central assumptions of the framework are that bilateral relations can be understood through an analysis of identity narratives. Such narratives may contain depictions of self and other that, if internalized through identity narratives, may affect how the actions of those representing or belonging to the other state are interpreted. In other words, the origins of patterns of amity and enmity are explored. A comprehensive analysis of the domestic context in which narratives, and patterns of amity and enmity, exist and develop is necessary in order to understand how they are used for political purposes and affect bilateral relations. In order to apply the framework to other cases it is necessary to pay attention to the specific conditions of the bilateral relations studied. The kinds of narrative analysed may differ in different settings and need not

be narratives about war. However, the basic principles are the same. Even though the analysis needs to be context-sensitive and the issue analysed is specific, the central assumptions of the framework can be used to analyse any bilateral relations.

Importantly, the approach focuses on what mainstream approaches tend to disregard. The aim has not been to argue that mainstream approaches lack currency entirely. The point, rather, is that the preoccupations and assumptions of these approaches have consequences both for how bilateral relations are understood and how politics is conducted. Like any approach, the mainstream approaches shed light on some features while ignoring others. Because of their dominance, however, these approaches are influential and their consequences far-reaching. In chapter 1, the general assumptions and consequences of these approaches were discussed. These include the focus on the state as a unitary, rational actor. States are often regarded, more or less, as the only relevant international actors and in the domestic arena they are afforded much power – they are basically regarded as being able to do as they please domestically. The domestic is bracketed as the international arena is given priority. Scarce attention is therefore paid to domestic struggles over identity narratives and the domestic as an arena in which narratives that affect bilateral relations are constructed. Furthermore, these approaches are often characterized by positivism. Positivism makes it difficult to address how actors are constituted and involves an objectivism that, as is illustrated below in the discussion of He's and Jin's studies, has consequences for how history-related issues are understood. The approach used in this study, on the other hand, has, through an analysis of a specific case, focused on these consequences and blind spots. It was demonstrated in chapter 1 that some of the preoccupations of the mainstream approaches are common in discussions of the history issue in Sino-Japanese relations as well and have consequences for how this specific issue is commonly understood. By providing an alternative understanding of the history issue it has also been possible to illustrate how the framework for understanding bilateral relations can be used to analyse a specific case.

In other words, the results of this study also have implications for IR theory more generally. It is common, as was mentioned above, for mainstream IR approaches to treat states as rational actors, the inner workings of which are often ignored. This study, by contrast, is concerned to a large extent with issues related to identity and the constitution of actors. Understandings of self and other, inherent in identities, may affect how a situation or the behaviour of other actors is interpreted, thereby leading to emotional or other non-rational behaviour. This is not only an issue concerning access to information – it is fundamentally

connected with the interpretation of information. Who I believe I am and who I believe you are will affect how I interpret and respond to your actions. If behaviour is rational, rationality needs to be understood as defined by the domestic context. In chapter 4, for example, it was demonstrated that debates in present-day China have centred on the issue of how to act patriotically in China. Against this background, behaviour will be rational if it is understood as patriotic.

Chapter 1 briefly discusses previous research on issues similar to those dealt with in this study, particularly the studies conducted by He (2009) and Jin (2006). Both He and Jin are explicitly influenced by Paul Cohen's *History in Three Keys*, in which history as experienced, as created by historians and as used by mythologizers are distinguished between (Cohen 1997:212-14, Jin 2006:32-36, He 2009:29). Jin argues, following Cohen, that mythologizers manipulate history: "This type of manipulation ... is quite subtle in nature and difficult for the public to detect. In many cases, people are either unaware of this domination over their thinking or reluctant to admit the influence" (Jin 2006:35). Might not the same be true for historians? How can the historian, attempting to create an objective account, be sure s/he is really objective? Even if all available sources are consulted the historian will still regard some events as more important than others (cf. Lundquist 1993:85). Indeed, that a certain event or phenomenon is chosen for study to begin with points to the limits of objectivity, as such choices can hardly be objectively motivated. Moreover, the mythologizer may not believe s/he is manipulating history but that s/he is constructing a "true" narrative. This has consequences for the frameworks employed by He and Jin. He is concerned with interstate reconciliation and the role of different kinds of narrative as obstacles to or facilitators of reconciliation (He 2009:40-41). The study "focuses on falsifiable, pernicious national myths" as obstacles to reconciliation (He 2009:27). This theoretical focus on falsifiable myths indicates that myths differ from "true" history: "some myths of the two sides may overlap, forming a shared but *false* historical memory" (He 2009:41, emphasis added).³⁴¹ The juxtaposition of true and false historical accounts becomes clear in the following claim: "Today, many countries are still wrestling with deciding whether to spread truthful or mythologized interpreta-

³⁴¹ Earlier in the book, a similar claim can be found: "Even if governments agree on a mythical interpretation of history for the sake of expedience, a truly friendly popular tie is unattainable because the intergovernmental agreement on *historical lies* is fragile" (He 2009:9-10, emphasis added). Jin presents a similar argument: "People seem willing to accept a simplified conclusion about a historical event if it sounds convincing and logical to them. It does not matter whether such a conclusion is an objective presentation of historical fact or not, it is "historically true" in the public eye if most people accept it as true" (Jin 2006:35). This suggests an understanding according to which objectivity is possible.

tions of the past” (He 2009:28). Even though Cohen’s distinction between history as created by historians and history as used by mythologizers may appear commonsensical, the distinction is not so clear-cut. He acknowledges this but still argues, based on Cohen, that there is a fundamental difference between what historians do and what mythologizers do (He 2009:29). This all seems reasonable at first sight but the crux is where to draw the line and how to determine that one narrative is a myth and another truthful. The claim that myths should be falsifiable is not entirely convincing as she also argues that:

[I]t is true that China and Poland suffered enormously at the hands of foreign aggressors, but to use victimhood to portray their entire modern history is a myth because it leaves out those more congenial, cooperative periods of their relations with the aggressor countries as well as their not-so-benign interactions with neighboring countries or ethnic groups within their own countries (He 2009:29).

It appears that it is no longer a question of falsifiability, or that the meaning of falsifiable has been considerably broadened from a narrow focus on the truthfulness of “facts” included in narratives – the issue here is selectivity. If selection bias is sufficient to prove a narrative “false”, then where does it end? Should every Chinese narrative about the war against Japan include China’s “not-so-benign interactions with neighboring countries or ethnic groups within” China in order not to be false? He’s conceptualization of stories about the past, influenced as it is by the positivist tradition, is problematic. The approach adopted in this study avoids the pitfalls of an approach to history influenced by positivism and mainstream IR. The focus is on how meaning is created and identities are constructed in the narratives analysed. Even though the question of what actually happened in the past is not addressed, it is still possible to draw conclusions concerning bilateral relations on the basis of an analysis of narratives and the politics surrounding the construction of narratives. Even if all parties involved in struggles over history writing in China and Japan were to agree on a set of basic historical “facts”, for example through joint history studies that all involved agreed were true, it would still be possible to create different narratives and to make sense of the past in radically different ways based on these agreed facts. That agreement on basic facts would solve the problem is an illusion. It is perfectly possible to create myths or other-maligning narratives based on a selection of agreed “objectively true” historical facts. Historical narratives, even those created by conscientious historians, are always based on selectivity.

In other words, agreement on basic facts does not rule out the possibility of creating narratives that emphasize “our” good and “their” bad actions/qualities and de-

emphasizes our bad and their good actions/qualities because such highlighting can be achieved, as this study clearly illustrates, through inclusion and omission as well as through the use of linguistic and other means of representation. Moreover, the categories into which participants in narratives are divided are significant in this regard – if participants are defined purely according to nationality this creates a different meaning than if they are categorized as city-dwellers, farmers, working-class people, landlords, men, women or simply human beings. Labelling, predication and other aspects of language, then, are not innocent and historians too need to make choices concerning, for example, how to label and depict participants when constructing their narratives. When studying narratives it is necessary not only to analyse “content”, as often conceptualized, but also form, because dissimilarities in form result in different content because form affects meaning. These conclusions could not have been reached without conducting a study that analyses, in detail, the actual composition and form of the narratives per se. This study, in other words, contributes to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, narrative-, identity- and history-related studies in International Relations (IR) by moving beyond the positivist and broad analyses common in the discipline to analyse narrative structure in detail. The contribution is empirical as well as theoretical. Previous studies dealing with Sino-Japanese relations have either largely ignored issues concerning narratives or approached them in a way that pays little attention to how narratives are constructed, that is, the form of narratives, because they do not conduct close textual analyses. This study contributes to research on Sino-Japanese relations by illustrating how meaning and “self and other” are constructed in narratives about war. It also demonstrates that these narratives are closely related to domestic struggles over meaning and identity. The intended political thrust of such narratives is related mainly to these domestic struggles but has international ramifications.

The studies conducted by He and Jin, as is discussed above, move beyond the narrow focus of mainstream IR theory and focus on ideas. Nonetheless, these approaches have in common with mainstream IR their positivist objectivism. This objectivism affects mainstream IR in a way similar to how it is manifest in the studies by He and Jin, discussed above. Interpretation and representation are seldom given the attention they deserve. Furthermore, domestic issues are not given much prominence when states are treated as black boxes. This consequence of mainstream IR is addressed by the framework used here as the role of domestic narratives and the domestic context are highlighted. By focusing on the domestic it is possible to demonstrate what approaches that bracket the domestic are missing. The frame-

work used here explicitly prioritizes the domestic. Many of the results of this study could not have been reached had the domestic been bracketed. For example, the domestic politics surrounding identity narratives in China and Japan have been elucidated. These identity narratives contain depictions of self and other that may affect how the behaviour of self and other are interpreted. Narratives, in other words, may help understand the existence of patterns of amity and enmity.

Even though, as discussed in chapter 1, there are approaches that pay attention to patterns of amity and enmity, these are often not problematized but taken more or less as given. Important questions such as where such patterns come from and how they are constructed are often overlooked. The present study makes a contribution by addressing the issue of where these patterns of amity and enmity come from. Such patterns may of course stem from many different sources. Narratives about war are possible sources, among others. Buzan and Waever argue that: “These patterns of amity and enmity are influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, and geography, but to a large extent they are path-dependent and thus become their own best explanation” (Buzan & Waever 2003:50). A pattern “is best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global factors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions” (Buzan & Waever 2003:47). Even though domestic factors are mentioned here, in the Regional Security Complex Theory framework this refers to “domestically generated vulnerabilities”, that is, whether a state is internally stable or not (Buzan & Waever 2003:51).

The patterns of amity and enmity are seen as constructed first and foremost through state interaction in a regional system along the model of Wendt’s system theory (Buzan & Waever 2003:50). Simply affirming that such patterns exist or have their origins in state interaction does not reveal much about how they develop and change. This relative disregard for the domestic is problematic. It is demonstrated in this study that domestic struggles over meaning are central to an understanding of narratives about war. The war with which the narratives analysed here are concerned consisted, of course, of interaction between states at the regional level. In this way, the narratives can be said to have their origin in state interaction. However, the narratives have been constructed and evolved within domestic contexts. It is within domestic contexts that they have developed as part of struggles concerning identity. It is within domestic contexts that narratives have been constructed using particular linguistic

and other means through which self and other are depicted in particular ways, and it is in these contexts that certain interpretations of these stories have been created. Patterns of amity and enmity, then, originate not in interactions between states but in interpretations of such interactions.³⁴² They are especially significant if these interpretations are integrated into identities on the basis of which the world is interpreted. Any approach to IR that treats the domestic as a black box not only misses these dynamics but also risks reifying patterns of amity and enmity. Narratives and other discourses on which patterns of amity and enmity are based are constructed using linguistic and other means. Systematic close textual analysis of the representational choices involved in the creation of such discourses has been given surprisingly little attention even within the constructivist IR camp. This largely unexploited resource provides a wealth of promising methodological assets that can be employed within and contribute to constructivist IR approaches.

Two approaches – RSCT and the approaches used by He and Jin have been given special treatment here. These approaches move away from the preoccupations of mainstream IR in different ways. However, they are still affected by mainstream IR in other ways and the consequences of this have been discussed in some detail above. Through a discussion of these approaches, based on the analysis conducted in this study, it has been possible to highlight some of the consequences of the preoccupations of mainstream IR thereby illustrating how the framework used here makes possible an understanding of bilateral relations that challenges and highlights the consequences of mainstream approaches. In the approaches developed by He and Jin, objectivism has consequences. In the case of RSCT, it is the bracketing of the domestic that has consequences. In approaches that retain several of the fixations of the mainstream it is likely that the consequences will be even more far-reaching.

³⁴² There is, in other words, no direct causality between events and patterns of amity and enmity because events need to be interpreted in order to attain meaning.

References

- “9.18” History Museum (1999) *Jiu yi ba lishi bowiguan* (Museum booklet), Shenyang: “9.18” History Museum
- Adler, Emanuel (2006) ‘Constructivism and International Relations’, Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. (Eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage
- Anderson, Benedict (2006, Revised edition) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London & New York: Verso
- Ashley, Richard K. (1984) ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, (2)
- Askew, David (2002) ‘The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends’, *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html>, Last accessed: 6 June 2009
- Bacchi, Carol Lee (1999) *Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems*, London: Sage Publications
- Barker, Christopher & Galasinski, Dariusz (2001) *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity*, London: Sage Publications
- Barnard, Christopher (2003) ‘Pearl Harbour in Japanese high school history textbooks: The grammar and semantics of responsibility’, Martin, J.R. & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *Re/Reading the Past. Critical and functional perspectives on time and value*, Philadelphia, P:A., USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Barthes, Roland (1977) *Image – Music – Text*, New York: Hill & Wang
- Bartov, Omer (2002) ‘The *Wehrmacht* Exhibition Controversy: The Politics of Evidence’, Bartov, Omer; Grossmann, Anita & Nolan, Mary (Eds.) *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, New York: The New Press
- BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2001) ‘China views Japanese premier’s apology as sign he will avoid shrine’, *Kyodo News Service*, 12 October
- BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2005a) ‘Japan should wake up to history’, *China Daily*, 24 July
- BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2005b) ‘Paper urges Japan to remove friction with China, South Korea for sake of UN bid’, *Mainichi Shimbun*, 13 April
- BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2007) ‘Chinese researchers unveil first “comfort women” report’, *Xinhua News Agency*, 3 July
- BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2010) ‘Japan, China to release history study report later January’, 16 January
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (1995) ‘Japanese Prime Minister’s Visit; Xinhua Chinese Report on Murayama’s Comments at Marco Polo Bridge’, *New China News Agency*, 5 May
- Bell, Duncan (2006) ‘Introduction: Memory, Trauma and World Politics’ in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Past and Present*, Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave
- Billig, Michael (1995) *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage

- Blaikie, Norman (2006) *Designing Social Research*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Boehm, Scott (2006) 'Privatizing Public Memory: The Price of Patriotic Philanthropy and the Post-9/11 Politics of Display', *American Quarterly*, Vol. 58 (4)
- Bohman, Stefan (1997) *Historia, museer och nationalism*, Stockholm: Carlssons Bokförlag
- Boll, Bernd (2002) 'Zloczów, July 1941: The *Wehrmacht* and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia', Bartov, Omer; Grossmann, Anita & Nolan, Mary (Eds.) *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, New York: The New Press
- Breen, John (2008a) 'Introduction: A Yasukuni Genealogy', Breen, John (Ed.) *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Breen, John (2008b) 'Yasukuni and the Loss of Historical Memory', Breen, John (Ed.) *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Brook, Timothy (2007) 'Radhabinod Pal on the Rape of Nanking: The Tokyo Trial and the Guilt of History', Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi (Ed.) *The Nanking Atrocity: Complicating the Picture*, Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books
- Brown, Wendy (2006) *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*, Princeton, N.J. & Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press
- Buckley, Chris (2005) 'Anti-Japan protests sweep across China; Japan won't get apology, Beijing says', *The International Herald Tribune*, 8 April 2005
- Burke, Carol (2006) 'The Price of Freedom is Truth', *Radical History Review*, Issue 95 (Spring)
- Buruma, Ian (2009) [1994] *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, London: Atlantic Books
- Buszynski, Leszek (2009) 'Sino-Japanese Relations: Interdependence, Rivalry and Regional Security', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 31, (1)
- Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole (2003) *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Callahan, William A. (2006) 'History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China', *Critical Asian Studies*, 38:2, pp. 179-208.
- Callahan, William A. (2007) 'Trauma and Community: The Visual Politics of Chinese Nationalism and Sino-Japanese Relations', *Theory & Event*, Vol. 10, (4)
- Callahan, William A. (2010) *China: The Pessimist Nation*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press
- Campbell, David (1998) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Cameron, Deborah & McDonald, Hamish (2005) 'China-Japan tensions ease after talks', *The Age*, 5 April 2005
- Carlsnaes, Walter (2002) 'Foreign Policy', Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. (Eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage

CCP Central Committee (1988) [1996] 'A Notice Issued by the CCP Central Committee Regarding the Reform and Strengthening of Moral Education Work in Middle and Primary Schools, *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 29, (4), Jul/Aug

CCTV (2009) 'Fushun Pingdingshan can'an yizhi jinianguan', Available online at: <http://space.tv.cctv.com/article/ARTI1251183588157613>, Last accessed 8 March 2011.

Central Committee of the CPC (1994) 'Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao (Outline for implementing patriotic education)' *Xinhua Net* Available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/16/content_2705546.htm, Last accessed: 25 June 2009

Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council (2006) [2004] 'Some Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving the Development of Ideology and Morality Among Minors', (Translation by Ming Qiang & Gregory P. Fairbrother) *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 39, (2), March/April

Chang, Iris (1997) *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, London & New York: Penguin Books

Chellaney, Brahma (2005) 'Beijing's historical fantasies; China and its neighbours', *The International Herald Tribune*, 13 December

Cheng, Joseph Y.S. (2003) 'Sino-Japanese Relations in the 20th Century', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 33, (2)

Cheung, Mong (2010) 'Political survival and the Yasukuni controversy in Sino-Japanese relations', *The Pacific Review*, 23 (4)

Chi, Robert (2007) "'The March of the Volunteers': From Movie Theme Song to National Anthem", Lee, Ching Kwan & Yang, Guobin (Eds.) *Re-envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press

China Culture Information Net (2009) *Baige aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi [One Hundred Patriotic Education Bases]*, [Online, cited 21 June 2009] Available from: <http://www.ccnt.com.cn/html/agjy>

China Daily (2002) *Hubbub over name unfounded*, Available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-03/25/content_112414.htm, Last accessed 7 August, 2009

China Daily (2005) 'Textbook sanction negates truth of war it is political provocation', 6 April

China Daily (2007) 'Museum to 'Comfort Women' Opens in Shanghai', 7 July

China Daily (2009a) 'Editorial: Change in Japan', Available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009japanelection/2009-08/31/content_8634511.htm, Last accessed: 3 November 2009

China Daily (2010a) 'Confucius Institutes enhance China's int'l image', Available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-04/23/content_9766116.htm, Accessed 24 April 2010

China Daily (2010b) 'China commemorates Nanjing massacre victims', Available online at: http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-12/13/content_11697273.htm#, Last accessed 14 December 2010

Chow, Kai-wing (2001) 'Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China', Chow, Kai-wing; Doak, Kevin M. & Fu, Poshek (Eds.) *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press

Christian Science Monitor (2006) 'Koizumi visit presents tougher Japan', 28 June

- Christenson, Thomas J. (2005) 'Will China Become a "Responsible Stakeholder": The Six-Party Talks, Taiwan Arms Sales and Sino-Japanese Relations', *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 16
- Coble, Parks M. (2010) 'The Legacy of China's Wartime Reporting, 1937-1945: Can the Past Serve the Present?', *Modern China*, Vol. 36, (4)
- Cohen, Paul A. (2003) *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past*, London & New York: Routledge
- Cohen, Paul A. (1997) *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Coser, Lewis (1992) 'Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877-1945', Halbwachs, Maurice (1992) *On Collective Memory*, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press
- Crew, Spencer R. & Sims, James E (1991) 'Locating Authenticity' in Karp, Ivan & Lavine, Steven D (Eds.) *Exhibiting cultures: the poetics and politics of museum display*
- Cripps, Denise (1996) 'Flags and Fanfares: The Hinomaru Flag and Kimigayo Anthem', Goodman, Roger & Neary, Ian (Eds.) *Case Studies on Human Rights in Japan*, London: Curzon Press
- Deans, Phil (2000) 'Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, (1)
- Deans, Phil (2005) 'Nationalism and National Self-Assertion in the People's Republic of China', *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 21
- de Bary, Theodore; Gluck, Carol & Tiedemann, Arthur L. (2006) *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Deng, Xiaoping (1989) 'Address to Officers at the Rank of General and Above in Command of the Troops Enforcing Martial Law in Beijing', Available online at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1990.html>, Last accessed 25 February 2010
- Deng, Yong (1997) 'Chinese Relations with Japan- Implications for Asia-Pacific Regionalism', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 70, (3)
- Denton, Kirk (2005) 'Museums, Memorial Sites and Exhibitionary Culture in the People's Republic of China', *The China Quarterly* No. 183, Fall
- Denton, Kirk (2007) 'Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese Museums', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kirk_A_-Denton/2547, Last accessed 18 October 2009
- Dierkes, Julian (2005) 'The Stability of Postwar Japanese History Education amid Global Changes', Vickers, Edward & Jones, Alisa (Eds.) *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, New York & London: Routledge
- Dikötter, Frank (1992) *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, London: Hurst & Company
- Doak, Kevin, M. (2007) *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan*, Leiden & Boston: Brill
- Dongbei Lieshi Jinianguan (2005) *Heitu yinghun*, Haerbin: Dongbei Lieshi Jinianguan
- Dorf, Michael C. (2007) 'Culture Wars in the Nation's Attic', *Social Identities*, Vol. 13 (2), (March)
- Doss, Erika (2008) 'War, Memory, and the public mediation of affect: The National World War II Memorial and American imperialism', *Memory Studies*, Vol. 1 (2)

- Dower, John W. (1997) 'Triumphal and Tragic Narratives of the War in Asia', Hein, Laura & Selden, Mark (Eds.) *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age*, Armonk, N.Y. & London: M. E. Sharpe
- Dower, John W. (1999) *Embracing Deafeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W.W. Norton
- Downey, Tom (2010) 'China's Cyber Posse', *New York Times*, 3 March, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html?pagewanted=1&ref=asia>, Last accessed 7 March 2010
- Dreyer, June Teufel (2001) 'Sino-Japanese Relations', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, (28)
- Drifte, Reinhard (2000) 'US Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, (4)
- Drifte, Reinhard (2009) 'The Future of the Japanese-Chinese Relationship: The Case for a Grand Political Bargain', *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 16 (2)
- Eighth Route Army Xi'an Office Website (2007) ' ', Available online at: <http://www.xabb1936.cn/china/3j.asp?NewsID=85&BigClassID=1&SmallClassID=35>, Last accessed 24 March 2010
- Ekengren, Ann-Maire & Hinnfors, Jonas (2006) *Uppsatshandbok: hur du lyckas med din uppsats*, Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Fairclough, Norman (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Fan, Jianchuan (2005) *Jianchuan Bowuguan Juluo (Jianchuan Museum Cluster)*, Sichuan: Jianchuan Museum
- Fan, Yongming (2008) 'Searching for Common Interests between China and Japan – a Chinese view', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 17, (55)
- Fang, Yew-Jin (1994) 'Riots' and Demonstrations in the Chinese Press: A Case Study of Language and Ideology', *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 5, (4)
- Fearon, James & Wendt, Alexander (2002) 'Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Sceptical View', Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. (Eds.) (2002) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage
- Feiler, Bruce (1991) *Learning to Bow: inside the heart of Japan* New York: Ticknor and Fields
- Feldman, Ofer (2005) *Talking Politics in Japan Today*, Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press
- Fukuyama, Shingo & Umebayashi, Hiromichi (2009) 'Japan ready for 'no nukes'', *Japan Times*, 25 August, Available online at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090825a1.html>, Last accessed: 6 February 2010
- Funabashi, Yôichi (2005) 'Chûgoku no yûjin he no tegami', *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 April
- Genron NPO (2007) *Japan-China Joint Opinion Polls*, Tokyo: Genron NPO
- Genron NPO (2009) *Dai5kai NitChû Kyôdô Yoron Chôsa no Saishin Kaisetsu*, Available online at: http://www.tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=439:5-&catid=110:20095&Itemid=203, Accessed: 21 September 2009
- George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew (2004) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
- Giesen, Bernhard (1998) *Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial Age*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- Gilbert, Paul (2000) *Peoples, Cultures and Nations in Political Philosophy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Gordon, Andrew (2003) *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa to the Present*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Gourevitch, Peter (2002) 'Domestic Politics and International Relations', Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. (Eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage
- Gries, Peter Hays (2004) *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press
- Gries, Peter Hays (2005) 'China's "New Thinking" on Japan', *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 185, Dec.
- Gustafsson, Karl (2009) 'Fredss- och krigsmuseers politiska roll i Japan och Kina', *Kosmopolis*, Vol. 39, (2)
- Gustafsson, Karl (2010a) *The Role of War Museums in Education in China: Patriotism and Morality*, Unpublished paper presented at the Moral Education in East Asia's Globalizing Societies: Concepts and Practices Conference, Nagasaki University, Japan, 11-13 June 2010
- Gustafsson, Karl (2010b) *Important Historical lessons or Threats – Japanese Perceptions of Chinese War Exhibitions*, Unpublished paper presented at the Re-presenting the past: Japan, China and World War Two in the Twenty-First Century Workshop, University of Leeds, UK, 7-8 July
- Gustafsson, Karl (2010c) *Towards a general framework for studying narratives about wars: Based on an analysis of narratives about war in China and Japan*, Unpublished paper presented at the Panic and Mourning - 1st Graduate Conference in Culture Studies Portuguese Catholic University, Lisbon, 28-29 October
- Gustafsson, Karl (2010d) *Exhibiting the Nanjing Atrocity in China and Japan*, Unpublished paper presented at the conference of the Nordic Association for the Study of Contemporary Japan (NAJS) held in Oslo, March
- Haberman, Clyde (1986) 'Japanese text is under fire once again', *The New York Times*, 10 July
- Hagström, Linus (2008-09) 'Sino-Japanese relations: The ice that won't melt', *International Journal*, Vol. 64 (1), Winter
- Hagström, Linus & Jerdén, Björn (2010) 'Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations- To Politicize or to De-politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 83 (4)
- Hall, Rodney B. (1999) *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Hall, Stuart (2006) [1980] 'Encoding/decoding', Hall, Stuart; Hobson, Dorothy; Lowe, Andrew & Willis, Paul *Culture, Media, Language*, Abingdon & New York: Routledge
- Halliday, M.A.K. & McDonald, Edward (2004) 'Metafunctional profile of the grammar of Chinese', Caffarel, Alice (Ed.) *Language Typology: A functional perspective*, Philadelphia, P.A., USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Hamburg Institute for Social Research (2004) *Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941 – 1944. An outline of the exhibition*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition
- He, Yanan (2007a) 'Remembering and Forgetting the War Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006', *History and Memory* Vol. 19 (2)
- He, Yanan (2007b) 'History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino–Japanese Conflict', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, (50)

He, Yinan (2008) 'Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce, Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations', *Asian Security*, Vol. 4, (2)

He, Yinan (2009) *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations Since World War II*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press

Heazle, Michael (2007) 'Nationalism, security, and prosperity: the three dimensions of Sino-Japanese relations', Heazle, Michael & Knight, Nick (Eds.) *China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?*, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, US: Edward Elgar

Heazle, Michael & Knight, Nick (2007) 'Introduction: 2005 – China and Japan's year of living dangerously', Heazle, Michael & Knight, Nick (Eds.) *China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?*, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, US: Edward Elgar

Heer, Hannes & Wodak, Ruth (2008) 'Introduction: Collective Memory, National Narratives and the Politics of the Past – the Discursive Construction of History', Heer, Hannes; Manoschek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Heer, Hannes (2008) 'The Head of Medusa: The Controversy Surrounding the Exhibition 'War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941 to 1944'', Heer, Hannes; Manoschek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Hein, Laura & Selden, Mark (2000) *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe

Hein, Laura & Takenaka, Akiko (2007) 'Exhibiting World War II in Japan and the United States since 1995' in *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 76, No. 1

Heiwa · Kokusai kyôiku kenkyûkai (2004) *Chûgoku Shûgaku Ryokô Handobukku*, Tokyo: Heiwa · Kokusai kyôiku kenkyûkai

Hertrich, André (2008) 'A Usable Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defense Forces and the Construction of Continuities', Saaler, Sven & Schwentker, Wolfgang (Eds.) *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, Folkstone: Global Oriental

Higashinakano, Shudo; Kobayashi, Susumu & Fukunaga, Shinjiro *Nanjing Jiken: "Shouko Shashin" o Kenshō suru (Analyzing "the Photographic Evidence" of Nanking Massacre)* Tokyo: Sôshisha

Hinchman, Lewis P. & Hinchman, Sandra K. (2001) 'Introduction', Hinchman, Lewis P. & Hinchman, Sandra K. (Eds.) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press

Hiranuma, Takeo (Ed.) (2009) *Han'nichi Kinenkan (Anti-Japanese Memorial Halls)*, Tokyo: Tendensha

Hiroshima City Web (2010) Available online at: <http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1271720896272/index.html>, Last accessed 13 May 2010

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (1999) *The Outline of Atomic Bomb Damage in Hiroshima*, Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

Hokuchin Museum website (2010) 'Hokuchin kinenkan raikansha 10mannin tassei', Available online at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/g sdf/nae/2d/hokutin2/dekigoto/dekigoto1.html>, Last accessed 10 March 2011

Hongse lüyou (2010) 'Balujun taixing jinianguan - Bowuguan mianfei kaifang hou de fazhan silu yu duice – yi balujun taixing jinianguan weili', Available online at:

<http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/news/LYYJ/10114144335FI0GIOG1I25CJEH8J99K.html>, Last accessed 25 March 2011

Honda, Katsuichi (1972) *Chūgoku no tabi*, Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha

Hopf, Ted (2002) *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press

Howarth, David (2000) *Discourse*, Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press

Huckin, Thomas (2002) 'Textual silence and the discourse of homelessness', *Discourse and Society* Vol. 13, (3)

Hughes, Christopher R. (2006) *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*, London & New York: Routledge

Hughes, Christopher W. (2002) 'Sino-Japanese relations and ballistic missile defence (BMD)', Söderberg, Marie (Ed.) *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, London & New York: Routledge

Hung, Chang-tai (1996) 'The Politics and Poetics of Songs: Myths and Symbols in the Chinese Communist War Music, 1937-1949', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, (4)

Hung, Chang-tai (2005) 'The Red Line: Creating a Museum of the Chinese Revolution' in *The China Quarterly* 184

Ide, Kanako (2009) 'The Debate on Patriotic Education in Post-World War II Japan', Haynes, Bruce (Ed.) *Patriotism and Citizenship Education*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell

Ienaga, Masaki (2004) 'Ajia Kappu Mondai ha dô Katarareta no ka', *Chūgoku geppō*, 58, (12)

Ijiri, Hidenori (1990) 'Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization', *China Quarterly*, No. 124, Dec.

Ikenberry, G. John 'Japan's History Problem', *Washington Post*, 17 August 2006, Available online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/16/AR2006081601427.html>, Last accessed: 5 November 2009

Íñigo-Mora, Isabel (2004) 'On the Use of the Personal Pronoun *We* in Communities', *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 3, (1)

Isaka, Satoshi (1995) 'On China policy, Japan takes off kid gloves', *The Nikkei Weekly*, 14 August

Jackson, Robert & Sorensen, Georg (2007) *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press

Jansen, Marius B. (2000) *The Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press

Japan Today (2010) 'Japan, China at odds over Nanjing Massacre victims in history report', Available online at: <http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/japan-china-at-odds-over-nanjing-massacre-victims-in-history-report>, Last accessed: 1 April 2010

Jears, Roger B. (2005) 'Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 69, Jan.

Jervis, Robert (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Jian, Zhang (2007) 'The influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations', Heazle, Michael & Knight, Nick (Eds.) *China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?*, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, US: Edward Elgar

Jianchuan Museum website, Guanzhang zibai (Introduction to the curator), Available online at: <http://www.jc-museum.cn/cn/intro.asp?IFID=691>, Last accessed: 1 October 2009

Jin, Qiu (2006) 'The Politics of History in and Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 11, (1)

Jin, Xide (2002) 'The background and trend of the relationship', Söderberg, Marie (Ed.) *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, London & New York: Routledge

Jorgensen, Marianne & Phillips, Louise (2002) *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage

JSNews (2009) 'Yizhang mianfei menpiao de gongli xiaoyiong you duoda', Available online at: <http://jsnews.jschina.com.cn/a/200905/t45752.shtml>, Last accessed 25 March 2011

Jäger, Siegfried and Maier, Florentine (2009) 'Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis', Wodak, Ruth & Meyer, Michael *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage

Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho (Publishing date unknown) *Peace Museum for "Kamikaze" Pilots*, Minamikyûshû-shi: Kagoshima Prf. Chiran Cho

Kagoshima-ken Minamikyûshû-shi (Publishing date unknown) *Chiran tokkô heiwa kaikan* (Brochure), Minamikyûshû-shi: Kagoshima-ken

Kahn, Joseph (2005) 'China Pushing and Scripting Japan Protests', *New York Times*, 15 April

Karp, Ivan (1992) 'Introduction: Museums and Communities: The Politics of Public culture' in Karp, Ivan & Lavine, Steven D (Eds.) *Museums and Communities: The Politics of Public Culture* Washington D.C. & London: Smithsonian Institution Press

Kato, Takanori (2008) 'Nanjing memorial lacks balance / Museum marking 1937 incident being used for political purposes' in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 26

Kavanagh, Gaynor (1996) 'Making Histories, Making Memories', in Kavanagh, Gaynor (1996) *Making Histories in Museums*, London & New York: Leicester University Press

Kawashima, Shin & Mōri, Kazuko (2009) *Gurōbaru Chūgoku he no Dōtei: Gaikō 150nen*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten

Kawashima, Shin (2005) 'The History Factor in Sino-Japanese Ties', *Japan Echo*, October

Kawashima, Shin (2006) 'Rekishi Taiwa to Rekishi Kenkyuu', *Kokkyō o Koeru Rekishi Ninshiki*, Tokyo:Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha

Kawatoko, Takeshi (2008) *The Mind of the Kamikaze*, Chiran-cho: The Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots

Keohane, Robert O. (1998) 'International Relations, Old and New', Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (Eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press

Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S. (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company

Kim, Yeong Hwan (2007) 'Promoting Peace and Reconciliation as a Citizen of East Asia: The Collaborative East Asian Workshop and the Grassroots House Peace Museum', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kim_Yeong-Hwan/2603, Last accessed 1 October 2009

Kingston, Jeff (2008) 'Nanjing's Massacre Memorial: Renovating War Memory in Nanjing and Tokyo', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Available online at: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/2859>, Last accessed 1 October 2009

- Kô, Bunyû (2002) 'Chûgoku kyôsan-tô ha tôchi no tame ni Nitchû sensô o riyô shiteiru', *Sapio*, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 8 May
- Koizumi, Jun'ichirô (2001) 'Chûgoku Jinmin Kônichi Sensô Kinenkan Hômon go no Koizumi Sôri no hatsugen', Available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/hatsugen.html, Last accessed 3 March 2010
- Koizumi, Jun'ichirô (2005) 'Speech by H.E. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan', Available online, English version: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/meet0504/speech.html>, Japanese version: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/17/ekoi_0422.html, Last accessed: accessed 16 December 2010
- Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan (2009) *Dai 70 Kai Rekihaku Fôramu: Sensô to Heiwa*, Chiba: Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan
- Komori, Yoshihisa (2002) 'Rokôkyô de mita Chûgoku no zô to onnen seisaku', in *Sapio*, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2002, 8 May
- Koo, Min Gyo (2009) "The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese political-economic relations- cold politics and hot economics?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, (2)
- Korea Times* (2001) 'Japan must learn lessons from Germany', 13 July
- Korea Herald* (2006) 'Nuke test could give momentum to Japan's rearmament, 10 October
- Kress, Gunther & van Leeuwen, Theo (2003) *Reading Images: The Grammar of Graphic Design*, London: Routledge
- Kure-shi kaiji rekishi kagakukan: Yamato myûjiamu (2006) *Jôsetsu tenji zuroku*, Hiroshima: Zamediajon
- Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal (2001) [1985] *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London & New York: Verso
- Lakoff, George (1991) *Metaphor and War: The metaphor system used to justify war in the gulf*, Available online at: http://www.arieverhagen.nl/11-sept-01/Lakoff_1991.html, Last accessed 24 January 2010
- Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark (2003) [1980] *Metaphors we live by Chicago*, London: The University of Chicago Press
- Lam Peng Er (2002) 'The Apology Issue: Japan's Differing Approaches Toward China and South Korea', *American Asian Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall.
- Leheny, David (2010) 'The Samurai ride to Huntington's rescue: Japan ponders its global and regional roles', Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives*, Abingdon & New York: Routledge
- Liao, Xuanli (2007) 'The petroleum factor in Sino-Japanese relations: Beyond energy cooperation', *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, Vol. 7, (1)
- Liebold, James (2010) 'More Than a Category: Han Supremacism on the Chinese Internet', *The China Quarterly*, 203 (Sept.)
- Lind, Jennifer (2009) 'A New Solution for Japan's History Problems', *International Herald Tribune*, June 25
- Lind, Jennifer (2008) *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
- Liu, Jie (2000) *Kankan Saiban: Tainichi Kyôryokusha o Osotta Unmei*, Tokyo: Chûô Shinsho
- Locke, Terry (2004) *Critical Discourse Analysis*, London & New York: Continuum

- Loitfellner, Sabine (2008) 'The appalling toll in Austrian lives ...': The *Wehrmacht* and its Soldiers in Austrian School Books', Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Luke, Timothy W. (2002) *Museum Politics: Power Plays at the Exhibition*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
- Lundquist, Lennart (1993) *Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik*, Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Luo, Zhitian (1993) "National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to the Twenty-One Demands", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27 (2)
- Ma, Xiaohua (2007) 'Constructing a National Memory of War: War Museums in China, Japan and the United States', Gallichio, Marc (Ed.) *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in U.S.-East Asian Relations* Durham & London: Duke University Press
- MacDonald, Sharon (1996) 'Theorizing Museums: An Introduction' MacDonald, Sharon & Fyfe, Gordon (Eds.) *Theorizing Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World*, Oxford & Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers
- Manicom, James (2008) 'Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: Limitations and Prospects', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 30, (3)
- Manicom, James & O'Neil, Andrew (2009) 'Sino-Japanese strategic relations- will rivalry lead to confrontation?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, (2)
- Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry (2002) *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Martin, Denis-Constant (1995) 'The Choices of Identity', *Social Identities*, Vol. 1 (1)
- McCarthy, Terry (1993) 'Japan voices remorse for wartime sex slaves', *The Independent*, 5 August 1993
- McCormack, Gavan (1996) *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, New York: M.E. Sharpe
- McVeigh, Brian (2006) *Nationalisms of Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co
- Men, Honghua (2010) 'East Asian Order Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Vol. 17, (1)
- Midford, Paul 'Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 2, (Mar. - Apr.)
- Minami, Morio (2009) 'Nihon ni okeru sensô hakubutsukan no fukkatsu', *Sensô Sekinin Kenkyû*, No. 65
- Minear, Richard H. (1971) *Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Mitter, Rana (2000a) 'Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997', *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 161
- Mitter, Rana (2000b) *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China*, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press
- Mitter, Rana (2003) 'Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38, (1)

Mitter, Rana (2005) 'Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, (2)

Mitter, Rana (2007) 'China's "Good War": Voices, Locations, and Generations in the Interpretation of the War of Resistance to Japan', Miyoshi Jager, Sheila & Mitter, Rana (Eds.) *Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Mizoguchi, Kozo (2007) 'Japan's Prime Minister Denies World War II Sex Slaves', *Japan Focus*, Available online at: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-K-MIZOGUCHI/2368>, Last accessed 7 January 2010

MOFA (2001) 'Visit to the People's Republic of China by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (Overview and evaluation)', 8 October, Available online, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/China/pmv0110/overview.html>, Japanese version available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/gh.html, Last accessed 3 March 2010

MOFA (2010) 'Nitchû rekishi kyôdô kenkyû (gaiyô)', Available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html, Last accessed 1 April 2011

MOFAPRC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China) *Some Sensitive Issues*, Available online at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm>, Last accessed 31 January 2010

Mok, Jeffrey & Tokunaga, Mitsuhiro (2009) 'A Cross Cultural Apology Episode of a Diplomatic Repair: A Study into Japan's Former Prime Minister Koizumi's Official Apology in April 2005', *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 8, (1)

Monbukagakushô (2006) *Kyôiku kihonhō (Fundamental Law on Education)*, Available online at: <http://www.mext.go.jp/b-menu/houan/kakutei/06121913/06121913/001.pdf>, Last accessed 27 February 2011

Monbukagakushô (2007) *Kyôiku kihonhō kaisei ni kansuru kokkai shingi ni okeru omo na tôben (Major answers in the Diet concerning the revision of the FLE)*, Available online at: http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/kihon/discussion/index.htm, Last accessed 27 February 2011

Moore, Gregory J. (2010) 'History, Nationalism and Face in Sino-Japanese Relations', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 15

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2005) *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History*, New York: Verso

Motomeru kai (Chûgoku no kôNichi kinenkan no futô na shashin no tekkyo o motomeru kokumin no kai) (2008) Available online at: www.mukai-noda.com/motomerukai.html, Accessed 16 September 2009

Murata, Yujiro (2001) 'A Discourse on the 'Chinese Nation' in Modern China', *China Report*, Vol. 347, (3)

Murayama, Tomiichi (1995) 'On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Available online at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>, Last accessed 7 January 2010

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (Year of publishing unknown) *Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum Museum* (Brochure) Nagasaki: Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Nanbu, Toshiaki (2005) *Shô/Homage* (Text written by the head priest of Yasukuni Shrine, Nanbu Toshiaki, in honour of Judge Radhabinod Pal.)

Nanbu, Toshiaki (2008) 'Goaisatsu' (Greeting), *Yûshûkan Zuroku (Illustrated book of the Yûshûkan)*, Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja/Kindai Shuppansha

National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities (2010) *Sengonritsu to kanyû jôkyô*, Available online at: http://www.nucfreejapan.com/siryô_2.htm, Last accessed: 6 February 2010

- National Post* (2005) 'Anti-Japan violence growing: Chinese authorities struggle to contain nationalistic violence over historical insult: Fury in Tokyo', 18 April
- Nelson, John K. (2002) 'Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle-School History textbook in Japan', *Critical Asian Studies*, No. 34, (1)
- Neumann, Iver B. (1996) 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, No. 2
- Neumann, Iver B. (1999) *Uses of the other: "the East" in European identity formation*, Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press
- Neumann, Klaus (2009) 'When history isn't made but happens: Memories of victimhood in Halberstadt (Germany)', *Memory Studies*, Vol. 2 (2)
- New York Times* (2006) 'In First Month as Japan's Premier, Abe Veers to Center', 28 October
- Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations) (2007) *Comments Marking Sixty Years of the Constitution of Japan*, Available online at: http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/statements/070427_2.html, Last accessed 27 February 2011
- NMAH (National Museum of American History) Website, *Director's Welcome* Available online at: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/message.cfm>, Last accessed: 28 December 2009
- NMAH (National Museum of American History) Website, *Mission and History* Available online at: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/mission.cfm>, Last accessed: 28 December 2009
- Nozaki, Yoshiko (2008) *War Memory, Nationalism, and Education in Post-War Japan: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy and Ienaga Saburō's Court Challenges*, London: Routledge
- Nozaki, Yoshiko (2005) 'The "Comfort Women" Controversy: History and Testimony', *Japan Focus*, Available online at: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshiko-Nozaki/2063>, Last accessed 7 January 2010
- Ochs, Elinor (1998) 'Narrative', van Dijk Teun A. (Ed.) *Discourse as Structure and Process*, London: Sage Publications
- Okada, Akito (2002) 'Education of whom, for whom, by whom? Revising the Fundamental law of Education in Japan', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 14, (3)
- Okinawa-ken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum) (2008) *Okinawa-ken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan Nenpō Dai9gō*
- Orr, James J. (2001) *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
- Osnos, Evan (2008) 'Angry Youth: A New Generation's Neocon Nationalists', *The New Yorker*, 28 July, Available online at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/28/080728fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=1, Last accessed 7 March 2010
- Otsu, Kazuko (2008) 'Citizenship Education and Curriculum in Japan', Grossman, David L., Lee, Wing On & Kennedy, Kerry J. (Eds.) *Citizenship Curriculum in Asia and the Pacific*, Hong Kong: Springer
- Oye, Kenneth A. (Ed.) *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
- Pan, Yihong (2003) 'Weianfu yanjiu, and: Rijun xingnuli: Zhongguo "weianfu" zhenxiang (review)', *China Review International*, Vol. 10 (1), Spring 2003
- Pan, Zhongqi (2007) 'Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, (1)

Paver, Chloe E.M. (2009) 'Exhibiting the National Socialist Past: An overview of recent German exhibitions', *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 39 (2)

People's Daily (2010a) 'China to build park marking Japanese army's inhumane experiments', 7 March, Available online at: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6911375.html>, Last accessed 8 March 2010

People's Daily (2010b) 'Express patriotism lawfully', 25 October, Available online at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7176587.html>, Last accessed 7 April 2010

People's Daily (2011) 'Wen outlines major government tasks in annual online chat', 28 February, Available online: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/9077690785/7302363.html>, Last accessed 7 April 2010

People's Daily Online 2008b '1200 museums to be free of charge next year', 28 July 2008, Available online at: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6462076.html>, Last accessed 21 June 2009

People's Daily Online 2008a 'Anti-Japan War museum in Shenyang to add KMT military leaders to exhibit', 22 January, Available online at: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6342988.html#>, Last accessed 17 October 2009

People's Daily (2006) 'Anti-Japanese War museums do not see visitor surge on commemoration day', Available online at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/04/eng20060904_299332.html, Last accessed 22 March 2011

Pollack, Alexander (2003) 'When guilt becomes a foreign country: Guilt and responsibility in Austrian postwar media representations of the Second World War', Dedaic, Mirjana N. & Nelson, Daniel N. (Eds.) *At War with Words*, Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter

Pollack, Alexander (2008a) 'The Myth of the 'Untainted *Wehrmacht*': The Structural Elements of *Wehrmacht* Mythology in the Austrian Press since 1945', Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Pollack, Alexander (2008b) 'All that Remains of the Second World War: Stalingrad and *Wehrmacht* Mythology in Television Documentaries', Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Pollack, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (2008) 'Crime Scene: *Wehrmacht* Exhibition', Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Propaganda Department of the CCP and the Research Office of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee (1983) [1996] 'The opinion of the Propaganda Department of the CCP and the Research Office of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee on Strengthening Education and Patriotism', *Chinese Education & Society*, Vol. 29, (4), Jul/Aug

Puppet Manchurian Palace Website, Available online at: <http://www.wmhg.com.cn/zl.htm#>, Last accessed 24 March 2011

Reemtsma, Jan Philipp (2002) 'On War Crimes', Bartov, Omer; Grossmann, Anita & Nolan, Mary (Eds.) *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, New York: The New Press

Reilly, James (2004) 'China's History Activists and the War of Resistance against Japan: History in the Making' *Asian Survey* Vol. 44, No. 2, Mar. -Apr.

Reilly, James (2006) 'China's History Activism and Sino-Japanese Relations', *China: An International Journal*, 4, 2, Sep.

- Reisigl, Martin & Wodak, Ruth (2009) 'The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)', Wodak, Ruth & Meyer, Michael *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage
- Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai (2004) *Heiwa Hakubutsukan Senso Shiryokan Gaidobukku*, Tokyo: Aoki Shoten
- Renmin Wang (2006) *Nanjing Minjian Kangzhanguan*, Available online at: <http://japan.people.com.cn/95927/76927/76941/index.html>, Last accessed 28 April 2011
- Richardson, John E. (2007) *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Ringmar, Erik (1996) *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Rose, Caroline (1998) *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-making*, London & New York: Routledge
- Rose, Caroline (2000) 'Patriotism is not taboo': nationalism in China and Japan and implications for Sino-Japanese relations', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 12, (2)
- Rose, Caroline (2005) *Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?*, London & New York: Routledge
- Rose, Caroline (2006) 'The battle for hearts and minds: Patriotic education in Japan in the 1990s and beyond', Shimazu, Naoko (Ed.) *Nationalisms in Japan*, London & New York: Routledge
- Rose, Caroline (2008) 'Stalemate: The Yasukuni Shrine Problem in Sino-Japanese Relations', Breen, John (Ed.) *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Ross, Kaz (2006) *Remembering Nanjing: Patriotism and/or peace in architecture*, paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong 26 June – 29 June 2006
- Roy, Denny (2004) 'Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations', *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 31, (2)
- Rozman, Gilbert (2007) 'South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry- a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, (2)
- Rüsen, Jorn (Ed.) (2008) *Meaning and Representation in History (Making Sense of History)*, Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books
- Saaler, Sven (2005) *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion*, München: Iudicum
- Said, Edward W. (2006) [1978] *Orientalism*, Stockholm: Ordfront
- Saito, Hiro (2010) 'Cosmopolitan nation-Building: The Institutional Contradiction and Politics of Postwar Japanese Education', *Social Science Japan Journal*, Advance access available online at: <http://ssjj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/11/23/ssjj.jyq060.full.pdf+html>, Last accessed 24 February 2011
- Sakaeda, Kyoko (2002) 'Madamada zoushoku chuu! Ishi 14shou 2jichiku ni matagaru kouNichi supotto 55', *Sapio*, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 8 May 2002
- Sakuwa, Kentaro (2009) 'A not so dangerous dyad: Chinas rise and Sino-Japanese rivalry', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 9, (3)
- Sand, Jordan (1999) 'Historians and Public Memory in Japan', *History and Memory*, Vol. 11 (2)

- Sanders, David (1998) 'International Relations: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism', Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (Eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press
- Sasajima, Masahiko (1997) 'Premier visits former Manchukuo', *The Daily Yomiuri*, 7 September
- Schiffrin, Deborah (2001) 'Language and public memorial: 'America's concentration camps'', *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 12 (4)
- Schreurs, Miranda A. (2009) 'Japan', Kopstein, Jeffrey & Lichbach, Mark (Eds.) *Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press
- Seaton, Philip (2007) *Japan's Contested War Memories: The 'Memory Rifts' in the Historical Consciousness of World War II*, London & New York: Routledge
- Seaton, Philip (2008) 'Pledge Fulfilled: Prime Minister Koizumi, Yasukuni and the Japanese Media', Breen, John (Ed.) *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Sekhar, D. Varaprasad (2008) 'Technology Transfer in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Context, Conflict and Cooperation', *China Report*, 44, (2)
- Seraphim, Franziska (2006) *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005*, Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press
- Shambaugh, David (2007) 'China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy', *The China Journal*, No. 57, Jan. 2007
- Shanxi government net (2008) *Balujun taixing jinianguan jieshao*, Available online at: <http://www.sxgov.cn/bwzt/changzhi/xgzl/598116.shtml>, Last accessed 25 March 2011
- Shen, Simon & Cheung, Mong (2007) 'Reshaping nationalism: Chinese intellectual response towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, (4)
- Shi, Yonggang & Liu, Qiongxiong (2008) *Guoren Daoci, Ditou Zhijing*, Beijing: Xinxing Chubanshe
- Shirk, Susan L. (2007) *China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise Oxford*, New York: Oxford University Press
- Shogakkan (2002) *Sapio*, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 8 May
- Skya, Walter A. (2009) *Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shintô*, Durham & London: Duke University Press
- Smith, Kerry (2002) 'The Shôwa Hall: Memorializing Japan's War at Home' in *The Public Historian* Vol. 24, (4)
- Smith, Paul J. (2009) 'China-Japan Relations and the Future Geopolitics of East Asia', *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 35, (4)
- Smith, Steve (2000) 'Wendt's World', *Review of International Studies*, 26
- Snidal, Duncan (1986) 'The Game Theory of International Relations' Oye, Kenneth A. (Ed.) *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
- South China Morning Post* (2005) 'China and Japan must steer ties back on track', 10 January
- State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (SCIO) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Xinwen Gongshi) (2010) 'Wang Chen: Wangluo meiti yao qieshi danfu qi weihu wangluo anquan

de zeren', 14 January, Available online at: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201001/t520724.htm>, Last accessed 27 March 2010

Sutter, Robert (2002) 'China and Japan: Trouble Ahead', *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (4)

Suzuki, Shogo (2007) 'The Importance of "Othering" in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, (1), March

Szechenyi, Nicholas (2006) 'Japan's History Problem: A Snapshot of U.S. Media Opinion', *Japan Chair Platform*, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Söderberg, Marie (2002) 'The Role of ODA in the Relationship', Söderberg, Marie (Ed.) *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, London & New York: Routledge

Takahashi, Tetsuya (2006) 'The national politics of the Yasukuni Shrine', Shimazu, Naoko (Ed.) *Nationalisms in Japan*, London & New York: Routledge

Takamine, Tsukasa (2005) 'A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations- Japan's strategic use of foreign aid', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 18 (4)

Takayama, Keita (2008) 'Japan's Ministry of Education "becoming the Right": Neo-liberal restructuring and the Ministry's struggles for political legitimacy', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 6, (2)

Tanabe, Toshio (2002) '3500mannin shishou no konkyo manninkô detchiage no karakuri', in *Sapio*, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 8 May

Tanaka, Yuki (2008) "The Songs of Nippon, the Yamato Museum and the Inculcation of Japanese Nationalism" in *Japan Focus*, Available online at: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yuki-TANAKA/2746>, Last accessed July 28, 2009.

Teruya, Kazuhiro (2004) 'Metafunctional profile of the Japanese language', Caffarel, Alice (Ed.) *Language Typology: A functional perspective*, Philadelphia, P.A., USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company

The Daily Yomiuri (1994) 'Murayama plans to ask Sakurai to quit', 14 August

The Daily Yomiuri (2003) "Washington Japanwatch: Hu willing to let bygones be bygones", 12 July

The Jianchuan Museum Cluster's Website, Available online at: <http://www.jc-museum.cn/en/intro2.asp>, Last accessed: 1 October 2009

The Smithsonian Institution Website *From Smithsonian to Smithsonian: The Birth of an Institution*, Available online at: <http://www.sil.si.edu/Exhibitions/Smithson-to-Smithsonian/>, Last accessed 28 December 2009

The Smithsonian Institution (2004) *The Price of Freedom: Americans at War*, Seattle: Marquand Books

The Statesman (2006) 'Friends or Foes?', 20 April

The Straits Times (2007) 'Japan and China to face up to history in building ties; Joint statement on relations comes after Chinese PM arrives in Japan', 12 April

The Times (2007) 'China treads carefully to keep Japan in line over war pledges', 3 April

The War of Resistance Museum's Website (Zhongguo Renmin Kang-Ri Zhanzheng Jinianguan), Available online at: <http://www.1937china.org.cn/index.php?id=105>, Last accessed 21 November 2008

Thompson, Bob (2002) 'History for Sale; Larry Small wants to remake the National Museum of American History and he's banking on a set of big-time donors to help. Will they end up privatizing the American past?', *Washington Post*, 20 January

- Tickner, J. Ann (1998) 'International Relations: Post-positivist and Feminist Approaches', Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (Eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press
- Tokudome, Kinue (2007) 'Passage of H.Res. 121 on "Comfort Women" the US Congress and Historical Memory in Japan', *Japan Focus*, Available online at: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kinue-TOKUDOME/2510>, Last accessed: 7 January 2010
- Torfinn, Jacob (1999) *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*, Oxford; Malden: Blackwell
- Triandafyllidou, Anna & Wodak, Ruth (2003) 'Conceptual and Methodological Questions in the Study of Collective Identities', *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 2 (2)
- Tsuchiya, Takayuki (1998) *Stoppu Henkô Heiwa Kinenkan: Zeikin o Tsukatta Hanzai ha Yurusarenai*, Tokyo: Tendensha
- Tsukurukai website, Available online at: <http://www.tsukurukai.com>, Last accessed 25 February 2011
- Ueno, Chizuko (1999) 'The Politics of Memory: Nation, Individual and Self', *History and Memory*, Vol. 11 (2)
- Uhl, Heidemarie (2008) 'Interpreting the "War of Annihilation": Responses to the exhibiton "Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of War of Annihilation, 1941 to 1944" When Staged in Vienna in 2002', Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Van Bremen, Jan (2005) 'Monuments for the Untimely Dead or the Objectification of Social Memory in Japan', *Perspectives on Social Memory in Japan*, Folkestone: Global Oriental
- van Dijk, Teun (1998) 'Opinions and Ideology in the Press', Bell, Allan & Garrett, Peter (Ed.) *Approaches to Media Discourse* Oxford; Malden: Blackwell
- van Dijk, Teun (2008) *Discourse and Power*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- van Dijk, Teun (2010) *Discourse and Context: A Sociocognitive Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- van Leeuwen, Theo (1996) 'The Representation of Social Actors', C.R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Routledge
- van Leeuwen, Theo (2005) 'Three models of interdisciplinarity', Wodak, Ruth (Ed.) *New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity*, Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company
- van Leeuwen, Theo (2008) *Discourse and Practice*, New York: Oxford University Press
- Vickers, Edward (2007) 'Museums and nationalism in contemporary China', *Compare*, Vol. 37, No. 3, June
- Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi (2007) 'The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate, 1971-75', Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi (Ed.) *The Nanking Atrocity 1937-38: Complicating the Picture*, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books
- Waldron, Arthur (1996) 'China's New Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizhong', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Oct.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company
- Wan, Ming (2003) 'Tensions in Recent Sino-Japanese Relations: The May 2002 Shenyang Incident', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, (5)

- Wan, Ming (2006) *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press
- Wang, Min (2005) *Chūgokujin no aikokushin: Nihonjin to ha chigau Stsu no shikō kairo*, Tokyo: PHP Shinsho
- Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000) 'Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, (3)
- Wang, Zheng (2006) *The Power of History and Memory: National "Patriotic Education" and China's Conflict Behaviour in Crises with the U.S., 1991-2001*, Ph. D. Dissertation, Fairfax, VA: George Mason University
- Wang, Zheng (2008) 'National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China', *International Studies Quarterly*, 52, (4)
- Wang, Zheng (2009) 'Old Wounds, New Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia', *History and Memory*, Vol. 27, (1), (Spring/Summer)
- Wang, Zhixin (2008) 'China, Japan and the Spell of Yasukuni', Breen, John (Ed.) *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, New York: Columbia University Press
- Weldes, Jutta (1999) *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
- Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46 (2): 383-92
- Wendt, Alexander (1994) 'Collective Identity formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, 88 (2): 384-96
- Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Wesley, Michael (2007) 'Jealous suitors: Sino-Japanese competitive regionalism and the future of East Asia', Heazle, Michael & Knight, Nick (Eds.) *China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?*, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, US: Edward Elgar
- Wenhua Zhongguo (2010) 'Zou jin Sichuan kangzhan bowuguan chongwen naduan buneng wangji de lishi', Available online at: http://www.china.com.cn/culture/zhanlan/2010-09/03/content_20857404.htm, Last accessed 9 March 2011
- Wette, Wolfram (2006) *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press
- White, Hayden (1975) *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press
- White, Hayden (1990) *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press
- White, Hayden (2000) *Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Williams, Walter (2001) 'National amnesia', *The Washington Times*, 20 May
- Wishnick, Elizabeth (2009) 'Competition and cooperative practices in Sino-Japanese energy and environmental relations- towards an energy security 'risk community'?', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, (4)
- Wodak, Ruth (2002) 'Fragmented Identities: Redefining and Recontextualizing National Identities', Chilton, Paul (Ed.) *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse*, Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company

- Wodak, Ruth (2006) 'History in the making/The Making of history: The 'German *Wehrmacht*' in collective and individual memories in Austria', *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 5 (1)
- Wodak, Ruth (2008a) 'How history is made' – The Origins and Aims of the Project', (Heer, Hannes; Manoshek, Walter; Pollack, Alexander & Wodak, Ruth (Eds.) *The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan
- Wodak, Ruth (2008b) 'Introduction: Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms', Wodak, Ruth & Krzyzanowski, Michal (Eds.) *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Wodak, Ruth & de Cillia, Rudolf (2007) 'Commemorating the past: the discursive construction of official narratives about the 'Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic'', *Discourse & Communication*, Vol. 1 (3)
- Wodak, Ruth & Meyer, Michael (2009) 'Critical discourse analysis: history, agenda, theory and methodology', Wodak, Ruth & Meyer, Michael (Eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Los Angeles & London: Sage
- Wodak, Ruth; de Cillia, Rudolf; Reisigl, Martin & Liebhart, Karin (2009) *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Wodak, Ruth & Reisigl, Martin (2000) *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism & Antisemitism*, Florence, KY, USA: Routledge
- Wong, Edward (2009) 'Showing the Glimmer of Humanity Amid the Atrocities of War', *International Herald Tribune*, 22 May
- Wuhan government net (2011) 'Balujun Wuhan banshichu jiuzhi jinianguan', Available online at: <http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/cms/publish/wuhan/2011-03/15/1201103150953490048.html>, Last accessed 25 March 2011
- Wu, Xinbo (2000) 'The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Mar. – Apr.)
- Wu, Xu (2007) *Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics and Implications*, Lexington Books
- Xinhua (2001) 'Japanese PM's visit to Lugou Bridge meaningful: Jiang', 8 October
- Xinhua (2005c) 'Pinglun: Zongrong cuangai lishi bi jiang zishi qiguo', 5 April
- Xinhua (2007) 'Guojia luyouju: Hongse luyouke liu sannian yu 4yi ren ci', 19 December Available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-12/19/content_7279970.htm, Last accessed 26 February 2010
- Xinhua net (2006) "'Jiu yi ba" lishi bowuguan kaiguan 7nian canguan renshu guo 700wan', Available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2006-09/17/content_5383644.htm Last accessed 25 March 2011
- Xinhua net (2011) 'Mianfei shidai, gonggong zhanguan de damen gai ruhe changkai?', Available online at: http://www.sx.xinhua.org/newscenter/2011-03/02/content_22185284.htm, Last accessed 25 March 2011
- Xinhua News Agency (2002) 'Japanese Democratic Party Director-General Visits Nanjing Massacre', 5 May, Available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-05/05/content_382142.htm, Last accessed 20 February 2010
- Xinhua News Agency (2005a) 'China Boosts "Red Tourism" in Revolutionary Bases', Available from: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/120838.htm>, Last accessed 26 February 2010
- Xinhua News Agency (2005b) 'Gov't Allocates US\$86m to Support 'Red Tourism'', Available from: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/137968.htm>, Last accessed 26 February 2010

- Xinhua News Agency* (2007) ‘Zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng jinianguan – 20nian jiedai guanzhong 1400duo wan ren-ci’, Available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-07/07/content_6339897.htm, Last accessed 8 March 2011
- Yamabe, Masahiko (1998) ‘Heiwa Hakubutsukan no Shinryaku, Kagaisha Tenji ni Taisuru Kougeki’ (Attacks against Aggression and Aggressor Exhibits at Peace Museums), Fujiwara, Akira (Ed.) *Nankin Jiken o dô Miru ka (How to View the Nanjing Incident?)*, Tokyo: Aoki Shoten
- Yamabe, Masahiko (2002) “Jûgonen sensô ka no hakubutsukan no sensô tenji” (War Exhibits at Museums During the Fifteen Year War), Suzuki, Ryô & Takagi, Hiroshi (Eds.) *Bunkazai to Kindai Nihon (Cultural Treasure and Modern Japan)*, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha
- Yamane, Kazuyo (2008) *The Role of NGOs in Peace Museums in Japan: A Case Study of the Osaka International Peace Center*, Paper presented at the 6th International Conference of Museums for Peace
- Yamane, Kazuyo (2009) *Grassroots Museums for Peace in Japan: Unknown Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation*, Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. Müller
- Yamazaki, Jane W. (2006) *Japanese Apologies for World War II: A rhetorical study*, London & New York: Routledge
- Yan, Xuetong (2001) ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 26
- Yang, Bojiang (2006) ‘Redefining Sino-Japanese Relations after Koizumi’, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (4)
- Yang, Daqing (2001) ‘The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan’, in Fujitani, T., White, G. M. & Yoneyama, L. *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham & London: Duke University Press
- Yang, Daqing (2002) ‘Mirror for the future or the history card? Understanding the ‘history problem’’, Söderberg, Marie (Ed.) *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, London & New York: Routledge
- Yang, Daqing (2003) ‘Reconciliation between Japan and China: Problems and Prospects’, Funabashi, Yoichi & Vogel, Ezra (Eds.) *Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace
- Yang, Daqing (2006) ‘Nankin Atoroshitizu – kensetsuteki na taiwa wa kanô na no ka’ (The Nanjing Atrocity – Is a Constructive Dialogue Possible?), Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi and Yang Daqing, (Eds.), *Kokkyô o koeru rekishi ninshiki: Nitchû taiwa no kokoromi (Contending Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations: Toward a History Beyond Borders)*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press
- Yang, Jian (2003) ‘Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Southeast Asia’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 25, (2)
- Yao, Chaocheng (2009) ‘The Sino-Japan Disputes and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, *China Report*, 45, (1)
- Yardley, Jim (2007) ‘China Stresses Ties With Japan Despite Sex Slavery Issue’, *The New York Times*, 7 March
- Yasukuni Jinja (2007) *Yûshûkan: Haikan no shiori*, Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja
- Yasukuni Jinja (2008) *Yûshûkan Zuroku (Illustrated book of the Yûshûkan)*, Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja/Kindai Shuppansha
- Yasukuni Shrine Office (Year of publishing unknown) *Guide of Yasukuni Shrine*, Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja
- Yoneyama, Lisa (2001) ‘For Transformative Knowledge and Postnationalist Public Spheres: The Smithsonian Enola Gay Controversy’, Fujitani, T., White, Geoffrey M. & Yoneyama, Lisa (Eds.) *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham & London: Duke University Press

- Yoshida, Takashi (2006) *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press
- You, Ji (2006) 'East Asian Community: A New Platform for Sino-Japanese Cooperation and Contention', *Japanese Studies*, Vol. 26, (1)
- Zhao, Quansheng (2002) 'Sino-Japanese relations in the context of the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle', Söderberg, Marie (Ed.) *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, London & New York: Routledge
- Zhao, Suisheng (1998) 'A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China', in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3
- Zhao, Suisheng (2004) *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen wang (News of the Communist Party of China) (Year of publishing unknown) *Hongse Lüyou (Red Tourism)*, Available online at: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64176/64181/index.html>, Last accessed 21 June 2009
- Zhongguo hongse lüyou wang a (Year of publishing unknown) *Zhongguo yibaige hongse lüyou jingdian jingqu*, Available online at: <http://www.crt.com.cn/ybgjq.html>, Last accessed 26 February 2010
- Zhongguo hongse lüyou wang b (Year of publishing unknown) *Zhongguo shierge zhongdian hongse lüyou jingqu*, Available online at: <http://www.crt.com.cn/second.htm>, Last accessed 26 February 2010
- Zhongguo hongse lüyou wang c (Year of publishing unknown) *Zhongguo sanshitiao hongse lüyou jingpinxian*, Available online at: <http://www.crt.com.cn/sstxl.html>, last accessed 26 February 2010
- Zhongguo Xinwenwang (2010) *Tu: Sichuan bowuguan 5nian xiying shubaiwan minzhong canguan*, Available online at: <http://www.chinanews.com/tp/2010/09-03/2509423.shtml>, Last accessed 9 March 2011
- Zhonghongwang (2007a) *Ranzhuang didao zhan yizhi lei ji jiedai zhongwai youke 1000wan renci*, Available online at: <http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/news/rzxxbb/2007/930/07930152157H1D33HB53IAB3G45GKII.html>, Last accessed 8 March 2011
- Zhonghongwang (2007b) *Dongbei lieshi jinianguan guanzhang: Qipan guanzhong huigui*, Available online at: <http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/gzrx/2007/921/079211552360J5KFH6F87A2FKJ6C36A.html>, Last accessed 24 March 2011
- Zhong Xuanbu (Propaganda Department) (1998) *Baige aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi shifan jidi ditu ji (Collection of maps of the one hundred model patriotic education bases)*, Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe
- Zhu, Chengshan & Zhang, Qingbo (2008) *QinHua Rijun Nanjing datusha yunan tongbao jinianguan chenzhan tuji (Collective Drawings of Exhibitions of Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders)*, Beijing: Changcheng Chubanshe
- Zolberg Vera L. (1996) 'Museums as contested sites of remembrance: the Enola Gay affair', MacDonald, Sharon & Fyfe, Gordon (Eds.) *Theorizing Museums: Representing identity and diversity in a changing world* Oxford & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers

**Doktorsdisputationer
(filosofie doktorsgrad)**

1. Tage Lindbom (1938) Den svenska fackföreningsrörelsens uppkomst och tidigare historia 1872-1900.
2. Lars Frykholm (1942) Studier över artikel 48 i Weimarförfattningen.
3. Jörgen Westerståhl (1945) Svensk fackföreningsrörelse.
4. Hans Thorelli (1954) The Federal Antitrust Policy.
5. Bruno Kalnins (1956) Der Sowjetische Propagandastaat.
6. Åke Thulstrup (1957) Aggressioner och allianser. Huvuddragen i europeisk storpolitik 1935-39.
7. Lars Sköld (1958) Kandidatnomineringen vid andrakammarval.
8. Rune Tersman (1959) Statsmakterna och de statliga aktiebolagen.
9. Jurij Boris (1960) The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine.
10. Per Sundberg (1961) Ministärerna Bildt och Åkerhielm. En studie i den svenska parlamentarismens förgångar.
11. Gunnar Wallin (1961) Valrörelser och valresultat. Andrakammarvalen i Sverige 1866-1884.
12. Göran Lindahl (1962) Uruguay's New Path: A Study in Politics during the First Colegiado, 1919-33.
13. Elmar Nyman (1963) Indragningsmakt och tryckfrihet 1785-1810.
14. Tomas Hammar (1964) Sverige åt svenskarna. Invandringspolitik, utlänningskontroll och asylrätt 1900-1932.
15. Krister Wahlbäck (1964) Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1937-1940.
16. Torsten Landelius (1965) Workers, Employers and Governments: A Comparative Study of Delegations and Groups at the International Labour Conference 1919-1964.
17. Kjell Goldmann (1971) International Norms and War Between States: Three Studies in International Politics.
18. Daniel Tarschys (1972) Beyond the State: The Future Polity in Classical and Soviet Marxism.
19. Harald Hamrin (1975) Between Bolshevism and Revisionism: The Italian Communist Party 1944-1947.
20. Birger Hagård (1976) Nils Wohlin. Konservativ centerpolitiker.
21. Gunnar Hellström (1976) Jordbrukspolitik i industrisamhället med tyngdpunkt på 1920- och 30-talen.

Stockholm Studies in Politics

ISSN 0346-6620

(De med * utmärkta avhandlingarna är doktorsavhandlingar,
som av skilda skäl ej ingår i Stockholm Studies in Politics)

1. Thomas G Hart (1971) *The Dynamics of Revolution: A Cybernetic Theory of the Dynamics of Modern Social Revolution with a Study of Ideological Change and Organizational Dynamics in the Chinese Revolution*. 9903705557
2. Sören Häggroth (1972) *Den kommunala beslutsprocessen vid fysisk planering*. 9903658125
3. Gunnar Sjöstedt (1973) *OECD-samarbetet: Funktioner och effekter*. 9905287434
4. Yngve Myrman (1973) *Maktkampen på arbetsmarknaden 1905-1907. En studie av de ickesocialistiska arbetarna som faktor i arbetsgivarpolitiken*. 9900827953
- * Rolf Ejvegård (1973) *Landstingsförbundet. Organisation, beslutsfattande, förhållande till staten*. (Grafisk Reproduktion Tryckeri AB).
5. Lars-Erik Klason (1974) *Kommunalförbund och demokrati. En studie av kommunikationsprocessen i kommunalförbund*. 9900795474
6. Magnus Isberg, Anders Wettergren, Jan Wibble & Björn Wittrock (1974) *Partierna inför väljarna. Svensk valpropaganda 1960-1966*. (Allmänna förlaget) 91-38-01936-1
7. Bengt Owe Birgersson (1975) *Kommunen som serviceproducent. Kommunal service och serviceattityder i 36 svenska kommuner*. 9901646588
8. G Roger Wall (1975) *The Dynamics of Polarization. An Inquiry into the Process of Bipolarization in the International System and its Regions, 1946-1970*. 990168627X
9. James Walch (1976) *Faction and Front: Party Systems in South India*. (Young Asia Publications: New Delhi) 9901135281
10. Victor Pestoff (1977) *Voluntary Associations and Nordic Party Systems. A Study of Overlapping Memberships and Cross-Pressures in Finland, Norway and Sweden*. 9901232996
- * Chimelu S. Chime (1977) *Integration and Politics Among African States. Limitations and horizons of mid-term theorizing*. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies). 91-7106-103-7
- * Katarina Brodin (1977) *Studiet av utrikespolitiska doktriner*. (SSLP/Försvarsdepartementet).
- * Lars Thunell (1977) *Political Risks in International Business: Investment Behavior of Multinational Corporations* (Praeger Publishers: New York).
11. Harriet Lundblad (1979) *Delegerad beslutanderätt inom kommunal socialvård*. (Liber) 9138-048909-4
12. Roland Björnsne (1979) *Populism och ekopolitik. Utvecklandet av en ekopolitisk ideologi i Norge och dess relationer till ett mångtydigt populismbegrepp*. 91-7146-039-X
13. Anders Mellbourn (1979) *Byråkratins ansikten. Rolluppfattningar hos svenska högre statstjänstemän*. (Liber) 91-38-04850-7
14. Henry Bäck (1979) *Den utrikespolitiska dagordningen. Makt, protest och internationella frågor i svensk politik 1965-1973*. 91-7146-065-9.
15. Rune Premfors (1980) *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*. 91-7146-071-3
16. Sahin Alpay (1980) *Turkar i Stockholm. En studie av invandrare, politik och samhälle*. (Liber) 91-38-05635-6
17. Diane Sainsbury (1980) *Swedish Democratic Ideology and Electoral Politics 1944-1948: A Study of Functions of Party Ideology*. (Almqvist & Wiksell International) 91-22-00424-6
18. Roger Ko-Chi Tung (1981) *Exit-Voice Catastrophes: Dilemma between Migration and Participation*. 91-7146-160-4
19. Stig Munknäs (1981) *Statlig eller kommunal skola? En studie av centraliserings- och decentraliseringsproblem inom svensk skolförvaltning*. 9902487424
20. Bo Lindensjö (1981) *Högskolereformen. En studie i offentlig reformstrategi*. 91-7146-184-1
21. Claes Linde (1982) *Departement och verk. Om synen på den centrala statsförvaltningen och dess uppdelning i en förändrad offentlig sektor*. 91-7146-406-9
- * Bernt Öhman (1982) *Löntagarna och kapitaltillväxten. Solidarisk lönepolitik och löntagarfonder*. (Jernströms Offsettryck AB) 91-38-07152-5
22. Stefan Svärd (1984) *Varför Sverige fick fri abort. Ett studium av en policyprocess*. 91-7146420-4
23. Bo Malmsten (1984) *Bostadsbyggande i plan och verklighet. Planering och genomförande av kommunal bostadsförsörjning*. (Statens råd för byggnadsforskning 869:1984) 91-540-4139-2.
24. Bertil Nygren (1984) *Fredlig samexistens: klasskamp, fred och samarbete. Sovjetunionens de-
tente-doktrin*. (Utrikespolitiska institutet) 91-7182-576-2

25. Jan Hallenberg (1984) *Foreign Policy Change: United States' Foreign Policy toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China 1961-1980*. 91-7146-428-X
26. Jan Wallenberg (1985) *Några effektivitetsproblem i statlig byråkrati*. (Studentlitteratur) 9144-23401-5
27. Maud Eduards (1985) *Samarbete i Maghreb. Om regionalt samarbete mellan Marocko, Algeriet, Tunisien och Libyen 1962-1984*. 91-7146-438-7
28. Ishtiaq Ahmed (1985) *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan*. 91-7146-458-1
29. Michele Micheletti (1985) *Organizing Interest and Organized Protest: Difficulties of Member Representation for the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO)*. 917146-451-4
30. Torbjörn Larsson (1986) *Regeringen och dess kansli. Samordning och byråkrati i maktens centrum*. (Studentlitteratur) 91-44-25311-7
31. Ingegerd Muncio (1987) *Från lag till bruk. Hemspråksreformens genomförande*. 91-7146471-9
32. Tuija Meisaari-Polsa (1987) *Ståndpunkter i UNCTAD. En analys av generaldebatterna 1964-1979*. 91-7146-472-7
33. Virginia Capulong-Hallenberg (1987) *Philippine Foreign Policy Toward the U.S. 1972-1980: Reorientation?* 91-7146-478-6
34. Hans Bergström (1987) *Rivstart? Från opposition till regering*. (Tidens förlag) 91-550-3315-6
35. Agneta Bladh (1987) *Decentraliserad förvaltning. Tre ämbetsverk i nya roller*. (Studentlitteratur) 91-44-27731-8
36. Nils-Eric Hallström (1989) *Lagen om ungdomslag i beslut och genomförande*. 91-7146-782-3
37. Maritta Soinen (1989) *Samhällsbilder i vardande*. (CEIFO) 91-87810-03-X
38. Stefan Lindström (1991) *Hela nationens tacksamhet. Svensk forsknings-politik på atomenergiområdet 1945-1956*. 91-7146-932-X
39. Yeu-Farn Wang (1991) *China's Science and Technology Policy: 1949-1989*. 91-7146-953-2.
40. Jan Hylén (1991) *Fosterlandet främst? Konservatism och liberalism i högerpartiet 1904-1985*. (Norstedts) 91-38-50086-8
41. Jan Johansson (1992) *Det statliga kommittéväsendet. Kunskap, kontroll, konsensus*. 91-7146969-9
42. Janina Wiktorja Dacyl (1992) *Between Compassion and Realpolitik: In Search of a General Model of the Responses of Recipient Countries to Large-Scale Refugee Flows with Reference to the South-East Asian Refugee Crisis*. 91-7146-007-X
43. Leo Bartonek (1992) *Der Topos »Nähe« - Ernst Blochs Eintrittsstelle in die Sozialwissenschaften. Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der modernen Gesellschaft*. 91-7153-022-3
44. Jan-Gunnar Rosenblad (1992) *Nation, nationalism och identitet. Sydafrika i svensk sekelskiftesdebatt*. (Bokförlaget Nya Doxa) 91-88248-24-0
45. Alexa Robertson (1992) *National Prisms and Perceptions of Dissent: The Euromissile Controversy Reflected in Opinion and the News in the UK and the FRG 1980-1983*. 91-7153-070-3
46. Lars Lindström (1993) *Accumulation, Regulation, and Political Struggles. Manufacturing Workers in South Korea*. 91-7153-121-1
47. Göran Bergström (1993) *Jämlikhet och kunskap. Debatter och reform-strategier i socialdemokratisk skolpolitik 1975-1990*. (Symposion Graduale) 91-7139-135-5
48. Jens Bartelson (1993) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. 91-7153-140-8
49. Ingvar Hjelmqvist (1994) *Relationer mellan stat och kommun*. 91-7153-186-6
50. Emmanuel Obliteifio Akwetey (1994) *Trade Unions and Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana*. 91-7153-250-1
51. Kristina Boréus (1994) *Högervåg. Nyliberalism och kampen om språket i svensk debatt 1969-1989*. (Tidens förlag) 91-550-4129-9
- * Steve Minett (1994) *Power, Politics and Participation in the Firm* (Athenaeum Press Ltd, Newcastle) 1 85628 331 3
52. Michael Karlsson (1995) *Partistategi och utrikespolitik. Interna motiveringar och dagspressens agerande i Catalina-affären 1952 och EEC-frågan 1961/62*. 91-7153-346-X
53. Sun-Joon Hwang (1995) *Folkrörelse eller affärsföretag. Den svenska konsumerkooperationen 1945-1990*. 91-7153-379-6
54. Ulrika Mörth (1996) *Vardagsintegration - La vie quotidienne - i Europa. Sverige i EUREKA och EU-REKA i Sverige*. 91-7153-460-1
55. Claes Wahl (1996) *The State of Statistics: Conceptual and Statistical Reasoning in the Modern State 1870-1940*. 91-7153-506-3
56. Peter Kjaer (1996) *The Constitution of Enterprise: An Institutional History of Inter-firm Relations in Swedish Furniture Manufacturing*. 91-7153-538-1

57. Eva Haldén (1997) *Den Föreställda Förvaltningen. En institutionell historia om central skolförvaltning*. 91-7153-578-0
58. Kristina Riegert (1998) *"Nationalising" Foreign Conflict: Foreign Policy Orientation as a Factor in Television News Reporting*. 91-7153-743-0
59. Peter Ehn (1998) *Maktens administratörer. Ledande svenska statstjänstemäns och politikernas syn på tjänstemannarollen i ett förändringsperspektiv*. 91-7153-779-1
60. Magnus Norell (1998) *Democracy and Dissent. The Case of an Israeli Peace Movement, Peace Now*. 91-7153-828-3
61. Jan Lionel Sellberg (1998) *Hur är samhället möjligt? Om den tidigmoderna naturrättens språkfilosofiska grunder. Brännpunkt: Samuel Pufendorf*. 91-7153-825-9
62. Jan-Axel Swartling (1998) *Ideologi och realitetsarbete. Om analys av makt och dominans på etnometodologisk grund*. 91-7153-846-1
63. Magnus Ekengren (1998) *Time and European Governance. The Empirical Value of Three Reflective Approaches*. 91-7153-861-5
64. Peter Strandbrink (1999) *Kunskap och politik. Teman i demokratisk teori och svensk EU-debatt*. 91-7153-943-3
65. Jouni Reinikainen (1999) *Right against Right. Membership and Justice in Post-Soviet Estonia*. 91-7153-951-4
66. Eric Stern (1999) *Crisis Decisionmaking: A Cognitive-Institutional Approach*. 91-7153-9936
67. Ulf Mörkenstam (1999) *Om "Lapparnes privilegier". Föreställningar om samiskhet i svensk samepolitik 1883-1997*. 91-7265-004-4
68. Cecilia Åse (2000) *Makten att se. Om kropp och kvinnlighet i lagens namn*. (Liber) 91-4706080-8
69. Margreth Nordgren (2000) *Läkarprofessionens feminisering. Ett köns- och maktperspektiv*. 91-7265-133-4
70. Charlotte Wagnsson (2000) *Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO and Chechnya. Securitisation Theory Reconsidered*. 91-7265-135-0
71. Max M. Edling (2000) *A revolution in favour of government. The American Constitution and ideas about state formation, 1787-1788*. 91-7265-130-X
72. Pasquale Cricenti (2000) *Mellan privilegier och fattigdom. Om italiensk demokrati och socialpolitik ur ett välfärdsstatsperspektiv*. 91-7265-179-2
73. Henrik Berglund (2000) *Hindu Nationalism and Democracy: A Study of the Political Theory and Practice of the Bharatiya Janata Party*. 91-7265-198-9
74. Magnus Reitberger (2000) *Consequences of Contingency: the Pragmatism and Politics of Richard Rorty*. 91-7265-199-7
75. Mike Winnerstig (2001) *A World Reformed? The United States and European Security from Reagan to Clinton*. 91-7265-212-8
76. Jonas Nordquist (2001) *Domstolar i det svenska politiska systemet: Om demokrati, juridik och politik under 1900-talet*. 91-7265-218-7
77. Kjell Engelbrekt (2001) *Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral Europe. A Perspectivist Approach*. 91-7265-234-9
78. Susanna Rabow-Edling (2001) *The intellectuals and the idea of the nation in Slavophile thought*. 91-7265-316-7
79. Nelli Kopola (2001) *The Construction of Womanhood in Algeria. Moudjahidates, Aishah Radjul, Women as Others and Other Women*. 91-7265-317-5
80. Maria Jansson (2001) *Livets dubbla vedermödor. Om moderskap och arbete*. 91-7265-340-X
81. Dagmar von Walden Laing (2001) *HIV/AIDS in Sweden and the United Kingdom Policy Networks 1982-1992*. 91-7265-342-6
82. Marika Sanne (2001) *Att se till helheten. Svenska kommunalpolitiker och det demokratiska uppdraget*. 91-7265-348-5
83. Bror Lyckow (2001) *En fråga för väljarna? Kampen om det lokala vetot 1893-1917*. 91-7265-359-0
84. Magnus Enzell (2002) *Requiem for a Constitution. Constitutionalism and Political Culture in Early 20th Century Sweden*. 91-7265-395-7
85. Welat Songür (2002) *Välfärdsstaten, sociala rättigheter och invandrarnas maktresurser: En jämförande studie om äldre från Mellanöstern i Stockholm, London och Berlin*. 91-7265-405-8
86. Johan Lembke (2002) *Defining the New Economy in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of EU Technology Infrastructure Policy, 1995-2001*. 91-7265-417-1
87. Maria Wendt Höjer (2002) *Rådslans politik. Våld och sexualitet i den svenska demokratin*. (Liber). 91-47-06585-0

88. Håkan Karlsson (2002) *Bureaucratic Politics and Weapons Acquisition: The Case of the MX ICBM Program*. 91-7265-531-3
89. Andreas Duit (2002) *Tragedins institutioner. Svenskt offentligt miljöskydd under trettio år*. 91-7265-528-3
90. Lucas Pettersson (2002) *Information och identitet. Synen på televisionens politiska roll i Sverige och EU*. ISBN 91-7265-549-6
91. Magnus Jedenheim Edling (2003) *The Compatibility of Effective Self-Ownership and Joint World Ownership*. 91-7265-589-5
92. Peter Hallberg (2003) *Ages of Liberty: Social Upheaval, History Writing and the New Public Sphere in Sweden, 1740-1792*. 91-7265-629-8
93. Linus Hagström (2003) *Enigmatic Power? Relational Power Analysis and Statecraft in Japan's China Policy*. 91-7265-628-X
94. Jacob Westberg (2003) *Den nationella drömträdgården. Den stora berättelsen om den egna nationen i svensk och brittisk Europadebatt*. 91-7265-681-6
95. Eva Erman (2003) *Action and Institution – contributions to a discourse theory of human rights*. 91-7265-726-X
96. Göran Sundström (2003) *Stat på villovägar. Resultatstyrningens framväxt i ett historisk-institutionellt perspektiv*. 91-7265-750-2
97. Ersun Kurtulus (2004) *State Sovereignty. The Concept, the Referent and the Ramifications*. 91-7265-754-5
98. Magdalena Kettis (2004) *The Challenge of Political Risk. Exploring the Political Risk Management of Swedish Multinational Corporations*. 91-7265-842-8
99. Sofia Näsström (2004) *The An-Archical State. Logics of Legitimacy in the Social Contract Tradition*. 91-7265-924-6
100. Gunilla Herolf (2004) *France, Germany and the United Kingdom – Cooperation in Times of Turbulence*. 91-7265-797-9
101. Lena Dahlberg (2004) *Welfare relationships. Voluntary organisations and local authorities supporting relatives of older people in Sweden*. 91-7265-928-9
102. Anette Gröjer (2004) *Den utvärdera(n)de staten. Utvärderingens institutionalisering på den högre utbildningens område*. 91-7265-939-4
103. Malena Britz (2004) *The Europeanization of Defence Industry Policy*. 91-7265-916-5
104. Hans Agné (2004) *Democracy Reconsidered. The Prospects of its Theory and Practice during Internationalisation - Britain, France, Sweden, and the EU*. 91-7265-948-3
105. Henrik Enroth (2004) *Political Science and the Concept of Politics. A Twentieth-Century Genealogy*. 91-7265-967-X
106. Lisbeth Aggestam (2004) *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*. 91-7265-964-5
107. Catrin Andersson (2004) *Tudelad trots allt – dualismens överlevnad i den svenska staten 1718-1987*. 91-7265-978-5
108. Johan Lantto (2005) *Konflikt eller samförstånd? Management- och marknadsreformers konsekvenser för den kommunala demokratin*. 91-7155-103-4
109. Daniel Helldén (2005) *Demokratin utmanas. Almstriden och det politiska etablissemangen*. 91-7155-136-0
110. Birgir Hermannsson (2005) *Understanding Nationalism, Studies in Icelandic Nationalism 1800-2000*. 91-7155-148-4
111. Alexandra Segerberg (2006) *Thinking Doing: The Politicisation of Thoughtless Action*. 91-7155-179-4
112. Maria Hellman (2006) *Televisual Representations of France and the UK under Globalization*. 91-7155-219-7
113. Åsa Vifell (2006) *Enklaver i staten. Internationalisering, demokrati och den svenska statsförvaltningen*. 91-7155-243-X
114. Johnny Rodin (2006) *Rethinking Russian Federalism. The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations and Federal Reforms at the Turn of the Millennium*. 91-7155-285-5
115. Magnus Lembke (2006) *In the Lands of Oligarchs. Ethno-Politics and the Struggle for Social Justice in the Indigenous-Peasant Movements of Guatemala and Ecuador*. 91-7155-300-2
116. Lenita Freidenvall (2006), *Vägen till Varannan Damernas. Om kvinnorepresentation, kvotering och kandidaturval i svensk politik 1970-2002* 91-7155-322-3

117. Arita Eriksson (2006) *Europeanization and Governance in Defence Policy: The Example of Sweden*. 91-7155-321-5
118. Magnus Erlandsson (2007) *Striderna i Rosenbad. Om trettio års försök att förändra Regeringskansliet*. 978-91-7155-448-2
119. Anders Sjögren (2007) *Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance: State Formation in Contemporary Uganda*. 978-91-7155-430-7
120. Andreas Behnke (2007) *Re-Presenting the West. NATO's Security Discourse After the End of the Cold War*. 978-91-7155-522-9
121. Ingemar Mundebo (2008) *Hur styrs staten?* 978-91-7155-530-4
122. Simon Birnbaum (2008) *Just Distribution. Rawlsian Liberalism and the Politics of Basic Income*. 978-91-7155-570-0
123. Tove Lindén (2008) *Explaining Civil Society Core Activism in Post-Soviet Latvia*. 978-91-7155-585-4
124. Pelle Åberg (2008) *Translating Popular Education – Civil Society Cooperation between Sweden and Estonia*. 978-91-7155-596-0
125. Anders Nordström (2008) *The Interactive Dynamics of Regulation: Exploring the Council of Europe's Monitoring of Ukraine*. 978-91-7155-616-5
126. Fredrik Doerer (2008) *In Search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993*. 978-91-7155-609-7
127. Mikael Blomdahl (2008) *The Political Use of Force: Beyond National Security Considerations as a Source of American Foreign Policy*. 978-91-7155-733-9
128. Jenny Cisneros Örnberg (2009) *The Europeanization of Swedish Alcohol Policy*. 978-91-7155-748-3
129. Sofie Bedford (2009) *Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context*. 978-91-7155-800-8
130. Björn Harström (2009) *Vad vi inte får se. 100 år av censurpolitik*. 978-91-7155-878-7
131. Monica Andersson (2009) *Politik och stadsbyggande. Modernismen och byggnadslagstiftningen*. 978-91-7155-944-9
132. Jenny Madestam (2009) *En kompispappa och en ytlig djuping. Parti-eliters ambivalenta partiledarideal*. 978-91-7155-962-3
133. Marja Lemne (2010) *För långt från regeringen – och för nära. Expertgruppen ESO:s födelse, levnad och död*. 978-91-7447-006-2
134. Maria Carbin (2010) *Mellan tystnad och tal – flickor och hedersvåld i svensk offentlig politik*. 978-91-7447-037-6
135. Sofie Tornhill (2010) *Capital Visions. The Politics of Transnational Production in Nicaragua*. 978-91-7447-052-9
136. Barbara Kunz (2010) *Kind words, cruise missiles and everything in between. A neoclassical realist study of the use of power resources in U.S. policies towards Poland, Ukraine and Belarus 1989–2008*. 978-91-7447-148-9
137. Eva Hansson (2011) *Growth without Democracy. Challenges to Authoritarianism in Vietnam*. 978-91-7447-199-1
138. Anna Ullström (2011) *Styrning bakom kulisserna. Regeringskansliets politiska staber och regeringens styrningskapacitet*. 978-91-7447-235-6
139. Karl Gustafsson (2011) *Narratives and Bilateral Relations: Rethinking the 'History Issue' in Sino-Japanese Relations*. 978-91-7447-305-6

