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
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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

FSHSG	Fukoku Seimei Hoken Sōgō Gaisha
KKT	Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Chōsa Oyobi Rippō Kōsakyoku
NDC	Naha District Court
ODC	Osaka District Court
OHC	Osaka High Court
TDC	Tokyo District Court
THHI	Tōkyō Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai
YJ	Yasukuni Jinja
YJY	Yasukuni Jinja Yūshūkan
YSSSKI	Yomiuri Shinbun Sensō Sekinin Kenshō Iinkai

INTRODUCTION

1. When the Japanese speak of *sensō* (war) without naming a specific war, they are usually referring to some or all of the battles that involved Japanese military forces from the Japanese invasion of China to the end of World War II (1931–1945). Earlier wars, including the Seinan War, Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and World War I, are normally referred to by name.

The term “Pacific War” (Taiheiyo Sensō), coined by the occupation forces as an alternative to the official Japanese term, “Greater East Asian War” (Daitōa Sensō), semantically fails to encompass the invasions in East Asia. Cultural critic Tsurumi Shunsuke proposed using the term “Fifteen-Year War” (Jūgonen Sensō) in order to include

the Japanese aggression in China (1986, 124). More recently, Japan scholars tend to use the term “Asia-Pacific War” (*Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō*) to refer to Japan’s battles on both the East Asian and the Pacific fronts. The term initially covered only the years 1941 to 1945 but has come to refer to 1937 and sometimes goes as far back as 1931. In this book I use “Asia-Pacific War” to cover the entire period of Japan’s military engagement from September 1931 to August 1945. For earlier naming of the Asia-Pacific War, see Kisaka (1993).

2. A recording of the song is included on the CD-ROM accompanying Ogawa (2006).

3. Ōe S. (1984, 188).

4. *Kokumin Kayō*, a daily program on the public radio network, aired from April 1936 to February 1941 as a way to promote patriotism through music. The program continued until August 1945 as *Kokumin Gasshō* (National Chorus).

5. All military-related deaths in modern Japan were collectively merged into the god of Yasukuni during enshrinement rituals that took place once or twice a year. See chapter 4 for a detailed description of the rituals.

6. Ōe S. (1984, 187–190).

7. Fourteen Class-A war criminals, including the seven that were executed, five that died while serving their sentences, and two that died before the final trial, were quietly enshrined in the fall of 1978. See chapter 5 for details about the enshrinement.

8. Besides Ōe’s work, representative scholarship in Japanese on Yasukuni Shrine include Murakami (1974), Zushi (2003), Takahashi (2005c), and Akazawa (2005). Examples of edited volumes on the topic that incorporate voices from inside and outside Japan include Nakano and Jōchi Daigaku 21 Seiki COE Puroguramu (2006), and Kawakami et al. (2006). Journalist Tanaka Nobumasa has written numerous works on topics associated with Yasukuni enshrinement. For English works, see Breen (2008).

Most Japanese scholarly and journalistic works on the shrine are driven by their strong support or criticism of the institution. The supportive stance is taken by Shinto scholars, members or supporters of the Japan Association for the Bereaved Families of the War Dead (*Nihon Izokukai*), and most members of the LDP. The critical position is maintained by political liberals and liberal intellectuals. Because of their political motivations, these writers often oversimplify issues in order to deliver a more persuasive polemics.

Officials of Yasukuni Shrine try to distance the institution from political debates and accuse the LDP of using it as a political tool. Shrine officials were especially critical after LDP members attempted to remove the names of the Class-A war criminals from the shrine’s register. In an interview with journalist Itō Tasumi (1987), then head priest Jin’no condemned the LDP and the *Izokukai* for demanding the removal of the names so that prime ministers would be able to make official visits to the shrine.

9. For an example of a scholarly analysis of the controversies associated with the memorial, see Sturken (1991).

10. On the significance of commemorating death for the construction and strengthening of national identities, see Gillis (1994) and Mosse (1990). For a collection of more recent studies that examine changing trends in the culture of commemoration, see Homans (2000). In Japan, the Research Center for Memorial and Remembrance (Irei to Tsuitō Kenkyūkai) at Kokugakuin University Centre for the Promotion of Excellence in Research and Education has conducted a series of symposia on the topic. Their research is available in three edited collections: Kokugakuin Daigaku Kenkyū Kaihatsu Suishin Sentaa (2008, 2010, 2013).

11. Since the Japanese language typically does not differentiate between singular and plural, it is tricky to discern how the gods at Yasukuni are counted. In response to postwar requests for removal of names from the register, shrine officials have described that the “god” of Yasukuni is singular although it comprises the spirits of approximately 2.6 million war dead. Shrine officials use an analogy by way of explanation: Once the spirit of a dead person is formally enshrined, it merges with the others into a single god, just as multiple candle flames merge into one. In addition to this many-souled singular god, there exists another god for the two members of the imperial family that are also enshrined there. Yasukuni Shrine refers to each “god” as *za* (a seat). It is important to note here, however, there is no mention of this many-souled singular god in the prewar literature produced by Yasukuni Shrine (see, for example, Kamo, 1911b). It is thus possible to speculate that the idea of the many-souled singular god was invented by the Yasukuni officials in the postwar period to deny requests for disenfranchisement.

The Japanese terms used to refer to the individual gods include *gun-shin* (military god), *gokoku-shin* (nation-protector god), and *eirei* (honorable spirits). I discuss the term *eirei* further in chapter 3.

12. Religion was not conceptualized as a generalized phenomenon in pre-Meiji Japan. Thus, the introduction of Shinto was not understood in the sense of “modern Christocentric notions of religion” Hardacre (1989, 18–19).

13. Ōe S. (1984, 190).

14. The Council of Worshipers’ Representatives, made up of ten people selected from financial circles and members of Nippon Izokukai (the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association), meets several times annually to decide matters concerning the shrine’s management and operation. Yatabe Masaomi, the president of Jinja Honchō (Association of Shinto Shrines), made news in 2006 by becoming a member of the Council of Worshipers’ Representatives (*Kyōdō Tsūshin*, October 25, 2006).

15. Until 1945 the military was in control of the events hosted at the shrine. In the postwar years, successive head priests were responsible for making policies on issues such as the Class-A war criminals’ enshrinement and the small, supplementary shrine for all of the war dead.

16. The plan to build a new national memorial stalled in 2002 but remains under consideration as one of the few possible solutions to the Yasukuni issue. At the national

memorial service on August 15, 2008, for example, Kōno Yōhei, speaker of the House of Representatives, appealed for a renewal of the process of planning a nonreligious national memorial (*Mainichi shinbun*, August 15, 2008, evening edition). For overviews and analyses of plans and debates surrounding the new national memorial, see Tanaka (2003b), Kokusai Shūkyō Kenkyūjo (2004), and Yamamoto J. (2010).

17. Some argue that the destruction of architecture signifies not just the demolition of a physical structure but also the eradication of its associated cultural meanings. Such arguments are made in the context of the deliberate destruction of enemies' cultural heritage in an attempt to erase history. I am pointing out the problematic nature of deliberately destroying one's own cultural heritage in order to erase inconvenient histories. See Bevan (2006).

18. Examples of studies on the relationship between memory and war memorials include J. Young (1993), Sherman (1999), Winter (1995), Kosher (2000), and Gillis (1994).

19. Yasukuni Shrine is more than a war memorial, and its political nature requires careful consideration. As historian Akazawa Shirō (2005, 2) notes, a key issue surrounding Yasukuni Shrine is whether the monument should have national significance. My objective here is to highlight other kinds of meanings associated with the shrine as a means of appreciating the site's complex relationship with efforts to come to terms with Japan's wartime past.

20. English translation published in 1980. (Halbwachs 1980, 128–157).

21. Theorists have since expanded on Halbwachs' ideas to incorporate the impact of modernity and postmodernity. See, for example, Nora (1989) and Huyssen (1995). For an overview of recent studies on memory, see Olick and Robbins (1998).

22. Halbwachs (1980, 141).

23. *Ibid.*, 154. The city of Hiroshima has proposed several similar ideas for the transformation of its image, hoping to deemphasize its atomic past by demolishing buildings damaged by the atomic bomb. Yoneyama (1999, 43–82).

24. Nora (1989, 7). See also Winter (1995).

25. For an overview of modernist and postmodernist trends in spatial theory, see Harvey (1989, 211–239).

26. Halbwachs (1980, 140).

27. Lefebvre (1991).

28. Foucault (1993) and Lefebvre (1991).

29. My analysis of Yasukuni as a site draws on Lefebvre's theorization of space.

30. Written testimony by Iwasaki Masuko, submitted at the Osaka District Court on April 19, 2002 (Takahashi T. 2005c, 13).

31. Takahashi T. (2005c, 43–45).

32. Gluck (1992, 12–13).

33. Representations of Japanese history in the Yūshūkan Museum are discussed in chapter 6.

34. The word *eirei* was newly appropriated in the early twentieth century to refer specifically to the war dead. This term is examined in more detail in chapter 3.

35. The lack of concern for life apparently not only gave rise to battle tactics that resulted in high casualty rates but also influenced broader strategies that failed to factor in the need to supply soldiers at the front, which led to widespread starvation among Japanese troops. For example, historian Fujiwara Akira (2001) argues that more than 60 percent of Japanese military deaths were due to starvation.

36. For example, Irie Yōko, born in 1935, describes the elementary school system of her generation as “mind control” (2000). Children’s author Yamanaka Hisashi, born in 1931, has written extensively on childhood experiences during the war, in part fueled by his contempt for teachers who were engaged in strict imperialist education. After the war they quickly turned to favor American democracy without offering any explanation to their students. Yamanaka’s writings are compiled into numerous books, including the six-volume series *Bokura shōkokumin*. Yamanaka (1974–1981). Similarly, throughout the war years readers were fed misinformation by newspapers and other forms of mass media, which collaborated with and were strictly censored by the military. See, for example, L. Young (1998), Yomiuri Shinbun Sensō Sekinin Kenshō Inkaï (2006), and Abel (2012).

37. Adorno (1986).

38. For the social circumstances of Japan during the Allied occupation and the reception of the new constitution, see Dower (1999).

39. Yoshida Y. (1995, 54–55).

40. Adorno (1986, 155).

41. The best-known collection of soldiers’ writings, *Listen to the Voices from the Sea*, is a compilation of letters written by student soldiers during the Asia-Pacific War (Nihon Senbotsu Gakusei Kinenkai [Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in War], also known as the Wadatsumi Society). Rynn and Quinn (2000) have translated a selection into English. Historian Ōe Shinobu (1988) analyzed some five hundred letters written home during the Russo-Japanese War and notes that in most cases the writer does not refer to the emperor. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (2006) also analyzes selected diary entries by student soldiers.

42. This poll was taken before the emperor declared himself human (*ningen sengen*) on January 1, 1946. In the poll, 30 percent felt regret, grief, or sorrow, and 23 percent experienced surprise, shock, and perplexity, while 22 percent felt relief or happiness. Yoshimi Y. (1987, 262).

43. Kitamura (1999).

44. Foucault (1977, 140).

45. Maruyama M. (1969, 84–132).

46. *Ibid.*, 128–129. Here, Maruyama is not referring to Yasukuni Shrine in particular but to the general concept of modern Shintoism, with the emperor at the zenith, who is being revered merely because he is at the top.

47. For analyses of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in English, see Totani (2008) and Minear (1972).

48. Gluck (2009, 97).

49. Lecture delivered on August 15, 1998, at a gathering of the Japan Association for Memorializing Fallen Students (Nihon Senbotsu Gakusei Kinenkai). The transcript is published as “‘Sengo sekinin’ saikō,” in Takahashi T. (2005b, 24–64).

50. The term “postwar responsibility” came into usage in the 1970s, but it has been mobilized since the 1990s, leading to a flurry of publications that use the phrase to explore new ideas to overcome the postwar impasse. For recent discussions on postwar responsibility, see, for example, Ōnuma (2007), Awaya et al. (1994), Taguchi (1996), Takahashi T. (2005b), and Kōketsu (2009). An anonymous reviewer noted that the earliest work with the term *sengo sekinin* in its title was published in 1971 by theologian and veteran Watanabe Nobuo. However, this book is a collection of essays that were published in the journal *Fukuin to sekai* (The Gospel and the World) on Watanabe’s war experience and postwar activism, including essays opposing the passage of the Yasukuni Shrine Bill. However, the book’s ideas on postwar responsibility are not in conformity with those that have been discussed since the mid-1990s.

51. Valid criticisms have been made of the concept of postwar responsibility. Historian Akazawa Shirō (1989), for example, apprehends the potential for being unclear or insufficiently specific about what one must be responsible for. But I believe that, when considered together with the idea of postmemory, the concept of postwar responsibility is useful. See chapter 6 for further discussions of postwar responsibility and postmemory.

52. YSSSKI (2006, vol. 1, 208–209).

53. *Ibid.*, 208.

54. For a detailed account of Japanese life immediately after the war, see Dower (1999).

55. Cited in Yoshida Y. (1995, 108).

56. Breen (2008, 156).

57. Ienaga (1987, 337–341).

58. Igarashi (2000, 13).

59. See, for example, Harootunian (1999b, 145).

60. *Mainichi* (newspaper), June 21, 2011. The Itami quote is from Ōe K. (1971). I would like to thank Aaron Gerow for posting the newspaper article on Facebook.

61. For a discussion of postmemory, see Hirsch (1996).

62. J. Young (1993).

CHAPTER 1: MOBILIZING DEATH

Epigraph. Kido Takayoshi (1983), entry dated January 15, 1860.

1. Kido (1983, 184–185).

2. Ikeda (1967). Archival documents associated with the construction of Tokyo Shōkonsha are available in the first chapter of the one-hundred-year history compiled by Yasukuni Shrine (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 1–75).

3. Recollection of Kamo Mizuho, the second head priest of Yasukuni Shrine (Murata 1919, 286). Architectural historian Suzuki Hiroyuki credits Ōmura as one of the few people in the history of modern Japan who was capable of urban planning with a long-term view. In addition to his proposal for the urban transformation of the Kudan area, Ōmura predicted, at a time when the land prices of former daimyo residences throughout Tokyo had fallen drastically with the political transition from Edo to Meiji, that the value of the Kudan land would soon rise. Fifty years after Ōmura's prediction, land prices in Tokyo increased to as much as sixty thousand times their original value in areas such as Nihonbash (Suzuki H. 1996, 1–2).

4. The map is included in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 40–41).

5. Diary entry dated June 26, 1869. Kido (1983, 248–249).

6. The temporary structures were situated not at the current shrine location but in the middle of what is today the outer garden (Ikeda 1967, 56).

7. Details of this first festival are included in *ibid.* (56–58).

8. The permanent structure, completed in 1872, consisted of only the inner shrine in *shinmei* style. The worship hall and corridors connecting the two buildings were not constructed until 1901. The inner shrine was dismantled and refurbished in 1989 for the 120th anniversary of the shrine.

The ceremonies fell on the dates of the four battles that decided the Imperial Army's victory in the Boshin War: January 3 (Battle of Toba-Fushimi), May 15 (Battle of Ueno), May 18 (the Fall of Hakodate), and September 22 (the Fall of Aizu). The two May dates were combined into a single festival. (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 387).

9. For information on early operations of the shrine, including its budget and relationship to the court, see Sakamoto (1984).

10. *Yūbin hōchi shinbun* (monthly), June 1872, italics added. The event that took place in May was reported in June since this was the newspaper's first edition.

11. Aoki K. (2004, 10).

12. Mosse (1990).

13. *Ibid.*, 5–7.

14. *Ibid.*, 70–73.

15. See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Fujitani (1998b).

16. Representative scholarship on Yasukuni Shrine that includes a summary of its early history includes Murakami (1974), Ōe S. (1984), and Akazawa (2005). A summary in English is available in Breen, "Introduction," in Breen (2008, 1–21). Most of the recent works draw on Murakami and Ōe S. for the shrine's early history.

17. Rituals, from funeral rites to various memorial milestones in the months and years following death, were designed to allow the living to respond to the desires of the dead and, at the same time, establish a boundary between the living and the dead. Even though they were understood as ways to signify to the dead that they now

belonged in a world separate from that of the living, for the living, in fact, they served as a process of mourning (Namihira 2004). This is not an exclusively Japanese practice: As Robert Pogue Harrison notes in his discussion of Western thoughts on death, “[t]he dead like to stay close to the living . . . To realize their fate and become truly dead they must first be made to disappear. It is only because their bodies have a place to go that their souls or images or words may attain an afterlife of sorts among the living” (Harrison 2003, 1).

18. Namihira (2004, 77–79).

19. Nishimura (2006, 56–57). Many other religious scholars and folklorists have written on the medieval practice. See, for example, Gorai (1994, 90), Tamamuro (1963, 79–82), and Sakurai (1984, 9). Sakurai notes that, after the mid-twelfth century, the spirits of the war dead became easier to appease since those engaged in warfare accepted death as the outcome of battle. In fact, the war dead, when appeased appropriately, were considered capable of bringing good fortune to the living.

20. Shinto scholars also have pointed out that, since belief in *goryō shinkō* cannot be observed in the late Tokugawa practices that developed into the *shōkon* ritual of Yasukuni Shrine, the medieval practice could not have been the origins of Yasukuni belief. Tsuda T. (2002).

21. Ōe S. (1984, 120–122). See also Murakami (1974).

22. Ōe references a work by ethnographer Sakurai Tokutarō, *Reikon kan no keifu*, to make this point. Ōe S. (1984, 120–122).

23. For studies on the political use of the dead outside Japan, see, for example, Verdery (1999), Rév (2005), and Ballinger (2003).

24. Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai (1916).

25. Ibid. (vol. 2, 425–426).

26. Prior to the Tokugawa period, the Mōri family, the leader of the domain, was a daimyo of significance, with vast land holdings in the strategic areas of present-day Hiroshima. But when Tokugawa Ieyasu took power, he banished the Mōri family to the western end of the island in retribution for Mōri Terumoto’s role in the Battle of Sekigahara, the decisive battle that enabled Ieyasu to seize power. The Mōris had held a grudge against Tokugawa ever since.

27. Ichisaka (2008, 59).

28. For a closer analysis of the text, see Wakabayashi (1986) and Harootunian (1970).

29. When repeating the names of historical Japanese figures, I choose either the first or the last, whichever is more commonly used in Japanese literature to refer to the person.

30. For an English translation of *Taiheiki*, see McCullough (2003).

31. Known today through popular-culture renditions of “Mito Kōmon,” Mito Mitsukuni also supervised the creation of *Dai Nihonshi*, a version of Japanese history that legitimizes the Southern Court, an alternate court that Emperor Go-daigo established in Yoshino after fleeing Kyoto in the Nan-boku-chō period. The *Dai Nihonshi*

allows the Kusunoki narrative to be the triumphant one: Kusunoki sacrificed his life for the sake of Go-daigo, who continued his imperial rule from the Southern Court.

32. Kobayashi and Terunuma (1969, 40–43).

33. *Ibid.*, 45–47.

34. On April 23, 1862, imperial loyalists gathered at Teradaya inn in Kyoto to plot a revolt to seize control of the Imperial Palace, only to be placated by Satsuma elder Shimazu Hisamitsu. Nine loyalists died as a result.

35. Kobayashi and Terunuma (1969, 48).

36. Shōin was placed under house arrest for smuggling his way onto an American ship and attempting to travel abroad without proper documents while on probation. After being sent back home, he started a private school for young, low-level samurai and other disciples.

37. There was a belief that the Mōri family was distantly related to the son of the fifty-first emperor, Heizei. Theories also claimed that the Mōri family was related to Kusunoki (Ichisaka 2008, 56–57, 62–63).

38. In 1858, bakufu elder Ii Naosuke led the Ansei purges, in which he attempted to eliminate the loyalists who opposed his political stance, including his handling of the shogunal succession and the signing of the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. A number of men were executed or died in imprisonment; others received punishment ranging from exile to loss of land holdings. Antibakufu men retaliated by attacking and killing Ii on March 3, 1860, in the Sakurada Gate incident.

39. “Deaths in state affairs” is a term subsequently used in reference to qualifications for Yasukuni enshrinement.

40. An excerpt of the relevant section of this imperial order is available in Kobayashi and Terunuma (1969, 30–31).

41. Reimeisha was a shrine founded in 1823 for the purpose of holding funerals (*ibid.*, 55–56). For a detailed account of this memorial service, including the names of attendees and the prayer offered during the ritual, see Katō T. (1967).

42. The men were later enshrined at Yasukuni around 1889 (Kobayashi and Terunuma 1969, 31).

43. Tsuda T. (2002).

44. In attendance at the first Chōshū ritual was Maki Izumi and members of the Kōmyōji faction, a radical *jōi* group that had conducted the first armed attack against foreigners (an American commercial fleet) on May 10, 1864. Attacks against foreign fleets continued in the following weeks. Attacks by U.S. and French battleships resulted in the first Japanese casualties on June 1 and 5 of that year. Thus the start of the *shōkon* coincided with Japan’s military demonstration of *jōi*. Tsuda T. (2002, 131).

45. The Sakurayama shrine compound included a site for tomb stonelike pillars. However, partly for practical reasons, body parts or ashes were not buried here: Since the bodies of those who died in battle were buried close to the battlefield, the collective memorial for *kiheitai* could be a site only for spirits. This model was used for regional shrines, as well as for Tokyo Shōkonsha and, later, Yasukuni Shrine.

46. *Shūtei bōchō kaitenshi* 7. Cited in Ichisaka (2008, 128–129).
47. Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai (1916, vol. 1, 182–184), YJ (1973, 5–11).
48. Ōkawa (1980, 78).
49. Tsuda T. (2002, 144).
50. Murakami (1984, 19–22).
51. Hata I. (2010, 25).

52. The official documents of the imperial army were issued while the emperor's relocation was being planned (exact date unknown), and orders were given to research and create a list of all the war dead since the Battle of Toba-Fushimi and to submit the list to Jōgikan of Tokyo. The earliest record of construction activity at Tokyo Shōkonsha is Kido Takayoshi's diary entry for March 15, 1869.

53. For example, family members of medical students killed by the atomic bomb while studying at Nagasaki Medical University requested their enshrinement. Nishimura (2003).

54. Hata I. (2010).

55. Kobayashi and Terunuma (1969, 34).

56. Imai Akihiko speculates that this was because Matsushiro and Iiyama, the imperialist clans that were in charge, were sympathetic due to their geographical proximity (Imai 2005, 75).

57. These criteria also changed over time. For example, deaths due to illness were not initially included in Yasukuni Shrine. And as I demonstrate in chapter 5, criteria for civilian affiliates were determined in the postwar period.

58. In addition, Saigō Takamori, who played a central role as a commander of the imperial loyalist army, is not memorialized at Yasukuni Shrine, as he later rebelled against the imperial government in the Seinan War.

59. Hata I. (2010, 17).

60. This land was designated for emergency purposes. Takasugi Shinsaku chose the site due to its resemblance to Shōin's hometown. Currently, Shōin Shrine occupies the site (Ichisaka 2008, 83).

61. *Ibid.*, 84.

62. June 10 to November 6, 1868, according to the Gregorian calendar.

63. In 1987, for example, representatives in Hagi City, present-day Chōsū, sent a request to the city of Aizu-Wakamatsu for a reconciliation to commemorate the 120th anniversary of the Boshin War. Aizu representatives declined, citing citizen protest. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), September 26, 1987, morning edition.

64. Morioka and Imai (1982, 4)

65. Gōda (1995, 100–103).

66. Morioka and Imai (1982, 4).

67. Imai (2005, 31).

68. Not all women took their own lives. Many fought with whatever weapons were available. Others participated in activities such as extinguishing fires inside the castle. For the fate of Aizu women during the Battle of Aizu, see Adachi (1981).

69. Yamakawa Kenjirō, ed., *Aizu Boshin senshi*, cited in Hoshi (1990, 67).
70. Yūzū Temple is a Pure Land Buddhist temple in present-day Ōmach, Aizu Wakamatsu (Imai 2002, 252).
71. Morioka and Imai (1982, 10). For Meiji's tours, see, for example, Fujitani (1998b).
72. Dated September 2, 1868 (Hoshi 1990, 69).
73. Burial, or cremation and burial, is a modern practice. In medieval times, dead bodies were deliberately left out in the open so that they would weather away and disappear. It was believed that, as soon as the rotting body disappeared completely, the spirit would be purified. The quickest method of purifying the spirit was to expose the dead body to the elements or submerge it in water (Gorai 1994, 13).
74. Imai (2005, 43).
75. Machiya Mondo, "Meiji Boshin junansha no rei hōshi no yurai," from Miyazaki Tomihachi, cited in Imai (2002, 253).
76. Members of the Byakko-tai had been called in to help prevent the imperialists from approaching the castle. Failing to do so, they retreated into the mountains. The next morning, twenty of the young men who had reached the Iimori Mountain pass witnessed Tsuruga Castle surrounded by flames. Mistakenly believing that their castle had fallen, they took their lives with their own swords amid a fierce storm. Only one member, Inuma Teikichi, a fifteen-year-old who had lied about his age in order to join the Byakkotai, survived (Imai 2002, 247–248).
77. According to Imai Akihiko, sources note that four bodies were transported to Myōkokuji and others buried at Iimori Mountain. Yoshida was later released when it became apparent that the burial was conducted at his personal request rather than by an official order from the Aizu.
78. Similarly, it can be argued that, in later decades, the modern military extended its power over family members by controlling the bodies of the military dead. I return to this idea in chapter 4.
79. Machiya Mondo, "Meiji Boshin junansha no rei hōshi no yurai," from Miyazaki Tomihachi, cited in Imai (2002, 258–259).
80. Amida Temple was originally a high-ranking temple of the Pure Land sect, but it was left devastated as a result of two fires. Chōmeiji Temple was the site of an especially fierce battle between the Aizu and the imperialist troops. Historians Morioka Kiyomi and Imai Hiroshi speculate that the imperialists consented to burial at these two temples because of their unfavorable conditions (Morioka and Imai 1982, 8).
81. The designation Special Government Shrine was an early Meiji invention, elevating the status of shrines dedicated to persons who loyally served the emperor in one way or another. The "god" to whom these Special Government Shrines was dedicated ranged from Fujiwara no Kamatari of the seventh century, to Sanjō Sanetomi, who was a member of the Kuroda Cabinet (1888–1889). Some of the shrines were built centuries earlier and were designated as such only in the early Meiji. Others were built anew as Special Government Shrines in the early Meiji. Most shrines established

their designations in the early Meiji. Kitabatake Shrine, the latest to be designated, received its ranking in the Showa era.

82. According to *Yasukuni Jinja shi*, a history of Yasukuni Shrine compiled by then head priest Kamo Momoki, as many as 105 memorials for the imperial loyalist dead were constructed between 1865 and 1870 (Kamo 1911b).

83. The previous year, the government announced that all *shōkonsha* land was exempt from taxes and that it would sponsor all rituals and maintenance related to the shrines (Kobayashi and Terunuma 1969, 65–68).

84. YJ (1987, 113).

85. In 1883 eighty men from Tosa were added. The largest addition occurred in 1888, when 601 men from Chōshū and five from Tosa were enshrined (YJ 1973, 38, 42, 46).

86. Mihashi (1986, 87).

87. YJ (1973, 28).

88. *Ibid.*, 29.

89. Gordon (2009, 85–87).

90. In 1877, at the eighth collective enshrinement, 6,505 were enshrined; 160 in 1878; and 264 who died of sickness while serving in the Satsuma Rebellion were enshrined in 1879 (YJ 1973, 34–38).

91. *Yōhai* is a ceremony in which the participants pay tribute to an object of worship from a distant site. In the case of Tokyo Shōkonsha, these ceremonies paid tribute to the tomb of Emperor Kōmei on January 23 (later rescheduled to January 30), Kashihara, Nara for Kigensetsu (the anniversary of Emperor Jimmu’s accession) on January 28 (later rescheduled to February 11), Emperor Jimmu’s tomb on April 3, and Ise Shrine for the Kanname festival on September 17 (later rescheduled to October 17).

92. Tenchōsetsu: emperor’s birthday. Meiji’s birthday on November 3 in this case.

93. “Rikugunshō ukagaisho” (Inquiry from the Army Ministry), dated October 24, 1879 (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 79–80).

94. “Daijōkan Hōseiikyoku gian” (Council of the State Legislation Department Bill) dated November 11, 1878 (*ibid.*, 80–81).

95. “Rikugunshō daiichi ukagaisho” (First Inquiry from the Army Ministry), dated December 17, 1878 (*ibid.*, 81). Up until this point, rites at the Tokyo Shōkonsha were conducted by army and navy ministers.

96. The three ministries agreed on the following: Rituals and ceremonies would be conducted in Shinto style and administered by the army and navy ministries; the Ministry of the Interior would oversee the promotion and demotion of priests; all three ministers had to agree on any change in the number or the salary of priests; the army would be in charge of building maintenance; and all three ministries had to agree on any changes to the main shrine or the worship hall.

97. The name Yasukuni derives from “Wu yi jingguo ye,” a passage in the Chinese history book *Chunqui zuoshi zhuàn*, meaning “creating a peaceful country.”

98. The text of the message is included in Ikeda (1967, 67).

99. Murakami (1974).
100. Sakamoto (1984).
101. Kobayashi and Terunuma (1969), Kuwa (1935), Ikeda (1967), and Mihashi (1986).
102. Hardacre (1989, 22, 27–29).
103. *Ibid.*, 47–51.
104. Miyaji Naokazu, *Jinja Kōyō* (1938), cited in Terunuma (1983).
105. For example, a shrine would be built in the spring, and a festival conducted to invite the gods. In the fall, a festival would be held to send off the gods, and the building would be dismantled. Based on Yanagita Kunio’s work, cited in Ono (1963, 12–13).
106. Between 1872 and 1878, nine shrines dedicated to historical figures were designated as Special Government Shrines.
107. “Rikugunshō daiichi kyoku ukagai sho, December 17, 1878,” cited in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 81).

CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONALIZING JOY

Epigraph. The nameless cat is describing a conversation among the women of his household.

1. Natsume Sōseki (1972, 378). In the original Japanese text, the girl calls the shrine “Tokyo Shōkonsha” rather than “Yasukuni Shrine,” the name that appears in the translation. I have replaced the shrine name to match the original.
2. Sōseki also refers to the lighthouse and the statue at Kudan in his later novel *Sanshirō*. Literary works that refer to Yasukuni Shrine or Shōkonsha are compiled in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 2).
3. At the time of the restoration, career soldiers constituted 5.7 percent of the population, while 93.4 percent were commoners (Katō Y. 1996, 17).
4. Mosse’s idea of the Myth of the War Experience is discussed in chapter 1.
5. Saitō G. ([1882] 2004, vol. 3, 212–213).
6. *Ibid.*, 215.
7. *Ibid.*, 240.
8. *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 4, 1875, morning edition.
9. Although Yūshūkan Museum dates the print as 1868, it must have been completed after 1871, when the lighthouse was built (YJY 1986).
10. The prints I examined are from the catalog “Woodblock Prints of Tokyo’s Famous Sites: The Dawn of Yasukuni Shrine as Seen through Woodblock Prints” (YJY 1986) for the 1986 exhibition at Yūshūkan.
11. Aoki K. (2004, 21).
12. Descriptions of these memorials, including names and dates of the rituals, are available in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1), chapters 3 and 4. Details of the battles and the

names of casualties dating from the restoration to the early 1930s in China are compiled in YJ (1933–1935).

13. Fujitani (1998b).

14. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 2, 49–51).

15. An inquiry by army minister Yamagata Aritomo dated February 2, 1878, requests permission to build a votive gallery on the shrine grounds. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 2, 49).

16. *Nichi-nichi shinbun* (Tokyo), November 22, 1877.

17. YJY (1883).

18. Author interview with Yūshūkan staff member Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005.

19. YJY (1883).

20. According to an inquiry by the Army Ministry to the Department of the Imperial Household, dated April 26, 1883, the military requested a loan of weapons for a period of thirty days each. The Department of the Imperial Household, in its reply of May 2, granted a loan of one weapon at a time for a period of one month each (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 2, 60–61).

21. For an overview of foreigner specialists hired in Meiji Japan, see Muramatsu et al. (1995). For a detailed account of foreigner architects hired in Meiji Japan, see Muramatsu (1976).

22. Murai (2006, 4).

23. After the memorial event, a group of sympathizers established a Bronze Statue Erection Committee (Dōzō Zōryū Iin) and sought donations for the construction. Upon consultation with a member of the Iwakura Mission, who studied bronze monuments on his European tour from 1871 to 1873, in April 1885 the committee commissioned sculptor Ōkuma Ujihiro, a graduate of the Imperial School of Art, to create the statue. For the process of the construction, see Murata (1919). Information on the sculptor is available in Tanaka S. (1994).

24. *Nichi-nichi shinbun* (Tokyo), February 7, 1893.

25. It seems that Ōmura is no longer widely known in Japan. One veteran who requested anonymity told me that when he had recently gotten together with his former fellow soldiers (*sen'yūkai*) at Yasukuni, nobody knew whom the statue commemorated. The veteran himself expressed distaste for the imposing presence of the Ōmura statue. E-mail correspondence, July 22, 2003.

26. Hattori (1992, 99–103).

27. Ishii (1908, 482).

28. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 663; vol. 2, 87). The track was five hundred ken, or approximately 990 meters long.

29. Prince Yoshihito visited Yasukuni five times in 1887, including a visit to the Yūshūkan museum on January 29, Sumo tournament on May 8, and another visit on June 18 (YJ 1973, 46).

30. In his entry under “Horse and Bicycle Racing” in the encyclopedia of Edo-Tokyo studies, folklorist Ōtsuki Takahiro credits these events with creating urban spaces that enabled Tokyoites to fully experience modernity (Ogi et al. 1987, 783–784).

31. Yamamoto S. (1971, 32–33).
32. It did not take long for horse races to become gambling opportunities in Japan. In the early twentieth century, the government tolerated the sales of betting tickets in the name of “improvement of military horses” (Ogi et al. 1987, 783).
33. Saitō G. ([1882] 2004, vol. 3, 240).
34. Ibid.
35. Kawabata Y. (1959); Yasuoka (1986).
36. Yasuoka (1984).
37. Ashihara (1984).
38. Masaoka Shiki’s comparison of his initial encounter with Yasukuni in the late 1860s with his visit twenty years later is included in Masaoka (1927, 77–79).
39. Katai recalls that when he was a child, the shrine ground was still quite empty, with only young cherry trees and Ōmura’s statue to occupy the space. He also notes that the *torii* seemed unnaturally large for the space (Tayama 1981, 68–72).
40. Kubota (1880, 2).
41. Six of the eight cannons were removed in February 1943 and donated to the military. The remaining two have been relocated to the space in front of Yūshūkan, the military museum (YJ 1973, 152).
42. Futabatei ([1907] 1919).
43. Although domestic expositions (*naikoku hakurankai*) held at Ueno starting in 1878 are often regarded as the earliest examples in Japan, the *bussankai* (product exhibition) by Daigaku Nankō (predecessor to Tokyo University) was held on the Yasukuni grounds in May 1871. For details on the Daigaku Nankō bussankai, see Kinoshita (1997).
44. Yoshimi S. (1987, 156).
45. For a history and description of such freak shows (*misemono*), see Markus (1985).
46. The Ryōgoku amusement district was extremely popular by the late eighteenth century. It centered around the Ryōgoku Bridge and had large open spaces on each end as places of refuge during Edo’s frequent fires. These open spaces were created after the big fire of 1703. For a description of *misemono* at Ryōgoku Bridge, see Figal (1999, 25–26).
47. A typical panorama building was a cylindrical structure, about twenty feet in diameter and twenty-five feet tall. A dark tunnel-like passageway connected the entrance to a platform situated at the center of the building, onto which visitors ascended via an internal, spiral staircase. On the platform, the view opened up to a nearly 360-degree view of battlefield scenery brought to life by clever uses of perspective and diffused light. The images on the cylindrical wall continued onto the floor, with foreground objects built as three-dimensional models and placed on the floor. Landscapers often installed live trees and bushes. The ceiling, which often incorporated a skylight to enhance the effect, was hidden from view by a canopy placed above the platform.

48. Initially, the icons were the main attraction. But after the 1770s, most of the visitors were attracted by the vendors and entertainers that opened shop in front of the temples (Zaino 1988, 80–81; Yoshimi S. 1987, 154–155).

49. For the relationship between religious spaces and amusement, see Yoshimi S. (1987, 153–157). The use of temple grounds for commercial purposes that profited the temple is noted in Kawazoe (1993, 121–124). For an analysis of Buddhist temples' strategies to increase popular support through entertainment, see Hur (2000).

50. Other sites were Shiba (Zōjōji), Fukagawa (Tomioka Hachimangū), and Asu-kayama (THHI 1972–1980, vol. 2, 1175–1176).

51. The districts were as follows: (1) Sensōji Temple and Asakusa Shrine; (2) shopping arcade (*nakamise*); (3) training hall (*denpōin*) for the monks of Sensōji Temple; (4) ponds and woods of the park (Ōike, Hyōtan-ike); (5) Oku-yama, where Hanayashiki is located; (6) amusement district; and (7) southeastern part of the park (Haga 1992, 261).

52. When the lack of popular entertainment led to declining numbers of visitors to Asakusa, restrictions on performance were lifted, and performers were given total freedom as long as they stayed within the Sixth District (Takeuchi 1991).

53. The exhibitions in Ueno Park took place in 1878, 1882, and 1891. The fourth national industrial exhibition was held in Kyoto (1895), and the fifth in Tennōji, Osaka (1903). The first private exposition took place on top of Kudan Hill in 1871. The following year, another exposition was held in Yushima Seidō. The Exposition Office (*bakurankai jimukyoku*) was established immediately after this second exposition (THHI 1972–1980, vol. 2, 1139).

54. Yoshimi Shun'ya describes Ueno as the “exhibition grounds for the image of a modern nation-state” (Yoshimi S. 1987, 131–133).

55. Emperor Meiji attended the annual festival of 1874 and the special festivals of 1875, 1877, 1895, 1898, 1906, and 1907. Meiji and his empress also visited the Noh stage several times toward the end of his reign. Hirohito attended special festivals every year between 1937 and 1945 and returned for annual or special festivals six times after the war. His last visit was in 1969 (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 2, 3–8).

56. Yoshimi S. (1987, 157–162).

57. The Ishiki Kaii ordinance regulated two types of minor crimes: *ishiki* (violation with intent) and *kaii* (violation without intent). The Meiji government strictly enforced this ordinance: In 1876, a total of 2,499 people were charged with the *ishiki* crime, and 8,461 people with the *kaii* rule in Tokyo alone (Yoshimi S. 1987, 159).

58. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 25–36).

59. Other places included Asakusa Okuyama (behind Sensōji temple), central Ginza, and Kanda Sakuma-chō (current Akihabara). The series of government regulations focused particularly on chasing performers and vendors away from the riverbanks and bridges, where the majority of amusements and commerce took place during the Tokugawa era (Yoshimi S. 1987, 163).

60. THHI (1972–1980, vol. 2, 1187). A description of a Yasukuni freak show during a postwar festival is included in Yoshiyuki (1971).

61. THHI (1972–1980, vol. 2, 1446–1449).

62. *Yomiuri shinbun* (Tokyo), February 11, 1905.

63. The panorama building was invented by British painter Robert Parker, who obtained a patent for it in 1787. Parker constructed his first panorama building in 1794. These structures became popular attractions throughout Europe from the late eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century. Unlike Japan, the subject matter of European panorama buildings was not necessarily war (Kinoshita 1999, 164–165).

64. An exception was the panorama building at the Asakusa Hanayashiki amusement park, which showed popular tourist sites from around the world.

65. Hashizume (1990, 135).

66. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 2, 270–271). Murakami Tsuruzō was a resident of Kanda Misaki-chō, not far from Yasukuni. He also sent a proposal to Yasukuni in 1903 to host a “sumo offering” (*sumo hōnō*) at the shrine. He proposed operating the Kokkōkan for eighty-seven days, after which the facility would belong to Yasukuni (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 2, 208–209).

67. For an analysis of visual information that the homefront populace was able to receive during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, see Dower, “Throwing Off Asia,” parts 2 and 3.

68. Edogawa (1987, 85).

69. *Jiji shinpō*, August 1–2, 1904.

70. Nihon Panorama-kan in Asakusa, the most popular panorama building, closed in 1909.

71. Hashizume (1998).

72. *Mainichi shinbun* (Tokyo), February 11, 1904.

73. *Jiji shinpō*, September 3, 1904.

74. *Shōkon* ceremonies for the Russo-Japanese War dead began in May 1905, and most were enshrined by May 1907. Altogether, 30,883 people were enshrined in May 1905; 29,960 in 1906; and 24,657 in 1907. The numbers decreased to 1,943 in 1908; 767 in 1909; and 32 in 1910 (YJ 1973, 69–78).

75. *Jiji shinpō*, December 8, 1895. According to the official chronology of the Yasukuni Shrine, the number of enshrined deceased was 1,496 (YJ 1973, 54).

76. *Jiji Shinpō*, December 17, 1895.

77. For example, Nihon Railway Company (Nihon Tetsudō Gaisha) offered a discount of 10–50 percent for *izoku* traveling to Tokyo for a *shōkon* ritual (*Yomiuri shinbun*, Tokyo, March 22, 1906).

78. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1906, morning edition.

79. A 1906 photo album is available at http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/kaihatsu/maai/taisai_thumb1_m3905_01.html.

80. The precise number is not clear from the *Jiji shinpō* articles, as the descriptions are vague. For example, an article dated December 17 notes that “some seventy people attended with invitation cards in the morning [of the 16th], with approximately four people per group,” but on December 18 “approximately 130 bereaved [were] in attendance yesterday,” and on December 19 “the number of bereaved (*izoku*) in attendance yesterday was 77, with an estimate of 280 to 290 including family members.” It is thus unclear whether the numbers on the first and second days indicate the number of invitations or the total number of visitors related to the enshrined.

81. *Jiji shinpō*, May 4, 1905.

82. Carol Gluck places the emergence of the so-called emperor system ideology at around 1890 (Gluck 1985, 17–21). Takashi Fujitani notes that Tokyo was not considered an imperial capital in the early Meiji years, as Edo castle burned down in a 1873 fire and was not reconstructed as the Imperial Palace until 1884, and the emperor was mostly absent from the capital on his frequent tours throughout the country (Fujitani 1998b, 31–92). Helen Hardacre also argues that Shinto in the early Meiji period underwent many organizational changes and did not increase its influence until after the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, during the Meiji period Shinto had not yet fully achieved its status as a national rite, nor was its ideological content (as opposed to its popular ritual practice) yet recognized by the general public (Hardacre 1989, 21–27; see also Gluck 1985, 138–143).

83. *Miyako shinbun*, December 15, 1895. Cited in Fujitani (1998b, 198).

84. *Kokumin shinbun*, May 6, 1906. Cited in Fujitani (1998b, 198).

85. Hardacre (1989, 109).

86. Fujitani (1998b, 214).

CHAPTER 3: NETWORKS OF GRIEF AND PRIDE

1. Ubukata ([1926] 1978, 47).

2. *Ibid.*, 167.

3. Kagotani (1994, 133–138).

4. Koizumi (1928, 249–255).

5. It is also possible that the student, on seeing his former mentor on his way to active duty, merely expressed what he had been instructed to say. I explore this kind of coerced (or institutionalized) behavior in chapter 4.

6. Initially, only those who were killed in action or those who died as a result of wounds sustained on the battlefield were eligible for enshrinement. Due to the large number of deaths resulting from illness during the Sino-Japanese War, however, the Army Ministry announced in 1898 that men who died as a consequence of illness contracted during active duty during the war would be eligible for enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine (Hata I. 2010, 55–57).

7. For scholarly analyses of conscription in modern Japan, see Ōe (1981), Katō Y. (1996), Kitamura (1999), and Harada (2001).

8. Conscription was managed at the local level in town and village halls and based on the existing family register system (*koseki*), with additional information required of each household.

9. Requirements for conscription, including age, changed frequently in the early years but for the most part remained at twenty. It was lowered to nineteen in 1943. Katō Y. (1996, 46–50).

10. Harada (2001, 30–31).

11. George Mosse also discusses ways in which soldiering was presented in inter-war Europe as an attainable and much admired profession (Mosse 1990, 19).

12. The lottery was eliminated in March 1939 (Kitamura 1999, 11).

13. Ōe (1981, 128).

14. Men between seventeen and nineteen years of age were considered auxiliary members of the military.

15. The data were recorded with such detail that one historian researching surviving records even noted that “It is probably impossible today, even at the government or corporate level, to compile personal information in such detail.” Cited in Harada (2001, 37–38).

16. I continue with Ubukata’s narrative as one case study worth examining. Other works that examine the use of everyday culture to promote nationalism and rationalize the Sino-Japanese War include Inui (2008), Ōtani and Harada (1994), and Keene (1971).

17. Dower, “Throwing Off Asia II.”

18. Ubukata ([1926] 1978, 41).

19. Inui (2008).

20. Ubukata ([1926] 1978, 37–38).

21. Iguchi (1998, 151).

22. *San’in shinbun*, April 24, 1895; cited in Kitamura (1999, 18).

23. Some areas formed military-related associations even before the Sino-Japanese War. In Sakai City, Osaka, for example, the local military affairs association (*heiji-kai*) was formed as early as May 1888. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the city had thirteen such associations that could engage in a variety of war-related activities from celebrations to funerals (Iguchi 1998, 140).

24. *Ibid.*, 148.

25. *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 1, 1904.

26. *Ibid.*, March 2 and 3, 1904.

27. *Ibid.*, June 23, 1904.

28. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1904.

29. Iguchi (1998, 138–139).

30. Kagotani (1994, 135).

31. Iguchi (1998, 145–146).
32. Harada (2001, 243–250).
33. The total number of war-related deaths for conscripts in the Sino-Japanese War was 13,488, with the national population around 42.27 million.
34. Approximately eighty-four thousand troops lost their lives during the Russo-Japanese War.
35. Tanakamaru (2002, 94).
36. Kagotani (1994, 135).
37. Oral history interview conducted by ethnologist Tanakamaru Katsuhiko in Ichigi County, Nagasaki Prefecture; cited in Tanakamaru (2002, 34–36).
38. *Ibid.*, 52–53, 95.
39. The government required each institution to submit a document requesting the portrait in order to obtain one, which all public schools and municipal institutions in fact were required to own. Initially, distribution of the portrait was limited. In the case of schools, distribution started with the normal schools for teacher training, after which it expanded to include high schools and, finally, elementary schools. Even in elementary schools, distribution began with schools of excellence. This method of distribution turned the portrait into a valued commodity and created a strong desire among schools to receive the portrait. Schoolmasters eagerly sent their request as soon as their school became eligible. Through this calculated distribution, the state fabricated the impression that the portrait was not imposed but was something that the schools sought and were grateful to receive (Taki 1988). For a historical survey and analyses of the Imperial Rescript on Education, see Soeda (1997) and Umetani (2000).
40. Most textbooks published in modern Japan, including all government-produced textbooks for every subject published between 1904 and 1941, are reprinted in their entirety in Kaigo (1961–1967). For an analysis of Yasukuni Shrine in textbooks, see Kitajima (2013).
41. *Jinjō shōgaku shūshinsho* 4 (2nd ed.), chapter 4 (Kaigo 1961–1967, vol. 3, 86).
42. Guidebooks designed for elementary school trips typically included Yasukuni Shrine on the list of possible places to visit. One example is Yamada K. (1990).
43. Yamamoto and Imano (1976, 307–313).
44. Works examined here include writings by folklorist Yanagita Kunio, along with more recent interpretations by Japanese historians and cultural anthropologists. Yanagita rarely gave a specific time frame or location for his descriptions of “local” and “folk” customs. He was trying to create an image of a timeless, unchanging view of the Japanese countryside as part of his attempt to critique the government’s policies for modernization at the expense of rural areas. Although Yanagita is often criticized for constructing narratives that concerned, in the words of Harry Harootunian, “a no-place, neither here nor there, past nor present, true nor false,” his works on death and the afterlife, such as *Nihon no matsuri* [Japanese Festivals] and *Senzo no hanashi* [The Story of Our Ancestors], are useful for understanding the kind of customs many people

in modern Japan nostalgically assumed to represent “the way things used to be.” I believe that the ideology of the family nation and Yasukuni memorialization were successful in part because of their appropriation of such longings and nostalgia (Harootunian 1999a, 107). My work is also informed by works that critically drew on Yanagita’s studies on death and the afterlife, including Kamishima (1961), Yasumaru (2001), Itō M. (1982), and Tanakamaru (2002).

45. Not coincidentally, the Japanese term for nation-state, *kokka*, uses the characters “country” and “family.”

46. The mortuary tablet (*ihai*) is a wooden plaque inscribed with the dead’s posthumous Buddhist name (*kaimyō*) that is typically placed on the family Buddhist altar. It was believed that as long as the tablet remained intact, the *ie* could be reestablished (Kamishima 1961, 263).

47. Kawamura (2000, 51–71). See also Itō M. (1982).

48. Itō Mikiharu believes that the concept of nation-state, which situated the emperor as the father figure, was easily and widely accepted in Meiji Japan because the traditional family structure, led by the father figure (*kafuchō-sei*), existed not only in the warrior class but also in agricultural communities (Itō M. 1982, 56–57). Fujita Shōzō argues that wars were necessary in modern Japan in order to reinforce the relationship between *ie* and the state (Fujita S. 1998, 1–12).

49. Irokawa Daikichi lists the imperial myth, the religious tradition of ancestor worship, the social structure of the family system, and the customary heritage of folk morality as the elements used to join the household (*ie*) to the nation (*kuni*) (Irokawa 1985, 282–283).

50. Even though the family register system was first introduced as early as 1872, it was not until the late 1870s and early 1880s that the register system started to take on an administrative function, thus connecting the *ie* unit to the nation-state unit (Itō M. 1982, 4–5).

51. Inoue (1891, 17–32).

52. Yasukuni Shrine also received considerable attention for the first time in the second edition of the ethics textbooks. Reprints of the ethics textbooks are included in *Kaigo* (1961–1967, vol. 3).

53. Karasawa (1989, 285–286). Kawamura Kunimitsu analyzed second-edition textbooks for all six grades and concluded that topics on ethical values concerning the state (the emperor and the national polity) and *ie*-related values had increased dramatically in comparison to the content of the first edition. According to Kawamura, a similar trend could be observed in the language textbooks (Kawamura 1990, 177–178).

54. Morioka (1977, 188).

55. Hozumi Yatsuka, “*Ie no hōriteki kannen*” (1898), cited in Itō M. (1982, 14–15).

56. The term *eirei* does not appear in the *Genkai* dictionary of 1889. The *Dai-Genkai* of 1929 defines *eirei* as the spirit of a great man. In 1932 *Jien* lists the definition as the spirit of a superior man. In postwar dictionaries, however, the definition of *eirei* is restricted to members of the military killed in war (Tanakamaru 2002, 13–14).

57. Tanakamaru (2002, 15–16). In Tanakamaru’s examples, the word *eirei* is used to supplement, not replace, the words “war dead.”
58. Kamo (1911b, n.p.).
59. Tanakamaru (2002, 18).
60. *Ibid.*, 27.
61. Yoshino Sakzō, “Seijika no atama,” in *Watasshi domo no shuchō* (Tokyo: Bunka seikatsu kenkyūkai, 1826); cited in *ibid.*, 37.
62. Orikuchi ([1943] 1968).
63. *Mainichi shinbun* (Tokyo), August 14, 1993, morning edition.

CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONALIZING GRIEF

1. *Shufu no tomo* (June 1939), 98–105.
2. See chapter 1 for my discussion of the Myth of the War Experience, which is based on George Mosse’s (1990) analysis.
3. Aoki S. (1976, 80).
4. An inventory of these objects is available in Sakai (2006). I reconstruct Umekichi’s journey using material included in this volume.
5. See L. Young (1998, 55–114) for the media’s role in Japan’s colonization of Manchuria.
6. The transportation log is reprinted in Sakai (2006).
7. For example, the photo series *Shashin kiroku Shōwa no rekishi* includes a pair of striking photographs taken at the same location two years apart. In a photograph dated December 13, 1935, several troops take off from the Shizuoka barracks in a large group. In a photograph shot from the same location and dated December 18, 1937, many fewer troops are returning, and numerous men are carrying a white box (Matsumoto et al. 1984, 105–106). These portable boxes were less than a foot long on each side.
8. Sakai (2006, 221).
9. For the willing collaboration of women’s groups in the national war effort, see Suzuki Y. (1986).
10. The documents are part of the *Rikugunshō dainikki*, a collection of all official documents preserved by the army. They are maintained by the National Institute for Defense Studies (Bōeishō Bōei Kenkyūjo) and available online at <http://www.jacar.go.jp/>.
11. Iwata (2005b).
12. In 1939 the Ministry of the Interior mandated one *gokoku jinja* per prefecture. Each prefecture was required to either designate an existing shrine as a *gokoku jinja* (whenever appropriate) or construct a new one.
13. Takenaka (2009a).
14. One death from the restoration was also enshrined during this ritual.

15. A regular festival (*rei taisai*) took place each year in April and October. A special festival (*rinji taisai*) took place only following a *shōkon* ritual.

16. The number was decreased to two soon after.

17. Ken'anfu is an imperial facility that held the spoils of the Russo-Japanese War. It comprises the Gyofu and four additional buildings that contained plunder from other Japanese wars of imperialism. After 1945 these items were returned, and the buildings are now used for storage.

18. The itinerary is in my possession. Since the groups (*han*) were organized according to the unit that the deceased belonged to, members typically were from the same or neighboring prefectures.

19. The document is undated. Since it mentions the total number of spirits enshrined by 1921, it was likely written around 1922. “Yasukuni Jinja reisaibi ni kansuru ikensho” (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 404–409).

20. This proposal was still being debated in the Imperial Diet seventeen years later, in 1938. “Teikoku kaigi ni okeru Tsutsumi Yasujirō shitsumon,” January 22, 1938 (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 409–410).

21. A temporary structure opened in 1924 and stayed in operation until the new building was completed and opened in 1931. This museum still operates today, with a new entrance hall added and the interior renovated in 2002. The postrenovation museum is discussed in chapter 6.

22. *Asahi shinbun*, November 14, 1931.

23. My description is based on an account of a walk-through by Matsuda Jōta, the head curator of Yūshūkan at the time (Matsuda 1933, 14–18).

24. Maruyama (2007).

25. Matsuda (1933, 13).

26. *Asahi shinbun*, April 26, 1932.

27. This facility was built with money from a bereaved widow, Mitsuya Teiko, who had donated half a million yen to the Army Ministry in accordance with her late husband's last wishes. The National Defense Hall was built using fifty thousand yen from the donation (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 2, 73–74).

28. YJY (1934, 1).

29. Since a brief description and the floor plan of Kokubōkan are included in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 2), several works on Yasukuni Shrine have mentioned the presence of this amusement park–like facility. But to my knowledge, the existing scholarship on Yasukuni Shrine does not discuss this booklet and its descriptions of the exhibits.

30. My description of Kokubōkan is based on YJY (1934).

31. *Ibid.*, 10.

32. *Ibid.*, 26.

33. *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 7, 1939. A description of this Filmon equipment is available in Iijima et al. (2001).

34. A description of Kokubōkan was featured in an issue of *Shōnen kurabu* (Boys' Club), a popular monthly magazine for young boys. *Shōnen kurabu* 21 (6) (June 1934), cited in T. Yoshida (2007).

35. *Asahi shinbun*, April 14, 1942.

36. Damage was limited during Tokyo's first air raid, on April 18, 1942. From November 14, 1944 to August 10, 1945, Tokyo was attacked by air 106 times, including the devastating firestorm of March 10, 1945, which killed more than ten thousand people. For detailed information and archival documents associated with air raids on Japan, see <http://www.japanairraids.org>.

37. *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 27, 1935.

38. *Ibid.*, April 24, 1940. In addition to newspaper articles, I have relied on descriptions of the ritual by people who were in attendance. See Ōishi (1941, 17–29), Katō Takeo (1941, 58–67), and Orikuchi ([1943] 1968).

39. *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 24, 1940.

40. Typically four or six legged, a *karahitsu* is used to store the *shintai* (the object in which the god is understood to reside) and other treasures at Shinto shrines.

41. Its name, *ohaguruma*, is derived from its original structure, with wheels that were likened to a bird's wings (YJY 1987, 10, 81). A model of the palanquin procession is on display in the Yūshūkan museum.

42. *Asahi shinbun*, April 24, 1940.

43. *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 24, 1940.

44. Sakai (2006, 314–315).

45. *Asahi shinbun*, evening edition, April 26, 1940.

46. Ken'anfu viewing was limited to one family member per deceased individual.

47. It is not entirely clear which special festivals the albums were produced for. Holdings of the albums in major libraries are incomplete. With fifteen volumes, the reading room at Shōwakan Museum has the most comprehensive collection. Both the Organization for the Advancement of Research and Development at Kokugakuin University and the National Diet Library have ten volumes each. The oldest volume available is from 1906 (Kokugakuin University), and the most recent volume is from October 1942 (Kokugakuin and Shōwakan).

48. The arrival scene is missing from the April 1940 volume.

49. Tanakamaru (2002, 69).

50. The album was among the objects maintained by Umekichi's brother. On April 24, 1938, Tokyo *Asahi* newspaper printed a short article on the completion of the album that mentions they will be sent to the families. A research team at Kokugakuin University also supports this claim: http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/kaihatsu/maa/taisai_index.html.

51. The numbers are based on my calculations using the information provided in YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 340–347).

52. *Ibid.*, 347.

53. Harada (1998, 2001).

54. The *ryō* was a currency unit used in premodern and early modern Japan. It was replaced by yen in 1871.

55. Harada Keiichi speculates that this most likely resulted in almost all dead being buried by the military as, at the time, two days would not have given families enough time to receive the news of death and request an alternative burial (Harada 1998).

56. “Senji rikugun maisō kisoku,” Army Ordinance 16 (July 17, 1894), and “Senji kaigun shibōsha toriatsukai kisoku,” Navy Notice 157 (September 21, 1894), cited in *ibid.*, 418.

57. “Senji rikugun maisō kisoku,” Army Ordinance 16 (Jul 17, 1894), cited in *ibid.*

58. Army Ministry file 604 and Army Ordinance 22, cited in Harada (2001, 213).

59. Harada (2001, 213).

60. They were also ordered to retrieve the enemy (Russian) dead and bury them, albeit using a different procedure. While the Japanese bodies were to be cremated on site, the Russians were buried without cremation unless it was feared that they carried a disease.

61. Ōe S. (1988, 132–133).

62. In contrast, the majority of the Sino-Japanese deaths were due to illness.

63. Another often-used method was cremation of the little finger. Namihira notes many instances in which the little finger was cut off corpses and cremated, often using the soldier’s mess kit. (Namihira 2004, 139–141).

64. The Battle of Guadalcanal (August 7, 1942–February 7, 1943) produced such a tremendous number of deaths that the military gave up any ostensible attempt to retrieve ashes or body parts. The military created a manual to assist those in charge at city hall, explaining to the bereaved families the reason for the absence of ashes and body parts. According to the published history of Toyota City, for example, the city hall personnel were to explain the following situations: (1) since the enemy had obtained the air rights over the island, on-site cremation was not possible; (2) their loved one’s death was a great contribution to the war effort in that, by directing enemy attention to the island for many months, Japan was able to strengthen its position for the later battles; (3) other troops made sure that the spirit of the deceased resides in the sand and stones. *Toyotashi-shi* 4, cited in Ichinose (2004a, 176).

65. From “Prayer for Peace,” by Ono Eiko, winner of the 2004 Chiran City speech contest. http://www.chiran-tokkou.jp/contest/index_2014.html.

66. Namihira (2004, 169).

67. Shijō Shirai, *Gatō ni shisumade: Ichi heishi no tegami yori*; cited in *ibid.*, 172–173.

68. Sometimes additional information was provided by comrades or hospital staff (Ichinose 2005, 176–178).

69. For a bibliography of publications on activities that involve searching for remains of the dead on battlefields, see Tamagawa (2008).

70. A parallel can be observed in the Self-Defense Forces’ treatment of those who died while on duty. See Field (1993) and Tanaka N. (2003a).

71. *Yokosuka bōei shinpō*, June 13, 1934.

72. *Tōkyō nichichi shinbun*, Kanagawa edition, June 13, 1934.

73. L. Young (1998).

74. Yano (2006, 49–57).

75. All aspects of the media, including the press, film, and radio, were subject to censorship prior to publication, release, or broadcast. The Public Order of 1931 subjected the press to extensive censorship. State control of printed matter was strictly enforced after the Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937. The public list of topics banned from publication included issues deemed sensitive to national security (e.g., accounts of troop movements, news on army and navy mobilization) and morale (e.g., any news that might weaken the public's confidence in the military, anti-military or pacifist comments, and articles critical of Japan's foreign policy) (Mitchell 1983, 283–284).

In the final years of the war, when Japan was struggling in its battles against the Allied forces, the Imperial Headquarters censored information on battle outcomes prior to announcement in order to create impressions favorable to Japan. For example, the number of enemy casualties, as well as battleships and aircraft lost, were inflated, while numbers on the Japanese side were decreased significantly. For a comparison of actual and announced outcomes of battles in 1942 and 1943, see Kawashima (1997, 76–85).

76. Niki (1972, 11–16).

77. Abel (2012, 15–16).

78. For an examination of the role of radio in wartime Japan, see Takeyama (1994) and Kishi Toshihiko et al. (2006).

79. *Asahi shinbun*, October 20, 1938, and April 26, 1939.

80. Especially after October 1937, when the one-hour time difference between Japan and Manchuria was eliminated, imperial subjects were instructed to participate in this collective experience on a number of occasions. Some of the events were those during which people had previously been observing the *yōhai* practice (see chapter 3), but live radio made possible the simultaneity of the activities throughout the empire (Hara 2004).

81. A partial script for the April 1940 ceremony is available in Nakamura and NHK Shuzai-han (2007).

82. *Asahi shinbun*, April 24, 1942.

83. While most of these children were not technically orphans since their mothers were still alive, such children were broadly publicized as war orphans (*sensō iji*).

84. Those eligible that year included schoolchildren up to the sixth grade whose fathers had died in Manchuria or China (YJ 1973, 134).

85. The description of the orphans' visit comes from the first photo album of the annual visits (Gunjin Engokai 1939).

86. *Asahi shinbun*, September 7, 1939.

87. Ibid., October 15, 1941. This report parallels a chapter of the third-grade ethics reader (fifth edition), which describes a conversation between a younger brother (presumably the same age as the reader) and his brother, his mother, and his eldest brother, who came home after being wounded in battle. The mother tells the younger brothers that it is their turn now to become soldiers. At this, the two younger brothers smile at each other. The textbook demonstrates the honorable mind-set of a mother who is proud and honored to send her sons to war regardless of the dangers (Kaigo 1961–1967, vol. 3, 398–399).

88. The mass media popularized *bidan* stories not only to promote patriotism but also to stimulate sales (L. Young 1998, 106–114).

89. *Shufu no tomo*, May 1938, 488–496.

90. Ibid., May 1939, 66–74.

91. Ibid., June 1939, 98–105.

92. Hashikawa (1974).

93. Takahashi T. (2005c, 21–26, 33–37).

94. *Shufu no tomo* (June 1939), 100–101.

95. See, for example, Takahashi (2005c, 2006).

96. *Yokosuka bōei shinpō*, June 13, 1934.

97. *Tōkyō nichichi shinbun*, Kanagawa edition, June 13, 1934. This type of reporting, which revealed the sadness and grief of the family left behind, decreased considerably as the war intensified. This perspective is seldom observed in relation to war deaths in the Pacific theater.

98. Sakai (2006, 69).

99. Aoki S. (1976, 80). Aoki, the author of the text from which this quote is taken, is a newspaper reporter and a critic. Born in 1929, he grew up in the very climate of the institutionalized grief discussed in this chapter. For him, Yasukuni Shrine was a playground that was transformed into a holy site during the Asia-Pacific War. In this essay on his perceptions of Yasukuni Shrine, Aoki quotes a veteran announcer (whom he does not name) who revealed this episode to him.

100. Orikuchi ([1943] 1968, 28).

101. *Tokkō geppō* (January 1942), 13. *Tokkō geppō* is a monthly report by the Special Higher Police (*Tokubetsu Tokkō Keisatsu*, i.e., the Japanese “thought police” during the war). For a close analysis of the report as well as other voices of dissent during the war, see Kawashima (1997).

102. *Tokkō geppō* (June 1942), 18.

103. Statement by a shoemaker, *Tokkō geppō* (March 1942).

104. *Tokkō geppō* (April 1942), 29.

105. Ibid. (June 1942), 20.

106. Kitamura (1999, 75).

107. Ibid., 78–93, 199–200.

108. *Asahi shinbun*, April 22, 1942.

109. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 158–159).

110. The shrine did not extend invitations to the bereaved families (including those living in Tokyo), citing issues of safety, transportation, lodging, and finances. Tokyo's bereaved families, however, were encouraged to attend the ceremony on their own (*ibid.*, 259, 266).

111. *Ibid.*, 265–267.

112. Itō T. (1989).

113. YJ (1973, 165).

CHAPTER 5: WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO MOURN?

Epigraph. Editorial for *Tōyō keizai shinpō*, October 13, 1945.

Epigraph. Father Bitter was here reflecting the advice he gave to Douglas MacArthur on the postwar treatment of Yasukuni Shrine.

1. Ishibashi ([1945] 1970).

2. See chapter 4 for the limited number of war dead memorialized at Yasukuni Shrine as of August 1945.

3. Ishibashi ([1945] 1970).

4. The prime minister made the statement at a Diet meeting on September 5, 1945. For an analysis of Higashikuni's statement, see Hosaka M. (1985).

5. For the history and an analysis of State Shinto, see Murakami (1970), Hardacre (1989), and Sakamoto (2006a). For a detailed analysis of the Shinto Directive, see Ōhara (1993).

6. The blueprint for the amusement park is reproduced in *Yasukuni no Inori Henshūkai* (1999, 167).

7. By definition, *izoku* includes the spouse, siblings, parents, grandparents, children, and grandchildren of the military dead.

8. For an overview of postwar history of Yasukuni Shrine, see Tanaka (2002) and Akazawa (2005).

9. For a historical overview and an analysis of the Izokukai in English, see Sera-phim (2006).

10. As suggested in the introduction, the so-called Yasukuni issue, or *Yasukuni mondai*, which many Japanese scholars and journalists have written and argued about, results from the conflation of various histories, practices, traditions, and beliefs associated with Yasukuni Shrine. For a chronological overview of *Yasukuni mondai*, see Takahashi F. (1990).

11. For an analysis of the controversies stemming from prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine from the viewpoint of the Izokukai, see Itagaki (2000).

12. Several years had passed since the revelation of the enshrinement on April 19, 1979, and two former premiers, Ōhira Masayoshi and Suzuki Kantarō, had visited

Yasukuni Shrine since then. Nonetheless, Nakasone's visit drew intense criticism because of its deliberately public nature. A *New York Times* article dated August 24, 1985, notes that China issued an “unusually sharp” criticism of Japan,” suggesting that such critiques of prime ministers' visits had not occurred earlier (*New York Times*, August 25, 1985). For the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine, see Takenaka (2007) and Mainichi Shinbun “Yasukuni” Shuzai-han (2007).

13. Films include *Amnyeong, Sayonara*, which follows a Korean woman whose father was enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine (directed by Kim Tae-il and produced by the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, 2005), and *Shussō no uta* (Headhunter's Song: The Cry of the Aboriginal People of Taiwan), a compilation of scenes of protest against Yasukuni Shrine by Taiwanese aboriginals (filmed and directed by Inoue Osamu and produced by Jōhō Kobo Spiriton, 2006).

14. Along with these demands for the removal of names from the register are cases in which family members have requested Yasukuni enshrinement of their loved ones. See, for example, Nishimura (2003).

15. Although the term *tsuitō* encompasses both memorial and mourning, I use “mourning” throughout when referring to *tsuitō* in order to distinguish between *tsuitō* and *irei*, which I translate as “memorial.”

16. Other works that deal with these terms include Yano (2006), Nishimura (2006), and Akazawa (2005).

17. Akazawa traces the origin of the lawmakers' explanations to an influential opinion by the late literary critic Etō Jun, who, as a key member of the Committee on the Cabinet Ministers' Visits to Yasukuni (Kakuryō no Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai ni Kansuru Kondaikai), defended lawmakers' visits to the shrine. Etō has argued that, in accordance with the traditional Japanese belief that the living cohabitate with the dead, the *irei* at Yasukuni are protecting the living. Therefore, it is a matter of rectitude for key lawmakers to pay tribute at the shrine. Etō's argument is summarized in Etō (1986).

18. For a detailed account of the discussions that took place in the SCAP, see Nakamura and NHK Shuzai-han (2007) and Haruyama (2006).

19. *Asahi shinbun*, October 19, 1951. Forty-fourth prime minister Shidehara Kijūrō visited in the fall of 1945.

20. *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 16, 1952, evening edition.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Before its privatization, the operating budget of Yasukuni Shrine was included in the Imperial Army's budget as “Offering money to Yasukuni Shrine [*Yasukuni Jinja gushin kin*]” (KKT, item 287, 2007, 392). Administrators at Yasukuni Shrine continue to devise ways to generate revenue in the postwar years. One notable move was the 1985 decision to convert the *shōkon saitei*, the space in which the rituals took place until 1945, into a commercial parking lot. As of March 2013, each parking space was leased for fifty thousand yen per month.

23. Tanaka (2002, 23). For an overview of the accomplishments of the Japan League, see Jōshita (2013).

24. Engohō provided much-needed financial support for the bereaved families, but many recipients disapproved of the name of the law. They argued that, as family members of those who had died in a wrongful war that the Japanese state waged, they were entitled to reparation (*hoshō*) rather than relief (*engo*). Historian Ishihara Masae argues that, in the case of Okinawa, the name of this monetary compensation reinforces the idea that Okinawan civilians willingly participated in the war effort and obfuscates the reality of Okinawan war experience (Ishihara 2007, 2008).

25. Information about Izokukai history is available at the Izokukai website, <http://www.nippon-izokukai.jp/>.

26. Journalist Tanaka Nobumasa describes an interview with a man whose war-widowed mother decided to join Izokukai so that she could participate in regular bus tours to Yasukuni Shrine. The man explains that his mother regarded Izokukai as something akin to a travel office that planned bus tours to the shrine (Tanaka N., Tanaka H., and Hata 1995, 11–14).

27. *Ibid.*, 32–33.

28. In June 1969 a group of Christians formed Kirisuto-kyō Izoku no Kai (Association for War-Bereaved Christian Families). In July 1982 approximately seventy Christians and Buddhists in the Asahikawa region withdrew their membership in Izokukai and formed Asahikawa Izokukai (Asahikawa Association for War-Bereaved Families). Similar organizations were formed in Kanagawa, Iwate, and Tokyo prefectures in 1986. Also in 1986 Shin Buddhists formed the Shinshū Izokukai (Shin Buddhist Association for War-Bereaved Families). These groups came together to form Heiwa Izokukai Zenkoku Renrakukai (National Committee on Peaceful War-Bereaved Families) in response to Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985. A strong anti-Yasukuni sentiment unites members of this group (Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1987).

29. At the end of the war, the wartime ministries of both army and navy were reorganized as the Demobilization Ministry, which was absorbed into the Ministry of Welfare in 1948.

30. Army Ministry, “Yasukuni Jinja gōshi tō ni kansuru ken” and “Yasukuni Jinja no gōshi tō ni kansuru iken,” dated September 21, 1945 (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 268–269).

31. Navy Ministry, “Dōken iken” (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 269–270).

32. Yasukuni Jinja, “Dōken iken” (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 270).

33. Kunaishō, “Dōken iken” (YJ 1983–1984, vol. 1, 270–271).

34. On the exchange between these ministries, see also KKT, items 104–106 (2007, 113–114).

35. YJ (1973, 167–167).

36. YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1, 278–290).

37. *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 21, 1945.

38. For example, Kishimoto advised against any kind of publicity of the Yasukuni festival. On visiting the shrine at the end of the *shōkon* ceremony, which took place on the night before the festivals, Kishimoto convinced the military officials to reduce

the military presence by wearing civilian clothing rather than uniforms for the duration of the festival (Nakamura and NHK Shuzai-han 2007, 152–153). See also KKT, item 141 (2007, 135).

39. According to the diary of Kishimoto Hideo, religious consultant to the general headquarters (GHQ), Yasukuni authorities had no idea that their institution was in danger until October 24, 1945, when Kishimoto visited the shrine to consult with the deputy chief priest. At the meeting, Kishimoto advised the priest against publicizing the memorial ceremony through media such as radio, newspapers, and posters to prevent provoking the GHQ. At the meeting, the two discussed possible changes that might encourage the GHQ to allow Yasukuni to continue operation, such as terminating its management by the military, including public figures in the deities, and changing the shrine's name (Nakamura and NHK Shuzai-han 2007, 138–139).

40. Tanaka N. (2002, 10–11).

41. Deputy head priest Ikeda Ryōhachi explained this process using the term *aiden* (enshrinement of two or more deities in one shrine) but did not give details of the form of this dual enshrinement (KKT, item 390, 2007, 397).

42. Kuramoto Keijirō, head of the administrative department, First Demobilization Ministry, “Gōshi horyū no omonaru riyū,” dated June 5, 1946 (KKT, item 129, 2007, 126).

43. The number is from both YJ (1983–1984, vol. 1) and YJ (1973). KKT gives the much lower figure of 16,861. “Yasukuni Jinja gōshi gyōmu oyobi saishiryō ni tsuite (June 28, 1946),” KKT, item 131 (2007, 128).

44. YJ (1973).

45. Tanaka Nobumasa argues that the sudden growth in the number for this year is due to cooperation by the Ministry of Welfare (Tanaka N. 2002, 66–68).

46. KKT, item 147 (2007, 137).

47. “Yasukuni Jinja gōshi tetsuzuki yōkō,” dated June 28, 1946 (KKT, item 133, 2007, 129).

48. “Shibotsusha kyūmei ni tsuite,” dated September 15, 1946 (KKT, item 137, 2007, 133).

49. “Summary,” dated late 1947 (KKT, item 150, 2007, 138).

50. “Senbotsusha chōsa gyōmu no ikan ni tsuite,” dated August 2, 1948 (KKT, item 151, 2007, 140).

51. This eligibility resulted from a revision of Engohō. Initially, the beneficiaries of Engohō included veterans. In August 1953, when a new law, Onkyū-hō (Veterans' Pension Law), was established to provide a pension to veterans, revisions were made to Engohō that extended eligibility to families of war criminals who were executed or died in prison.

52. “Kōwa jōyaku hakkō go no shibotsu sha gōshi ni tsuite,” dated April 11, 1985 (KKT, items 333 and 334, 2007, 335–337).

53. Tsunoda (1977, 264–265).

54. *Ibid.*, 265–267.

55. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), January 9, 1986, morning edition.
56. For an analysis of this court case, see, for example, Arai R. (1971) and Nakayama (1972).
57. See, for example, Hirano (1990) and Morone (1998).
58. The Supreme Court ruled the Iwate case unconstitutional in 1997.
59. For a detailed account of the extended lawsuit, see Tanaka N. (2003a) and Field (1993).
60. Koizumi ultimately visited the shrine on August 13, 2001.
61. The number is from 2002 (Tanaka N. 2007, 42).
62. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), April 16, 1978, morning edition.
63. Other demands included the return of ashes, information about the death (date, location, cause, condition, etc.), compensation equivalent to what the Japanese *izoku* had received, including interest (Korean and Taiwanese nationals were not eligible for a pension), and a public apology in a number of Japanese and Korean newspapers (TDC 2006).
64. Tanaka (2007, 37).
65. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), April 22, 2002.
66. Ibid. November 2, 2001.
67. The plaintiffs lost (ODC 2003).
68. Takahashi T. (2005b, 29–46).
69. See the Introduction for my discussion of the “emotional alchemy” of Yasukuni Shrine.
70. The case was filed against Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, Yasukuni Shrine, and the Japanese state for Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001; April 21, 2002; and January 14, 2003 (ODC 2004).
71. Ibid., 24.
72. Ibid., 25.
73. Ibid., 55–64.
74. OHC (2005).
75. The three visits were on January 14, 2003; January 1, 2004; and October 17, 2005.
76. Tanaka N. (2007, 40–41).
77. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of the manuscript for pointing out this parallel.
78. The second case, presented on February 14, 2003, was brought by 124 people from Taiwan, many of whom had family members on the Yasukuni register.
79. Taiwanese Yasukuni supporters are favorites of conservative media outlets such as the journal *Seiron*. In its special feature, “Yasukuni and the Japanese Spirit (*Yasukuni to Nihon jin no kokoro*),” in August 2003, the journal spotlighted multiple Taiwanese contributors who argued for the importance of Yasukuni Shrine for the spirits of the Taiwanese war dead (Rin 2003; Shie 2003).
80. ODC (2004, 12–13).

81. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), June 14, 2005, evening edition.

82. “Saisan sanpai, Koizumi shushō ni NO. Yasukuni iken ‘kakkiteki,’ hyōka no koe,” *Asahi shinbun* (Osaka), evening edition, September 30, 2005.

83. Engohō carried over the payment structure of the military pension system, which allotted no privileges to those without Japanese nationality, thus resulting in the exclusion of Korean and Taiwanese war-bereaved families from payment (Tanaka N. 1997, 33).

84. “Dai 44 kai kokkai shūgiin shakai rōdō iinkai giroku dai 28 gō,” dated April 12, 1962 (KKT, item 416, 2007, 457).

85. Testimony by Takahashi is not included in the written judgment of the case. The transcript is available in Tanaka N. (2009).

86. *Ibid.*, 38–39.

87. *Ibid.*, 26–27.

88. *Ibid.*, 32.

89. ODC (2009).

90. *Ibid.*

91. *Ibid.*

92. The shrine personnel often use the metaphor of a candle flame to explain the impossibility of removing a particular spirit. According to this explanation, the spirits merge into each other just as a candle flame can merge with another. And just as it is impossible to divide a flame, so it is impossible to remove the individual spirits.

93. Tanaka N. (2009, 48).

94. Tokoro (2007a).

95. An abbreviated transcript of the original complaint is available in *Tsubute* 59 (Summer 2008), 83–94, as an appendix to an article by Kawabata (2008).

96. NDC (2010). For analyses of this ruling, see, for example, Sawaki (2011). Okinawans filed a lawsuit against Prime Minister Koizumi for the pain and suffering caused by his visits to Yasukuni. Contempt for civilian enshrinement at Yasukuni was a large underlying factor. The case was rejected on October 12, 2006 (Tanaka N. 2007, 54–91).

97. The official category is “Rank: Civilian Employed in Army (Non-Salaried)” (NDC 2010, 4–6).

98. <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/history/detail.html>.

99. “Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 1,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 1, 2009, morning edition, 31.

100. Ryūkū Izokukai, established in February 1952; predecessor of the Association of Bereaved Families of Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa-ken Izoku Rengōkai).

101. In 1981 the relief law was further expanded to include children who were six years and younger at the time of a parent’s death.

102. “Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 6,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 8, 2009, morning edition, 31.

War death opened prospects for income, and the urgent need for *izoku nenkin* for the bereaved family members was not limited to Okinawa. In 2002 ethnographer Ishida Shigenori conducted an interview with an elderly woman in a Yamanashi village. When discussing her late husband, who returned home from the war weak and sickly, she admitted that she wished he had died in battle. When asked to explain further, she commented that her response was a result of *izoku nenkin*. Although her husband had returned, he remained unhealthy and was unable to work. But since he had returned home alive, the family was not eligible for the pension (Iwata 2005a).

103. “Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 5,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 6, 2009, morning edition, 31.

104. Cited in Ishihara (2007, 46).

105. Also to be noted is the state’s use of the term *engo* (relief, protection) rather than *hoshō* (compensation). Ishihara Masaie argues that the term *engo* suggests the protection and support of people in need, while *hoshō* indicates compensation for a loss (“Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 12,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 17, 2009, morning edition, 31).

106. “Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 7,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 10, 2009, morning edition, 33.

107. “Eirei ka inu jini ka: Okinawa kara tou Yasukuni saiban,” documentary film broadcast through Ryūkyū Asahi Hōsō in 2010, available in three installments at YouTube. The first installment is available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zolHhY8Sd5Q>.

108. According to the document *Taiheiyō sensō ni okeru waga kuni no higai sōgō hōkokusho* (Overall Report of Damage Sustained by the Nation during the Pacific War), compiled by the Economic Stabilization Agency in the Office of the Secretary General in 1949, the number of civilian deaths in all prefectures excluding Okinawa was 299,485. Accessed through the Digital Archive of the National Archives of Japan, <http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/>.

109. These military documents are reproduced in Ishihara (1983, 1984, 1985).

110. The term *shūdan jiketsu* was not used during the Asia-Pacific War. Journalist Ōta Yoshihiro invented the term in 1950 while he was interviewing individuals for his publication *Tetsu no bōfū* (Typhoon of Iron), the first collection of Okinawans’ testimonies of their wartime experience (Ōta, “Dohyō o machigaeta hito: Sono Ayako shi e no hanron,” in *Okinawa Times*, May 11, 1985; cited in Ishihara 1991, 82–83).

111. Bōeichō Senshi Shitsu, *Senshi sōsho: Okinawa hōmen rikugun sakusen*, cited in Yakabi (2005).

112. Ishihara (1991, 11).

113. “Okinawa-ken Seikatsu Fukushima Engoka sentō sankasha gaikyō hyō,” cited in Kawabata (2008, 88).

114. Ishihara (2007, 47).

115. Sawaki (2011, 172).

116. Ishihara (2007, 45).

117. At the start of the occupation, the US military attempted to mandate the study of English beginning in the first grade, but the plan failed due to lack of personnel. The military rulers also used the precolonial name Ryūkyū, rather than Okinawa, to diminish the sense of connection with the rest of Japan (ibid., 37).

118. “Dai 24 kai kokkai shūgiin kaigai dōhō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru chōsa tokubetsu iinkai giroku dai 14 gō,” dated May 23, 1956, in KKT, item 398 (2007, 423).

119. Ishihara (2007, 38–39).

120. Regardless of the anti-Yasukuni sentiment prevalent in the prefecture, the rhetoric that the shrine presents is identical to that of other *gokoku jinja* as well as Yasukuni Shrine (<http://www.okinawa-gokoku.jp/index.jsp>).

121. Article 20: Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. (1) No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. (3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Article 89: No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority.

122. Kawabata (2008, 85).

123. NDC (2010, 22–23, 26).

124. Ibid., 26–27.

125. “Yasukuni soshō: Gōshi wa seishinteki kutsū; Naha chisai, genkoku gawa, han-heiwateki to shuchō,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 11, 2009, morning edition, 27.

126. NDC (2010, 11).

127. Ibid., 32.

128. Ibid., 59.

129. Ibid., 66.

130. “‘Sensō sanbi o inpei,’ Yasukuni soshō izokuno ikari todokazu; namida tame ‘hanashi ni naran,’” *Okinawa Taimusu*, October 27, 2010, morning edition.

131. NDC (2010, 62).

132. “Shasetsu: Yasukuni gōshi soshō: sensō kagaisha to dōretsushi suruna,” *Ryūkyū shinbun*, October 28, 2010, morning edition.

133. Tanaka N. (2007, 166–167).

134. Ibid., 181.

135. Sugahara (2005, 42–54).

136. Ibid., 46.

137. Ibid., 45.

138. Bitter (1973, 118).

CHAPTER 6: MOBILIZING MEMORIES

1. The film is also available as a DVD of the same title, produced and distributed by Yasukuni Shrine. The film was first screened at Yūshūkan on September 1, 2008. The DVD is undated.

2. John Breen discusses three mnemonic strategies utilized by Yasukuni Shrine: text, display, and ritual. Here I focus on display (Yūshūkan Museum) as a mnemonic apparatus that seeks to reshape the Yasukuni narrative to appeal to younger audiences (Breen 2008).

3. I introduce a representative website and mailing list in the Epilogue. For analyses of war and peace museums in Japan, see Takenaka (2007, 2014), Yamane (2009), and Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai (2000).

4. Hirsch discusses the postmemory generation as a singular entity. But I use the plural here since, in the twenty-first century, now almost seven decades after 1945, the experiences of postmemorial remembrance are more diverse. For the purposes of this chapter, I separate postmemorial Japanese into two groups: the first postmemory generation, whose parents experienced the war; and the second postmemory generation, whose parents did not experience the war (Hirsch 1996; 1997, 22; 2008).

5. I am not arguing here that inherited trauma is more difficult but rather that the process of overcoming trauma can be more problematic for the postmemory generations due to the complex nature of the trauma.

6. The trajectory of postwar Japan has often been compared with that of Germany, particularly in the area of war reparation. But for the area of civilian experience I find the literature on Holocaust memories and their representation more useful for thinking through the Japanese situation due to the prevailing victim consciousness in Japanese memories. For scholarship on the Japan-Germany comparison, see Buruma (1994), Fujiwara K. (2001), Awaya et al. (1994), and Nakamasa (2005).

7. Sūkei Hōsankai is the successor of Yasukuni Jinja Hōsankai, introduced in Chapter 5.

8. Here, I rely primarily on Herman (1997). Brison's account of overcoming her own traumatic experience is also useful (1999). The concept of postmemory has been developed in relation to Holocaust studies, and I am aware of the criticisms regarding the retroactive use of currently available trauma theory on the events of World War II. In short, the Holocaust has come to appear as an event "that can be fully understood only in the light of our knowledge of PTSD," as Ruth Leys has pointed out. My intention here is not to analyze the actual experiences of World War II, nor do I suggest that members of the postmemory generation are suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rather, I am interested in the social and political dynamics that affected them in the postwar decades, the processes through which they became familiarized with wartime narratives of the survivor generations, as well as the debates on war responsibility that have had a strong presence in the society they grew up in. The use of trauma theory, I believe, suggests one useful way of thinking about these

processes. Leys is cautioning against the simplified understanding of the Holocaust that results from using only the currently available theory to understand the events that occurred before the development of our PTSD knowledge. But she also acknowledges that current literature on PTSD “represents the culmination of an attempt to do justice to the earlier psychiatric literature on the Holocaust survivor by integrating it into a unified theory” that applies to the victim of diverse kinds of trauma, both before and after our knowledge of PTSD. I use ideas that were produced with the knowledge of PTSD, but I do so cautiously in order to offer a possible reason for the efforts of the postmemory generation to comprehend the past (Leys 2000, 15–16).

9. Treat (1995), J. Young (1988), Scarry (1985), Caruth (1996).

10. LaCapra (2001).

11. Attie (1998). Scholarly analyses of Attie’s works include Muir (2010), J. Young (2000), Apel (2002).

12. Levinthal (1996, 1997).

13. Baer (2002), Apel (2002).

14. J. Young (2000, 4).

15. Spiegelman (1991).

16. Hirsch’s discussion of postmemory is specific to the Holocaust experience in that the succeeding generation attempted to bridge not only the temporal gap but also the spatial, neither of which can be achieved: temporal, because of the impossibility of going back in time, and spatial, because the site from which their parents were exiled no longer exists (Hirsch 1996, 662).

17. For information on and an analysis of Tsukuru-kai, see Saaler (2005). For museum controversies, see Takenaka (2014).

18. Interview with Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005. The term “cornerstone” is from Breen (2008, 156).

19. See chapter 5 for the relationship between Izokukai and Yasukuni Shrine.

20. The shift from the display of objects to an exhibit with a historical narrative is part of a larger trend in history museums. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, for example, took this strategy for its 1994 renovation. In a 2005 interview, the then curator of Shōwakan Museum discussed the plan to gradually shift from displays to exhibits with a historical narrative as well. Author interview with Watanabe Kazuhiro, January 26, 2005.

21. I am aware that the relationship between an increase in the number of the museum visitors and the historical narrative presented is not so straightforward; I discuss the phenomenon in further detail later in the chapter.

22. <http://www.yasukuni.jp/~sukei/message.html>.

23. *Yasukuni Jinja Sūkei Hōsankai setsuritu shui*, <http://www.yasukuni.jp/~sukei/message.html>.

24. Joining the Asanagi does not require a separate fee, as membership in either Hōsankai or the Friends of Yūshūkan (depending on the member’s age) is a prerequisite. <http://asanagi.com/nyuubunitsuite.html>.

25. As was the case with many life insurance companies, Fukoku Seimei was a “con-
scription insurance (*chōhei hoken*)” company until 1945. For the early history of Fu-
koku Seimei, see FSHSG.

26. A special exhibit mounted at this temporary space is detailed in Skabelund
(2011).

27. The opening day was scheduled to coincide with the first day of Mitama Mat-
suri (Itō Y. 1988, 50).

28. At the outset, fifteen display rooms contained approximately three thousand
objects (Ōyama 1994, 96). For a brief description of the museum displays prior to the
renovation, see Tokoro (2007a).

29. The number of monthly visitors between July 1986 and November 1987 is avail-
able in Itō Y. (1988, 51).

30. Ibid.

31. The film *Mitama o tsugu mono* also has English subtitles.

32. Interview with curator Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005. Iki, who was chief cura-
tor of the museum at the time of the interview, also held the title of deputy priest (*gon
negi*) at the shrine. Iki and others who had the curatorial position received no training
as a curator. Instead, they came to the shrine to train as a priest and were appointed
for a limited period to the museum.

33. Ibid.

34. The description is based on my visits to the museum, the museum catalog, and
unofficial guidebooks to the museum. Unofficial guidebooks published to date include
Nishikawa (2003) and Zushi (2007). Kokugakuin University scholar Ōhara Yasuo
also published a guidebook on the renovated museum in cooperation with Yasukuni
Shrine (Ōhara 2003). See also Matayoshi (2004) for a detailed review of the mu-
seum exhibits.

35. Text at the time of my visit on March 13, 2011.

36. Zushi (2007, 122).

37. This experience of ascension can be considered a contemporary version of the
spatial practice that early public museums offered as part of their role of enlightening
the masses. For example, in her analysis of the first public art museums, Carol Dun-
can describes the entrances of museum buildings that readied the visitors for an en-
lightening experience by having them ascend grand staircases into the building and
walking through massive pillars (Duncan 1995).

38. The sculptor Hinago Jitsuzō’s other works include the monumental tower situ-
ated in Heiwadai Park, Miyazaki Prefecture, on which the infamous characters “hakkō
ichiu (eight corners of the world under one roof)” are engraved.

39. “Umi yuka ba” gained popularity through the same venue as the poem “Yasu-
kuni no,” with which I began this book. Although the accompanying music was com-
posed in 1880 in response to a commission by the Imperial Navy, it did not gain popu-
larity outside the military until the song was picked up by the NHK for the national
song series (Ogawa 2006).

40. Even though historians have come to some basic agreement on what happened in the city of Nanjing in December 1937, depictions of this tragedy vary significantly not only in Japan but also internationally. See, for example, Fogel (2000).

41. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the ceremony and associated activities planned for the visiting families.

42. In Room 9 the documents related to the *shōkon* ceremony are obscured by the palanquin replica as well as the dim lighting.

43. Literally translated as “stitches by one thousand,” *sen-nin bari* is a piece of cloth on which one thousand women sewed one stitch each. The cloth was meant to protect men from bullet wounds.

44. For an analysis of how the deaths of these men were politicized by wartime media and popular culture, see Dorsey (2009).

45. *Yomiuri shinbun* (Tokyo), December 8, 1941, front page.

46. For an analysis of these bride dolls, see Schattschneider (2009).

47. The photographs are exhibited with the permission of the family. The number of the photographs has increased considerably since the opening of the new museum in 2002.

48. For analyses of writings by *tokkō* pilots, see Ohnuki-Tierney (2006).

49. For the use of nostalgia as a marketing strategy, see Ivy (1995).

50. Visitors with family members enshrined at Yasukuni can participate in an official worship service that takes place inside the main shrine. Typically, Izokukai organizes group tours to Tokyo that include this service. During the summer festival *Mitama Matsuri*, individuals can also register to participate in the official worship. A monetary offering is required for this, and worshippers later receive a token gift on the Yasukuni theme based on the amount of the donation. As part of the registration process it is also necessary to write the name of a relative enshrined, but shrine personnel do not check for accuracy (author’s experience, July 2003).

51. Interview with Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005.

52. Photocopy of three architectural renderings in the author’s possession.

53. Correspondence between *sūkei hōsankai* member Sakuta Masaaki and Yasukuni Chief of General Affairs Hanada Tadamasu, dated January 10 and 14, 2000. Correspondence photocopy in the author’s possession.

54. According to Miwa Yūji, who represented the planning company Nomura Kōgei, which designed the exhibit for the Yūshūkan renovation, the glass wall, against which the plane is situated, can open up to connect the entrance hall to the open space immediately outside. The initial plan to open up the wall and pull the fighter plane to the outdoor space, however, was never realized (Miwa Yūji, interview with the author, January 28, 2005).

55. The father’s role is that of the typical *kigyō senshi*, or “corporate warrior,” whose function was to sacrifice his private life for the rebuilding of postwar Japan. We see here a parallel between the grandparents’ generation, who fought in the Asia-Pacific War, and the father’s generation.

56. Japanese Culture Channel Sakura, <http://www.ch-sakura.jp/about.html>.

57. When Yasukuni initially approached Matsuda, the rough idea for the film was to have an elderly woman walking through Yūshūkan with her granddaughter, recounting memories of her experiences, which were triggered by the objects on display (interview with Matsuda Takeyuki, October 8, 2009, <http://www.ch-sakura.jp/hodo/election.html?id=628>).

58. According to the museum, “the Association for Friends of Yūshūkan was established in order to further strengthen the connection between Yūshūkan and people twenty-five years [of age] or younger, so that they might inherit the noble spirits of the *eirei*, who sacrificed their precious lives for the sake of their nation, and learn the accurate history of modern Japan” (Nishikawa 2003, 45).

59. The shrine has commemorated Girls’ Festival and Children’s Day since 1947, but until 2004 it was not part of an organized group such as the Association for Friends of Yūshūkan.

60. One objective of this “quiz rally” is to entice children, who might otherwise be turned off by the wordy panels, into the museum and develop in them an interest in the material displayed (interview with Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005).

61. *Sūkei hōsankai dayori* 106, August 2010, “Heisei 22 nen tanabata matsuri oyako no tsudoī hōkoku.”

62. The objective of these children’s events seems to be twofold: to cultivate young children as followers and to encourage their parents, typically in their thirties and forties, to participate in events at Yasukuni (interview with Iki Hiroshi, January 28, 2005).

63. <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/precincts/dovehouse.html>.

64. For an English translation of the pamphlet, see Gardener (1999).

65. “Yasukuni daihyakka: Watakushi tachi no Yasukuni Jinja,” pamphlet obtained at Yasukuni Shrine on June 1, 2008.

66. The Allied forces are explained in parentheses as “America, Britain, Dutch, and China,” echoing the ABCD powers, which, according to the Yūshūkan narrative, surrounded and pressured Japan to wage war against the United States.

67. These are the dates for the Bon Festival of the lunar calendar (*kyū bon*).

68. *Ichigaya keizai shinbun*, July 14, 2010. <http://ichigaya.keizai.biz/headline/892/>. A more updated sociological analysis of the festival’s popularity is available at <http://trendy.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/column/20130828/1051741/>.

69. These lanterns, which demonstrate appreciation for the *eirei* and represent prayers for a peaceful world, provide a major source of revenue for the shrine. The fee to have a lantern placed on the shrine is twelve thousand yen for a large one and three thousand yen for a small one. For more substantial prices of two hundred thousand yen (large) and seventy thousand yen (small) one can arrange to have a lantern hung during the festival every year. <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/schedule/mitama.html>.

70. Yanagita seems to have become sympathetic to the discourse. In a lecture he presented to Tokyo University students in fall of 1941, he said that the Japanese *mat-suri* made him reconsider his objection to the Japanese government’s stance that Shinto

was not a religion. In the lecture, he argued that worship of god is the essence of Japanese life and, at the same time, of Japanese politics (Yanagita 1990, 236–237).

71. Yasukuni no Inori Henshū Iinkai (1999, 174).

72. Foucault (1995).

73. In March 2009 Okinawan newspaper *Ryūkyū shinpō* published a series on Yasukuni enshrinement in thirteen installments. The beginning of the first installment, which portrayed a typical scene at Yasukuni Shrine, included a description of the site as “even evoking a sense of tranquility (*heīwa sae kanji saseru*).” “Soko ni hisomu mono: Okinawa to Yasukuni, engohō 1,” *Ryūkyū shinpō*, March 1, 2009, morning edition, 31.

74. There is only one other shrine in Tokyo where a *misemono goya* is showcased on a regular basis: the Hanazono Shrine in Shinjuku (Iwata 2006, 180).

75. *Nihon keizai shinbun*, March 17, 1995.

76. *Asahi shinbun* (Tokyo), March 18, 1995.

77. Editorial, *Kikan sensō sekinin kenkyū* 11 (spring 1996), cited in Taguchi, 1996, 24–25.

78. The phrase “postwar responsibility” has existed since the 1970s, but it was mobilized in the last two decades of the twentieth century and resulted in a flurry of publications that use the phrase to formulate innovative ideas for breaking through the stagnant postwar period. For recent discussions on postwar responsibility, see Ōnuma (2007), Takahashi T. (2005b), and Kōketsu (2009).

79. Ienaga (2002).

80. See, for example, Kōketsu (2009) and Takahashi T. (2005b).

81. Examples of transnational scholarship include Shin, Park, and Yang (2006), Hasegawa and Tōgō (2008), and Kawakami (2006).

82. For a detailed analysis of the Shōwakan exhibit, see K. Smith (2002). An overview of the exhibit hall’s difficult path to completion is provided in Hammond (1997) and Tanaka N. (1997).

EPILOGUE

1. This categorization also has its limits, as with my division of the postmemory generations into two. The structure of the survivor generation is more complex inasmuch as it is based not only on their age but also on demographic factors such as gender, class, economic status, educational background, birthplace, and place of residence. But I introduce this division here to make some important points.

2. It is an open mailing list, with the age of participants ranging from middle-school age to a small (and dwindling) number of veterans in their nineties. Topics range from narratives of the wartime experiences of the survivor generation and debates on political issues surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, to, more recently, critiques of the Tokyo Electric Company on its handling of the nuclear crisis following the Great East Japan

earthquake of 2011, the island disputes with China, and the reinterpretation of several articles of the constitution.

3. The group's research on Yasukuni Shrine, on which Hasegawa bases his tours, was published as a booklet titled *Fieldwork on Yasukuni Shrine and Yūshūkan Museum: For Studying, Researching, and Thinking* (Tōkyō no Sensō Iseki o Arukukai 2006).

4. He maintained and constantly updated a website of survivors' experiences and often responded to requests from US veterans wanting to return Japanese items that they had had since the Asia-Pacific War. His website and mailing list are still maintained by volunteers. See <http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/senso/>.

5. See, for example, Yamanaka (1974–1981, 1982, 1989, 2003).

6. Shrine personnel, however, close their eyes to the tour, although guides are instructed not to use a microphone during the visit. Hasegawa speculates that the shrine management decided not to interfere as long as the tours bring in “customers,” that is, paying visitors to the museum, café, and gift shop.

7. Tōkyō no Sensō Iseki o Arukukai (2006, 3).

8. J. Young (1992).

9. J. Young (1993, 5).

10. <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/precinct/index.html>.

11. Hata I. (2001).

12. The relationship between the two is not clear. The Liberal Democratic Party established the Committee for the State Support of Yasukuni Shrine in March 1964, but the shrine bill was not officially presented to the Diet until 1969.